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This work is a modern history of Changsha, the capital city of Hunan province, 
from the late nineteenth to mid twentieth centuries.  The story begins by discussing a 
battle that occurred in the city during the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), a civil war that 
erupted in China during the mid nineteenth century.  The events of this battle, but 
especially its memorialization in local temples in the years following the rebellion, 
established a local identity of resistance to Christianity and western imperialism.  By the 
1890’s this culture of resistance contributed to a series of riots that erupted in south 
China, related to the distribution of anti-Christian tracts and placards from publishing 
houses in Changsha.  During these years a local gentry named Ye Dehui (1864-1927) 
emerged as a prominent businessman, grain merchant, and community leader.  When a 
massive urban riot erupted in April 1910, Ye and other gentry were accused of 
withholding grain from starving peasants and other disgruntled locals.  At the end of the 
same decade, in 1919 the Treaty of Versailles ended the war in Europe but awarded 
German owned territory in north China to Japan.  Students and activists erupted in 
protest in cities throughout China, especially in Changsha.  The climate of urban 
activism that emerged by the 1920’s inaugurated an age of civic identity in the city.  
Activists embraced certain ideas associated with western modernity—such as Marxism—
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in order to overcome western imperialism.  Among the voices of dissent were young 
activists such as Mao Zedong (1893-1976).  Students from foreign missionary schools 
even joined the protests.  This new generation of activists published articles in the local 
press and other journals denouncing the West’s influence not only in Changsha, but also 
in communities throughout China.    
I also discuss the history of women in Changsha, most notably the experiences of 
an activist named Zhu Tierong (1915-2009).  During World War II she worked with the 
local chapter of the YMCA to care for refugees.  The war also brought intense carnage 
to Changsha, as much of the city was destroyed by a fire in 1938.     
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Preface 
Changsha is the capital city of Hunan, a province in southern China.  It lies in 
the northeastern part of the province along a main river called the Xiang (pronounced 
Shee-ang).  Running from north to south, for centuries the Xiang has been the center of 
Hunan’s and even much of China’s rice cultivation and production.  The low wetland 
areas around Changsha and the Xiang River have always been a fertile agricultural area, 
as other cities along the river have also served as regional trading posts.  Apart from the 
paddies used for rice production near the river, much of the remaining territory of the 
province is comprised of rugged terrain, mainly in the form of forested mountains and 
small hills.  Containing the two Chinese characters for “long,” and “sand,” Changsha’s 
name dates back to antiquity.  It likely derives from the sandy beaches of a long islet 
that sits in the middle of the Xiang River, dividing the city’s eastern and western banks, 
today known as “Orange Island.”  
This dissertation examines the history of Changsha’s modernization during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  It argues that cities such as Changsha 
were more authentic examples of how gradually the rest of China developed, as 
compared to the more prominent urban centers such as Beijing, Shanghai, or even 
Hankou.  By the late nineteenth century Hunan was known as one of China’s most anti-
foreign and conservative provinces.  My central research question is to investigate the 
various social, cultural, and economic reasons why such was the case.  This will 
encompass the later years of China’s last imperial dynasty, the Qing (1644-1911), and 
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extend through the better part of what is known as China’s Republican period (1911-
1949).  Chapters 1 through 5 cover the intense anti-foreign and anti-reform mentality 
that existed in Changsha, from waning decades of the nineteenth century and through the 
1920’s.  Chapter 6 and 7 are a history of women in Changsha.  Chapter 8, the final 
chapter, is about Changsha’s “Great Fire of 1938,” and discusses the role of the 
Nationalist Party and its leader, Chiang Kai-shek in ordering the fire.  It also chronicles 
the humanitarian relief effort by local organizations such as the YMCA.       
My first chapter discusses the enduring legacy upon Changsha’s urban space of 
the battle for the city during the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) in 1852.  This rebellion 
began as a result of the influence of Christianity in southern China.  Hong Xiuquan, a 
lower-ranking literati who hailed from the countryside near the city of Guangzhou, 
became inspired by teachings from the Bible.  He began preaching his own version of 
Christianity, and won many converts among the disenfranchised and lower classes.  By 
the early 1850’s he amassed such a large following of disciples and coverts that he raised 
an organized army.  This posed a significant threat to the Qing dynasty, whose imperial 
armies were ill equipped to face the southern rebels.   
During their campaign to capture and subdue cities in southern China, the Taiping 
rebel army laid siege to Changsha in the summer and fall of 1852.  The south wall of the 
city, as well as the Tianxin Pavilion, located along the southeastern corner, were 
important areas of public space and tradition that symbolized how the city remained 
resistant to outsiders—such as western missionaries or reform-minded intellectuals—in 
the years that followed.  The battle as well as the fame of the Hunan Army and its 
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leader, Zeng Guofan (1811-1872), were also celebrated in memorial temples built 
throughout Changsha following the rebellion.  By the early twentieth century the area 
around the city’s south gate continued to be an important area of local culture and civic 
life.  Chapter 2 shows how anti-Christian sentiment remained a problem during the post-
Taiping years for both western missionaries who attempted to penetrate Hunan, but also 
for reform-minded Chinese intellectuals.1  In the same decade of the anti-Christian riots 
mentioned above, in 1898 Liang Qichao (1873-1929), one of the most famous 
intellectuals in Chinese history, led an effort to establish training academies with 
Western-based curricula in Changsha, but ultimately failed.   
The subject of Chapter 3 concerns a rice riot that broke out in 1910, very much 
influenced by local resentment towards the Qing government and westerners in the city. 
Mostly led by members of local carpenter’s guilds, large crowds attacked and burned the 
governor’s compound, a center of state power.  American, British, as well as other 
international schools and businesses were also burned, wrecked, or looted by urban 
peasants.  The chapter also recounts how reportage of the riot in the national press 
contributed to the growing seeds of discontent, contributing to the abdication of the Qing 
imperial court during the Revolution of 1911.   
A prominent member of Changsha’s gentry, Ye Dehui (pron. Yeh Dehway,1864-
1927), hoarded grain during the riot, but his influence on local life merits further 
attention.  In Chapter 4 I construct a narrative biography of Ye.  I begin with his 
                                                
1 See Paul Cohen, China and Christianity:  The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-
foreignism, 1860-1870 (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1963), 48ff., also R. Wardlaw Thompson, 
Griffith John:  The Story of Fifty Years in China (London:  The Religious Tract Society, 1906)  484. 
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family’s migration to Hunan during the Taiping Rebellion, his birth in 1864, and then 
discuss his place as one of the most powerful members of Changsha’s urban civic and 
business community during the late Qing.  His rise to power was indicative of the 
emergence during the post Taiping period of a new class of urban gentry-merchants 
throughout China.  Under the imperial baojia system that divided the city into streets 
and wards, each headed by different street wardens, Ye was the most powerful 
“community leader” of all the wards.  He conducted most of his business and other 
affairs out the Huo Gong Dian, or infamous “Fire Palace,” located on Pozi Street in the 
city center.  More than simply a businessman, he was also an active member of 
Changsha’s intellectual scene, an avid collector of books, and patron of the arts.       
Chapter 5 discusses how throughout the 1910s and 1920s Changsha also became a 
center of labor and civic activism.  Many years prior to becoming leader of the People’s 
Republic, Mao Zedong (1893-1976), was an urban labor organizer and activist who 
worked closely with students from Yale Medical School and other radicals in the city.  
Many of the articles he wrote for the Hunan newspaper Da Gong Bao (L’Impartial) 
during this period reflected his concerns with issues such as women’s emancipation and 
marriage equality, as well as the general mood of discontent present in the city following 
the Treaty of Versailles following World War I, which awarded German territory in north 
China to Japan.  This resulted in nationwide protests on May 4, 1919, as well as a period 
of intellectual and cultural enlightenment, now known as the “May Fourth Movement.”  
Anti-foreign sentiment in the city also escalated after the “May Thirtieth Incident” in 
1925, when a group of protesters in Shanghai were gunned down by police.  Especially 
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following this incident, students from schools throughout the city, from middle schools, 
girl’s schools, and even those from the Yale Medical College, all produced and 
distributed leaflets advocating the violent expulsion of foreign interests in the city.     
In Chapter 6 I chronicle a brief history of women in Changsha.  The suicide of a 
local woman in November 1919 was widely discussed in the local press as an example of 
the precarious conditions experienced by women not only there, but throughout China. 
This was also true for those who worked in trades such as prostitution.  The chapter 
benefits from my translation and analysis of some of the most infamous cases of 
prostitution that existed in Changsha during the Republican period.  But the most 
profound story of women in Changsha is narrated in chapter seven.  Sophia Zhu Tierong 
(1915-2009) was an activist who volunteered in the city during World War II.  
Volunteering with the local YMCA, she and her husband played vital roles in the 
humanitarian relief effort to help displaced refugees and other victims of the war.  
Following the Communist Revolution in 1949 she authored several English language 
articles for the China Monthly Review, noting the intense effort by the CCP to fully 
modernize Changsha.  During the Anti-Rightist Campaign in the 1950’s her husband 
tragically took his own life, and she was forced to endure the horrors of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976) on her own.  
Today on northern face of the Tianxin Pavilion there lies a small park, where 
especially during cooler spring and summer days local residents enjoy reclining to drink 
tea.  Here one will find another landmark also important to Changsha’s history:  A 
plaque and memorial drum bell commemorating the fire of 1938, which is the subject of 
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Chapter 8.  When faced with an invading Japanese army in 1938, and as a part of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s “scorched earth policy,” local officials were ordered to burn much of 
the city to the ground.  
I am greatly indebted to a great number of scholars, colleagues, and friends, who 
have helped and supported me during my postgraduate career at the University of Texas.  
First and foremost I am grateful to my doctoral advisor, Huaiyin Li.  His patient, 
consistent, and thoughtful criticism has shaped and challenged my view of modern 
Chinese history.  He has taught me to set the highest standards of scholarly excellence 
for my work.  I am also grateful to my other doctoral committee members in UT 
Department of History, Mark Metzler and Mary Neuburger, who have given me 
thoughtful support, encouragement, and feedback.  Thanks also to David Sena for 
serving on my committee, and for the friendly mentoring of Wen Hua Teng and Camilla 
Hsieh, as well as Robert Oppenheim, Yvonne Chang, Chiu-mi Lai, and Jennifer Tipton in 
the Department of Asian Studies at UT. In UT History I owe additional thanks and 
appreciation to Marilyn Lehman, Jacqueline Jones, Alison Frazier, James Vaughn, 
Benjamin Brower, and Alberto Martinez.  A big thanks to William Hurst of 
Northwestern University, for serving on my committee all the way from Chicago! 
My development as an historian has also greatly benefited from the teaching of 
Roger Louis and the program in British Studies at UT Austin.  From 2011 to 2015 I was 
the recipient of a Winston Churchill Fellowship that was a valuable source of funding and 
financial support.  The chapter on the Changsha Rice Riot of 1910 was partly composed 
during a writing workshop with H.W. Brands during the spring of 2011, and I am grateful 
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to Professor Brands as well as to my classmates in that seminar who encouraged my 
research—Pete Weiss, Jonathan Hunt, Peter Hamilton, and others. Special thanks also to 
my other friends and colleagues in UT History, Jessica Werneke, Chris Heaney, Ryan 
Groves, John Harney, Chloe Ireton, Chris Metz, Diego Godoy, Hu Guangji, Zhai Jing, 
Chris Rose’s “15 Minute History,” and many others.  Additional thanks to Nathan 
Montgomery, for helping me translate the rice riot oral history interviews, as well as 
Dyann Collins, for some last minute help on revising my Bibliography.      
From 2012 to 2013 I was granted a Fulbright IIE fellowship to conduct my 
doctoral research in Changsha, and am very grateful to Janet Upton and Jonathan Akeley, 
the program directors for China, as well as the Fulbright Taiwan program.  I have to also 
acknowledge a number of people, both scholars and friends in Changsha: the staff of 
Hunan Normal University’s Foreign Students office, as well as Zhou Qiuguang of their 
Institute of Modern History and Culture, and the friendly archivists at the Hunan Normal 
Library.  Rao Huaimin, their distinguished and veteran scholar of Hunan’s history, once 
gave me one of his own shirts to replace mine, after arriving at his house late, hurried, 
and soaked with sweat one hot summer Changsha day.  I am also grateful to Zhang 
Jingping, Yu Pengyuan (next time the dumplings and noodles at Xin Hua Lou will be on 
me!), Ren Bo, Tang Ying, Liu Duping, Tracy Wang Ying, Janet Wang, Emily Yi, Mark 
Ma, Richard Tang, and other local friends.  I am also grateful to the CET Program in 
Harbin, China, as well as Professor Wang Jingrong of the Harbin Academy of Social 
Sciences, for helping me read through historical documents during an intensive Chinese 
language program during the fall of 2012.  I also benefited from the friendship, 
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camaraderie, and collaboration with some of my American Fulbright colleagues who 
were researching in China during 2012-2013:  Jonathan Tang, Brian Cwiek, Elise 
Anderson, and Sakura Christmas.  Many thanks also to Wang Qisheng and the graduate 
students in the History Department at Beijing University, who organized a conference 
during the summer of 2013 that gave me the opportunity to present a paper on the rice 
riot.  Special thanks also to Joseph Esherick for meeting with me in Beijing the same 
summer.  During the summer of 2014 I visited the archival collections on Yale in China 
available in the Manuscripts and Archives section of the Sterling Memorial Library at 
Yale University.  I am grateful to their archivists and staff for their help and assistance 
during my two weeks there, as well as Nancy Yao Massbach of the Yale China 
Association.  Finally, I would like to thank the organizers of the UT Austin College of 
Liberal Arts “Dissertation Boot Camp,” Dean Esther Raizen and Lauren Apter 
Bairnsfather, for helping me write the chapter on the Changsha fire of 1938.  Many 
thanks to Dean Raizen for her editorial comments on that chapter as well.
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Introduction 
 
   Image 1-1. Map of Hunan province.   
 
A permeating narrative of this dissertation concerns the number of conflicts that 
emerged during the years prior to and following Changsha’s contact with both western 
institutions and ideas during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  This is a 
study of urban unrest and activism that resulted from the confrontation of opposing 
forces—the rapid appearance in the city of western colonial institutions, such as 
businesses, schools, and missions, followed by rejection and antagonism from local 
residents.  Changsha during these years was a place that experienced conflicts between 
rural and the urban, indigenous and the foreign, conservative and radical, as well as the 
  10 
civic and unruly.  In this regard, during my early study of Hunan, I drew much 
inspiration from the late Angus McDonald, who noted that:   
Patriotism, for the nineteenth century Hunanese, went hand in hand with 
anti-Christianity.  Changsha was the national center [in China] for the 
most lurid anti-Christian propaganda during the nineteenth century, and 
missionaries were driven out of the province at least eleven times between 
1863 and 1900.2  
 
In many respects the entire present work owes its inspiration to these two 
sentences.  Much of the opening chapters discuss Christianity and anti-Christian 
movements in Hunan.  This will help answer the question of why Hunan and its capital 
city were so extremely anti-foreign, and how this attitude forged its modernization during 
the first half of the twentieth century.  In the words of Eric Hobswam, studying 
Changsha’s development in these years is one of an “age of extremes.”3   
As noted in my Preface, a foreign religion was introduced into Hunan during one 
of one of the largest and most violent civil wars in human history. This was the Taiping 
Rebellion (1850-1864).  In recent years perhaps no other event has attracted the interest 
of scholars who study modern Chinese history.  Responsible for the deaths of some 30 
million people, it exerted an extremely violent toll on the Chinese population.  One of 
the more popular works about the rebellion remains Jonathan Spence’s God’s Chinese 
Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan, a detailed account of the origins 
and history of the Taiping movement, from its beginnings in the southern provinces of 
Guangdong and Guangxi, to its violent end.  A lesser-known but equally important book 
                                                
2 Angus McDonald, The Urban Origins of Rural Revolution, Elites and the Masses in Hunan Province, 
China, 1911-1927 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 16. 
3 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Age of extremes: the short twentieth century, 1914-1991 (London: Michael Joseph, 
1994).  
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is Jian Youwen’s The Taiping Revolutionary Movement.  Its extensive use of Chinese 
language primary source material makes it an essential piece of English language 
scholarship on the rebellion.  A more recent book by Stephen Platt narrates the history 
of the Taiping Rebellion from the perspective of global history, with special emphasis on 
the role of Zeng Guofan and the Hunan Army.  Tobie Meyer-Fong has recently 
published a fascinating and important book about the violent toll the rebellion exerted on 
Chinese society.  Additional scholars such as Joseph Levenson, Kathryn Bernhardt, and 
Philip Kuhn have also expanded our knowledge in areas related to the socio-political 
consequences of Taiping governance in southern China, as well as the cultural clash of 
two opposing worldviews during the rebellion, Taiping as opposed to Confucian.4     
This amount of scholarship does contain some accounts of the Taiping’s siege of 
Changsha in 1852.  But left out of these narratives are the legacy of not only that battle, 
but the memory and commemoration of the rebellion in public memorials throughout 
Changsha during the late 19th century.  This will be discussed in my first chapter. 
Memories of resistance to a foreign religion remained ingrained upon the conscious of 
people throughout Hunan and in Changsha, which partly explains the degree of hostility 
experienced by missionaries who unsuccessfully tried to enter Hunan in the decades 
following the rebellion. 
                                                
4 See Joseph R. Levenson, “Confucian and Taiping ‘Heaven’: The Political Implications of Clashing 
Religious Concepts.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Jul., 1962), pp. 436-453. 
Kathryn Bernhardt, “Elite and Peasant during the Taiping Occupation of the Jiangnan, 1860-1864.”Modern 
China, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Oct., 1987), pp. 379-410. Philip Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial 
China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).  
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 By the early 1890’s western missionaries also encountered intense resistance in 
communities throughout Hunan and its provincial neighbor to the north, Hubei.  This 
often represented a clashing and blending of competing ideologies and worldviews:  the 
West and Christianity on the one hand, and China and Confucian orthodoxy on the other. 
Hunan’s conservatism was also related to the history of its intellectual traditions.  For 
centuries Changsha had been one of the national centers for education and learning. This 
tradition was upheld by the presence and influence in the city of a strong wealthy gentry 
class who were steadfastly opposed to western modernization.  Resistance to outsiders 
was not only limited to urban elites and the educated classes, but also extended to the 
ordinary rank and file.  
Through the course of Changsha’s modernization there was a transformation 
away from traditionalist thought and local consciousness that rejected western 
modernization and imperialism toward one that embraced certain aspects of 
westernization, resulting in a unique form of Chinese modernity.  A rice riot in 1910, 
followed by the Revolution of 1911 just over one year later, ended the Qing dynasty.  It 
represented the breaking point and decline of the traditionalist regime in the city, 
ushering in a new era of radicalism.  The socialists and urban activists who embraced 
anarchism in Changsha during the 1920’s were just avowedly anti-western as the 
traditionalists who opposed Christianity and reform during the 1890’s.  But they 
embraced certain ideas and resources of modernization—such as printed media, political 
mobilization, as well as ideologies such as Marxism and Anarchism—in order to 
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overcome western domination and imperialism.  This resulted in a self-determined 
citizenry in Changsha and modern China.  
Beginning in the late 1970’s historians produced monographs narrating modern 
Chinese history from the perspective of specific regions or localities, emphasizing reform 
at the urban or civic levels, arguing that the nucleus for a nascent civil society had its 
beginnings in villages, towns, and cities.  G. William Skinner’s highly influential The 
City in Late Imperial China introduced “regional systems theory,” and “standard 
marketing areas” to the historiography of urban China.  It covered subjects such as the 
cosmology of the ancient walled city, urban administration, guilds, imperial academies, 
as well as distinctions between urban and rural space.  For the purposes of this study, 
within Skinner’s system of macro regions Hunan would be considered in the “middle 
Yangtze region.”    
The city of Hankou, the large Middle Yangtze trading port city just to the north of 
Changsha in Hubei province, was Changsha’s urban big brother.  It was a metropolis on 
par in size and significance to Beijing and Shanghai.  William Rowe has argued that 
Hankou definitely evinced a distinct urban mentality, where the typical city dweller often 
proceeded in daily life “however they damn well pleased.”  This was a result of the 
heterogeneous composition of Hankou’s city life, a mixture of itinerant merchants, 
laborers, and other urban dwellers.  The existence of organizations such as water 
brigades to prevent and control frequent flooding, as well as fire brigades, were possibly 
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the first signs of a civil society with Chinese characteristics.5  But much of the basis of 
William Rowe’s argument, that the city was a Chinese model of a community with a 
Western conception of a civil society, or public sphere, has been criticized by Frederic 
Wakeman.6 In my chapter on the powerful gentry merchant Ye Dehui, I argue that like 
Hankou, by the late Qing Changsha had developed its own Central Business District.  
Among all the studies done on Chinese cities and urban life, Changsha shares a 
kinship with other smaller main land cities such as Chengdu.  My own use of the term 
“urban commoners” in Chapter 3 is borrowed from Di Wang, who has done important 
work on the relationship between Chengdu’s urban commoners and public space during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Public spaces such as teahouses 
became an important part of city life, serving as indoor “extensions” of public space, and 
“as places of public leisure, recreation, and entertainment, but also as work sites and 
arenas for local politics,” becoming “windows” through which changes in urban life 
could be understood.  People relaxed and socialized, merchants discussed business, and 
some settled disputes.7  Other important work on Chengdu has focused exclusively on 
its development into a modern city.  During the Republican period reformers worked to 
establish urban reconstruction programs, such as a modern police force, as well as 
telegraph lines and railways.  Beginning with the New Policies that were introduced by 
1901, there was a movement to establish a western-style city administration during the 
                                                
5 William Rowe, Hankou: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796-1895 (Stanford:  Stanford 
University Press,  1989), 19.   
6 Frederic Wakeman, “Civil Society in Late Imperial and Modern China,” in Lea H. Wakeman ed., Telling 
Chinese History: A Selection of Essays (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 336-337. 
7 Wang Di, Street Culture in Chengdu:  Public space, urban commoners, and local politics, 1870-1930 
(Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 2003).  
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1920’s.8 These new policies were also attempted in Changsha.  But my discussion on 
the rice riot of 1910 suggests that such policies were resisted and resented by certain 
disenfranchised segments of the local population.         
Changsha was also like many cities in China in that throughout its history it has 
often served as a hub for immigrants or refugees.  Prior to the first Opium War (1841-
1843, Shanghai was a small market town and most of its residents came from other 
places.  Those who hailed from neighboring prosperous areas emerged as the dominant 
classes in Shanghai.  The main reason Shanghai’s population explosion was that many 
fled the Taiping rebels during the Taiping Rebellion.  Although many refugees from 
regions afflicted with drought or famine often fled there, the city flourished economically 
during the later half of the nineteenth century, with the largest foreign concession of any 
treaty port actually open to Chinese residents.  Thus the famous attractions of Shanghai, 
notably the “Bund” or Nanjing road would have been largely irrelevant for the average 
urban dweller, who lived in traditional neighborhood and houses, or lilong fangzi.  Often 
these two story structures served the dual function of both storefront and residence, and 
was also the case with Changsha.9   
In treaty port towns throughout the lower and middle Yangtze regions of southern 
China, native place associations and guilds were also influential community 
organizations and active in civic affairs.  In Shanghai guildhalls served as important 
public spaces, and by the early Republican Period urban community organizations 
                                                
8 Kristin Stapleton, Civilizing Chengdu:  Chinese Urban Reform, 1895-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000).  
9 Hanchao Lu, Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1999).  
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conceptualized their own vision of state making at local levels.  Native place 
associations (tongxiang hui, hui guan, or gongsuo) were manifestations of a unique brand 
of Chinese civil society.  Such associations where so commonplace in Shanghai that 
they were “generally taken for granted” by the larger public.10 Native associations were 
important for finding burial spaces for deceased members, as well as philanthropy. These 
were the primary functions of the native associations, to help those who could not help 
themselves.  The reform minded members of the native associations were usually 
returned students from overseas or wealthy merchants.  The conservatives were mainly 
comprised of gentry elites, who monopolized positions of authority within the 
association, and many held positions for life.11 In similar fashion, the family of Ye 
Dehui, the subject of Chapter 4, were migrants who came to Hunan from Jiangsu on 
China’s eastern coast.  When first arriving in Changsha they enjoyed patronage at the 
Suzhou guild house in the central part of the city.  In addition, carpenters, dockworkers, 
and water carrier guilds maintained a considerable presence in Changsha.  They were a 
main reason for the vibrant and active trade unionism that emerged in the city during the 
late 1910’s and early 1920’s.  
When considering the amount of secondary literature related to urban China, the 
question remains as to how best construct a coherent theoretical framework for 
understanding Changsha’s distinctive place in the narrative of modern China, one that 
helps us unpack the issues specific to Changsha’s modernization raised thus far.  
                                                
10 Byrna Goodman, "Being Public: The Politics of Representation in 1918 Shanghai," Harvard Journal of 
Asiatic Studies (2000), 52.  
11 Ibid.  
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If the present discussion will be one of such opposing binaries, one useful and 
important work for the study of the urban form and space remains Henri Lefebvre’s The 
Production of Space.  Focusing on various aspects of European history, art, literature, 
politics, etc, an important part of his argument is how dialectics, or more specifically, the 
concept of binary (ex. the proletariat and bourgeoisie, theory and practice, the mental and 
the social, philosophy and reality, etc.) thinking has shaped the formation of modern 
cities, that the urban form implies the interplay of contradictory forces at work: it is 
repressive yet liberating, it is hegemonic yet empowering.12 Such extremes also play out 
throughout each of my chapters on Changsha.    
In accounting for the West’s creation of the “other” in literature and other 
writings, Edward Said has helped shape our understanding of the West’s engagement 
with the non-Western world.  But although the historical subjects discussed herein often 
operated within a world of extremes and confrontation, the challenge remains to construct 
historical narratives that “complicate the binary categories—East/West, 
progress/backwardness, self/other—that Said sees as constitutive of Orientalism.”13 In 
doing so we can begin to recognize that even amidst the struggles brought about by the 
conflict between East and West, there nonetheless exists the need to engage in newer and 
more unique ways of thinking and writing about China.  For instance, recent work has 
identified two competing narratives—modernization and revolution—in the study of 
modern Chinese history, and instead suggest a third way, such as a “within time” 
                                                
12 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2000).  
13 Mary Neuberger, The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern 
Bulgaria (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 4. 
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approach to studying history, where key historical events are analyzed in the moment of 
their occurrence, absent of a linear progression or assumed teleology.  My analysis of 
certain formative events in Changsha’s history, such as the riot of 1910 and the fire of 
1938 will benefit from such a narrative framework.14  Other scholars have also proposed 
how best construct a uniquely Chinese version of modernity, one embracing historical 
empiricism and analysis that does not over-indulge too heavily in Western critical theory. 
A good place to start for these kinds of “alternative visions” could even come from 
Chinese thinkers.15 The relevance of western theory to the study of China should also be 
one “understood and evaluated from a perspective grounded in Chinese reality.”16  
Approaches viewing events, actors, and other phenomena as “within time,” told from the 
Chinese perspective, or those that allow “alternative visions” of historical narrative, can 
all contribute to our understanding of Changsha’s modern history.  
One of the problems with attempting to move beyond a binary understanding of 
urban space in China is that the very formation and layout of the traditional city lends 
itself to a certain dualism.  From the time of the Warring States period (475-221 BCE), 
cities in China transitioned from the capitals of regional city-states to provincial 
administrative centers, purposed for extracting taxes fro the local population.  They also 
served as military outposts for the formation of militias and the garrisoning of troops.  
                                                
14 Huaiyin Li, Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing 
(Honlulu:  University of Hawaii Press, 2013).    
15 Philip Huang, “Theory and the Study of Modern Chinese History: Four Traps and a Question,” Modern 
China, Vol. 24, No. 2, Symposium: Theory and Practice in Modern Chinese History Research. 
Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese Studies, Part V. (April 1998), pp. 183-208, 205. 
16 Zhang Longxi, Mighty Opposites: From Dichotomies to Differences in the Comparative Study of China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 179.  
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Every city in imperial China, similar to cities in Europe, was enclosed by a large 
wall and a moat.  Changsha’s city wall was known as one of the most formidable in the 
empire, with its gates arranged according to the “four cardinal directions,” at north, south, 
east, and west. The western gates of the city, called Da Xi Men and Xiao Xi Men, 
literally the “Big” and “Small” Western Gates, were located along the banks of the Xiang 
River, and were important areas of commerce.  But inside the main city gates also 
existed other walled enclosures that housed county, provincial, imperial governments, 
and employed hundreds of officials, and staff, as well as runners.  Despite such 
separation there were, of course, areas of urban space that transcended such dualism, in 
that Changsha was also known for its complex network of narrow streets and alleys. 
Changsha’s own segregated spatial characteristics were partly the cause of events 
such as the rice riot of 1910.  The local and provincial governments worked in 
compounds that were completely separated from the rest of urban life.  But though in 
many respects binary, Changsha’s urban form nonetheless evinced its own pattern of 
social formation.  Examples of this will be seen in my discussion of Pozi Street as one 
of Changsha’s most active business and civic centers.  Other areas, such as the part of 
the old city just outside the South Gate, became important civic spaces where various 
kinds of commoners or itinerant travellers gather, worship local deities, or buy snacks 
from street vendors.     
According to James Scott, the layout of most any modern city’s streets and alleys 
may have been confusing to the visitor, but “The fact that the layout of the city, having 
developed without any overall design, lacks a consistent geometric logic does not mean 
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that it was at all confusing to its inhabitants.”17 This evokes a certain similarity to Pierre 
Bourdieu’s conception of habitus as a basis for conceptualizing the structural foundations 
of any given society and its social conditions.18  If one were to provide a laymen’s 
definition, habitus is essentially the unwritten system of social conventions and customs 
by which any group or society lives.  This can obviously be applied to close-knit 
communities, such as rural villages in remote parts of the world, or even a walled city, 
which represents a somewhat larger manifestation of the same construct.  Although 
often applied to the study of rural society, such a structural understanding of city life, 
allows us to understand the formation of Changsha as a unique urban space.  It was a 
physical space enclosed by a wall, representing its own closed system, but also 
functioned as a center of intellectual history.  The presence of educational institutions, 
such as schools and academies, existed as forces which formed a local identity of 
conservative traditionalism that was directly related to the legacy of Confucianism.    
Following the Taiping Rebellion its cityscape also became laden with ancestral temples 
and other halls commemorating the bravery of Zeng Guofan’s Hunan army.  
In the following section I next section I give a comprehensive historiography of 
Hunan and Changsha, of works referenced throughout my dissertation.  More 
importantly is that it recognizes the contributions of historians in mainland China, such as 
Zou Qiuguang, Rao Huaimin, Zhang Pengyuan, and others, who have devoted a lifetime 
of scholarship to the study of Hunan and its history.               
                                                
17 James Scott, “Cities, People, and Language,” in Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve 
the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 53. 
18 Pierre Bourdieu, in Richard Nice trans., “Structures and habitus,” Outline of a Theory of Practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 72.  
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HISTORIOGRAPHY OF MODERN HUNAN 
 
The late 1970’s produced some important scholarship that shaped our 
understanding of Changsha’s history.  The first of these was Joseph Esherick’s Reform 
and Revolution:  The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei (1978).  Drawing on the 
radicalization of the social sciences within the U.S. academic community during the 
1960s, Esherick’s study became one of the seminal works of a whole new generation of 
western scholarship employing Marxist approaches to Chinese history.  Another work 
produced in the late 1970’s was Angus McDonald’s The Urban Origins of Rural 
Revolution:  Elites and the Masses in Hunan Province, China, 1911-1927.  This book 
is hands down the best book ever written about Hunan.  Much of McDonald’s narrative 
takes place within Changsha, and extensively chronicles its most important historical 
events during the Republican period:  the reform and independence movements of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Revolution of 1911, the workers 
movements, and the struggle for leadership among Hunan’s various feuding warlords.  
Lynda Shaffer’s work, Mao and the Workers:  The Hunan Labor Movement, 1920-1923, 
discussed in detail the major strikes and unionization of the provincial working class in 
wake of the May Fourth Movement and founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 
1921.  Professor Shaffer’s work is also an encouraging reminder that I am not the first 
native Texan and alumnus of the University of Texas to write about the history of Hunan 
and Mao Zedong!      
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Another monograph produced in the 1970’s added an important contribution to 
the debate on Hunan’s intellectual history, Charlton M. Lewis’ Prologue to the Chinese 
Revolution:  The Transformation of Ideas and Institutions in Hunan Province, 1891-
1907.  Focusing on the decade and a half during the end of the nineteenth and beginning 
of the twentieth century, Lewis identified and discussed two the themes of anti-
foreignism and nationalism.  The former of these were typified in events such as the 
numerous instances of missionary disturbances and anti-Christian riots occurring during 
the 1890’s, as well as the conservative opposition to the reform movement of 1898 in 
Hunan.  Because these two events figure so prominently in the modern history of 
Changsha, both will be discussed with detail in Chapter 2.  In the case of nationalism, 
Lewis addresses the failure of social revolution during these years to arouse significant 
popular support among secret societies and student organizations.19  
Very recent English language scholarship by Stephen Platt and Liu Liyan has 
made a very valuable contribution to our knowledge of Hunan’s rich intellectual history.  
In Provincial Patriots: The Hunanese and Modern China, Platt discusses Hunan’s 
tradition of reform, beginning with Wang Fuzhi and even Zeng Guofan.  Liu Liyan’s, 
Red Genesis, The Hunan First Normal School and the Creation of Chinese Communism, 
1903-1921, provides a detailed history of Changsha’s First Normal School as formative 
to the education of a young Mao Zedong and other communist leaders.      
                                                
19 Charlton Lewis, Prologue to the Chinese Revolution:  The Transformation of Ideas and Institutions in 
Hunan Province, 1891-1907 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).   
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Numerous main land Chinese historians have also written about Changsha and 
Hunan history.  After 1949 one of the foremost influential scholars of Hunan’s history 
was Lin Zengping.  Beginning in the early 1960’s Lin was one of the first post 
revolution Chinese scholars to seriously study the Revolution of 1911.  His series, 
simply titled, “The Xinhai Revolution” (Xinhai Geming), was a collection of volumes 
commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the events of 1911.  It focused specifically on 
the role of secret societies in the early part of the 20th century, and their cooperation with 
the revolutionary factions in Hunan.20 Like many scholars of his generation, Lin 
benefited from having come of age during the Republican period, when the most talented 
generation of scholars in the history of modern China, came of age.  They benefited 
from the study of the Confucian tradition of Chinese classics, as well as their exposure to 
western ideas and thinking.  Lin also mentored Zhou Qiuguang, one of the foremost 
scholars on the study of philanthropy during the late Qing today, specifically on the work 
and writings of Xiong Xiling.21 Upon his death in 1991, Lin Zengping’s private library 
was donated to the library at Hunan Normal University.  During my time spent there as 
a visiting scholar from 2012-2013, this collection was of great use to my research.  Lin’s 
collection contained rare volumes of Hunan Wenshi Ziliao and Changsha Wenshi Ziliao, 
most of which are out of print, will be referenced, translated, and even quoted throughout 
this dissertation.  Of also great benefit to the present work is the multi-volume 
collections of Hunan Lishi Ziliao, a series first published in the late 1950’s and then again 
                                                
20 Lin Zengping, Lin Zengping wencun, “Zhi shi suo yan,” pp. 1ff.   
21 Xiong hailed from west Hunan (Xiangxi), and helped organize flood and famine relief efforts not only 
in his region, but throughout the province.  He was also one of the late Qing thinkers involved the reform 
and independence movements in Hunan during the late Qing and early Republican years. 
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in 1980.  The former of these series represented the first efforts by mainland historians 
of modern China to chronicle the events of their own history and modernization prior to 
1949.  Many historians of modern China, be they from the mainland or universities in 
the west, have benefited from these collections.  The collection, allocation, and editing 
of various ziliao, or “materials” makes the historian’s task quite easy, because in many 
respects the work of collecting data on a given topic (such as the Revolution of 1911 or 
May 4th Movement), has already been done for us.  However, this should also give us 
pause for concern.  
Although a large amount of historical materials are available within the 
thematically edited ziliao volumes, they represent a body of knowledge produced by 
scholarly committees at universities.  After 1949 their publication was under the 
exclusive direction of the Communist Party (CCP).  As such one wonders what 
significant materials and other data have been excluded from public record, or to what 
extent the content of the documents presented in the various ziliao have been edited for 
content, and if the final products handed down to us represent the institutional bias of the 
Communist Party.   
But recently, another body of edited volumes, the newly published scholarly 
series Huxiang Wenku, represents the most significant era during China’s era of reform 
by the intellectual community in Hunan to produce an encyclopedic series of books 
solely devoted to Hunan’s history and culture.  These works have gone beyond 
traditional Marxist or CCP approaches to modern Chinese history, and have incorporated 
modernization as well as the thought of other western theorists.  The multi-volume 
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collection includes provincial and city gazetteers from cities and counties throughout 
Hunan, as well as edited collections and essays on Hunan’s most influential intellectuals 
and thinkers.  This collection, the volume on Ye Dehui in particular, has also been quite 
useful for my research.  
Long based out of Academia Sinica in Taiwan, Zhang Pengyuan’s Hunan 
Xiandaihua de Zaoqi Jinzhan (The Early Progression of Hunan’s Modernization, 2001), 
is a comprehensive and exhaustive history of Hunan.  Although educated in the school 
of modernization theory, Zhang’s work represents a comprehensive and exhaustive 
examination of Hunan in the modern era.  It discusses political, environmental, as well 
as the socioeconomic conditions of Hunan during the late Qing, and calls upon a variety 
of original source material; gazetteers, literature, and the like.  Owing to his fluency in 
English, Zhang also uses an western social theory to explain his specific understanding of 
Hunan’s modernization.  Like many recent historians he has also theorized about 
finding new approaches to modern Chinese history, recognizing that China’s contact with 
the West, especially Hunan’s, was invasive and even “deceptive” in nature, but explains 
modernization as part of jincheng, or a “process,” and that “modernization is a 
revolutionary process.”22  
Following Lin Zengping’s generation, Rao Huaimin, another scholar based out of 
Hunan Normal University, has also contributed numerous publications and articles on 
Hunan’s history.  Professor Rao’s work has also focused on the Revolution of 1911.  
                                                
22 “Xiandai hua shi gemingxing de jincheng.” For further study of Professor Zhang’s understanding of 
modernization and process, see the introduction to his book, p. 6ff.  
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But most relevant for this study, he has also published extensively on the events in Hunan 
prior to the revolution, and is the foremost expert on Changsha’s Rice Riot of 1910.  
One of his most important pieces of scholarship, and one extremely important for this 
present work, is his 2001 edited volume of primary documents on the riot, Changsha 
Qiangmi Fangqiao Ziliao Huibian (A Compilation of Materials on the Changsha Rice 
Riot).  Possibly owing in part to the publication of Professor Rao’s edited work, in the 
last decade new interest has emerged in the mainland academic community in 
Changsha’s rice riot, producing several important monographs.  Among these are two 
articles written by Li Xizhu of the Beijing Academy of Social Sciences.23 These articles 
discuss Changsha’s powerful gentry and the Qing government, and how in the moments 
leading up to the rice riot relations between these two camps broke down. Another of Li 
Xizhu’s articles, and by far the most interesting, discusses the role of the media in the late 
Qing.  Reportage of the events in Changsha influenced public opinion throughout the 
empire, strengthening public distrust of the imperial government.            
Another important source for understanding the events of the rice riot, are several 
oral history interviews conducted by a middle school teacher named Liu Duping during 
the mid 1970’s.  A few of these interviews are included in the back pages of Rao 
Huaimin’s edited volume, as well as in a volume of Changsha Wenshi Ziliao (Changsha 
Literature and Historical Materials) also specifically devoted to the riot.  Based on the 
data he collected in these interviews, Liu himself wrote an article that appeared in 
                                                
23 I am indebted to graduate students from the history department at Beijing University, Ma Siyu and 
others, for familiarizing me with Professor Li Xizhu’s work, as well as some valuable constructive 
feedback on my research, during a conference held at Beijing University in July 2013.     
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Changsha Wenshi Ziliao no. 6, published in 1988.  Yang Shiji’s Xinhai Geming 
Qianhou Hunan Shishi (A History of Events Before and After the Revolution of 1911) 
served as one of the main sources for Joseph Esherick’s own discussion of the Changsha 
rice riot.  Liu Duping’s article is longer and contains more information not only about 
the role of the urban gentry and Qing authorities, but also about the history of the grass 
roots nature of the uprising, thus presenting a more well rounded picture of the events. 
More of this will be discussed in my chapter on the riot, in Chapter 3.  In 2006 Liu 
Duping’s oral history interviews reappeared in their entirety, in Changsha Jiyi: Qingmo 
Changsha “Qiangmi” Fangqiao Changbian Jishi (Remembering Changsha:  The Late 
Qing Changsha Rice Riot) written by a Changsha author named Tang Ying.    
Finally, my work draws upon much of the scholarship discussed and cited above. 
But as with any study, I aim to embark on new territory and find my own voice. The 
pages which follow attempt to tell a unique story of a unique space and place, neither of 
these of which cannot be understood without telling a story of how people of Changsha, 
be they warriors, revolutionaries, local gentry, or female activists lived and died.  It 
begins with people, walls, and guns.    
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1-“Two Wills Clashing”1 
September 11, 1852.  A group of two thousand armed rebels rides into the 
southern suburbs of Changsha.  Their objective is to capture the city.  Having 
originated in the provinces that border Hunan to the south, in the span of a few years 
these rebels were part of a movement large enough to threaten to the Qing, China’s last 
and fading dynasty (1644-1911).  Inspired by his own bizarre vision of Christianity 
combined with native folk beliefs, Hong Xiuquan (1814-1864), leader of the movement, 
amassed an army bent on overthrowing the Qing, leading them on a steady advance that 
began in his native Guangxi province in southern China.  Hong and his rebels hoped to 
secure Hunan’s provincial capital in order to gain control of the province’s main 
waterway, the Xiang River, granting them vital access to an easy transportation route that 
fed directly into neighboring Hubei to the north.  But for as much success that the 
Taipings enjoyed in their early campaigns, the siege of Changsha proved to be their 
biggest challenge to date and a formidable obstacle.  From the time of the Three 
Kingdoms (220-280 B.C.E.), its city wall was well known for its strong fortifications, and 
had been repaired and rebuilt through successive dynasties.   
This chapter introduces Changsha’s urban geography by discussing the legacy of 
the siege of 1852.  Doing so will make a significant contribution to the few existing 
English accounts of the battle, specifically those from Jonathan Spence and Jen Yu-wen. 
                                                
1 This phrase comes from Jonathan Spence’s description of the battle of Changsha:  “The siege of 
Changsha is thus partly the story of two wills clashing, one steeped in the successful practice of Confucian 
virtue, one confidently in touch with God the Father.”  Jonathan Spence, God’s Chinese Son:  The 
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan (New York:  W.W. Norton and Company,  1996), 164.   
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Both have provided good descriptions of the siege, but place little emphasis on the 
significance of specific places and place names associated with the siege, such as the 
Tianxin Pavilion and Changsha’s south wall.  Thus I also introduce my own analysis of 
the siege and its relationship to some of Changsha’s historic landmarks, as well as 
insights about why the siege and the battle for Hunan remained one of the most important 
contests of the entire Taiping Rebellion.   
Although the Taipings never successfully captured Changsha, the rebellion and 
the siege of 1852 left an indelible mark on the city.  If we conceive of the pre-Taiping 
traditional Chinese city in imperial China as not only a physical urban habitus, 
surrounded by large walls and a moat, but also as an epistemological space, one that 
functioned as a military, administrative, and educational center, then the Taiping 
Rebellion and its aftermath brought about a change in the existing social and economic 
order.  This initiated a transformation of local society that will be covered in the 
chapters that follow.  Specific case studies of the consequences of this process on the 
local level can also help us learn much about how communities in late imperial China 
transitioned from spaces of tradition to ones of modernity and nationhood. 
 
 
THE SIEGE   
 
The attack on Changsha began in early September 1852, after the Taiping army 
made their way into Hunan from Guangdong province.  After sacking Hunan’s 
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southern-most city of Chenzhou they proceeded north and captured Hengzhou, as well as 
Zhuzhou in eastern Hunan as well as its surrounding counties.  These successive 
victories gave them control of virtually half the province, as well as most of the Xiang 
River.  One of Hong Xiuquan’s most trusted generals, Xiao Chaogui (1820-1852), 
known as the “Western King,” was charged with leading the assault.  Initially his forces 
had the element of surprise.  After routing Hengzhou a few kilometers to the south, the 
rebels secured control of the main public road that went straight to Changsha’s south 
gate.  Qing troops had long expected and prepared for the Taipings to force their attack 
on Changsha from there.  But guided by local bandit groups antagonistic to the Qing and 
newly recruited into the rebel’s fold, Xiao bypassed the main road and led a small 
detachment of two thousand soldiers through eastern Hunan’s rugged countryside into the 
outskirts of Changsha.  Then on the morning of September 11, approximately 10 li from 
the southern gate in an area called Shima Pu, Xiao and his men suddenly appeared on 
horseback with a detachment of soldiers in the southern suburbs.2  The Qing troops 
garrisoned there had recently arrived from Shanxi in north China had been preparing to 
eat breakfast and were taken completely by surprise.  Xiao ordered the execution of 
their commander, Yin Peili, as well as many as two thousand Qing army soldiers.  Some 
Qing forces managed to escape into the city interior to give warning that rebel troops had 
arrived.  The city gates were immediately ordered closed and barricaded.3  
                                                
2 One li is equivalent to approximately 500 meters.   
3 Wang Qingcheng, “Renzi er nian taiping jun jin gong Changsha zhi yi,” Taiping tianguo de lishi he 
sixiang (Zhonghua shuju, 1985), 168.  
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Although Xiao’s attack took some the government troops stationed south of the 
city by surprise, eventually it may have worked to the Qing’s advantage.  Changsha’s 
mazelike networks of streets and alleys, coupled with his lack of familiarity with the city 
could have caused Xiao to believe that the Tianxin Pavilion, the highest point of the city 
wall, located on its southeastern corner, was the drum tower at the city’s center.  This 
caused Xiao to focus the thrust of the rebel attack there, unconsciously establishing one 
of the main centers of combat for the entire two-month duration of the siege.4  For some 
historians the problem with Xiao’s surprise attack was the small number of his force, a 
mere two thousand soldiers, for the initial attack.  Had Xiao chosen a more conventional 
attack with a large army, the results of the siege might have been different.  
Furthermore, prior to the attack Qing generals already garrisoned in the city had been 
making preparations for a siege for several weeks prior to the rebel’s arrival, so they were 
not completely overwhelmed once the Taipings arrived.  Their southern advance 
eventually forced a focused attack at Changsha’s southern and western walls, specifically 
at the South Gate, as well as the “Xiaowu,” and “Liuyang” gates along the eastern wall. 
Despite the surpise attack, the Qing forces in the city still had enough time to close the 
gates and refortify the city walls.  Enough imperial troops were already garrisoned 
inside the city and stationed along defensive outposts along the city walls to fend off such 
a small contingent.  This bought time for reinforcements to arrive.5    
                                                
4 Jen Yu-wen, The Taiping Revolutionary Movement (London: Yale University Press, 1973), 97.   
5 Ibid., 97ff. Lin Zengping and Fan Zhongcheng, Hunan jin xian dai shi (Changsha:  Hunan shi fan da 
xue chu ban she, 1991), 56-57.    
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Upon realizing the city gates had been closed, Xiao ordered construction of a 
command post and positions for fixed cannon atop a nearby hill called Miaogao Peak.  
This provided the necessary elevation to pose a significant strategic threat to the highest 
point of Changsha’s southern wall and the Tianxin Pavilion, where Qing cannons had 
been equally positioned for defense.  Another Taiping command post was set up at 
Aoshan Temple, not far away.  As for the Qing forces, the soldiers inside the city 
numbered around eight thousand.  Although there were a large number of officers, many 
of them became too “convulsed with fear” (jing kong wan zhuang), to command.  The 
provincial governor present at the time, Bao Qibao, was said to be an inept military 
commander and completely beside himself with worry.  Believing in the superstition of 
Changsha’s city god, he ordered its statue erected atop the south gate drum tower, and for 
priests to continually pray over it day and night for good luck.6  But fortunately one of 
the Qing’s chief military minds and ablest commanders, Luo Bingzhang, also happened 
to be in Changsha at the time of the Taiping attack.  A jinshi (a successful scholar 
official who had passed the highest level of imperial examinations, held in Beijing), Luo 
ironically hailed from the same county in Guangdong as Hong Xiuquan.  For a time he 
served as Hunan’s governor, and even had a residence in the city.  From the beginning 
of the siege Luo personally coordinated the Qing’s counterattack from atop the south 
wall.7          
                                                
6 “Shi jiu, Taiping jun lian ke Yong Xing, An Ren, You Xian, Li Ling, jin gong Changsha” (1852 nian 8 
yue), Hunan sheng zhi, Hunan jin bai nian da shi ji shu, di yi juan, di er ci xiu ding ben (Changsha: Hunan 
renmin chuban she, 1979), 26.    
7 Jen, The Taiping Revolutionary Movement, 97.  Spence, God’s Chinese Son, 164.     
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After establishing their base from the position at Miaogao Peak, the Taiping 
cannons rained down destructive volleys of rocket propelled fire bombs into the city, 
killing and wounding many, and inflicted much damage upon homes and property.  
Charged with not only with its defense but also with putting out of the numerous fires 
caused by fire bombing, Qing forces remained helpless during the initial days of the 
attack.  Then on the morning of September 18, Xiao Chaogui ordered a concentrated 
barrage of rocket firebombs aimed at the south wall, hoping to break down its defenses.  
Following the barrage thousands of rebel soldiers hoisted ladders up its face, while the 
Qing defenders desperately fought to repel them from the top.  Intense fighting 
commenced between the two armies in urban areas directly outside the south gate, such 
as Bingxiang Alley.  The fighting continued into the next day and raged from street to 
street and house to house.  On this day Qing forces also experienced their first stroke of 
good fortune, as general Deng Shaoliang (1801-1858), a native of West Hunan, arrived 
from nearby Xiangtan with an additional nine hundred soldiers as reinforcements.  
Coming from the south, his army arrived via back road, catching the Taipings by 
surprise.  This distraction allowed the Qing defenders to reinforce the south wall by 
using stones from alleys and streets in the city.8   
On September 26 Jiang Zhongyuan (1812-1854), arrived in Changsha with 
approximately fifteen hundred reinforcements.  He ordered his men to immediately 
construct ramparts at the Tianxin Pavilion.  Since it was the highest and most heavily 
fortified point of the city wall, the pavilion’s southeastern orientation provided a tactical 
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advantage to the defenders, as it could be used to defend two sections of the wall 
simultaneously.  From this corner as well as from the city’s eastern gate, known as 
Liuyang Gate, the Qing mounted stiff resistance, and were thus able to control much of 
the engagement.9   
Qing General Jiang proved himself one of the ablest commanders of the entire 
rebellion.  He was a native of southern Hunan, and as with all scholar officials in the 
Qing government, had served the majority of his career outside the province.  When his 
father died in 1850 he was summoned back to his hometown to observe the required 
mourning ritual, and thus happened to be in Hunan during the Taiping invasion.  This 
same custom of mourning a dead parent was also the cause of Zeng Guofan’s return to 
Hunan a few years later.  Zeng organized local militia forces into an effective army that 
became one of the major reasons why the Qing were finally able to suppress the 
rebellion.  His story and contribution to Changha’s history will be further discussed 
below.  But like Zeng Guofan, Jiang Zhongyuan also had experience organizing local 
militias, and later the two men even joined forces.  His death by suicide in 1854 while 
defending the city of Luzhou in Anhui province was a great loss to the imperial army.10     
Although the exact date remains uncertain, in late September 1852 the Qing also 
dealt the rebels their first serious setback since the beginning of the rebellion.  Most 
likely during one of the intense attacks on the southern wall, cannon fire from the guns 
mounted atop the Tianxin Pavilion struck and mortally wounded the Western King, Xiao 
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Chaogui.  Xiao had dramatically charged into battle while wearing bright yellow robes, 
making him an easy target for archers, cannon gunners, or just about anyone else fighting 
on top of the wall.  Jen Yu-wen’s narrative of the event claims Xiao was struck by a 
cannonball, which also concurs with most definitive Chinese language accounts, such as 
Hunan historians Lin Zengping and Fan Zhongcheng (1991).  Most scholars also agree 
that his death occurred unnecessarily and dealt a tragic blow to the Taiping’s morale.  
Xiao had been one of its founding members and one of Hong Xiuquan’s most trusted 
military advisors.  His death also allowed for Yang Xiuqing to assume command of the 
siege and become one of the Taiping’s primary commanders in the field.  More 
importantly it marked the beginning of a conflict between Yang and Hong Xiuquan, 
bringing irreparable harm to the entire movement.11 
Upon receiving news of Xiao’s death the Qing government immediately ordered 
further reinforcements to defend Changsha.  On October 3 the Qing Third and Middle 
Route armies arrived, offering the first serious resistance since the attack began almost a 
month earlier.  But despite the onslaught of government troops, the Taiping front lines 
held and pushed the Qing armies back.  The rebel’s numbers were further strengthened 
by the arrival on October 5 of Yang Xiuqing (the “Eastern King”) and most of the 
remainder of the entire Taiping army, the final thrust of rebel forces that had been 
steadily advancing from southern Hunan.12  The Taipings also constructed of a series of 
pontoon bridges to join up with other rebel forces encamped on the western bank of the 
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Xiang River, as well as Shui Lu Zhou (today referred to as Juzi Zhou, or “Orange 
Island”), the large islet situated in the middle of the river.  Doing so increased their 
numbers and allowed for a steady stream of supplies and provisioning.  It also allowed 
for a more direct attack of Changsha’s western wall.13   
Increased fortifications enabled the Qing defenders to hold until the month’s end, 
allowing other generals to arrive with reinforcements.  Recognizing Bao Qibao’s inept 
leadership, the imperial court in Beijing quickly ordered his replacement by Zhang 
Liangzhi, who arrived on October 7 with five thousand soldiers.  One of General 
Zhang’s most capable aides in Changsha was a young officer named Zuo Zongtang 
(1812-1885), another great military leader in China’s modern history.14  Thus by early 
October the Qing imperial army had gathered as many as many as 50,000 troops and 
capable officers to defend the city.  Soon after arriving they consolidated their forces 
and convened a meeting to plan for a prolonged siege.  Deng Shaoliang, Zhu Han, He 
Chun, Zhang Guoliang, and Jiang Zhongyuan ordered for the even division and 
encampment of forces to guard the city at each of its major gates—north, west, and east.  
Soon after Yang Xiuqing assumed command of the Taiping army and launched a 
major counteroffensive, the Qing General Xiang Rong (1792-1856) arrived in Changsha 
with giant cannons that were immediately mounted atop the southeast corner of the wall 
at Tianxin Pavilion.  Xiang had achieved success in the imperial army by literally rising 
through the ranks.  First as a common soldier, he gained promotion by distinguishing 
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himself in various campaigns against insurgent rebel uprisings during the first Opium 
War (1841-1843), as well as during the earliest days of the Taiping uprising in 
Guangdong in Guangxi provinces.  In 1847 he was appointed military governor of his 
native province in Sichuan.  He later served in the same capacity in Hunan and Guangxi, 
and was one of the ablest Qing commanders to arrive in Changsha since the fighting 
began.   
To counter the Taiping’s pontoon occupation of the Xiang River, on October 31 
Xiang Rong and one of his lieutenants Wang Jialin, led a force of 3,000 crack troops on 
an offensive from the shallow waters of the Xiang’s western bank to attack enemy 
encampments on Orange Island.  But they seriously underestimated the rebel’s numbers.  
A large contingent commanded by the young Taiping General Shi Dakai (1831-1863) lay 
waiting in ambush amidst the islet’s dense foliage.  A mere twenty-one years old at the 
time of the siege, at an early age Shi was introduced to Christianity by Hong Xiuquan in 
his native Guangxi.  His family’s wealth and social position in the region proved a 
valuable asset to the formation and growth of the rebel army.  Despite his youth, Shi’s 
leadership and position as the “Wing King,” and “seventh brother” of Jesus Christ within 
the Taiping hierarchy remained a valuable asset to the rebel’s military victories 
throughout the rebellion.15  The Qing offensive was a huge failure, resulting in over one 
thousand casualties, forcing a chaotic retreat back across the river.  Xiang was 
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eventually dismissed from office as a result, only to be promoted a few months later 
when the Taipings invaded Wuchang in neighboring Hubei.16  
On October 14 the Taipings launched their largest assault on the southern and 
eastern walls.  A force of six to seven thousand men sett out from their base at Miaogao 
Peak staged another massive offensive, attacking the gates along the eastern face of the 
city wall.  One account from this offensive reads:   
On Chu er (October 14), six to seven thousand bandits of the third army 
group rushed out from Miaogao Peak and rounded the wall to stage an 
attack outside the Liu Yang [Eastern] Gate.  Officers and men were 
immediately dispatched, led by County Deputy Yan Zhengqi, Jia Xiangpu, 
and the acting governor Jiang Zhongyuan.  Their forces met the bandits 
head on and cut their force in half.  General Xiang Rong also dispatched 
an additional two-hundred men from inside the city as reserve support. . .17        
 
To further supplement their attack on Changsha’s formidable southern wall, the 
Taiping’s new commander Yang Xiuqing, relied on the skills of miners recruited into the 
Taiping ranks from neighboring Hengzhou to dig tunnels at its base.  Once the tunnels 
were dug in deep enough, explosives were packed in tightly and detonated.  Within the 
city the Qing countered these efforts by employing blind people to listen for sounds of 
tunneling at the base of the wall.  But by the afternoon of November 10, a deep enough 
tunnel had been dug under the wall.  Through the detonation of a large amount of high 
explosives, the south wall was finally breached.  The breach occurred near the Tianfei 
Gong, a temple dedicated to imperial concubines, where it was said that Deng Shaoliang 
happened to be inside gambling.  Following the explosion Taiping forces poured into 
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the city but Qing troops quickly converged to the area near the temple for a counterattack.  
From atop the city wall vats of steaming oil were poured down on the rebels, slowing 
their advance.  The fighting at the breach became so intense and chaotic that troops from 
either side became virtually indistinguishable.18  But the Qing forces held their ground 
and forced the rebels out of the city.     
On November 13 the Taipings successfully tunneled through the city wall again at 
its southwestern corner, near Golden Fowl Bridge (Jinji Qiao).  After detonating a large 
mine, another large force poured into the city, but were pushed back in retreat after 
meeting with a hoard of Qing defenders commanded by Generals Jiang Zhongyuan and 
He Chun.  Finally on November 30, the Taipings breached the south wall yet again, 
tunneling and blowing an eight to nine feet hole, ironically at Kuixing Lou, a Daoist 
temple dedicated to the God of Fate.  But as with each of the numerous previous 
attempts, they mounted heavy casualties whilst attempting to enter the city.  In this one 
attack they lost a thousand men.  Shi Dakai also made several forays from the western 
banks of the Xiang as well as Shui Lu Zhou to attack Changsha’s western wall, but by 
late November these also proved unsuccessful.  Although Shi had severely beaten Xiang 
Rong’s forces during the failed offensive at Orange Island on October 31, the Taiping 
occupation of the Xiang River’s western bank, as well as Shui Lu Zhou by means of a 
massive flotilla of pontoon bridges, though ingenious, divided the bulk of the rebel forces 
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and forced an engagement on two fronts.  It also prevented the Taipings from attempting 
to surround the city from either the eastern or northern sides of the city wall.19   
In the final analysis it seems that what saved Changsha during the siege of 1852 
was attributable to a combination of certain key factors.  First, its extremely large and 
thick city wall, especially at its southern face.  The Tianxin Pavilion’s high position and 
placement of Xiang Rong’s large cannons enabled the Qing to constantly keep the 
Taiping forces at bay throughout the duration of the siege.  Despite exhaustive efforts at 
tunneling and blowing large holes into Changsha’s wall, they were never able into 
penetrate into the city.  Second, the city’s unique geographical position, with the 
western portion of the wall running directly parallel to the Xiang River, forced the enemy 
to refocus their efforts to attack the city from the water via a complex system of pontoon 
bridges.  This also represented one of the few instances during the early years of the 
Taiping Rebellion when the Qing’s officers and generals commanded competently.  
They also took full advantage of Xiao Chaogui’s error to stage a surprise attack, which 
resulted in the bulk of the Taiping forces having to siege the city from two different 
positions.  But because the Qing had spent most of the fall of 1852 preoccupied with 
defending the city, they also failed to take advantage of the Taiping defeat and recognize 
an opportunity to attack the fleeing army.  
Finally realizing the siege was quickly becoming a battle of attrition in the Qing 
army’s favor, Hong Xiuquan ordered for his forces to abandon the effort at Changsha.  
On the evening of November 30, the same evening of their last failed attempt to breach 
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the wall, the rebels made preparations to evacuate and began a forced march under the 
cover of darkness along the western bank of the Xiang.  The army marched north and 
eventually captured the city of Yuezhou near the border of Hunan and Hubei.  Thus 
despite the loss of Changsha, the Taipings eventually gained access to the Xiang River’s 
main outlet at Dongting Lake, which allowed them to proceed unabated to Wuhan.     
 
THE LEGACY OF ZENG GUOFAN 
 
Following the siege Hunan continued to be a main theater of combat throughout 
the course of the Taiping Rebellion.  As the rebels made their way north to Wuhan and 
then finally to Nanjing on the eastern coast, the pacification of Hunan remained a 
priority.  Although they gained control of much of the territory of China’s Middle and 
Lower Yangtze regions, Changsha remained a Qing held island within a sea of Taiping-
held territory.  Control of Changsha would have allowed the rebels to use the city as an 
administrative center as well as military outpost to garrison troops and distribute supplies.  
But without such a resource, and at least in Hunan, they remained an army on the move.  
In the years and months that followed the Taipings made additional attempts to subjugate 
the province and its capital.  The Qing on the other hand, continued to take full 
advantage of Changsha as an outpost and command center.  The man at the heart of this 
effort was a native Hunanese official named Zeng Guofan (1811-1872).  
 Zeng obtained the jinshi degree in 1838 at the age of twenty-eight.  After 
entering the Hanlin Academy, and within the span of a few years, he became one of the 
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ablest ministers at the imperial court.  While serving in a government post in Jiangxi 
province during the summer of 1852, just prior to the siege of Changsha, Zeng learned of 
his mother’s sudden death in his native Hunan.  In accordance with established custom 
he was required to renounce his post and remain in his hometown (near present day 
Xiangtan, very near Changsha) to mourn for a period of two years.  Soon after he began 
the journey, the Taiping army invaded Changsha, and he was forced to take a detour to 
attend his mother’s funeral.  When he finally arrived by early October, the Taipings 
were already in their second month of laying siege to the provincial capital, located just a 
few kilometers from his hometown.  Following the fall of Wuhan, in January 1853 the 
Qing government ordered Zeng to organize militias in Hunan, as a possible alternative to 
the Qing army.  The call to Zeng and other scholar officials to raise these kinds of local 
militias was an attempt on the part of the Qing imperial court to find a force that could 
pose a legitimate counter to the Taiping’s successes.  In campaign after campaign the 
rebels had taken advantage of the Qing army’s poor organization and leadership.  
Although Changsha had been successfully defended, many towns and cities throughout 
southern China had not been so lucky.  On paper it also seems that Zeng was ill 
equipped for the job.  He possessed little or no military training, and could not even ride 
a horse.  What he did have, according to one contemporary, was a keen ability to judge 
and evaluate talent, which he put to good use when he began organizing what became 
known as an elite fighting force known as the “Xiang Army” (named from Hunan’s 
River) in Changsha.20       
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When Zeng arrived in Changsha in January, the city served as his base of 
organization and command post for the organization of local militia groups to serve in the 
army.  Soon after arriving, he declared martial law and immediately refortified the city 
to prepare for another siege.  Because the Taipings had recruited heavily from anti-Qing 
secret society organizations throughout Hunan, Zeng began a local campaign aimed to 
root out potential traitorous elements, executing over two hundred insurgents suspected 
of ties to secret society organizations.  Thus in the early stages of Zeng’s efforts to 
organize the army, Changsha became a testing ground for such harsh methods of 
administration that had not been used by previous regional governors.  In the months 
following the siege, by late 1852 the city served as the “main bastion” and training center 
for Zeng’s militia forces.  He even noted in his personal correspondence that a local 
magistrate, Yang Yibao, began organizing a “street corps” in Changsha for urban 
security.  By the next year Zeng personally played a part in training and commanding 
this force, stating in an imperial memorial that the purpose of the street corps in the city 
was “to patrol the streets to guard against wandering bandits, and ‘if there are suspicious 
figures or any who have ever robbed in bands, [the street corps] would use the 
commanding flag granted by the provincial governor and request imperial orders to 
execute them right on the spot.’ ”21     
Some of his contemporaries believed Zeng overstepped his bounds as a scholar 
official, even defying the dictates of the neo-Confucian philosophy under which he had 
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been reared.  And much like many view the role of Abraham Lincoln during the 
American Civil War, some of Zeng’s contemporaries believed him too harsh, and that he 
often exceeded his authority.22  Almost a year after his arrival in Changsha, in 1854 
Zeng appealed to the local masses by issuing a public proclamation declaring the 
superiority of Confucianism to Christianity.  The Taipings unique form of Christian 
teaching and interpretation of the Bible, had even led them to ban the teaching of 
Confucianism.  To a scholar such as Zeng, this represented a direct threat to all of 
Chinese civilization and their way of life.  “Scholars cannot read Confucius, but instead 
there are the so-called words of Jesus:  the ‘New Testament’ book.  They take 
thousands of years of Chinese manners, ethics, classics, and laws, and in a single day 
sweep them away completely.”23    
Thus taking on the role of military leader and administrator in Changsha 
presented Zeng with a number of challenges.  But the army Zeng initially raised in 
Hunan during the early 1850s, first from his base in Changsha, helped turn the tide of the 
entire rebellion in the Qing’s favor.  The Xiang Army has even been referred to as a 
“counterinsurgency force,” one faced with the challenge of winning the hearts and minds 
of peasant communities often antagonistic to the Qing.24  Beginning in 1854 they 
marched into neighboring Hubei and recaptured the trading port of Hankou (modern day 
Wuhan).  In the years that followed they proceeded eastward down the Yangtze 
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corridor, where they finally recaptured the city of Nanjing (the rebel capital) from the 
Taipings in July 1864.  While the successes of Zeng’s military achievements have been 
well chronicled in other studies of the Taiping Movement, what next follows is a 
discussion of its legacy in Hunan and Changsha in the years following the rebellion.        
 
SECRET SOCIETIES IN HUNAN 
 
The Taiping Rebellion left millions dead throughout China.  In the years after it 
finally ended, the Qing government also faced additional problems of administration.  
The demobilization of Zeng Guofan’s Xiang Army and other forces that fought against 
the Taiping proved difficult and also left its own legacy.  Most of his troops came from 
small rural communities in Hunan and its neighboring provinces.  Once they returned to 
their homes following the war, they struggled to find means of subsistence.  Unable to 
find steady work as farmers or laborers, many joined secret societies.  By this time there 
existed numerous such organizations.  Some originated after the fall of the Ming 
dynasty, and began as small groups who professed loyalty to the Ming.  Societies such 
as the “Hong River Society” (Hong Jiang Hui), and the “Heaven and Earth Society,” 
(Tian Di Hui) also gained many members during the late Qing.  The Hong society owed 
its allegiance to the former Taiping leader Hong Xiuquan, whereas the roots of the Tian 
Di Hui dated back even further, as one of the first organizations formed in wake of the 
Qing’s conquest of the Ming Dynasty two centuries prior.  Frederic Wakeman 
characterized secret societies of this period, especially those of southern China, as a kind 
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of “counter state,” in a largely agrarian society.  They were also an autonomous 
“political organism within society,” and “represented an artificial but complete social 
subsystem.”25  In addition to being Ming loyalists, the origins of secret societies after 
the Taiping was also attributable to the rapid inflation that followed the rebellion, and 
economic inequality.  Such organizations also served as “mutual aid societies” to help 
each other.26  In addition to demobilized soldiers society members were also comprised 
of boatmen, common peddlers and lower class people, tax evading salt smugglers, 
itinerant shaman who practiced divination and sorcery, general “greenwood” outlaws (Lu 
Lin Hao Han), stick-carrying hooligans, as well as numerous beggars and other thieves.27  
 During the late Qing the most important secret society in Hunan was the “Elder 
Brother Society,” or Ge Lao Hui.  In Hunan the organization owed its origins to the 
Taiping Rebellion when the number of  “stranded and disbanded soldiers,” (san bing 
you yong), increased due to the Qing government’s policy of recruiting soldiers and then 
disbanding or dismissing them when no longer needed.  In the years following the 
rebellion reports from successive Hunan governors discussed the emerging problem of 
secret society activity in the province, and their difficulty in pacifying them.  In 1877 
governor Wang Wenshao reported to the Guangxu Emperor,  
Your servant has looked into the question of the Ge Lao Hui bandits, they 
have raised their own military camps in each and every province, many of 
the soldiers in the camps are from Hunan and Anhui. They organize their 
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own military affairs, and are continuously disbursing.  These bandits 
groups constantly cause trouble and invade villages.28   
   
Governor-General Zhang Zhidong expressed similar sentiment and frustration in 
1893, noting in a report the brave and competitive nature of Hunanese temperament 
throughout history.  During the Taiping Rebellion Hunan’s peasants may have cast aside 
farm tools to join Zeng Guofan’s army, but the consequences of demobilization proved a 
continuing problem.  Many hailed from poor villages in the countryside and were from 
non-landowning families.  According to Zhang, many roamed the countryside as 
vagabonds with former brothers in arms searching for work or adventure, and sooner or 
later:    
From some pamphlet they discover these absurd notions that the secret 
societies can offer them refuge (miu li shan tang ming hao), sing some 
fake folk ballads and are incited by such ignorance (shan huo yu meng), 
then begin a lifestyle of violently robbing and plundering.29                           
 
Thus it goes without saying that in the late Qing period, provincial authorities 
remained confounded by the prevalence of secret society activity in Hunan.  Growth of 
secret societies in the post Taiping years is another example of the increasing localism 
that eventually helped bring about the collapse of the empire.  Despite the successes of 
Zeng Guofan’s regional armies, dismissing of their troops in inland provinces such as 
Hunan and Anhui caused such problems.  By the first decade of the twentieth century 
secret society membership throughout China had grown so much that many new recruits 
to China’s first revolutionary organizations were from secret societies.  The city credited 
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for the outbreak of the Revolution of 1911, Wuhan, by 1911 had some 5,000 to 6,000 
members who belonged to the Qing government’s New Army.  This explains why the 
revolution was successful.  Because so many of its members were part of a society, they 
may have joined the army, but remained disloyal and antagonistic to the Qing.30  
  
LEGACY OF THE TAIPING IN CHANGSHA:  URBAN FORM AND FOLKLORE           
  
Another important legacy of the Taiping Rebellion, in Changsha specifically, 
concerned the consctruction of temples commemorating the sacrifices of those who 
defended the city in 1852, as well as the exploits of Zeng Guofan and his Xiang Army.  
The courage of the Qing defenders from the siege and later Zeng Guofan earned their 
places in memorial halls throughout the city, becoming fixtures of urban space and 
popular worship.  Being thus memorialized, the popularity of such men and their 
exploits must have been common knowledge among the population.  This was an 
understanding of local history prior to the advent of the Communism and revolutionary 
ideals, when Zeng Guofan’s reputation became tarnished by Communist historiography.  
Today, a visit to one of Changsha’s most famous landmarks, the Tianxin Pavilion, is 
evidence of such a legacy.  Prominently on display outside the south wall of the pavilion 
at a major intersection is a large and imposing statue of Xiao Chaogui, the Taiping 
general who laid seige to the city.  Zeng Guofan on the other hand, enjoys no such 
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position of public prominence anywhere.  This is because after 1949 the Communist 
interpretation of history viewed the Taipings as their revolutionary forebears.    
The Tianxin Pavilion is a public marker and reminder of the contradictions and 
complexities of local history, much like David Harvey’s discussion of the Sacre Coeur.  
What is now considered one of Paris’ most famous urban landmarks and tourist 
destinations, construction of the Sacre Coeur, a Catholic church, was built upon the exact 
site where some of the most notorious mass killings and atrocities were committed during 
the Paris Commune of 1871.  Local authorities eventually won the right to construct the 
church on the site, but even a century later it was still remembered by leftist groups as a 
site of pilgrimage.31  In a similar fashion, the Tianxin Pavilion in Changsha represents 
the competing ideologies of two versions of history.  One recognizes the invading rebels 
as heroes, and the other celebrates the courage of those who defended the city in 1852, as 
well as other Hunanese who fought against the Taipings until the conclusion of the 
rebellion.       
County records from the late 1850s suggest that respect of Zeng Guofan and the 
Xiang Army were an important fixture of Changsha’s urban space following the Taiping 
Rebellion.  According to the gazetteer for Changsha County from 1871, during the reign 
of the Tongzhi emperor, in the year 1856 (the sixth year of Emperor Xianfeng) a site was 
chosen in the northeast part of the city, in an area called He Long Chi (He Long Pond) for 
the construction of ten memorial temples to honor those who fought against the Taipings.  
Most likely this consisted of one large temple with ten rooms or chambers, one for each 
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of the men memorialized.  Funds for temple construction were donated by Xiang Army 
veterans, and called for the establishment of a school, the Qinzhou Academy, for the 
children of those commemorated in the temple.  During the second month of every 
season an “auspicious day” was chosen to pay homage and respect to those honored.  
The report says that the bronze vessels inside the temple were constantly fragrant (fendou 
xinxiang), and incense always burned, and that the temples were frequented by thousands 
of visitors each year.32  As with any modern war memorial, such sites served as vital 
reminders to Changsha residents of the brave exploits of soldiers who had defended their 
city during the great siege of 1852, and throughout the duration of the Taiping Rebellion 
in Hunan.  As such, the temple erected at Helong Chi was a site of public memory, one 
that based itself on the sacrifices of those who had come before.  It was also a reminder 
to Changsha’s citizens that foreign intruders and their heterodox beliefs had been repelled 
and defeated.  The fact that such memorial sites existed may help explain why Changsha 
and even all of Hunan remained intensely conservative, anti-western, and anti-Christian 
during the late Qing, a theme that will be revisited in the chapters that follow.  What is 
also interesting is that of the ten men memorialized at the Helong Pond temple in 1856, 
only one of the ten actually came from Hunan province.  While some higher ranking 
officers may have come from Hunan, the majority of the soldiers who died during the 
siege were not from there, but were from other provinces, such as Anhui, Hubei, 
Zhejiang, and Guangxi.  
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Many of the public temples and sites of worship were concentrated around the 
area of the north gate of the city, also known as Xiangchun Men.  This was in 
accordance with the traditional layout of the imperial Chinese city, where urban 
structures of administration, worship, and officialdom were often situated in the north 
part of a walled city.  By the early twentieth century such temples still existed in 
Changsha.  In 1905 British Customs Commissioner Alfred Harris noted that throughout 
Changsha the prowess of Zeng Guofan and other Hunan heroes were "commemorated in 
the city in splendid temples or memorial halls, where their tablets dwell in lonely 
grandeur—no one else being worthy of association with such leaders.”33 Following his 
death in 1872 a huge public temple in his honor was erected in Changsha, establishing 
Zeng’s legacy as a permanent feature of Changsha’s urban space and religious culture at 
the time.34     
 Another legacy of the 1852 siege concerns the tradition of urban folklore.  
During the mid 1980’s the “Hunan Provincial South Changsha Folk Literature 
Community Organization,” conducted a series of interviews with south Changsha elderly 
residents to gather stories related to local myths and legends.  Many date back to 
antiquity while others told more modern tales.  A few are related to the memory of the 
Taiping Rebellion.  One such story came from a retired teacher named Song Wenzhong, 
aged 66 at the time of his interview, who recounted a popular local tale of the Western 
                                                
33 Alfred H. Harris, “Changsha Trade Report for the Year 1904,” China: The Maritime Customs.  
Decennial Reports on the Trade, Industries, etc. of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce, and on the 
Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., 1904). In 
Zhongguo jiu haiguan shiliao (Beijing: Jinghua chubanshe), 228.  
34 Changsha Xianzhi, 24-25.  
  52 
King Xiao Chaogui’s death during the siege of 1852.  According to Song, local legend 
had it that Xiao’s death at the hands of the Qing General Xiang Rong’s giant cannons 
occurred as the result of an accidental discharge, and that the specific gun that inflicted 
the fatal wound was officially conferred the title “The Red-clothed General” (Hong yi 
jiang jun), by the Qing emperor.35   
 During his residence in Changsha in the early part of the twentieth century the 
American doctor and founder of the Yale-China mission in Changsha, Edward Hume, 
recounted a similar but slightly different version of the same story.  According to 
Hume’s version, the cannon’s name was the “Red-haired General” (hong mao jiang jun).  
After walking along the south wall one day a soldier stationed there recounted to Hume 
and his wife the story of the siege of 1852, and the role this specific cannon played in 
taking the life of Xiao Chaogui.  According to local belief, since the cannon possessed 
the power to take life, then it must have the power to give life as well.  In Hume’s 
words, the soldier explained that the locals in Changsha believed spirits existed “in every 
rock and tree, in every mountain and hill and river.  We believe there are protecting 
spirits even in our guns and swords.  Isn’t it natural that the people should come up here 
[to climb the wall] to worship—not the metal body of the gun, but the spirit within?”  
The powers of the Red-haired General were especially called upon during the cruel 
winter and summer months, when young infants were most vulnerable to illness and 
death.  During those months women from the city often climbed the wall to ask for 
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blessings from the cannon.  Designating the cannon as “red-clothed,” or “red-haired” 
may have originated from the Chinese designation for the Dutch, whom they often 
referred to as the “red-haired ones.”  The Dutch were also known for their exceptional 
use of firepower and modern cannons.36 Thus even by the 1910’s locals in Changsha still 
worshipped the cannon as a kind of deity or symbol of good luck.  It had remained in its 
original position atop the south wall near the Tianxin Pavilion, and locals could freely 
climb atop the wall to burn incense sticks, hang scrolls to express thanks, or even touch 
the cannon to receive a special blessing.  What many believe to be the original cannon 
also remains atop the pavilion to this day.   
 Another south wall oral history came from a 90 year-old man named Zhong 
Ergong, who recounted a local tale related to burial of the dead following Xiang Rong’s 
failed attack on Orange Island in particular.  It was said that following the battle, the 
dead bodies of thousands of Qing soldiers remained floating in the waters of the Xiang, 
stretching for several miles beyond Changsha.  Many of the corpses were eventually 
gathered by Changsha’s farmers and fishermen and buried in mass graves at the eastern 
base of Tian Ma Mountain (near Yuelu Mountain and the present day campus of Hunan 
University), on the west side of the Xiang River.  Years later the Changsha gentry, led 
by Ye Dehui, petitioned the local government to have this area renamed the “Tombs of 
the South River Soldiers.”37  In the context of the particulars of warfare, soldiers and 
generals described thus far, such data speaks to the toll in lives lost the Taiping Rebellion 
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exerted on Changsha society.  Tobie Meyer-Fong’s recent work on the social 
consequences of the rebellion, specifically in the Jiangnan region, provides similar stories 
of tragedy and death.  Her translation of an Anhui gazetteer from 1860 describes a 
poignant and frightening picture of the violence of the rebellion.  Many residents in that 
county “suffered and were killed, or killed themselves or were captured or starved to 
death or died in epidemics.  Those that died totaled more than half the population.”38  
The existence of memorials and temples honoring the sacrifices of the war dead 
illustrates how even by the early years of the twentieth century the legacy of the siege of 
1852 still must have exerted a lasting influence in the memory of Changsha’s residents.  
Located near the famed Yuelu Mountain, the existence of mass graves at Tian Ma 
Mountain was likely.  The area has long been a repository for war dead throughout 
Changsha’s modern history.  Today if one ascends Yuelu Mountain from behind the 
campus of Hunan Normal University or Hunan University, they would encounter the 
tombs of Hunan’s most famous revolutionaries.  There are tombs of heroes such as 
Huang Xing and Chen Tianhua (both discussed in the following chapters), as well as the 
burial mounds of many soldiers who lost their lives during World War II and the ensuing 
civil war.    
In ways more profound and symbolic than the written page, the memory of the 
seige of 1852 and the pro-Taiping, revolutionary view of Hunan history still exists today 
in modern Changsha.  One of its most prominent public and historical landmarks, the 
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Tianxin Pavilion still stands as the last remnant of the city’s ancient and once formidable 
southern wall.  Entrance to the park allows one to walk through the pavilion, where 
amongst other historical relics and information on local history one will also find what 
are believed to be some of the actual cannons that General Xiang Rong used during the 
siege of 1852 to suppress the Taiping.  Most significantly is that located at the base of 
its outside wall is a statue commemorating the brave sacrifices of Xiao Chaogui and the 
Taiping rebel army who perished whilst attacking the city (Figure 1.1).     
 
    Image 2-1.  Tianxin Ge (天心阁).  
The Tianxin Pavilion, Changsha, Hunan province.   
Statue was constructed in 1993. Xiao Chaogui is seated atop the horse.  
Photographed by the author. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The kind of romanticization of the Taipings, represented in this statue (Image 2-
1), both in urban form and in modern historiography, resulted in Zeng Guofan, his family, 
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and Qing generals such as Jiang Zhongyuan to be viewed as “counterrevolutionaries” and 
“bad elements” in the historical narrative of modern Chinese history.  But the era of 
reform and opening allowed for a new generation for scholars and historians, as well as 
the general public, to examine Zeng’s contribution to Chinese history. The rise of Zeng 
and the subsequent recruitment of his Hunan army has since become the stuff of legend, 
in that many credit him with turning the tide of the entire conflict in the Qing army’s 
favor.   
Following the rise of the communist party, after 1949 Zeng’s reputation suffered 
within historical writing that viewed the rebel Taiping army as the revolutionary 
forebears of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  According to Huaiyin Li, the 
controversy over Zeng’s contribution to modern Chinese history first began during the 
Republican period between the nationalist historian Jiang Tingfu, who supported 
modernization theory, and Fan Wenlan, whom Mao commissioned to write a new history 
of modern China based on a more revolutionary narrative.  According to Fan and other 
Marxist historians influenced by his school of thought, Zeng Guofan and his Hunan 
Army were nothing but Qing loyalists who “butchered” the rebel Taipings, was the 
“forefather of all reactionaries in the past one hundred years,” and a “traitor to the 
Han.”39  Even in one of the more significant works on the Taiping movement, Taiping 
tianguo de lishi he sixiang, by Wang Qingcheng, published in 1985, is exclusively 
devoted to discussing the exploits and achievements of the Taiping army and its leaders. 
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There is very little discussion on the Qing army or Zeng Guofan, and when referred to 
they are merely labeled as diren, or “enemy.”  Other contemporary Western historians, 
such as Stephen Platt have identified Zeng as one of Hunan’s “Provincial Patriots,” who 
was nonetheless a “Reluctant General,” who was “physically inept and could barely ride 
a horse,” yet assumed command out of an obligation to protect his hometown and native 
province.40  Tobie Meyer-Fong has remarked that in recent years Zeng has been 
“ambivalently rehabilitated along with Confucius as an exemplar of national values, as a 
part of an officially promoted search for new sources of legitimacy in a world where 
loyalty to the current system partially trumps Han ethnic nationalism,” and that focusing 
on the wartime destruction of the Taiping Rebellion “is understood as a negation of the 
Taiping movement as revolutionary and progressive, and as a critical statement about the 
post-1949 order.”41     
Bearing this understanding of Zeng Guofan’s complicated legacy in mind, the 
statue outside the Tianxin Pavilion also serves as a modern symbolic metaphor of the 
complexities of Changsha’s modern history.  The existence of what remains of the south 
wall and its cannons, along with each of the colors of the Qing army banners, reminds of 
the legacy of China’s last dynasty, the Qing, and how members of its army, as well as 
local residents defended the city in 1852.  But the statue of Xiao Chaogui at the base of 
the wall outside pavilion also reminds us that Changsha’s modern history was often one 
of contradictory forces at work.  The presence of the two in the same physical urban 
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space, commemorating a singular event represents the complexity of this legacy, one that 
will be discussed throughout the present work.
  59 
2-The Conservative Tradition 
Christianity came to Hunan through foreign missions.  The years following the 
Taiping Rebellion witnessed a series of anti-Christian riots that erupted throughout 
China.  The first part of this chapter discusses how, by the early 1890’s, much of this 
activity originated from publishing houses in Changsha.  The second part of this chapter 
discusses the influence of the reform movement of 1898.  In 1897 Liang Qichao (1873-
1929), a reform-minded intellectual during the late Qing, went to Changsha to establish 
new, western style training academies.  I also discuss the specific roles of local 
reformers during this movement, such as the founding of the Southern Study Society and 
School of Current Affairs, and the influence of influential publications such as Xiangbao 
and Xiangxuebao.  Though a failure at the time, Liang Qichao’s work left an enduring 
legacy for future generations of activists, those of the May Fourth era in particular.  
 
“MISSIONARY CASES” IN CHINA 
 
Sources related to missionary disturbances during the late Qing are numerous, 
often consisting of reports from regional officials to the Qing court. To glean the western 
perspective there are collections of British consular papers from Wuhan specifically 
related to the Zhou Han case.  A cursory reading of these materials makes it clear that 
Zhou exacerbated both British officials and the missionary community in southern China.  
Within the reform centered narrative of modern Chinese history, discussed elsewhere in 
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this book, characters such as Zhou Han often take a back seat to the actors and heroes of 
reform and modernization.  In some respects this is also the case in Platt’s Provincial 
Patriots, where the author suggests that Zhou Han was the “alter ego” of the famed 
Hunan reformer Guo Songtao.  Whereas Guo’s patriotism called for China to embrace 
western ideas, Zhou’s anti-foreignism and polemical attacks on Christianity represented a 
different kind of patriotism, one based in a “fundamental desire to unify that Hunanese 
audience in resistance to a weak central government.”  And the two shared some similar 
ideas, in that they both believed the imperial government was responsible for China’s 
weakness.  But by elevating Guo Songtao as well as other anti-foreign Hunan radicals 
such as Chen Tianhua, Zhou’s influence and activity during the anti-Christian riots of the 
late nineteenth century merits little attention from Platt.1 For as much attention that Platt 
devotes to discussing Guo Songtao, in the long run it seems that Guo’s brand of 
reformism failed.  Rather it was the intense anti-foreignism espoused by Zhou and 
others who following him such as Chen Tianhua, that fanned the flames of anti-foreign 
nationalism during the waning years of the Qing dynasty.  Discussing complex 
historical characters mired in the traditions of China’s ancient cultural heritage within the 
modern constructs of patriotism and nationhood represents another problem.  Thus one 
of the additional aims of this chapter is to discuss Zhou Han separately from other 
reformers and radicals of his time.  Although intensely anti-foreign in some respects 
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Zhou was more of a “patriot” than any of those who followed him, in the sense that he 
fought to preserve and defend Hunan and China from Western thought.  
One of the most famous instances of anti-Christian activity in China came in June 
1870, when nineteen people were killed in Tianjin, most of them French nationals 
engaged in missionary activity.  A French consular official, Henri Fontanier, frustrated 
with the local government for not doing enough to address the growing anti-western 
sentiment in the city, stormed into the a county magistrate’s yamen with a pistol, killing 
the magistrate’s attendant.  A mob stormed into the compound and seized Fontainer, 
beating and killing him.  The mob was also responsible for the deaths of other 
missionaries and their families, even the sisters from a nunnery.  In the years following 
the western expatriate community labeled this incident as the “Tianjin Massacre.”2  
Much anxiety was caused by the practice of Catholic missionaries to adopt and baptize 
abandoned infants, and since most missionary compounds and churches were closed to 
the public common bystanders never knew what was actually taking place behind their 
walls. Such practices caused rumors and speculation.          
But crowd violence and against western missionaries had occurred in other parts 
of China prior to the incident in Tianjin.  In 1862 crowds attacked and destroyed French 
Catholic churches in Nanchang, Jiangxi, as well as the Hunan river towns of Xiangtan 
and Hengyang.  In both instances it was believed that inflammatory literature inspired 
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the rioters and that much of this literature emanated from sources in Changsha.3  
Following the Taiping Rebellion a tract entitled “A Record of Facts to Ward off 
Heterodoxy,” circulated throughout China.  Paul Cohen suggests that the unknown 
author of this tract was most likely Hunanese and had been a part of Zeng Guofan’s 
military staff.  In the years following the first opium war “hostile literature emanated 
from the province in all directions and provided the spark for an untold number of 
missionary disturbances.”4   
 
DISTURBANCES IN HUNAN 
 
In Hunan alone, between the years of 1861 and 1910 there were as many as 
nineteen jiaoan, or “missionary cases.”  In more serious cases churches were attacked 
and burned, and missionaries chased out of cities, as happened in Wuling district near 
Changde in 1881.  In the less severe cases, again in Changde in 1893 or Hengzhou five 
years later, anonymous posters appeared denouncing Christianity.5 These protests and 
riots were often not simply mindless outbursts of the unruly masses but reflective of very 
practical concerns.  For instance, there was a widespread misunderstandings related to 
women and childbirth, that after a women’s menstrual period arrived it was a custom of 
Western barbarians to drink it, and that soon after birth infants were sodomized.  There 
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were also rumors that during worship services congregants of both sexes fornicated with 
each other freely.  However, some parts the content of “A Record of Facts to Ward off 
Heterodoxy,” present several logical and concise arguments against Christianity and 
biblical teachings.  Nonetheless, the main purpose of the tract, notes Paul Cohen, was to 
“encite mass action.”6  As the record of missionary cases in Hunan suggests, this goal 
was certainly achieved.           
In 1883 the British missionary Griffith John wrote of his journey by boat from 
from Hankou into Hunan.  He and his party were barely able to penetrate the northern 
part of the province, encountering local resistance to their presence in literally every town 
and port.  Their first stop was in Yuzhou, the port city adjacent to Dongting Lake in the 
very northern part of Hunan.  Upon arrival John and his party dropped anchor and 
immediately “left the boat and walked right into the thickest part of the busiest suburb,” 
to begin preaching and distributing Christian literature.  But soon upon arrival they 
aroused the suspicions of locals, drawing a hostile crowd.  The residents obviously did 
not take kindly to such an intrusion, and along with cries to beat and have them killed, 
began pelting John and his party with stones.  A local magistrate helped escort them out 
of the city, but the pelting continued even as they boarded their boat to depart.7  
John’s next stop was a smaller Hunan river town, called Longyang, along one of 
the adjoining rivers, a few miles southwest of Yuzhou.  On the morning after their 
arrival, and without any invitation from the local government or prearrangement, John 
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and his party set out into the city to once again begin preaching and distributing literature.  
As with Yuzhou similar results followed, but even worse: 
Soon after entering the city gate, a man passed me with a long slip of red 
paper, which turned out to be a placard, denouncing the foreign barbarians 
and calling upon the people to rise en masse, and cast them out of the city.  
I turned around, followed the man, and saw him post the placard on the 
wall.  I deemed it advisable, however, to take no notice of it, and went on 
with my work.  By-and-by another came up to me with a handful of 
placards, which he was going to scatter all over the place.  He shook 
them in my face and told me that I must get out of the city at once. . . He 
then took hold of me, and dragging me by the coat, declared that I must go 
out of the city at once.8   
          
 By this time a sizable crowd gathered around John and his party.  The fact that 
they were not beaten was most likely due to the presence of soldiers sent by the local 
magistrate, to urge the crowd not to beat the foreigners, and to also protect them.  After 
finding the magistrate’s office, they argued for the right to remain in Longyang and 
continue preaching, but to no avail.  In the meantime a crowd of thousands had gathered 
around the magistrate’s office.  The ensuing spectacle described by John is worthy of a 
movie drama, where among the throng of locals a narrow path was made by which the 
hapless band of missionaries were hurriedly escorted by local militia back to their boat, 
luckily without injury.  They encountered even fiercer resistance at the larger treaty port 
town of Changde, up the river from Longyang, but were not even able to exit their boat.   
 Soon after arriving in Changde John discovered that the residence of a Catholic 
missionary had been destroyed, and that its priest had been forced to leave the city.  
John also secured a copy of a public placard, which he was able to translate, announcing 
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that Changde’s gentry, scholars, and merchants would soon convene at the city temple to 
decide the fate of a Catholic convert surnamed Guo, who would be beaten and his house 
demolished.  After discovering such sentiment, John wisely decided not to go ashore 
and venture into the city, and that if they did so “we should be left to the tender mercies 
of the mob.”9    
 Charlton Lewis noted Griffith John’s proficiency in both mandarin and also many 
dialects of the Yangtze region, but his “single-minded ambition to save souls was 
facilitated by a monumental scorn for Chinese civilization.”10  In many ways it was 
figures such as John who precisely typified the Western attitude toward China at the time, 
be they missionaries or merchants.  While readily admitting to the unfairness of the 
unequal treaties that followed the opium wars, John nonetheless believed that it was 
incumbent upon the West to bring China up to speed with the rest of the developing 
world.  China’s traditions, culture, and ways of life represented an obvious impediment 
to its eventual progress.11  For him and many at the time there was also little doubt that 
Hunan and Changsha was at the center of a large printing enterprise meant to discredit 
Christianity and the Western presence in the region.   
 Lewis’ study of the anti-foreign movements throughout China during these years 
also suggests that such activity also owed its influence to the success of Zeng Guofan’s 
Hunan Army and the resulting Hunanese diaspora following the Taiping Rebellion, a 
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period that when many of the more important cities in China come under the governance 
and leadership of officials and military leaders from Hunan.  Such was the case in 
Nanjing, where not only official posts became occupied with men from this province, but 
also members of the rank and file.  The influence of secret society organizations such at 
the Ge Lao Hui, or “Elder Brother Society,” further contributed to the unrest, because it 
was through such organizations where anti-Qing and anti-western sentiment thrived.  
Within these organizations attacks against western establishments could be planned and 
coordinated.12              
Western evangelical Christianity’s frontier style methods of proselytization in 
southern China’s hinterland had also been among the causes for the Taiping uprising. 
Missionaries, Isachar Roberts, a southern Baptist, illegally distributed Christian tracts in 
south China during the 1830’s and 1840’s.  Despite exhibiting admiration for Hunan and 
its people, Griffith John and other missionaries even referred to its inhabitants as 
“Hunanites,” as if they were some Old Testament tribe.  But from reading John’s 
account of his first trip into Hunan, it is clear that he and at least some of his party were 
conversant and skilled at Chinese, and possessed some working knowledge of local 
customs and traditions.  Even during the early 1880’s when John and his group first 
ventured into Hunan, they knew that Hunan had been a focal point of resistance to the 
Taiping rebels, an army inspired by Christian teachings and ideals.  But John and others 
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did not recognize that attempting to preach the same religion in the region could prove to 
be frustrating.13 
John’s and other missionary accounts suggest that the reason for such local 
resistance to the Christian message, and even to the presence of westerners generally lay 
in the local gentry’s manipulation of the masses.  Given the conservative nature of 
Hunan’s gentry in the late Qing, perhaps such was the case in some instances.  But 
perhaps deeper fears and concerns caused such an intense reaction on the part of town 
Hunan’s town and country residents, such as local superstitions and folk customs, as well 
as general xenophobia.           
 
THE CASE OF ZHOU HAN 
 
By the early 1890’s many suspected that the author and instigator of a growing 
body of anti-Christian placards and tracts, was a Hunan native named Zhou Han, and that 
he managed a large printing operation somewhere in Changsha.  Apparently as a reward 
for his military service under the famed General Zuo Zongtang in Western China, Zhou 
had been awarded an official posting in Shanxi, in northwestern China.  But in 1885, 
and possibly resulting from as a result from a dispute with Zuo Zongtang, he petitioned to 
move back to Changsha with his family, when much of the trouble surrounding his case 
began.  Like the author of “A Record of Facts to Ward off Heterodoxy,” Zhou’s 
writings claimed that Christianity was an evil cult, that Jesus Christ was the “pig god,” 
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and that his teachings aimed to “scrape out the eyes, and to cut out the heart and cut apart 
infants, to cut out a woman’s uterus, and to rape and cut off the queues of infants.”14 
In September 1891 numerous churches and missionary residences in Yichang, 
Hubei just to the north of Hunan were attacked and burned by mobs.  That fall 
disturbances continued throughout the province, with uprisings in Hankou and the 
smaller town of Wuxue.  By early the next year the posting of placards continued.  On 
the morning of January 21, 1892 the British Consul stationed in Yichang, C.W. Everard, 
awoke to find an inflammatory placard posted on the front door of his residence, as well 
as numerous others posted on the back walls of the area Catholic churches, on some were 
written the characters “kill the foreigners.”15  
In November 1891 the British consul stationed in Hankou, C.T. Gardner, 
forwarded to the British Foreign Office in Beijing a translations of a series of placards 
recently discovered in the city.  The author of many of the placards identified himself as 
Zhou Han, or Zhou Zuoying, and that he was from Hunan.  A section of one states:     
Every one who follows the devil’s religion and worships the pig spawn 
offends Heaven, earth, the three luminaries, the saints, the sages, the 
fairies, the Buddhas, ancestors, and forefathers, father and mother.  Every 
one who only obeys the holy men of the central land, the teachings of their 
Imperial Majesties of the Manchu Dynasty, is in his true heart an official, 
secretary, clerk, attendant, soldier, militiaman, scholar, farmer, artisan, and 
merchant.  All these bitterly hate Jesus the pig spawn.  All these bitterly 
hate the wild pig, the devil families, the piggish devils.  There are open 
pig devils and there are secret pig devils.  There are grandchildren and 
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great grand children of the pig devils.  The pig devils have wives, 
concubines, daughters, and women.16  
 
Circulation of such inflammatory literature caused a sensation throughout 
Hankou.  The year before a missionary doctor had been severely beaten, and around the 
time these placards were discovered two other foreigners were murdered.  Gardner 
immediately petitioned to personally lead an envoy of gunboats to Changsha, to find and 
destroy the printing houses responsible, but was refused.17  It was also with a bit of 
irony that Zhou Han hailed from Ningxiang county in Changsha municipality, known 
throughout China for its pork trade, so famous in fact that it was often said that in 
imperial times swine from Ningxiang was shipped to Beijing for consumption by the 
emperor.  
                                                
16 “Translastions of Six more Anti-Christian Placards, published in and disseminated from Hunan. Placard, 
November 18, 1891,” Document No. 60, Item No. 6, in Ian Nish, ed. British Documents on Foreign Affairs, 
175.     
17 P.D. Coates, The China Consuls:  British Consular Officers, 1843-1943 (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 271. 
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  Image 3-1. One of Zhou Han’s placards.  
See C.W. Allan, Our Entry into Hunan (London:  Robert Culley, 25-35 City Road, and 
26 Paternoster Row, E.C.),  25.18  See also in Paul Cohen, China and Christianity, 
140ff.     
 
A classic example perfectly illustrating the some of the alarming visual aspects of 
Zhou Han’s placards can be seen in figure 1.1, originally published in C.W. Allan’s Our 
Entry into Hunan.  The picture seen here, titled da gui shao shu tu, or “Illustration 
depicting the burning of the great devils,” depicts a bearded Chinese gentleman 
supervising the execution of two foreigners, likely missionaries, by being poked and 
stabbed to death with stakes, while their bibles and other literature burn in the pot nearby.  
The Chinese men in scholarly attire standing near the pot show their disgust and distain 
                                                
18 The inscriptions on the placard read, “Trashy, magical books, foul as dung, slandering the sages and 
reviling the immortals, making enmity with all the world, and “The heretical teaching of the swine breed 
brought from abroad; mocking at heaven and earth, destroying ancestral worship—wickedness more than 
myriads of arrows and swords can abolish,” See C.W. Allan 24ff.  
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for the foul odor emanating from the pot.  The incendiary nature of just this one 
illustration suggests that to even non-speakers of Chinese would have been alarmed and 
shocked by such a depiction.  The man carrying the pole bearing scales with books 
stacked on both sides contrasts with the books being burned in the pot to show how the 
viewer how when compared with the teachings of Christianity, the Chinese intellectual 
tradition offered true balance and harmony to the world.  
Thus by late 1891 and early the next year western consular officials throughout 
China remained certain that anti-Christian literature and placards were being published 
and circulated from Hunan.  Zhou Han and other conspirators, or perhaps even 
Changsha’s gentry, were responsible.  In February 1892 the foreign residents of Fuzhou, 
the capital of Fujian province on China’s eastern coast, petitioned the British Foreign 
Secretary in Beijing to address the growing amount of literature being “sent forth in vast 
quantities” from Changsha “to all provinces of the empire.”19  Later the same month the 
residents of Hankou followed suit.  They filed a similar petition, to address “the wide 
diffusion, amongst the natives of this and adjoining provinces, of the virulent anti-foreign 
literature, in the shape of placards, cartoons, pamphlets, and books.”20        
By early 1892 it was also clear to British officials that Zhou Han or the Hunan 
gentry were the source of all the trouble.  Part of their exasperation lay in the fact that 
because Changsha had not yet been established as a treaty port it remained relatively cut 
off from communications from Hankou by telegraph, thus dealing with the potential 
                                                
19 “W.M. Waham and 28 Others, Letter from Foreign Community at Fuzhou to the Marquis of Salisbury, 
February 10, 1892.” Document No. 135, in Ian Nish, ed. British Documents on Foreign Affairs, 254.     
20 “A.E. Reynell and 92 Others, Letter from Foreign Community at Hankow to the Marquis of Salisbury, 
February 27, 1892.” Document No. 150. In Nish ed., Ibid, 263-264.    
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source of the agitation proved difficult.21  Within Changsha’s city walls Zhou’s work 
also enjoyed wide circulation, and with apparently little resistance from local officials.  
Anti-Christian posters, placards, and other vivid illustrations regularly appeared directly 
alongside imperial decrees aimed at denouncing such activity.  The British consul in 
Hankou also concluded that it was beyond a shadow of a doubt that the various writings 
and illustrations depicted on the placards “were not the production of illiterate men.  
The Hunan anti-Christian publications, almost without exception, have scholars for their 
authors.”22        
According to an April 1892 investigation and memorial to the Qing emperor from 
Zhang Zhidong, the Governor-General of Hunan, Hubei, and Guangdong provinces, 
Zhou Han was somehow associated with at least three literary press shops in Changsha. 
At each of these locations anti-Christian literature, placards, and posters were printed.  
One of Zhou’s supposed accomplices Chen Jude, was one of the managers of the printing 
house in Changsha probably responsible for the printing of the inflammatory placards and 
other literature, but testified that he was unaware of the content of what was being 
printed, which meant that he was either illiterate or simply making excuses.  Chen also 
testified that the workers in his shop frequently came and went, and there would be no 
way to track or hunt down any other specific employees responsible, or to prove that they 
worked for Zhou Han.  Chen also had many clients, and printed books for many people.  
                                                
21 “Minute of Interview between Sir J. Walsham and the Tsung-li Yamen at the Legation on the 22nd 
February, 1892,” Ibid, 267.   
22 “Introduction and Review prefixed to one of the Anti-Christian Publications entitled, ‘A Complete 
Picture Gallery,’ ” Hankow, December, 31, 1891, Document 102.  Ibid, 207, 210.  
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His account records only listed the surnames of his clients and their sponsoring 
institutions, and how much they were charged based on the number of characters printed.   
Deng Maohua, another acquaintance of Zhou’s, ran another bookstore or printing 
house called Baoshan Tang, or a “charity hall” located near a well just inside Changsha’s 
Xiaoximen gate.  From the nineteenth century such halls had been set up throughout the 
empire to encourage philanthropy and public welfare, but most importantly to serve as 
sites for the reading of the Sacred Edict.  In fact such charity halls often served as the 
centers for anti-foreign activity throughout the empire, and in Changsha Zhou Han 
authored tracts such as Death to the Devil’s Religion were often read and recited in public 
by local xiucai degree holders alongside the Sacred Edict.23  Its location near the city’s 
Xiao Xi Men, or “Small West Gate,” is of further interest to note, because this would 
have placed it on or very close to Pozi Street, one of Changsha’s main business 
thoroughfares.  This area was controlled by the family of Ye Dehui, a powerful local 
literati and conservative gentry.  Access to this small western gate also put Zhou Han’s 
charity hall in close proximity to the docks along the banks of the Xiang River.  After 
printing and mass production they could be easily moved to be loaded onto ships to be 
transported to other port towns throughout China.  Many in the foreign community 
suspected that Zhou received special patronage and financial support from Changsha’s 
gentry.  Thus it is possible that gentry such as Ye Dehui and some of his associates 
could have been among Zhou’s chief supporters and financiers.    
                                                
23 Lewis, Prologue to the Chinese Revolution, 29, 33.    
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Deng Maohua testified that he was well acquainted with Zhou as well as his 
comings and goings, and that in 1891 Zhou had actually lived in the shop for several 
days, then abruptly left.  It is possible that Chen Jude, Deng Maohua, and another 
accomplice named Zeng Yuwen apparently ran printing and distribution operations in 
Changsha while Zhou travelled itinerantly throughout the middle Yangtze region to 
preach his anti-Christian message.24  Among the placards and other publications 
circulated by Zhou were “Admonishing the Gentry,” (guanshen baoxun), “Laws for 
Raising Children,” (yuying liangfa), “Liferaft for Saving Children” (zhengni baofa), 
“Maxims for Jade Pupils,” (geyan zhenbi), and many others.  Also there were forged 
documents made to look like official Qing script, denouncing Christianity and calling on 
citizens to rise up in open rebellion against missionaries and other westerners.  Zhou and 
his followers were also accused of circulating forged letters from the governors of Hubei 
and Hunan.  In terms of character those he came into contact with regarded Zhou as 
somewhat of an oddity.  Numerous witnesses claimed that even in person he would 
make the most nonsensical claims, and that communicated with dead spirits.  In Hubei a 
middle level official named Yi Shu appears to have been under Zhou’s employ, and was 
responsible for a large portion of anti-Christian literature appearing there.25            
Governor Zhang’s report was likely an attempt to strike a bargain between Zhou’s 
supporters in Changsha and the foreign authorities.  It isuggested that Zhou Han was so 
mentally handicapped and impaired that he was incapable of giving his own testimony, so 
                                                
24 Zhang Zhidong, “Hunan kanbo fanjiao jietie andeng qingxingzhe,” April 21, 1892, Qingmo jiaoan, di 
erce, (Zhonghua shuju:  Zhongguo diyi lishi danganguan, Fujian shifan daxue lishixi,  1998),  552. 
25 Ibid., 552-555. 
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neighbors and family had to testify on his behalf.  Each of the men apparently 
responsible for printing Zhou’s works and operating the Changsha bookstores—Deng 
Maohua, Chen Jude, and Zeng Yuwen, at any point never emphatically admitted that it 
was Zhou Han who was responsible for printing the anti-Christian literature.  Zeng 
Yuwen had died the previous year, and even under torture both Deng and Chen refused to 
admit guilt, or that they had committed any wrong offense, either on their own part or 
Zhou Han’s.  Governor Zhang also concluded that perhaps some person or persons were 
allegedly using Zhou Han’s good name as a reputable official to print the tracts and other 
literature, and that since Zhou Han was so mentally ill and crazy it would have been 
impossible for him to do so.  
But given the influence of Changsha’s conservative gentry in the late Qing, it is 
likely that Zhou enjoyed their patronage, which explains why the progress of Zhang 
Zhidong’s investigation seemed hindered at the time.  Given the widespread perception 
that Zhou Han was the chief agitator and cause of all the unrest, there is little doubt that 
he was the main author of much of the literature.  In many respects Zhang Zhidong’s 
report played the middle ground, with one hand meant to pacify Changsha’s gentry, and 
the other British officials.  The conservative gentry in Changsha, who supported Zhou 
Han financially obviously had no problem with the printing of literature expressing such 
views.  But If Zhang had taken any punitive action against Zhou Han the gentry would 
have incurred the wrath of many in Changsha sympathetic to Zhou.  Zhang also faced 
pressure from British authorities to do something about the case, so in the end it seemed a 
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compromise was reached.  In order to placate both parties Zhou was placed on house 
arrest and Zhang filed a report thoroughly detailing his efforts to address the matter.26  
The British were also limited in regards to how they could respond.  While it is 
true they enjoyed extraterritorial power in major treaty ports, at least by the late 
nineteenth century their number of gunboats and troops, especially within China’s 
hinterland, remained limited.  Thus use of force was not an option.  They were also at a 
loss to seek aid from other western powers, such as France or Germany, for fear of 
jeopardizing their military and commercial supremacy in China.27  Britain’s foreign 
minister to China in 1891, Sir John Walsham, failed to adequately address the rising tide 
of anti-foreignism rampant throughout China during these years.28  Even Britain’s Prime 
Minister, Lord Salisbury, to which most of the correspondence from missionaries and 
consular officers stationed in China was addressed, seemed particularly out of touch and 
unsympathetic to Chinese officials distressed about British imperialism.  Serving as 
Prime Minister from 1886-1892, Lord Salisbury, or Robert Bascoyne-Cecil—was known 
as a conservative and staunch supporter of imperial policy and the commonwealth.  He 
served as Britain’s minister to India and was also a devout Christian, making him 
sympathetic to the plight of persecuted missionaries abroad.  In the minds of Salisbury 
and other conservatives, Christianity represented another component of Britain’s 
civilizing mission to the non-western world.29       
                                                
26 Lewis, Prologue to the Chinese Revolution, 36.  
27 Edmund S. Wehrle, Britain, China, and the Antimissionary Riots, 1891-1900 (Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota Press, 1966), 30-31.  
28 Ibid., 29.   
29 Ibid., 11.  
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Even by the time Changsha opened as a treaty port in 1904, Zhou Han’s legacy 
continued to reverberate throughout the city.  British Consul Alfred Harris referred to 
him as a “scholar” and “misguided patriot,” and that Zhou’s “bitter anti-Christian 
writings and the violence of his publications earned for Hunan an unenviable notoriety as 
an anti-Foreign and anti-Christian province; they were the cause of the Yangtze riots of 
the previous decade . . .”  But more importantly Harris suggested that Zhou’s lurid 
distaste for all things foreign only achieved the opposite effect, that instead “led to the 
opening of the province—the very thing their author hoped to render impossible.”  
Harris also notes that at least as of 1904 Zhou Han was one of Changsha’s most notorious 
residents, still living in confinement.  For Harris, and no doubt much of the expatriot 
community in Hunan, these kinds reactionaries were an obvious impediment to 
commerce and progress.30    
Zhou Han’s extreme reaction to Christianity also bears further thought. What is 
fascinating is Zhou’s use of the homophonic qualities of the Chinese language to serve as 
a counter to Christian teachings.  After the first Catholic missions first arrived in the mid 
19th century, the Chinese language also created problems for translation of the gospel.  
Owing to the legacy of Mateo Ricci, a Jesuit missionary who first visited China during 
the sixteenth century the Catholic term for the Christian god was tianzhu, or “heavenly 
master.”  But for those who displayed distrust of foreigners, the zhu in tianzhu could 
also be translated as the term for “pig,” also pronounced as zhu.  Although the two terms 
                                                
30 Alfred Harris, “Changsha Trade Report for the Year 1904.” China: The Maritime Customs.  Decennial 
Reports on the Trade, Industries, etc. of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce, and on the Condition and 
Development of the Treaty Port Provinces. Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., 1904. In Zhongguo jiu 
haiguan shiliao (Beijing: Jinghua chubanshe), 228-229. 
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differed tonally, with the zhu of tianzhu being pronounced with the third tone and the zhu 
of zhurou pronounced in the first, nonetheless much of the anti-Christian literature 
appearing in China by the late nineteenth century remained tainted with illusions to the 
“pig-god,” or “pig-gospel” and graphic illustrations depicting a pig being crucified on a 
cross.31  
When compared to other cultures and traditions, the intense ideological and 
cultural reaction to Christianity bears further thought and analysis.  Consider the 
example of Mexico and the story of the Virgin of Guadalupe.  According to legend in 
December 1531 an Aztec native named Juan Diego was walking in the hills near present 
day Mexico City when he saw a vision of a young girl surrounded by light, speaking to 
him in his native language.  When he confessed his vision to a local Spanish priest, and 
later presented him with an image emblazoned in his cloak, it was believed that it was the 
Virgin Mary.  But the hill where Juan Diego reportedly witnessed this event was also 
the site of Tepeyac Hill, where the Aztec earth goddess Tonantzin was worshipped, a 
kind of reimagining on the part of Aztec culture of transplanting their own indigenous 
religious iconography to allow for the introduction of an alien religion.  Like Juan 
Diego, Hong Xiuquan’s exposure to Christianity was interpreted through the lens of his 
folk beliefs, resulting in millenarian visions of sainthood, reaping one of the largest civil 
wars in human history, killed untold millions, and literally brought the Qing empire to its 
knees.   
                                                
31 Charlton Lewis also accounts for the use of homonyms in the Chinese language to manipulate foreign 
phrases and Christian teachings.  See Lewis, Prologue to the Chinese Revolution, 33.  
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In similar fashion Zhou Han interpreted the teachings of the Bible through the 
lens of his own knowledge of Chinese culture, literary tradition, and folk beliefs.  In 
terms of the later, this can be seen in his understanding that the divine figure of Jesus 
depicted in the Bible was not some heavenly master, but a pig, a notion equally at odds 
with the Judeo-Christian tradition that pigs and pig meat are filthy and not fit for 
consumption.  The other important contrast with other colonial encounters was the 
pervasive influence of an intellectual tradition—in this case Confucianism—which also 
created significant conflict between China and the Christian world.  The use of native 
folk beliefs was one of the ways in which local populations in Changsha interpreted 
western modernization during this period.  This question will be further discussed in the 
chapters that follow.        
 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Mateo Ricci’s The True Meaning 
of the Lord of Heaven, made a convincing case for the compatibility between the 
Confucian and Christian traditions, that the teachings of the god of the western bible 
amounted to a summation or completion of Confucian ideals.  However, one could just 
as well argue that the two traditions also contrasted in many respects.  Confucianism has 
always been a highly pragmatic and ritual centered philosophy, emphasizing one’s proper 
behavior in society, and one’s relationships within a patriarchal hierarchy of the nuclear 
family and ruling state.  Such a philosophy might have meshed well with Mateo Ricci’s 
Catholic vision of the Christian faith, always relying upon its own authoritarian structure 
of priests, bishops, archbishops, pontiffs and popes—a hierarchy very similar to the 
Confucian doctrine of the five relationships—friend to friend, older to younger brother, 
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husband to wife, father to son, and ruler to ruled.  But the introduction of evangelical 
protestant Christianity into China emphasized individual salvation.  Each convert had a 
special calling from god, such views came at odds with the Confucian world.  Since 
antiquity Confucian teachings have also been regarded as highly humanistic in their 
worldview, lacking emphasis on aesthetic or spiritual concerns, further bringing it to odds 
with Christianity.   
 Even Zhou Han’s inflammatory rhetoric, extreme as it may sound, contains traces 
of a desire to protect and safeguard China’s Confucian heritage.  In the passage above 
Zhou refers to the Christian presence in China as being a threat to “earth, the three 
luminaries, the saints, the sages, the fairies, the Buddhas, ancestors, and forefathers, 
father and mother.”  Furthermore, “every one who only obeys the holy men of the 
central land, the teachings of their Imperial Majesties of the Manchu Dynasty, is in his 
true heart an official, secretary, clerk, attendant, soldier, militiaman, scholar, farmer, 
artisan, and merchant.”  By referring to literally every class and position of Chinese 
society, Zhou called upon his understanding of Confucian hierarchy, and that Christian 
teachings represented a direct threat to this revered legacy.  Some of Zhou’s other 
literature confiscated and translated by British authorities, while equally vitriolic, also 
contains illusions to China’s intellectual heritage and Confucian legacy, and at times even 
reads like a commentary critiquing Christian doctrine and western thought.          
 Even in some of the earlier writings discussed by Paul Cohen that appeared in 
Hunan following the Taiping Rebellion, “A Record of Facts to Ward off Heterodoxy,” in 
particular, we find that the anonymous author of this tract also called upon Confucian 
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tradition to criticize Christian teachings.  For instance, the Christian god’s claim of 
dominion over all, and that the authority of rulers of all nations derived from him.  But 
if such were the case, the author argues, then “why is it that from ancient times on there 
has been no lack of tyrannical rulers?”  The author also attacked the concept of Jesus as 
God’s son, sent down into the world to redeem humanity, using the common phenomena 
of revolt and popular uprisings in China’s history as an example.  He noted that if 
thousands of subjects were to engage in revolt, and one official deemed himself 
responsible for the crimes and transgressions of many, would such a judgment be just?  
Finally and most importantly, the author challenged the claim that in the end times the 
Christian god would extinguish all heterodox teachings.  If such were to happen, the 
author argued, did this mean that the teachings of Confucius, Mencius, of Laozi, or the 
teachings of Buddha would be extinguished as well?32  Cohen also notes that the tools 
used by the author of “A Record of Facts to Ward off Heterodoxy,” combined “a skillful 
blending of truth and falsehood,” with the way they seem obsessed with women’s 
menstrual periods and sexuality, as well as the abduction of children, thus on the one 
hand to the lay reader they seem to be perverse exaggerations.  But in other parts the 
author argues quite eloquently and effectively against biblical teachings.  We also find 
this to be the case with the Zhou Han related literature.   
 During January 1899 William Barclay Parsons, an American engineer, journeyed 
to China and later wrote of his trip to Hunan and Changsha.  He travelled to the 
                                                
32 In discussing these themes Paul Cohen also provides more lengthy quotations and further discussion. 
See Cohen, China and Christianity, 52-53.    
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province to survey the surrounding land for railroad construction. At the time he 
observed:  
Changsha, the capital of Hunan, is one of the most interesting places in the 
empire, on account of its extreme exclusiveness. Only two or three 
foreigners, but no missionary, had ever been in the city, and these few 
were smuggled in in closed chairs. Like all Chinese cities, it is heavily 
walled, and strongly gated, the gates being locked at night, giving a most 
medieval air.33 
 
 Parsons and his party were received by the provincial governor, and entered the 
city amidst a very formal procession: 
With our chairs in line, from the leading on of which the chief engineer 
waved a small American flag—we entered the city, the first foreign party 
to do so publicly and with official honors, and very proud to feel that the 
first foreign flag to wave within Changsha walls should be that of the great 
republic. Thus fell Hunan’s strongest tradition!34 
 
The people of the city seemed generally welcoming to Parsons and his entourage:  
Although the streets were jammed with people and the houses along the 
route filled to overflowing, there was not heard a single opprobrious 
epithet or even impolite reference. As a general thing, the people seemed 
glad to see us, or, at the worst, merely exhibited a stolid indifference, or 
more usually an inordinate curiosity.35           
 
 Perhaps one reason this particular party was met with a more friendly reception 
was that they were not missionaries, but members of a foreign expedition to inquire about 
railroad construction.  This may have been reflective of the local gentry’s pragmatic 
attitude toward modernization. While rejecting of foreign ideas such as religion and 
philosophy, they nonetheless may have been eager to do business with the foreign devils. 
                                                
33 William Barclay Parsons, An American Engineer in China (New York: McClure, Philips, and Co., 
1900), 82. 
34 Ibid., 87. 
35 Ibid., 88. 
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Absent of the dogmas and proselytizing charisma of missionaries, the engineers also 
seemed to be more welcomed by the local population.  But by the late 1890’s 
Changsha’s gentry became embroiled in their own dispute with reformist factions in the 
city.  
 
 
Late Qing Reformers in Hunan 
 
 The expedition of William Barclay Parsons during the fall and winter months of 
1898-1899 came during the exact time when the imperial court in Beijing initiated the 
Hundred Days of Reform.  Following China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War in 
April 1895, intellectuals in China became alarmed by its lack of modernization, and that 
it lagged behind the West in the areas of math, science, and technology.  Beginning in 
summer 1898, over a one-hundred day period the young emperor Guangxu (1871-1908) 
issued a series of edicts calling for comprehensive changes in a number of areas:  
modernizing the imperial examination system, reforming the education to include math, 
science, and Western philosophy, as well as Western capitalism, and strengthening the 
military.  Within the imperial court, Kang Youwei (1858-1927), the emperor’s personal 
tutor, was the main voice of reform.  During this time Liang Qichao (1873-1929), 
Kang’s protégé, and considered one of the brightest young minds in the empire, 
journeyed to Changsha to establish new training academies where students could be 
reared in new curriculums based on Kang’s thought, with special emphasis on newer 
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interpretations of the Confucian classics that combined them with western philosophy 
and history.  But Liang and the other reformers were met with stiff opposition from 
Changsha’s wealthy gentry elite.   
A core issue driving the debate between conservatives and reformers across the 
empire during the late Qing was the conflict between followers of the New Text (jin wen) 
and Old Text (gu wen) schools of thought.  Students of the New Text School advocated 
a different approach to interpreting the Confucian classics, one that placed philosophy 
before literature, history, and poetry.  More importantly their ideals made them open to 
integrating Western philosophy, as well as math and science into the traditional 
curriculum that emphasized students in China only learn and memorize the Confucian 
classics.  
 If the reform faction faced such conservative opposition during the Hundred Days 
of Reform, why did they choose Hunan, a province known for its intense conservatism, to 
practice their ideas?  Such questions are best answered by first considering that by the 
late nineteenth century Hunan province was home to some of the empire’s most 
promising young minds, many of which were influenced by Kang’s thought.  
Throughout its history Hunan and its capital also maintained a rich and storied 
intellectual heritage.  Data from the sixtieth year of the reign of Qianlong (1796) reveals 
that out of all of the provinces in the Chinese empire at that time Hunan contained the 
most land devoted to educational purposes, numbering some 730,080 mu.36  By the late 
Qing the city boasted three of the finest Confucian academies in all of the empire, located 
                                                
36 A mu is equal to approximately .165 acres of land. In Zhang, Hunan xiandaihua de zaoqi jinzhan, 78.  
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within the city or its outskirts.  There was Yuelu Academy, situated at the base of Yuelu 
Mountain, on the western bank of the Xiang River.  Just outside the south gate was 
Chengnan Academy, former school of the famed Song philosopher Zhu Xi.  Qiuzhong 
Academy was located just outside the north gate.37   
One of Hunan’s earliest and most important post Taiping reformers was Guo 
Songtao (1818-1891).  His eagerness to embrace western models of thinking and 
militarization during the Self-Strengthening Movement in part derived from his 
experiences as a young man.  During both opium wars he participated in the Qing 
army’s poor defensive campaigns in Zhejiang, and then at the Dagu forts near Beijing in 
1858.  The superiority of western military power during these battles made a big 
impression on him.38  After serving under Zeng Guofan in suppressing of rebel forces 
during the Taiping Rebellion, the two remained close friends and confidantes.  
Intellectually Guo was a disciple of one of Hunan’s most famous and revered thinkers, 
Wang Fuzhi. In the years following the rebellion Guo became one of the late Qing’s 
staunchest advocates of self-strengthening and reform.  He helped found Changsha’s 
famous Chengnan Academy, and constructed temples honoring Wang Fuzhi, Zeng 
Guofan, and other Hunan army heroes throughout the city.  In 1863 he was appointed 
Governor of Guangdong province, where he established close relationships with western 
merchants and missionaries.  Through these contacts Guo became exposed to western 
ideas and thinking for the first time.  Due in part as a gesture of compensation for the 
                                                
37 Lewis, Prologue to the Chinese Revolution, 10.  
38 Kuo Ting-yee and Liu Kwang-ching, “Self-Strengthening: The Pursuit of Western Technology,” in John 
King Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of Modern China, Vol. 10, The Late Qing 1800-1911 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 500ff. 
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murder of a British interpreter in Yunnan, in 1875 the Qing court sent Guo to England to 
serve as diplomatic consul and ambassador to the English throne.  During his few years 
in England Guo witnessed first hand the progress of the industrial revolution and 
parliamentary government.  He visited factories and attended sessions of parliament, 
and met dignitaries and officials from all over the world.  Since the population of Hunan 
was larger than all of Japan at the time, Guo was alarmed by the number of Japanese 
studying in England.39          
But owing to Hunan’s anti-western xenophobia following the Taiping Rebellion, 
throughout his career Guo was one of the first reform minded intellectuals from Hunan to 
confront the conservative ideology that dominated Changsha’s intellectual culture.  His 
fascination and association with westerners and their ideas made him a subject of ridicule 
and suspicion in the conservative province.  Even before his trip abroad, Changsha’s 
gentry viewed him with suspicion.  Guo advocated modern advancements such as 
railroads, telegraphs, and steamships to be built in Hunan, but the gentry roundly opposed 
them, fearing that it would only court the entry of foreigners into the province.  It was 
even said that in July 1872 following the death of Zeng Guofan his body was brought 
back to Changsha for burial.  Zeng had distinguished himself as one of the greatest 
military leaders in modern Chinese history, and was the Hunan patriot who raised the 
provincial army that suppressed the Taipings.  When the steamship bearing his body 
arrived in Changsha the local gentry became alarmed and did not allow it to dock in the 
                                                
39 Platt, Provincial Patriots: The Hunanese and Modern China, 38ff.  
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city.  A more conventional and less “modern” boat had to be found, and eventually they 
allowed Zeng to be entombed southwest of the city.40           
 After Guo’s turn as ambassador in England, he returned to his residence in 
Changsha only to face shame and ridicule.  Nonetheless, he persisted in his efforts to 
reform Hunan’s educational curriculum.  In his later years Guo befriended and mentored 
another of Changsha’s influential gentry, Wang Xianqian, who ironically mentored one 
of the city’s most iconic and infamous conservative gentry, Ye Dehui.  Guo’s most 
enduring legacy to China’s era of self-strengthening lay in his contribution to shaping a 
unique Hunanese identity, as well as “a partial model for a modernizing Chinese 
nationalism based in Chinese culture.”41    
Hunan expecially became a center for reform minded debate during the Hundred 
Days of Reform.  In the fall of 1897 Liang Qichao (1873-1929) journeyed to Hunan and 
partnered with young reform minded intellectuals to found The School of Current Affairs 
and the Southern Study Society.  Another native Hunan reformer, Xiong Xiling, was 
integral in securing the school’s location, and later served as its headmaster.  After 
temporarily holding classes in another location, a proper school was eventually 
constructed by September outside the northern city gate in an area called Hou Jia Long.  
Among the forty or so initial pupils enrolled with Liang was a young student named Cai 
E who went on to become one of Hunan’s greatest generals, and a hero of the Revolution 
of 1911 in Yunnan.  After Liang’s arrival in November, he gave official lectures for at 
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least four hours every day and was said to have remained at the school until the late hours 
of the night, often going without sleep, helping students with their assignments.  Such a 
pace of work no doubt led to his exhaustion, and was one of the reasons he was forced to 
leave Hunan the following February.  Twenty-six years later, in 1922 Liang was invited 
back to Hunan by then governor Zhao Hengti, for his first visit back since his short stay 
during 1897-1898.  When Liang revisited the site of his former school, and fondly 
recalled his experiences in Hunan during the Hundred Days of Reform, he was moved to 
tears.42         
Another lecturer at the School of Current Affairs was Tan Sitong (1865-1898).  
A Hunan native, Tan was one of the first modern Chinese thinkers to advocate 
statehood.43  His ideas of reform were very much inspired by a reimagined version of 
Confucianism in wake of modernity, brought forth in Ren Xue, or “On the Study of 
Humanity.”  Tan’s understanding of ren, emphasizing the values of raw energy and 
dynamism in all people, also informed his understanding of Western economics.  This 
made him a proponent of the free market and trade at a time when western imperialism 
was becoming increasingly unpopular in China.  He often critiqued Chinese society as 
backward, and that it should become more open to western thinking.44  At meetings of 
the Southern Study Society Tan lectured on subjects such as astronomy, where he taught 
that western ideas regarding the origin of the universe where inherent in Confucian 
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thought.  Such knowledge was not a newfound concept that derived from the West, but 
was even alluded to in Chinese classics such as the Book of Changes or Book of History.  
He also argued for a more relativistic understanding to the concept of Chinese existence 
expressed in the term zhongguo, or “middle kingdom.”  For Tan it was obvious that 
most societies placed themselves as the center of all existence and anyone from outside 
their region as outsiders.45 In “On the Study of Humanity” Tan also advanced the then 
radical notion that the emperor of China was on par with the rest of his subjects:   
The ruler is also one of the people; in fact, he is of secondary importance 
as compared to ordinary people.  If there is no reason for people to die 
for one another, there is certainly less reason for those of primary 
importance to die for one of secondary importance. Then, should those 
who died for the ruler in ancient times not have done so? Not necessarily. 
But I can say positively that there is reason only to die for a cause, 
definitely not reason to die for a prince.46 
 
 The mere suggestion that the emperor, a revered figure and part of China’s 
imperial tradition for centuries, was simply a regular man, would have been viewed by 
many at the time as blasphemous.  Not only was he “one of the people,” but for Tan he 
was also of “secondary importance compared to ordinary people.”  Years after his death 
such sentiments endeared him to student radicals and activists such as Mao Zedong. 
 Another radical concept from Tan’s “On the Study of Humanity” concerned the 
equality of the sexes, where he observed how the mistreatment of women in traditional 
Chinese society was in fact a distortion of Confucian thought.  He observed that even in 
ancient China it was legal for women for ask for a divorce: 
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As to the husband-wife relationship, on what basis does the husband 
extend his power and oppress the other party? Again it is the theory of the 
three bonds which is the source of the trouble.  When the husband 
considers himself the master, he will not treat his wife as an equal human 
being.  
 
The “three bonds” referred to the traditional Confucian bonds which of subjects to 
the ruler, wives to husbands, and fathers to sons.  According to Tan, beginning with the 
Legalist school of the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE) these bonds had been distorted to 
justify the subjugation of women in the household.47  After the conservatives shut down 
the new training academies, Liang fled Changsha and eventually ended up in Japan, 
whereas Tan went directly to Beijing to protest.  He was later executed in the wake of a 
palace coup staged by the Empress Dowager Cixi, the young emperor’s aunt, which 
summarily abolished all of the reforms he had enacted.  His martyrdom inspired future 
generations of revolutionaries.                  
Another prominent voice in the Hunan reform movement in 1898 was Wang 
Kaiyun, who founded Hunan’s first steamship line, construction company, and was one 
of the initial proponents of a railway line connecting Changsha with Hankou to the north 
and Guangzhou to the south.  Wang also invited Liang to found the Changsha Academy 
of Current Affairs.48  The reform-minded Governor Chen Baozhen, who came to power 
in 1895, was preceded by Wu Dacheng, who had already initiated reforms in the areas of 
Hunan’s economy, education, and military.  Like Wang Xianqian, Ye Dehui, and 
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Governor Zhang Zhidong, this Wang initially supported the reformers but then later 
rejected them.    
The radicalism taught by Liang and Tan at the new school also emphasized Han 
nationalism and vehemently criticized the ruling Manchus.  In the winter of 1897 Liang 
issued a memorial to Governor Chen, calling for Hunan declare its independence from 
the rest of China.  Liang had been inspired by similar calls for independence, as well as 
folk heroes from late Tokugawa Japan, such as Oshio Heihachiro and Saigo Takamori.  
According to Peter Zarrow the ideas that most inspired Liang were the administrative 
efficiency and constitutionalism of the Meiji reformers, and calls for independence, not 
necessarily grounded in notions of advancing democracy.  For Liang the role of a 
national emperor “lay neither in his political powers nor his symbolic value, but precisely 
in his openness to change for the sake of the national community.”  By doing so he 
likened a despot’s role to that of a “sage emperor,” and as with Russia’s Peter the Great 
and Wilhelm I of Germany, where the emperor had a more “unifying role” for his 
subjects.  Liang also took note of how the Japanese employed students and emissaries 
returned from visits to Europe.  In Japan they were given suitable positions in 
government, but in China the students took a back seat to the conservative institutions 
already in power.49           
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Liang had also become incensed by the German annexation of territory in 
neighboring Shandong.50  Writing an article for Xiangbao, a Hunan newspaper, he urged 
Hunan’s gentry to learn from the successes of the Meiji restoration in Japan.  More than 
any other place in China, Hunan represented the best locale for reform.  Liang and his 
disciples also helped found the Southern Study Society (Nan Xue Hui), which served as 
the chief venue for printing, publishing, and circulating the influential newspapers 
Xiangbao and Xiangxuebao.  These two publications served as the outlets for the spread 
of revolutionary and reform-minded ideas in Hunan, the core of a newly “imagined 
community” in Hunan, one inspired by western learning and the right to self-
government.51  In its early stages many of Changsha’s powerful conservative gentry 
supported the reform movement, but as the rhetoric in Liang’s newspapers intensified, 
they became increasingly alarmed, setting the stages for an ideological confrontation 
between Liang’s school, the moderates, and the gentry.  Wang Xianqian, Ye Duhui, and 
other gentry mobilized Changsha’s students into their own literary society, the Scholar’s 
Compact of Hunan (Xiangsheng xuehui).  After attending some of Southern Study 
Society’s meetings, Wang became appalled at many of their radical ideas, namely the 
concept that all people should have individual rights.  Students from Hunan’s famed 
Yuelu Academy, on the west side of the Xiang River petitioned Wang to fervently 
oppose such teachings, since they had the same potential to unravel Chinese society that 
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the Christian ideas of the Taipings some years before.  According to Hao Chang, the 
antireform movement at once “took on a character reminiscent of the anti-Christian 
incidents in the late nineteenth century.”52   
 The gentry were also alarmed by the radical teachings of Kang Youwei, and his 
treatise, The Study of Confucius as a Reformer.  Kang’s belief that the western ideals of 
social equality between all classes and egalitarianism completely clashed with traditional 
notions of Confucian hierarchy.  But perhaps most alarming was that Kang-Liang 
school completely denied the legitimacy of Neo-Confucianism, even dating their letters 
from the date of Confucius birth rather than that of the ruling Manchu dynasty.53  Wang 
and Ye Dehui published a seven-point rebuttal of Kang’s doctrine, claiming that although 
western ideas were important to China’s modernization, Confucian thought was the 
vanguard of Chinese civilization.54  Once an ardent supporter of Liang Qichao and the 
reformists, Wang Kaiyun even joined the opposition.  He and the other gentry were all 
in favor of what the west offered in terms of technology and innovation, but remained 
intensely suspicious of any ideas that threatened Confucian tradition, and the foundations 
of elite/state authority.55  A native of Hengzhou, Wang and others were also alarmed by 
the number of Confucian academies being converted to new schools, where students 
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gathered in large numbers to hear teachers lecture on various subjects, a model also akin 
to Christian—but more importantly, western—style of worship.56   
 
CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION  
 
Outside Hunan another leading voice of conservative opposition came from 
Zhang Zhidong, the aforementioned Viceroy of the Hu-Guang region who reported to the 
emperor regarding the Zhou Han case a few years before.  Zhang published his own 
influential treatise, Exhortation to Study.  Like the Hunan gentry and other advocates of 
self-strengthening, Zhang agreed that China needed to reform and accept modern 
innovations such as the railroad and telegraph, but that Confucianism should remain the 
central tool of statecraft.  Taking a more moderate stance on reform he criticized both 
hardcore conservatives and liberal reformists: 
The conservatives resemble those who give up all eating because they 
have difficulty swallowing, while the progressives are like a flock of sheep 
who have arrived at a road of many forks and do not know where to turn.  
The former do not know how to accommodate to special circumstances; 
the latter are ignorant of what is fundamental.57  
 
  In addition, Zhang’s understandings of some of the tenets essential to Chinese 
political thought, such as zheng (“political affairs”) and fa (the “law”), completely 
differed from those advocated by the Liang-Kang school, who believed that in order for 
China to reform western political ideas should inform or change the way rulers thought 
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about concepts such as zheng and fa.  But for Zhang and others such thought amounted 
to blasphemy, because these concepts had been handed down over the centuries through 
other sages and rulers, and were therefore immutable.58  Zhang’s track record of reform 
also illustrates his dedication to modernization and industrialization.  From 1886 to 
1899 he helped found as many as eight different training schools or academies in or 
around Wuchang and Guangzhou; a torpedo school, school of mining, railroad, military 
arts, and a school for non-commissioned officers.59  These were institutions more 
concerned with modernizing reforms, and less with western philosophy or history.           
But as the debate intensified the most vicious opponent and leader of the 
opposition against the reform movement in Changsha came from Ye Dehui (1864-1927).  
As a disciple of Wang Kaiyun, during the late Qing and early Republican periods, Ye 
became Changsha’s most well known and wealthiest member of the gentry elite.  Aged 
thirty-eight in 1898 the Hundred Days of Reform allowed Ye’s reputation and power to 
rise in prominence throughout Changsha.  In December 1897 Ye had expressed his 
extreme dissatisfaction with the reformist fever occurring throughout the empire, and 
with the thought of Kang Youwei in particular. Of Kang and the other reformers, at the 
time Ye noted,  
All of this debate began last November.  You’s [Kang Youwei] 
intelligence is extremely vast and great, and has been so for a number of 
years.  There are many schools of thought related to the Confucian 
classics, and each expresses their own point of view. The best of these 
thoughts are seen in the achievements of the finest examination 
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candidates.  But I’m afraid that the fanning of these flames and beating of 
drums have no teachers or fathers to guide them. These beastly 
floodwaters should be restrained, and it is our responsibility to do so.60          
 
Initially Ye also displayed similar respect and good will toward Liang Qichao.  
When Liang first arrived in Changsha Ye and other local gentry initially welcomed him 
with open arms.  The two men actually dined together on a number of occasions, and 
seemed quite congenial.61  But Ye took issue with the Kang-Liang school’s 
interpretations of the Gong Yang, Zuo Zhuan, commentaries on the Confucian classics as 
well as the works of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi.  In short, for Ye and other the 
conservatives the reformist interpretations of the Confucian classics represented a radical 
break from tradition, and were completely heterodox.  This criticism soon ramped up 
after the founding of Liang’s Southern Study Society.    
The struggle between the conservatives and reformers in Changsha also included 
some of the Southern Study Society’s other reform-minded lecturers, most notably Pi 
Xirui and Wen Tingshi.  Pi Xirui (1850-1908) was a Changsha native who obtained the 
jinshi degree in 1882.62  When the Southern Study Society officially opened for classes 
on February 21, 1898, Pi Xirui gave the introductory lecture.  It was a grand affair with 
much of local officialdom, governor Chen Baozhen, leaders from the provincial 
educational administration, the chief prosecutor of the local court, and most of 
Changsha’s high-ranking gentry attending.  Chen Baozhen even lectured, and with 
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respect to most of Pi’s subject matter initially all seemed kosher.  Wang Xianqian, Ye 
Dehui, and others deemed most of its contents “orthodox.”  But during the lecture Pi 
also mentioned the need for political reform and its relationship to protecting Confucian 
values.  This is where he, as well as the entire reform movement in Changsha, 
encountered criticism and resistance.63  
While Pi, Liang, and other teachers of the society lectured on the thought of Kang 
Youwei, Ye also became increasingly hostile to their embrace of Western ideas.  The 
tension between Ye and Pi later played out in the Changsha press and literary circles.  
The April 6 issue of Xiangbao contained a poem composed by Pi’s son Pi Jiayou, which 
among other things suggested that the world was perfectly round.  China comprised only 
a part, and was “not in the middle” ( bing bu zai zhong yang).  To the modern observer 
this may seem trivial, but to conservatives such as Ye anyone who questioned China’s 
place as the middle kingdom amounted to heresy.  In Yi Jiao Cong Bian he responded,  
Of course the world is round, and that there is a so-called middle and a 
division of four corners.  But is there not a division between east and 
west? Asia is in the southeastern part of the world, of which China 
occupies the central part.  The four seasons all come in order starting 
with the spring and summers, and the five elements [metal, wood, fire, 
water, earth] all originated from the south east, so obviously China 
occupies a place of first importance.  Since a foreigner laughs at China’s 
arrogance, how can one expect to speak such sense with him?64                  
 
One of the key insights from this statement comes from Ye’s observation at the 
very end, where he observes that much of the West’s engagement with China derived 
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from a sense of arrogance, especially when it concerned intellectual thought.  For Ye 
and other conservatives, since the basis of the West’s presence in China during these 
years also derived from the military and economic hegemonies imposed by the Opium 
Wars and subsequent series of treaty ports, it is no wonder they remained so staunchly 
opposed to intellectual trends.    
Pi and Ye had collaborated for several years, sharing similar interests in the 
Confucian classics and collecting old books.  They even frequently loaned their books to 
each other.  Many of Pi’s own authored works also came courtesy of Ye’s own library.  
In early 1893 Ye returned to Changsha after a long time away, and paid a visit to Pi 
Xirui’s residence.  But Pi’s appointment to the Southern Study Society associated him 
with the Kang-Liang school, and soon after it became known that he would be one of the 
main lecturers, Ye Dehui and Wang Xianqian made their objections known.  Ye even 
went so far as to prevent Pi from serving as a lecturer.65   
The objections of Ye and other conservatives derived from their own personal 
interpretations of Confucian scholarship and the proper roles of scholar officials during 
the late Qing.  They were also related to the Qing empire’s policy on intellectual debate 
after the fall of the Ming dynasty.  Being fully aware of their status as a foreign ruling 
power, soon after the Qing came to power they officially banned scholars from publically 
airing their views.  Soon after the fall of the Ming many scholars looked on the past with 
nostalgia and reminisced about times when there were less restrictions on what could be 
spoken of in the academy. Gu Yanwu (1613-1682), a noted scholar from that time even 
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termed this practice as one of writing “books today, but do not speak about them” (jin ri 
zhi dang zhu shu, bu dang jiang xue).66  
 
Conclusion 
 
Chang Hao attributes the failure of the Hunan reform movement during the late 
1890’s to the radicalism of its later stages, and especially the “ill-conceived” model of 
using Meiji Japan as a guidebook for reform.67  But deeper causes for the failure also 
stemmed from other conservative voices outside Hunan prior to 1898, not only from 
influential scholar elite like Zhang Zhidong, but even from the father of the reform effort 
in China.  It was actually Li Hongzhang who coined the phrase “self-strengthening.”  
He also agreed that China needed to implement western science and mathematics, and 
these remained central to his ideas into a reformed educational curriculum.  But also in a 
very pragmatic sense Li recognized the potential dangers of developing western 
education into China.68  Another reason for the failures of 1898 can also be attributed to 
hyper bureaucratic structure of the late Qing government, as well as the temperament of 
the Guangxu emperor.  Luke S.K. Kwong notes that by the late Qing the emperor had 
come to depend on a complex network of memorialists and secretaries—who often had to 
deal with their own back logs of paperwork to sift through—to get information.  
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Frustrated with the slow pace at which his policies were being advanced throughout the 
empire, Guangxu’s bad temperment created an atmosphere of fear and resentment within 
his cabinet, even forcing him to sack all six ministers from the Board of Rites in one 
stroke.  It is easy to understand how bureaucracy could frustrate the plans of any 
reformer.  Even in the modern era, if one does not know how to play politics at the 
highest levels of government then most often the efforts of the most radical progressives 
will be hindered.69  
The center of anti-western thought in China the early part of the same decade, as a 
new century dawned Hunan was also the site of epistemological confrontation on two 
fronts.  The first of these involved the Changsha’s gentry-elite’s response to Christianity 
in the Yangtze region, embodied in Zhou Han’s propaganda.  By posting inflammatory 
pamphlets, pictures, and other literature on the walls of western churches for public 
display and consumption, Zhou and his followers won the hearts and minds of locals in 
communities small and large throughout the Middle Yangtze region, even in hinterland 
provinces adjoining Hunan, in Hubei, Guizhou, and Jiangxi.  Distribution of this 
literature was no doubt facilitated by the vast networks of rivers and other waterways in 
these low land provinces, especially Hunan’s main artery, the Xiang River.  The 
widespread distribution of Zhou’s literature suggest that he must have had significant 
resources at his disposal.  If Zhou’s propaganda was as freely on display inside 
                                                
69 Luke S.K. Kwong, “Chinese Politics at the Crossroads:  Reflections on the Hundred Days of Reform 
of 1898,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3 (July 2000), 670-672. 
  101 
Changsha’s city walls as British officials believed, then we can speculate that it must 
have been tolerated and condoned to some degree by local authorities.      
The second kind of confrontation occurred when Liang Qichao arrived in 
Changsha in 1898, bent on promoting his reform minded ideas to independent-minded 
Hunan students, and others eager to listen.  Initially the local gentry also lent their ears 
to Liang’s cause, but when it became obvious that the mores and authority of the 
Confucian state were under attack, the gentry fought back, crushing the reform 
movement.  In these years China’s “modernization” was stopped dead in its tracks.  
Suppression of the Liang-Kang school in wake of the Hundred Days of Reform paved the 
way for Changsha’s conservative gentry to take complete control of provincial affairs 
during the waning years of the nineteenth century, and set the stage for the confrontation 
with western powers by the time Changsha opened as a treaty port in 1904.       
 But the Hundred Days of Reform were not a complete failure for the reform 
movement in Hunan. Despite the fact that Liang, Tan, and others were forced out of the 
province and in Tan’s case executed, it was during their stay there that many of them 
were exposed to even more radical thoughts and ideals.  And it was during this time, 
away from their native province and country that conceptions of national identity 
emerged.  For many of these young reformers such identity remained rooted not in a 
nationalism for the building of a Chinese nation, but one purely based in their collective 
identities as Hunanese. 
The paradox by which China and Hunan engaged with the West, accepting 
technology and innovation on the one hand, but suspicious and rejecting anything 
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associated with democratization or free thought on the other, set the course for China’s 
tumultuous modernization in the first half of the 20th century.  These tensions remained 
dormant during the Mao era, and have continued in the Era of Reform.    
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3-Riots and Revolutions  
One of the characteristics of Hunan’s Xiang River Culture (huxiang wenhua), has 
always been a reputation of Hunanese man, meaning “rough,” “fierce,” or even 
“barbaric.”  In the spring of 1910 a riot broke out in Changsha that represented the 
culmination of urban angst precipitated in part by how the unique cultural character of 
Hunan clashed with the forces of Westernization.  The riot was initially caused by a 
series of incidents involving the purchase of rice outside the south gate of the city.  
Crowd agitation exploded into a cathartic release of frustrations caused by a variety of 
urban-related problems:  the inflationary price of rice, the increasing number of refugees 
in the city caused by a flood the previous fall, frustration at the local gentry and 
government, and resentment toward westerners, primarily missionaries and merchants.  
Over a three day period crowds in Changsha, many of them carpenters, destroyed the 
governor’s compound, looted rice stores and granaries throughout the city, and ransacked 
and looted numerous western churches, businesses, and schools.1  
 
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND ORAL HISTORY 
 
The most concise and thorough English language account of Changsha’s rice riot, 
or qiangmi in Chinese, comes from Joseph Esherick’s Reform and Revolution: The 1911 
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Revolution in Hunan and Hubei, who discussed the riot within the context of social 
unrest and revolutionary fervor in the late Qing.2  Esherick reoriented the discussion of 
the Revolution of 1911 not as the conspiracy of a vanguard of revolutionary intellectuals, 
but rather as a mass uprising brought about through the convergence of various political 
and socioeconomic problems, or the overall “revolutionary milieu” of social discontent 
present throughout China at the time.3  
One of main purposes of this chapter is to show that in the historiography of the 
rice riot, too much emphasis has been placed on the role of Changsha’s powerful urban 
gentry.  Not enough scholarship has addressed the other members of society who 
actually participated in the rioting.  The best sources for finding this perspective comes 
from a series of oral history interviews conducted by Liu Duping in the 1970’s, which 
mostly cover the riot’s early stages, especially the attack on the Qing government yamen 
at the city center.  According to some of the accounts in these sources, at times the 
crowd manifested a clear and logical purpose:  to punish the government and local 
officials responsible for the rice shortage in the city, to deface and disgrace symbols of 
Qing statehood, as well as express frustrations with the build up of western businesses, 
schools and churches in the city.4  Combined with other historical perspectives related to 
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gender, folklore, crowd violence and agency, as well as theories of urban space, I seek to 
revisit the Changsha Rice Riot, but not simply as a prelude to the events of 1911, but as a 
separate event with its own history, causes, and consequences.  
Changsha’s rice riot lasted only a few days but for those who witnessed it or even 
lived at the time, it made a powerful impression.  Mao Zedong recounted to the 
American journalist Edgar Snow how as a young man the memory of the riot helped 
shape his own revolutionary consciousness.5  Such was certainly understandable 
because Mao was a Hunan native.  At the time of the riot he was a primary school 
student a few miles away in his hometown of Shaoshan.  His impression of injustice was 
no doubt compounded by the fact that many who took part in the riot were summarily 
beheaded and executed.  It is also interesting to note how Mao referred to the rioters as 
“rebels.”  As a result of his Marxist view of history, in the memory of Mao Zedong the 
incident assumed a revolutionary flavor.  When understood this way, his nostalgia is 
easy to recognize.  But at times one questions the notion if the rioters considered 
themselves revolutionaries, or even “rebels,” but simply angry common folk frustrated 
                                                                                                                                            
various dairies and other sources, specifically related to the qiangmi.  Although many of these ballads are 
invective denunciations of westerners, local officials, and gentry, many also reveal the superstitions and 
folk beliefs held by Changsha’s urban commoners, and as such help us better understand what motivated 
their actions for rioting, as well as their distrust of westerners.  See Qinhai geming qian hou hunan shishi 
(A History of Events in Hunan Before and After the Revolution of 1911).  While its author Yang Shiji 
acknowledged their importance, he believed their perspective limited and as such classified them as 
products of late Qing Changsha’s “petty urban bourgeoisie,” or xiaoshimin, establishing their contribution 
to Hunan’s history within the framework of a revolutionary narrative. Yang Shiji, Qinhai geming qian hou 
shishi (Changsha:  Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1982),  169.  For the oral history interviews, see Tang 
Ying and Liu Duping, Changsha Jiyi:  Qingmo Changsha qiangmi fangqiao (Changsha: Hunan wenzhi 
chubanshe, 2006).  In this chapter noted as CSJY.   
5 Mao stated,  “I never forgot it.  I felt that there with the rebels were ordinary people like my own 
family and I deeply resented the injustice of the treatment given to them.” In Edgar Snow, Red Star Over 
China, Revised First Edition (New York: Grove Press, 1968), 135.  Also see Joseph Esherick, in Reform 
and Revolution in China: The Revolution of 1911 in Hunan and Hubei, 123. 
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with the status quo and the local government, who wanted better access to food, quality 
of life, and to provide for their families.  This is especially true when one considers that 
after 1949 a few of the men interviewed by Liu Duping went on to enjoy high ranking 
positions in Hunan’s communist government, and were already retired by the mid 
1970’s.6  As with Chairman Mao, their testimonies might have been tainted by a more 
revolutionary understanding of the riot, remembering the events as a part of “class 
struggle,” as a “mass uprising,” or an attack against “western imperialism.”  But theirs 
were not written accounts, but oral narratives of past events.  Thus such jargon is scarce, 
and seems mainly focused on the events as they occurred.  Even recounting these events 
during the height of Mao’s power in China, these men still remembered the qiangmi more 
as part of Changsha’s folk or popular history.  
Finally, if Liu Duping’s oral history narrators seemed nostalgic about anything, it 
was for old Changsha.  Not only were the narrators sometimes eyewitnesses and 
participants in the riot, but they were former residents of certain areas of the city.  In 
their recollections they remembered the very same places and place names associated 
with the major events of the riot.  For instance, by the time of the riot Zhan Bingsheng’s 
family had lived just outside Changsha’s south gate for three generations, in Bixiang 
alley on the corner opposite from the very same granary where the riot began.  During 
Liu Duping’s interview, Liu noted that as Zhan related his memories of the location of 
                                                
6 Zhou Shizhao had been a classmate of Chairman Mao’s, had served as the headmaster of Changsha 
Number 1 Teacher’s College, and Vice-Governor of Hunan Province.  Yuan Fuqing had been Vice-
Chairman of Hunan Province.  Xu Jiesheng, whose interview is one of the longest and most detailed, 
providing useful information not only about the qiangmi, but Changsha society in the late Qing, served as a 
delegate in the Changsha’s People’s Congress.  In Tang Ying, Liu Duping, CSJY, 213ff.      
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the granary and its pillaging, he “used his finger to point at the alley across the way.”7  
This suggests that during their interview the two men sat across from the former site of 
Dai’s store.  Despite the passage of time, and whatever had transpired in this man’s life 
through the tumultuous events of China in the 20th century, even by the early 1970’s 
Zhan remained a resident of this alley.  Liu lists Zhan’s age during the interview at 
seventy-five, which meant that at the time of the riot he would have been a young boy.  
Thus his recollection of the event not only relied upon his own memory of what occurred, 
but most likely depended a great deal upon how people in that community—neighbors, 
relatives, and friends—also remembered it, and how they in turn narrated their 
remembrance of the event to him and to each other.  Many of Liu Duping’s narrators 
were former residents of other neighborhoods and communities in Changsha associated 
with the qiangmi, such as Aoshan Temple, also located outside the city’s south wall.  
Thus throughout these interviews there exists a connection between the memory of local 
historical events and Changsha’s urban space in the late Qing.                     
With the exception of major conflicts such as the Taiping Rebellion, observers at 
the time noted that never in China’s modern history had a Qing government compound 
been attacked and destroyed.  At the time the event itself was significant, and 
throughout the empire reportage in the media was widespread.  One of the most 
contemporary and concise accounts of the riot came from the periodical “Eastern 
Miscellany” (Dongfang Zazhi).  This journal’s detailed coverage and analysis of the 
                                                
7 CSJY, Interview with Zhan Bingsheng, 231ff. Another interviewee, Wang Yulin, also lived on Bixiang 
St. during the riot., 243.  
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event suggests that its author was most likely from Hunan.  At times equally critical of 
the Hunan and Qing governments, Changsha’s gentry, and even the rioting crowds, the 
author lamented that at least from Ming times, for a period of five to six hundred years, 
and in twenty or more provinces throughout the empire, a government yamen had never 
been attacked in such fashion.8  The Changsha newspaper, “L’Impartial,” (Da Gongbao) 
criticized the harsh repression of the riot by Hunan’s governor, Cen Chunming, and that 
hopefully the imperial government would learn from such disturbances, and “assume 
responsibility” for what had occurred.9  More recent scholarship by Li Xizhu suggests 
that news of the unrest in Changsha enjoyed wide circulation in newspapers such as 
Shenbao, greatly influencing public opinion in cities and towns throughout the empire, 
further solidifying already existing negative perceptions of the Qing government, and 
sowing seeds of discontent.  The editorials in Shenbao were intensely critical of 
government corruption and Changsha’s conservative gentry, as well as Cen Chunming’s 
mismanagement.10  Another important source for understanding the events of the 
qiangmi and the role of the gentry is Arthur Rosenbaum’s article, “Gentry Power and the 
Changsha Rice Riot of 1910. ”  Similar in some ways to Joseph Esherick, Rosenbaum 
                                                
8 Rao Huaimin and Fujiya Koetsu, eds., “Hunansheng cheng luanshi shuji,” Dongfang Zazhi, vol. 5.  In 
Changsha qiangmi fangqiao ziliao huibian (Changsha:  Yuelu Shushe, 2001),  267. 
9 “Hunan,” Dagongbao, Xuantong ernian sanyue qiri (Tianjin ban), Vol. 11 (Renmin chubanshe chuban, 
faxing. Xian xinhua yinshuachang yinshua, 1982), 497.    
10 Li Xizhu, “Pangguanzhe guancha qingmo minbian de shidian yu fanying, “Shenbao”, you guan 
Changsha qiangmi fangqiao de yulun quxiang,” Shehui kexue yanjiu (March 2010), 153ff.  
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emphasized the leadership of Changsha’s gentry in both inciting and leading the rioters 
during the riot.11     
   
HUNAN’S ECOLOGY AND RICE ECONOMY 
 
To fully comprehend the significance of Changsha’s urban society and 
commercial life, we must first note the obvious fact that Hunan, like most other provinces 
in China, was predominantly rural.  The city itself was served by its proximity to a 
major waterway, the Xiang River, and served as a marketing and trade center for grain 
and other goods to be shipped to other ports in the region.  This requires some 
discussion on the unique ecology of Hunan, and how management of its rice and grain 
economy provisioned the Qing Empire.  Although Hunan’s wetlands allowed for 
abundant rice production, it also created constant problems for officials tasked with 
disaster and famine relief.  When disaster struck refugees fled to cities and smaller 
towns in search of shelter and work.  Following the Taiping Rebellion the imperial 
granary system often used to distribute emergency grains to the needy during natural 
disasters, weakened.  This was partly caused by the increase in commercial activity 
throughout the middle and lower Yangtze regions, impacting Changsha and other market 
towns. 
                                                
11 Arthur L. Rosenbaum, “Gentry Power and the Changsha Rice Riot of 1910,” The Journal of Asian 
Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3 (May, 1975), pp. 689-715.   
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As a city in late imperial China, Changsha must be understood within the context 
of its relationships with two key trades at the time.  One of these was rice.  Hunan lies 
at sea level, with a subtropical climate and an ecosystem uniquely conditioned for rice 
cultivation and other crops, but also prone to frequent flooding.  Dongting Lake borders 
Hubei in the north part of the province, with the Xiang River flowing from it southward.  
There is also a vast network of adjoining of smaller rivers.  Counties occupying these 
areas of the province have always been among the ripest for cultivation.  Thus most of 
the arable land remains concentrated among the basins surrounding Dongting Lake and 
the Xiang River.  But this accounts for roughly twenty percent of all provincial land.  
Relying on numerous county gazetteers and agricultural surveys, Zhang Pengyuan’s 
analysis of Hunan’s rice economy in the late Qing, specifically in the eighty-year span of 
1821-1911, reveals that frequent heavy rainy seasons in the summer often resulted in 
flooding.12  With most of Hunan’s early rainfall concentrated in the spring and summer 
months of April through June, the timing of such rainfall conflicted with harvest rotation.  
Faced with the constant threat of natural disaster, flood prevention and dike construction 
were often the top priority of peasants and officials in the countryside.13        
As the largest market town of Hunan Province during the late Qing Dynasty, 
Changsha was the seat of county and local governments.  A center for commerce and 
trade, it was the major port city for the Xiang River, a vital north-south waterway 
connected to the Yangtze River in Hubei Province, just north of Hunan.  Changsha 
                                                
12 Zhang Pengyuan, Hunan xiandaihua de zaoqi jinzhan, 38-39.   
13 Peter Purdue, Exhuasting the Earth: State and Peasant in Hunan, 1500-1850 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press,  1987),  26-27.   
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occupied a unique place not only through the flow of good and services, but also through 
its bureaucratic function as a center for government, where “a given capital city fitted 
into two empirically distinct spatial structures, what G. William Skinner refers to as 
“field administration” on the one hand, and “the non official structure of societal 
management,” on the other.14  
Peasant hardships in early 20th century China were exacerbated by several factors, 
one of which concerned increasing numbers of mouths to feed.  Others included the 
failure of the Qing state to control flooding.  Combined with population growth, during 
the late Qing commercial activity in Hunan intensified.  Thus the number of wealthy 
households and landowners increased, as did the number of tenants.  As market activity 
in the region also increased, peasants became inexorably tied to the whims of the market.  
Tax increases became a problem.  The regional power vacum created by the Taiping 
Rebellion loosened state forms of control such as the baojia and lijia household 
registration systems, and landlords became free to extract whatever tax or deposits they 
saw fit.  By the mid nineteenth century the pressure on Hunan’s tenant farmers had 
become so intense it is no suprise that so many of them willingly joined the Taiping 
rebels, who promised land reform, redistribution and freedom from exploitation by 
wealthy landowners.  By 1852 as many as 20,000 peasants had joined the cause.15            
By the spring of 1910 natural disasters, population growth, and increased 
commercialization created a perfect storm of socio-economic problems for Hunan in the 
                                                
14 G. William Skinner, “Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems,” in G. William Skinner ed., The City 
in Late Imperial China (Stanford:  Stanford University Press,  1977),  275.  
15 Perdue, Exhausting the Earth, 237ff.  
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early twentieth century.  Little industry had developed in the province, and wages were 
low.  Indigent peasants could find work in mines, or on the newly developing railroad, 
but such work was mainly seasonal, and paid little.  Villages throughout the province 
had been stricken with poverty, with only one to two percent of all rural households 
owning land.  Since tenant farmers were required to pay out much of their harvests for 
the increasing rice trade, little was often left over for their own consumption.  A portion 
of what remained had still to be paid to the landlord as rent.  Peasants were also required 
to pay a deposit for their land, at an amount fixed by the landlord.  There was also the 
burdens of other expenses, such as festivals, required ancestral sacrifices, weddings, as 
well as the buying of cattle, seed, and fertilizer.16     
The state of Hunan’s currency was also extremely chaotic and unstable.  At the 
time, every province in China issued its own currency, and types varied within each 
province or region.  There was Hunan currency (changyang), Mexican currency 
(xiongyang), as well as the various types of paper money (piao):  Changsha bills 
(chaopiao), Hunan bills (shengpiao), as well as western bills (yangpiao).  For peasants 
the most commonly used form of currency was copper cash, or wen.  If one wanted to 
exchange silver or copper coins the best they could hope for was a ninety percent rate of 
return.  Those who suffered most from this were petty merchants and businessmen, as 
well as servants and women responsible for buying rice.17            
                                                
16 Rao Huaimin, ed., “Hunan zhaoxin zhiyou,” Shibao, Lunshuo, Gengshu sanyue. In Changsha qiangmi 
fangqiao ziliao huibian (Changsha:  Yuelu Shushe, 2001), 222-224.  
17 Ibid.  
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After Changsha opened as a western trading port in 1904 the export of rice 
increased substantially.  Table 4-1 shows that beginning in 1902, when the city of 
Yuzhou just to the north opened, the provincial economy witnessed a dramatic increase in 
rice exports.  After Changsha officially opened, within a few years it began to surpass 
Yuzhou’s rice economy, so that by 1907 the capital city became the center for commerce 
in the province.  It is worth noting the significant drops of output in flood years, 1906 
and 1910 respectively.  In 1906 heavy rains flooded most of Changsha.  Whole parts of 
the city became submerged, with residents and shop owners forced to dwell for a time in 
attics or the roofs of their houses, and even on the city walls.  Reserves in public and 
private granaries were ruined.18  
Table 4-1.  1904-1910 Hunan Rice Exports (In Piculs).19 
City Year 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 
Yuzhou 100,759 344,212 257,653 31,473 288 __ __ __ __ 
Changsha __ __ 121,561 301,075 37,534 353,208 911,124 668,632 35,952 
 
What is interesting to note is the pattern of flooding in one year followed by a 
bumper harvest the next.  Rice exports from 1907, at 353,208 piculs, suggest as much.  
Such a pattern is related to the unique condition of Hunan’s ecology.  When the Xiang 
                                                
18 Oliver G. Ready, “Changsha Trade Report, 1907,” 119. China: The Maritime Customs.  Decennial 
Reports on the Trade, Industries, etc. of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce, and on the Condition and 
Development of the Treaty Port Provinces.  Shanghai:  Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., 1904. In Zhongguo jiu 
haiguan shiliao (1859-1948). (Beijing:  Jinghua chubanshe), 119. 
19 Alfred Harris, “Changsha Trade Statistics, IV.-Exports (Not Including Re-exports).” China: The 
Maritime Customs.  Decennial Reports on the Trade, Industries, etc. of the Ports Open to Foreign 
Commerce, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces.  Shanghai:  Kelly and 
Walsh, Ltd., 1904. In Zhongguo jiu haiguan shiliao (1859-1948). (Beijing:  Jinghua chubanshe), 272.   
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River flooded it may have wreaked havoc on peasant daily life and dwellings, but when 
the flood waters receded vital nutrients had been deposited on the top soil, making the 
land more suitable for cultivation.  The trade data for 1910 reveals a much different 
story, indicating a dramatic decline in rice exports.  This was because another flood in 
1909 resulted in another bad harvest.  The Changsha Customs Commisioner at the time, 
C.E.S. Wakefield, writing after the Revolution of 1911, noted the rebellion’s influence on 
the regional economy, literally bringing it to a halt.20  This data on Hunan’s rice trade 
helps contextualize the events which caused the rioting in 1910.             
 
LOCAL POLITICS AT PLAY 
 
During the rice riot Cen Chunming governed Hunan.  His ascension to the 
highest seat of authority in Hunan mainly derived from family connections.  His brother, 
Cen Chunxuan was a “favored minister” to the Empress Dowager Cixi.  Cen Chunming 
had also studied under Zhang Zhidong, the former Governor-General of Hubei, who 
founded Wuhan University.  Cen had been a staunch supporter and defender of the new 
reforms (xinzheng) of the late Qing, a last gasp effort by Empress Dowager to improve 
the failing empire’s weak infrastructure, abolishing the centuries old imperial 
examination system, and establishing China’s first western universities.  These reforms 
were essentially a repeat of those proposed back in 1898.  Though this time the Qing 
                                                
20 C.E.S. Wakefield, “Changsha Trade Report, 1911,” In Zhongguo Jiu Haiguan Shike (1859-1948), 
Jinghua Chubanshe, No. 55.   
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government was serious about modernization, they came too little and too late.  In the 
hinterland these new reforms called for local investment in various public works projects, 
such as railroad construction, new schools with western-based curricula, and the 
formation of a new western-style military.  But especially during the economic and 
social crisis surrounding the rice riot, Changsha’s gentry used the new reform projects as 
an excuse to attack Governor Cen, arguing that these programs exerted a considerable 
drain on public resources.         
In his five-year tenure as governor Cen also failed to win the hearts and minds of 
the public.  He seldom venturing outside the confines the yamen, and distrusted the 
revolutionary activity happening in the city caused by newly returned students from 
Japan.  In the spring of 1910 when the shortage of rice came to a head, magistrates from 
Changsha and neighboring Shanhua county pleaded with Cen to lower the price of rice, 
and to put an embargo on all shipments of grain out of the province.  But by the time he 
gave this order it was too late.  Once Cen ordered the prohibition, it took almost a month 
to fully enforce such a policy, and rice continued to be exported.  To save face with the 
local population Changsha’s gentry completely supported the ban yet privately continued 
to hoard and maintain their private rice stores.  Wang Xianqian and Ye Dehui also 
vetoed an effort by the city’s prefect Yu Pingyuan that called on Changsha’s wealthy 
citizens to give up seventy percent of their own grain stores to government granaries.21    
Cen remained completely out of touch with the situation in the city.  He 
reportedly believing that Changsha’s commoners lived luxuriously, and acquiesced to the 
                                                
21 Ibid, 702.   
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British demand to have gunboats stationed in the city as a check on repeated instances of 
anti-foreign agitation that had erupted the year before.22  As such, in a relatively short 
span of time, and under Cen’s watch, the city had quickly become the center of what 
Keith Schoppa has termed as the three “M’s” of imperialism—missionaries, merchants, 
and the military.23  
After the riot broke out the popular choice to succeed Cen was Hunan’s vice-
governor Zhuang Gengliang.  The enmity between the two men was no secret to the 
public.  In contrast to Cen’s perception as an outsider and reformer, Zhuang was a forty-
year veteran of Hunan officialdom.  As a conservative he enjoyed patronage with 
Changsha’s gentry.24  Over the years Zhuang’s public displays of reverence and charity 
curried favor with Changsha’s residents, earning the nickname “Zhuang Qingtian,” 
likening him to Bao Qingtian, a Song Dynasty official known for his honesty and hatred 
of corruption.25  But as far as the reform movement was concerned, Zhuang was 
something of a tyrant, suppressing it viciously at every turn.  He was responsible for the 
capture, torture, and execution of Liu Daoyi and Yu Zhimo, members of the 
“Revolutionary Alliance” (an underground revolutionary organization the supported the 
overthrow of the Qing and the establishment of a republic) in Changsha.26  
                                                
22 Rao Huaimin and Fujiya Koetsu, eds., “Hunansheng cheng luanshi shuji,” Dongfang Zazhi, vol. 5.  In 
Changsha qiangmi fangqiao ziliao huibian (Changsha:  Yuelu Shushe, 2001), 260.  Esherick, Reform 
and Revolution, 123.  
23 R. Kieth Schoppa, The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2000), 21.  
24 Yang Shiji, Xianhai geming qianhou shishi, 153.  Esherick, 129.   
25 Kong Xianjiao also earned the moniker, “Kong Qingtian.”  See Rao Huaimin, 268.   
26 Liu Duping, Changsha wenshi ziliao, 44.  
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From the time Cen assumed office, the gentry sought to have him removed from 
power, and the rice riot represented the perfect opportunity.  While they may have 
outwardly supported the embargo on rice exports, as businessmen it was gentry such as 
Ye Dehui and Wang Xianqian who most benefited from the rice trade.  Thus placing an 
embargo on rice would have conflicted with their interests.  Cen also lay at the mercy of 
Qing governance in the region, both from the Governor General of Hunan, Hubei, and 
Guangdong provinces, as well as the regional superintendent.  On the foreign side, he 
faced pressure from the British, and was bound by the provisions of the 1902 MacKay 
Treaty.  This treaty not only allowed for the substantial increase in rice trade throughout 
the Yangtze region, but more importantly called for the opening of more treaty ports, one 
of them being Changsha.     
 
THE QIANGMI 
  
On the morning of April 11, 1910, a water carrier named Huang Guisun gave his 
wife money to buy rice from Dai Yishun’s granary, on Bixiang Street just outside 
Changsha’s south gate.  Prior to the riot Dai had a rather nefarious reputation throughout 
the city, and established a considerable reputation for himself as a local gentry.  Along 
with other community leaders, his name had been inscribed on the stele of a local temple.  
Townsfolk often called upon him to settle local disputes.  He was frequently seen within 
the large compound of government buildings, or yamen, talking with important officials, 
and his large granary also contained a teahouse, a place where Dai courted local tax 
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collectors to drink and chat.27  Huang Guikun, a former resident of south Changsha near 
Aoshan Temple, noted that to his face local people referred to Dai Yishun as “Father 
Dai,” but behind his back he was known as “Dai the harsh (Dai kebo).”28         
Huang Guisun gave his wife 80 copper cash pieces, enough to by one pint of rice.  
But after arriving Wife Huang discovered that the price of rice had risen to 85 copper 
cash, and she did not have enough to buy. Her family had been hungry for many days, so 
in an act of desperation, she went to a nearby pond called Laolong Tan, and took her own 
life by jumping into the water. Upon hearing of his wife’s fate a few hours later, Huang 
Guisun collected his two children and jumped into the same pond.  The desperate act of 
a whole family taking their own lives caused rage and indignation throughout Changsha, 
and that night it became the talk of the town in alleys, shops, and teahouses throughout 
the city.  Many believed tragic events such as the Huang family suicide were bad 
omens.  In the days after the suicide, the area around Laolong pond became a place of 
mourning, and it was said that “every night angry currents” could be heard there.29     
During the late Qing period, water carriers such as Huang Guisun were a common 
sight in Changsha.  Edward Hume, an American doctor from Yale-in-China, based in 
Changsha, noted that the carriers hauled water from the Xiang River into the city with 
bamboo poles across their shoulders, carrying a bucket on each end.  When the current 
was slower in the wintertime the water was clearer and cleaner, whereas in the summer 
                                                
27 CSJY, Interview with Xu Jiesheng, 223.  
28 Rao Huaimin and Fujiya Koetsu eds., “Huang Guisun chun jia tou shui de qian qian hou hou, Huang 
Guikun kou shu,” In Changsha qiangmi fangqiao ziliao huibian (Changsha:  Yuelu Shushe, 2001), 323. 
29 Yang Shiji, 170??? 
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months, due to the rising levels of the river, often as much as “six to ten feet in a day” the 
water was murkier.  Hume also observed that “We could tell just how far it was down to 
the river by watching the path they left behind them:  the wetter their tracks, the nearer 
we were to the river.”30  
 
Image 4-1. “Porters Carrying Pails up Steps, Changsha,” 1900.   
These men are seen carrying water from the banks of the Xiang River,  
as described by Edward Hume.  Photo Courtesy of Bristol University.  
 
While Dai Yishun and other wealthy officials dined on succulent delicacies like 
shark fin and sea slugs in high-end local eateries, peasants in Changsha starved.  As a 
result of flooding and other recent natural disasters, many destitute peasants from the 
countryside lived in shanties along a small hill outside the city’s south gate, an area 
known as “Hungry Stomach Ridge.” (E Du Ling).  It was here that a small community 
had formed, of water carriers, clay diggers, waste collectors, and others who hoped to 
find work in numerous odd jobs around the city.  Kang Guihe, with his wife and two 
                                                
30 Hume, Edward H.  Doctors East, Doctors West:  An American Physician’s Life in China (New York:  
W. W. Norton and Company,  1946),  96-97.  
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children, also lived on the ridge, and like Huang Guisun, found work hauling buckets of 
water around the city. The previous winter brought heavy snow, and Kang’s family 
lacked sufficient food and clothing to survive.  One day after the snow settled, Wife 
Kang went out to beg for food. Hours later her body was found near the south gate.  
Thus corpses of starved, frozen peasants were a common sight on city streets and alleys 
at the time.31  A famine the previous winter had been particularly tough on peasants who 
migrated to the city, many forced to eat tree bark and bamboo.  Another peasant noted 
that there were many cases that winter of urban peasants starving to death.32  Many of 
the peasants on Hungry Stomach Ridge had migrated to the city in search of work, their 
villages and homes swept away by the flood of 1909.  At the time, the kind of tragedies 
experienced by the Kang and Huang families were becoming increasingly common 
throughout the region.  
The day after the Huang family suicide, another older woman also went to Dai 
Yishun’s grain store to buy rice.  Upon seeing this woman’s collection of tattered coins, 
Dai informed her that some of her money was no good, and that she needed to exchange 
two of the coins for better currency.  The woman complied and later returned with more 
usable coins.  But Dai then informed her that the price had risen again, and so this old 
woman also did not have enough to purchase rice.  But this woman, instead of doing 
something desperate, began to quarrel with Dai, and their argument became so fierce that 
                                                
31 CSJY, Interview with Huang Guikun, 235.  
32 Ibid, 234.  
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bystanders nearby started to stop, and eventually a crowd gathered. Dai was badly beaten 
and his rice stores pillaged.   
The day after the Huang family suicide a crowd gathered at the South Gate district 
police station to demand that the price of rice to be lowered.  The area of Changsha’s 
south gate, as well as the surrounding community, served as a focal point for the causal 
events of the qiangmi. Dai Yishun’s rice store was located on Bixiang Sreet, just outside 
the south gate.  The Huang family committed suicide in Laolong Tan, also located near 
the south gate, as was Hungry Stomach Ridge.  Aoshan Temple, a popular local temple, 
was located not far away, outside the southeast corner of the city wall, near a popular 
well, called Baisha Jing.  It was considered a popular meeting place for peasants, 
erected as a commemoration to the memory of the bodhisattva Ding Aoshan, an official 
from Sichuan during the Jin Dynasty known for his benevolence and charity.33  Every 
June, peasants celebrated his birthday with a festival, and the temple was considered a 
popular gathering place for civic events.  It contained a large outdoor stage and 
adjoining lawn that could hold as many as a thousand people.  Public performances 
were often held there.34  Thus, South Gate was the part of the old walled city associated 
with the everyday life of the common people.  This was in contrast to the north gate of 
the city, known then as Xiang Chun Men, more associated with public buildings related 
to governance, as well as a concentration of ancestral temples and sacrificial altars.  
                                                
 
34 CSJY, Interview with Li Zhengting, 270.   
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When the magistrates of Shanhua and Changsha counties arrived at the South 
Gate to dismiss the crowd, they posted a notice stating that rice would be sold at a normal 
price the next day, and the crowd dispersed.  But a carpenter named Liu Yongfu was 
arrested for making slanderous remarks about the Hunan governor.  He may have also 
been one of the ringleaders during the pillaging of Dai Yishun’s rice store.  The 
following day another crowd gathered, still demanding that the price of rice to be 
lowered.  They were further incensed by the arrest of Liu, and demanded his release.  
A police commissioner from Fujian named Lai Chengyu arrived to dismiss them.35  The 
Huang family suicide and the arrest of Liu Yongfu still fresh on their minds, the crowd 
flew into a rage, seizing Lai and beating him severely.  They tied him and his queue to a 
temple post, pulled out his beard, and even stuffed pig manure into his mouth.  The 
crowd then proceeded to the city center, where they surrounded and burned the main 
government yamen.  In the days that followed, rice shops and granaries throughout the 
city were looted, and crowds attacked western homes, schools, businesses, and churches, 
in some cases burning them to the ground.  
In part the riot was spawned by the actions of two different women.  Wife 
Huang’s suicide not only prompted the suicide of her husband and children, but it 
incensed Changsha’s residents.  When combined with another woman’s fierce argument 
with Dai Yishun, a local gentry with a bad reputation, the result was crowd action.  One 
of the most influential monographs on the role of women in food riots comes from E.P. 
Thompson’s essay, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth 
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Century.”  Much of Thompson’s argument for crowd agency in England’s eighteenth 
century grain riots relied upon a wealth of preserved pamphlets, booklets, letters, and 
other public documents, which suggested that grain riots of this period were much more 
coordinated and organized by members of the working class than previously thought. 
some points of similarity can be found in his method of analysis, especially concerning 
crowd psychology as well as the role of women.   
According to Thompson, food riots in eighteenth century England were often 
started by women, because they were the members of the household “most involved in 
face-to-face marketing, most sensitive to price significancies, most experienced in 
detecting short-weight or inferior quality.  It is probable that the women most frequently 
precipitated the spontaneous actions.”  Another similarity to grain riots in the European 
context is what Thompson refers to as the “motif of intimidation,” or that grain riots often 
broke out with the intent to punish unscrupulous or corrupt grain merchants.36  Such was 
also the case during Changsha’s rice riot, where granary owners such as Dai Yishun, or 
officials such as Lai Chengyu were severely beaten.   
This comparison also fits well with analysis of riots by modern China historians.  
In his study of rural China Kung-Chuan Hsiao noted that hunger riots in imperial China 
were ones usually “occasioned by the inability of the government to cope with the 
situation[s] created by famine.”  Kung also corroborates the pervasive role of local 
                                                
36 E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the Crowd,” Past and Present, 114, 116.  Although 
Thompson’s article has been frequently cited through the years, it has also come under criticism. See Mark 
Harrison, Crowds and History: Mass Phenomena in English Towns, 1790-1835 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 12. One point made by Harrison worth noting is that contrary to what Thompson 
argues, grain riots in eighteenth century England were actually quite rare.     
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gentry in many food riots.  Although during the nineteenth century food riots in 
Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Hunan, and Hubei, gentry were often the target of mob violence, in 
other instances they served as the prime organizers and instigators.37  Elizabeth Perry 
has characterized such riots during the late Qing as incidents of “anti-foreign terrorism,” 
which included food riots, but also involved mass action against foreign missionaries, 
businesses, and schools.  In the case of Changsha there was an equal amount of anger 
directed against both the local government and foreigners.38  A few years later, in 1918, 
nationwide riots erupted throughout Japan.  In part these were also related to the high 
price of rice.  Michael Lewis suggests that these riots in particular reflected the diversity 
of popular protest in Japan, and also revealed “the patently false stereotype of the bland 
uniformity of Japanese society.”39  Similar to Lewis, I also mean to suggest that 
Changsha’s rioters were more than an unruly mob, but were comprised of certain 
disenfranchised members of society with very specific grievances.                   
The suicide of the Huang family, as well as the common occurrence of suicides in 
the area of Changsha’s south gate, also merits further attention.  During the late Qing 
the Laolong pond outside the south gate of the city was a common place for peasants to 
commit suicide, and many peasants, including the Huang family, were reported to have 
died there.40  And in the days following the Changsha riot, it was said that many more 
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Washington Press,  1960), 444, 448.  
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peasants committed suicide by jumping into different wells throughout the city.41  
Edward Hume also observed the practice of jumping in wells to commit suicide.  When 
women in Changsha often took their own life this way, sometimes it was to express their 
spite toward an abusive husband or his family.  If her attempt was successful, the 
husband and his whole family lost face in the entire community.42    
The adversity of daily peasant life was not only felt in Changsha.  Just to the 
north in Hankou, during the same period as the Changsha riots, “the perils of flood, fire, 
and epidemic were unusually severe, even by Chinese standards, and the general 
ambiance of death was compounded by the ever-present threat of business failure and 
market reversal, which led in alarming numbers of cases to suicide.”43  Throughout 
Chinese history suicide has often been associated with social protest or unrest.  
Obviously in the case of common peasants, seldom were such actions intended to spark 
protest or mass action.  But the conditions precipitating their choice to commit suicide 
often resulted in some form of public outrage, protest, or other acts intent on 
commemorating what the deceased stood for or hoped to achieve.  To protest the 
invasion of Chu by a neighboring rival state, during the Warring States period the poet 
Qu Yuan committed suicide by jumping in the Miluo River near Dongting Lake.  His 
act is commemorated each year during one of China’s most popular public holidays, the 
Dragon Boat Festival.  By the late Qing it remained one of Changsha’s most important 
                                                
41 Yang Shiji, 171.  
42 Hume, 152.  
43 William Rowe, Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796-1895, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1989), 20.   
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and celebrated public festivals.44  After the Japanese government restricted the number 
of Chinese studying in Japan in 1905, Chen Tianhua, one of Hunan’s most notable and 
influential reformers, committed suicide by jumping into Tokyo’s Omori Bay.  One of 
his compatriots, Yao Hongye, also did the same in Shanghai.  The remains of Chen and 
Yao were later returned to Changsha for public burial on Yuelu Mountain on the west 
side of the Xiang River in Changsha.  Thousands of students mourned the two men in a 
funeral procession.  At the time, these two were considered by many, especially within 
the expatriate community of exiled intellectuals in Japan during the late Qing, to be 
among the founding fathers of Hunanese nationalism and the national movement for 
statehood in China.45  Thus suicides often occurred for political reasons, or was often an 
act of desperation among the lower classes.  When such events are combined with what 
we already know about the suicides of the Huang family and others during the rice riot, 
we can appreciate the influence these types of suicides exerted on Changsha society.                
The adverse socio-economic conditions of the time also burdened many of 
Changsha’s petty laborers, carpenters in particular.  Among the crowd that stormed 
government buildings in Changsha during the rice riot were members of carpenter’s 
guilds.  Since the incursion of foreigners into the city after it opened as a treaty port in 
1902 masons and carpenter’s groups became frustrated with local officials and gentry, 
but more importantly the British authorities for outsourcing carpenters from Hankou to 
build the new western style buildings—missions, customs houses, consulates, and 
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schools—putting them out of work. Yu Changchun worked as a caulker at the time of the 
riots, and was among the crowd that burned the government yamen. According to Yu, 
more than half of those who stormed the yamen that day were masons or carpenters, 
some of them shirtless, despite the cold weather.46   
Another carpenter surnamed Liu Shaoming, is also prominent character in many 
of the oral history interviews.  In addition to being skilled at carpentry, sculpting mud, 
and bricklaying, according to the narrators Liu was adept at Chinese kungfu.  He was 
seen leading a charge of peasants into the government compound, located in the center of 
the walled city.  Zhang Liansheng, a twenty-year old resident of Changsha at the time of 
the riot, was along with Liu, a member of the same carpenter’s guild.  Zhang was also 
among the peasants that stormed into the yamen, and vividly recalled how Liu led them 
through the outer gate of the government compound:     
At twilight I was standing on the old screen wall opening near the 
ceremonial archway bearing the inscription “Protect the country, Aid the 
people” with Wu Shousong and I happened to see that there were many 
people outside the Futai yamen.  They were all yelling and cursing: “Dog 
government officials, so wicked that common people have no rice to eat”.  
Everyone was crying out and the emotion of the crowd was explosive, 
everyone rushed towards the outer gate of the yamen.  Suddenly I saw a 
short and stout fellow rush out from among the crowd, in his hand he 
brandished a shining saw and flew as fast as an arrow towards the east 
facing part of the yuanmen.  “Ah!, shorty Liu the third!” Liu Shaoming 
charged forward to the yuanmen where the sentry guards were using guns 
to block the crowd.  One of Liu Shaoming’s legs flew up and he kicked a 
guard to the ground, and after a few more swift steps he charged to the 
base of the mast located in front of the screen wall, lifted the saw high and 
started cutting.   
                                                
46 CSJY, Interview with Yu Changchun, 253-254.  
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When the crowd saw Liu Shaoming, they charged in, already extremely 
excited, all yelling, crowding through the archway.47 
 
Some of Zhang’s testimony exemplifies the tendency for oral histories to seem 
too dramatic.  Although skeptics might doubt the possibility of Liu Shaoming using 
kungfu to disable government sentries, Zhang’s memory of the event confirms that Liu 
was clearly involved in the incident, and played a significant role in leading the crowd.  
Gongfu practitioners like Liu Shaoming were common in Changsha at this time, their 
skills figuring prominently in the mythology of peasants who joined the Boxer movement 
in northern China the previous decade.  In fact, it is possible that Liu and others may 
have been among a small group of former Boxers rumored to have taken part in the riot.  
As the third of eight brothers, and known for his short stature, he was nicknamed “shorty 
Liu the third.”  Liu was also known as a kungfu teacher, holding classes and teaching 
students at night.  He was considered by many as “a forthright and hot-tempered man 
who loved to defend others from injustice and hated corrupt officials.”48   
Another former eyewitness noted that at the time the Qing government compound 
contained two very tall and prominent imperial masts:  
There were two, located at the two ends of the screen wall, one of them 
had a flag, the other had a square shaped object [on top] which displayed 
the rank of the imperial inspector. It was this one [the one that displayed 
the rank] that was sawed down.  Sawing down the mast was making a 
statement to the imperial inspector: I am going to saw you down!49 
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Thus by sawing down the imperial mast carpenters such as Liu Shaoming 
castrated state power.  At this time government compounds of provincial capital cities 
were barricaded behind walls, sealed off and isolated from the public.  This was also 
true for government personnel.  Since all cities in imperial China were thus surrounded 
on all sides by walls, the government yamen represented a walled city within a walled 
city, and according to G. William Skinner, represented the “quintessence of urbanism.” 50 
Not only did the peasants use kerosene to burn the government building, and cut down 
the imperial mast, but they also destroyed the screen barriers and walls, and turned over 
the ceremonial lions flanking the entrance.51  These stone lions were quite large and 
heavy, and meant to have special protective powers, from the time of the Han Dynasty 
appeared outside all imperial palaces, tombs, government temples, and homes of the 
wealthy.  After passing by the lions, when entering a traditional building or residence in 
imperial China, a guest would then come upon a screen or stone wall, known as the 
yuanmen, placed as obstructions to outsiders.  Through entering buildings with these 
types of screen barriers one was supposed to be intimidated by the power and influence 
of those inside. The power associated with these symbols, of the Qing’s imperial urban 
space, the burning of the government yamen by Changsha’s carpenters was a deliberate 
attack against state power and authority.  Since in the city of imperial China the 
government yamen was one of the most important urban structures, we can begin to 
                                                
50 G. William Skinner, “Introduction:  Urban and Rural in Chinese Society,” in G. William Skinner ed., 
The City in Late Imperial China (Stanford:  Stanford University Press,  1977),  254.    
51 CSJY, Interview with Yu Changchun, 253.  
  130 
recognize the magnitude of such an event, and how it influenced not only the local 
situation in Changsha, but also resonated throughout the empire.  
Other carpenters, such as Fan Yuanquan and Tan Chunsheng also witnessed the 
burning of the yamen.  Tan noted the precarious situation that Changsha’s carpenters 
faced at the time, that “the first, second, and third months of every year were the slow 
season for carpenters and caulkers; it was the hardest time of year to make it through.”52  
This coupled with the fact that many of the carpentry jobs were being outsourced to 
workers from Hubei, added to the carpenter’s stressful conditions.  Another carpenter 
involved in leading the attack was a certain He Wenqing, also “very skilled at martial 
arts, ” and something of a local tough man, known for his brute strength. 53 He was also 
at the front of the crowd that led peasants into the yamen.  After Liu Shaoming cut down 
the government mast, He Wenqing was seen carrying a bottle of kerosene.54  Other 
peasants participated in the spreading of kerosene around the compound, often exposing 
themselves to gunfire from government soldiers.  According to another eyewitness, 
“more than half of these people were craftsmen.  Some of them were shirtless, but even 
as cold as it was they were still sweating profusely.  The patrol soldiers stood below 
firing towards the direction of the roof, and shots whizzed by, but the rioters were not 
afraid at all.”55  Such testimony confirms those who attacked Changsha’s government 
buildings were led by robust and charismatic personalities such as Liu Shaoming and He 
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Wenqing.  These out of work urban laborers expressed their frustrations at the Qing 
government.  
Another body of work that contributes to our knowledge of the rice riot are 
several folk ballads.  The form and meaning of destroying symbols associated with state 
power inspired their composition, designed to remind the reader or listener that imperial 
authority had, in effect, been feminized and stripped of its dignity.  One of them reads: 
The lions in front of the yuanmen gate roar, 
long showing their sharp teeth and claws. 
But how can they get up after being pushed over? 
How can something so masculine become so feminine? 56 
 
Composed after the riot, such ballads still perform an important function related 
to how the event was recounted and interpreted in local memory. During the attack, 
government troops shot and killed at least ten rioters, and wounded several others.  In 
the aftermath of the riot, perpetrators were executed by firing squad on the other side of 
the river.  Likely invoking the tradition of in Chinese culture, of ghosts and spirits of 
ones who have died unjustly (yuanhun), another ballad reads:   
The ghosts of the dead howl and curse in front of the gate to the yamen,  
and the sound of the governor is muddled.   
How can a man of such small stature kill so many,  
and why shouldn’t the ghosts cry out? 57    
 
Another folk ballad proclaimed that the wrath of Hunan’s “fire god,” zhurong, 
had come upon the foreign businesses and churches (zhurong yu xing fu yang yang, fen 
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ba yanghang you jiaotang).58  Since antiquity the fire god played an important role in 
Changsha’s folk culture.  The peak of nearby Heng Mountain contains a temple 
dedicated to him, and it is considered one of China’s “five sacred peaks.”  Since the 
Ming Dynasty, one of Changsha’s most famous temples, Huo Gong Dian, or the “Fire 
Palace,” served as a site for zhurong worship.  Destruction of state symbols of authority 
informed by such folk beliefs suggests that despite having been led and incited by Yang 
Gong or Zhuang Gengliang, that at least some of the men who rioted in Changsha that 
spring day possessed a sense of justice, purpose, and direction.  This is also confirmed 
by the oral testimony of many former carpenters discussed above.  Since many of these 
men were members of carpenter’s guilds, this challenges the perception that the rioters 
were simply a “misorganized mob,” easily swayed by gentry leadership.59  Perhaps it is 
better to suggest that the carpenter’s interests dovetailed with the Changsha gentry, and 
having shared interests, became more agreeable to what places the gentry wanted them to 
attack.       
 
Conclusion 
 
 Because it lacked an intellectual or true revolutionary base the Changsha Rice 
Riot of 1910 was not a true revolutionary uprising.  By relying upon the testimonies of 
eyewitnesses and participants, the above discussion has attempted to suggest that the riot 
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was also more than simply a prelude to the 1911 revolution.  It was in the classic sense, 
a late Qing urban uprising, but one led by common people with very specific names, 
beliefs, and occupations.  By attacking both symbols of state power and foreign 
imperialism, carpenters and other peasants from the areas surrounding Changsha’s south 
gate expressed their own sense of justice and motivations for rioting.  Responding to 
allegations by the Qing government that revolutionary conspirators planned the qiangmi, 
one newspaper commentary noted that since it occurred spontaneously, the uprising 
obviously could not have been planned or preconceived by any of the revolutionary 
parties.60  Perhaps the most profound effect of the riot came through its coverage in 
media throughout China, influencing public opinion and setting the stage for the events of 
the Wuchang Uprising in 1911.        
The recollections of former participants and other Changsha residents also help us 
paint a picture of Changsha’s urban landscape in the late Qing, and the specific sites and 
locations they valued.  Life for South Gate Changsha residents in the late Qing was 
often adverse, and the riot represented an opportunity for various disenfranchised 
elements of society, such as local carpenters, to vent their frustrations with local 
leadership and the forces of westernization.  In many respects, the causes of the riot lay 
at the feet of gentry such as Ye Dehui, and the inaction of Governor Cen Cunming.  But 
placing too much emphasis on their roles diminishes the stories and narratives of those 
who actually participated in the rioting.  Characters such as Ye Dehui also need to be 
understood within the broader context of elite society in late Qing Changsha.  Their 
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influence over urban life during this period requires further scrutiny, a topic I turn to in 
the next chapter.  
  135 
4-The Refined Watchman 
 As a member of Changsha’s gentry elite and a major character in the intellectual 
and political life of the city, Ye Dehui (1864-1927), has gained little attention from 
contemporary historians.  His role in suppressing the Hundred Days of Reform in 1898 
has already been discussed with some detail in Chapter 2.  But his body of intellectual 
work, business and commercial interests, as well as his role in Changsha’s cultural and 
social life, all merit further attention.1 
Ye was despised by many of his contemporaries and even after his death in 1927 
continued to be the subject of disdain within communist interpretations of modern 
Chinese history.  Even Western historians followed suit.  For his crimes of hoarding 
grain during the 1910 rice riot, as well as his overall contempt for Changsha’s peasant 
class, Joseph Esherick noted that Ye’s execution in 1927 was a “just reward,” for crimes 
committed against the masses.2  Chinese language materials published in the early years 
of the post-Mao era generally shared this assessment as well, identifying Ye as one of late 
Qing Changsha’s “wicked gentry” (lie shen).  The opening sentences in the introduction 
of Ye Dehui Ping Zhuan, published in 1985, reads, “Ye Dehui represents modern Chinese 
history’s faction of conservative feudalism, and was Hunan’s most infamous wicked 
gentry.  During the reform movement of 1898 he attacked all the leaders of the reform 
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movement, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Tan Sitong, and achieved short-lived fame.”3  
Another source of Hunan historical materials published in the early 1980’s contains an 
article on Ye simply titled “The Wicked Gentry Ye Dehui,” in which among other things 
he is referred to as an “unscrupulous businessman and profiteer” (shikuai), “a local tyrant 
and bully” (di tou she), the tiger who lived on the mountain (zuo shan hu, in reference to 
his status as the local head of Pozi Street), and one who “most foully consorted with” 
(chou wei xiang tou) Wang Xianqian and other local gentry to oppose the reform 
movement of 1898.4  Even Angus McDonald, who to date has provided the only 
somewhat appreciative English language assessment of Ye, described him as a “loser,” 
“imperialist lackey,” “wealthy bibliophile, arrogant reactionary, and greedy rice 
merchant.”5  Fortunately contemporary scholars in main land China, such as Zhang 
Jingping, have begun to rethink Ye’s life and extensive scholarship, as well as the role he 
played Changsha’s social and economic scene during his lifetime.  The title of this 
chapter, “Refined Watchman,” comes from Professor Zhang’s four-character phrase, 
“Shou Wang Si Wen,” translated from the title of her work on Ye Dehui.6  
When combined with what we already know from the work of other scholars who 
have studied the gentry merchant class during the late Qing, we can recognize the 
importance in rethinking Ye’s role and legacy to not only Changsha’s but to China’s 
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intellectual history.  During these years he personified Hunan’s intense conservatism, 
and his influence in local affairs intensified the ideological hubris associated with Hunan 
and Changsha.  Before discussing his early years, background, and other exploits, I will 
first continue the discussion from the previous chapter by noting Ye’s own particular role 
in the rice riot of 1910.   
  
ROLE IN THE RICE RIOT 
 
 
A consistent theme in both English and Chinese language accounts of the qiangmi 
concerns the role of Changsha’s gentry elite in inciting and sometimes even leading the 
rioters.7 Well-known instances of direct gentry involvement include Kong Xianjiao and 
Yang Gong. Before the crowds stormed into the government yamen and while it was still 
surrounded, the crowd’s anger was reportedly aroused by Kong, who came out from the 
yamen to address them, saying that while Changsha’s people starved in the streets the 
city’s government spent spending money on railroad and school construction, part of the 
new reform projects initiated in the first decade of the new century. His remarks were met 
with applause and praise. Soon after the crowd stormed into the compound.8 Later Kong 
even reportedly dispatched his three sons to set a middle school on fire, piling desks and 
chairs up and setting them ablaze with pieces of their clothing doused with gasoline. 
                                                
7According to Joseph Esherick “The most convincing evidence of gentry direction is the pattern of 
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Yang Gong controlled the city’s fire brigade. When Western buildings throughout the 
city were burned, Yang used his influence to prevent the brigade from putting out the 
fires.9  Because of their control of Changsha’s rice market, other powerful gentry such 
as Ye Dehui and Wang Xianqian also bear responsibility for the qiangmi.    
 
Image 5-1.  Image believed to be Ye Dehui.  
One of late Qing Changsha’s most influential gentry. 
 
Rather than directly leading or inciting the unrest, Ye’s biggest offense during the 
qiangmi involved “possessing grain without selling it” (yougu bushou), hoarding at least 
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ten tons of grain.10 Yi Ren’gai, a former Changsha middle school teacher, recalled that 
Ye Dehui manipulated zhanpiao, or “store tickets,” used for grain purchase:  
Grain speculation, investment according to market fluctuations, and 
trading in zhanpiao, were all just like buying stocks.  Some bosses 
bought and sold grain that didn’t exist and used the zhanpiao to make 
money.  At the time there was something known as “wealthy man, fake 
customer” [zhencaizhu, jiakeren]. Those that issued “store tickets” had to 
rely on landlords to become wealthy.  These landlords [the gentry] 
controlled a large amount of zhanpiao and caused trouble in the grain 
market, always taking advantage of crop irregularities to raise the price of 
grain.11 
 
This suggests that gentry such as Ye pretended to be customers of the granaries as 
renters, but in fact they actually managed the granaries.  They became quite wealthy 
because they also owned the granaries.  Thus Ye Dehui clearly exploited the local grain 
market at the expense of the poor.  Some of the exact details of his involvement and 
prominent role in Changsha’s commercial life bear further thought.  In an alley in 
central Changsha called Fan Xi Xiang, Ye owned a rice shop and warehouse called 
Dechang he Qiandian.  This alley lay in the heart of Changsha’s old city, perpendicular 
to one of its most famous and active commercial thoroughfares, Pozi Street. During the 
late Qing Ye Dehui’s family managed and controlled Pozi Street, which also happened to 
be the location of Huo Gong Dian, the “Fire Palace.” Not only was this a site for 
worshipping zhurong, the fire god, but it was also an active civic center where one could 
go to eat local snacks, watch an opera, or drink tea.12 Pozi Street ran directly to the Xiang 
River and derived its name po meaning “sloping,” or “slanting” from the fact that it 
                                                
10 Yang Shiji, Xinhai geming qianhou shi shi, 153, 177. 
11 Interview with Yi Ren’gai, in Liu Duping and Tang Ying, Changsha jiyi, 265.  
12 Zhang Jingping. Ye Dehui shengping ji xueshu sixiang yanjiu (YDSP) (Changsha: Hunan shifan daxue 
chubanshe, 2008), 246ff.  Also see Yang Shiji, Xinhai geming qianhou shishi, 177.   
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sloped down to the riverfront, giving merchants and dockworkers easy access to the 
docks on the west bank of the river, where goods could be offloaded and carted up into 
the city center. 
Through his influence on Pozi Street Ye gained wealth through his business 
ventures and invested in Japanese shipping companies in Changsha.  This explains in 
large part the seemingly favorable attitude that Japanese merchants displayed toward him.  
Angus McDonald remarked that for wealthy gentry such as Ye, “one way to deal with the 
ongoing invasion from the west was to enjoy it.”13 Arthur Rosenbaum’s study of 
Changsha’s gentry during the riot notes that by the late Qing and especially after the city 
became a treaty port, the gentry’s wealth in the city was augmented by increased 
involvement in commercial ventures, making them “commercial capitalists.”14 
Many late Qing reformers, beginning with Liang Qichao, Kang Youwei, and 
others, embraced western philosophy, but were often critical and skeptical of the negative 
influence capitalism exerted on Chinese society.  With Ye we find the opposite.  His 
firm opposition to western philosophy and thinking on the one hand and his eagerness to 
engage in business with foreigners on the other, placed Ye Dehui at one side of a 
recurring paradox.  Amidst China’s contact with the West, these enigmatic men often 
struggled with how to cope with western modernization. As a pragmatic businessman it is 
no wonder that Ye took precautions to safeguard his business interests when the qiangmi 
                                                
13 McDonald, Urban Origins of Rural Revolution, 66–67.  
14 Rosenbaum, “Gentry Power,” 692. 
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broke out.  His pro business ideals were similar to the kind of Confucian pragmatism 
discussed by Kwang-ching Liu.15 
Ye Dehui’s speculation of the market, grain hoarding, and generally enigmatic 
and nefarious reputation in local society may have further incited contempt of the gentry 
from urban commoners. But local carpenters like Liu Shaoming and He Wenqing, 
discussed in the previous chapter, displayed their own rationale for participating in the 
unrest, irrespective of the gentry.  Though not an admission of guilt Ye later tried to 
account for his actions during the qiangmi in a letter to Zhang Zhidong’s advisor Miao 
Quansun:  
The riot in Hunan was an unprecedented tragedy (qiangu weiyou). Wang 
Xianqian and I did not dare go out, and the gentry were very worried.  
Because of the disorder, I anonymously telegraphed the Hunan governor, 
because I did not know what else to do. Kong Xianjiao, Yang Gong, and 
Zhuang Gengliang all tried to tell the crowds to go home, but their efforts 
were in vain, so there was some trouble, and there were signs of confusion 
(diandao zhiji).  This is why I did not sell grain, and so people blamed 
me for the trouble. But I still do not understand why everyone thought I 
was at fault.16 
 
That the riot was tragic and an “unprecedented” event in Hunan’s history and that 
there were definite “signs of confusion” was the closest Ye ever came to acknowledging 
guilt or regret over the affair.  His comments also need to be understood within the 
context of how he perceived himself as a member of elite society.  But how did he attain 
                                                
15 Liu, Kwang-ching “Confucian as Patriot,” 5–45.  
16Ye Dehui to Miao Quansun in Zhang Jingping, Ye Dehui shengping, 223–224.  For the full text of the 
letter see also, Ye Dehui zhi Miao Quansun, “Shisan/Guting long zhengli,” Yi feng tang youpeng shuzha,  
542.    
  142 
this status?  A deeper look into Ye’s past reveals both how he rose to prominence in the 
Changsha and how he exerted his influence on urban life.    
 
 
 
EARLY LIFE AND EDUCATION 
 
The Taiping Rebellion caused a flood of refugees to flee to urban centers, many to 
Shanghai, contributing to its growth as a commercial and trading port.  But others, such 
as the family of Ye Dehui, fled into China’s hinterland, allowing for smaller yet 
important river towns in the lower and middle Yangtze regions to grow and prosper 
commercially.  This explains the rise of Hankou’s commercial development during the 
late nineteenth century, and to a lesser degree Changsha’s.  The Ye’s originally hailed 
from Wu County in Jiangsu province, directly descended from the famous Song Dynasty 
scholar Ye Mengde (1077-1148).  But the Ye’s immigrated to Changsha during the 
mass migrations following the rebellion.  After settling in Changsha Ye’s father, Ye 
Junlan, opened a dyehouse on Pozi Street near the city center, and also made money as a 
salt merchant.  One of the main reasons for opening up of business at that specific 
location was its proximity to the Suzhou Guild House, or the huiguan, for the large 
number of Suzhou migrants living in Changsha following the Taiping.  The family also 
owned a residence in nearby Xiangtan, which Ye often claimed as his hometown.  
Dehui was born in 1864 at the Ye family residence near the “Small West Gate,” or Xiao 
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Xi Men, the very same area and alley where in later years he eventually became a 
dominating figure in local business and politics.    
 In 1880 Ye Dehui began his studies at the Yuelu Academy located at the foot of 
Yuelu Mountain on the western side of Changsha’s Xiang River, where he studied under 
the school of Neo-Confucianism.  The Yuelu Academy was founded during the 
Northern Song Dynasty.  At its height was one of the four most influential Confucian 
academies in the entire empire.  Neo-Confucianism dominated the intellectual life of the 
empire, owing to the thought of Zhu Xi (1130-1200).  Considered one of the fathers of 
the Neo-Confucian school during the Ming and Qing periods his commentaries on and 
interpretations of the Confucian classics became the basis for imperial examinations. 
During these dynasties Confucianism not only was considered the standard rubric for 
intellectual life, but also as a form of statecraft.  The generation ruled under this school 
produced a new class of educated gentry elites, who enjoyed power and prestige on par 
with county magistrates and high- ranking officials.  Thus students of any imperial 
academy in the empire would have been quite familiar or influenced by Zhu Xi’s 
teachings.  Following the end of the Southern Song the influence of the academy waned, 
but Zhu Xi’s teachings continued to influence the academy’s curriculum.17   
By the late nineteenth century the academy reestablished itself as a center of 
Confucian learning, and such was the intellectual climate Ye Dehui and his 
contemporaries became reared. While there he studied under Liu Peiheng, and a famous 
                                                
17 Zhang Jingping, YDSP, 39ff. 
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scholar from Ningxiang County named Cui Shi.18 In February 1884 Ye took part in the 
county-level examinations for Xiangtan, near Changsha, placing seventh.  The 
following May he advanced to become the prefectural magistrate for Changsha county.  
 In November 1884 Ye Dehui married the second daughter of Lao Deyang, of 
Shanhua County, whose family was also originally from Wu County in Jiangsu.  From 
Ming times the sons and fathers from the Ye and Lao clans transacted in business and 
frequently intermarried.  The Lao family were also the original founders and proprietors 
of the Jiu Zhi Tang medicine shop on Changsha’s Pozi Street, most of which was 
controlled by the Ye family. Thus, Ye’s marriage to one of Lao’s daughters solidified his 
ties and control within the city’s most important commercial area.19  
 Following his marriage Ye sat for the imperial examinations and passed, but soon 
came at odds with some of his elder contemporaries, notably Wang Kaiyun (1832-1916) 
and Guo Songtao.  In June 1886 Wang Kaiyun founded a poetry society, called the Bihu 
sishe, at Changsha’s Kaifu Temple north of the city’s main gate, comprised of nineteen 
members.  In 1888 the society invited Ye to join, but later he recalled his lack of interest 
in joining at the time, feeling that the society’s philosophy was nothing more than a 
jumbled mix of some good and some bad ideas. Thus even as a young scholar and early 
in his career, Ye established himself as an opponent of the reform school.20    
 In May of 1892 Ye successfully passed the dianshi exam, qualifying him to serve 
at the imperial court in Beijing, and to become a jingguan, or imperial court official.  
                                                
18 Zhang Jingping, Shou Wang Si Wen, 25.  
19 Zhang Jingping, Shou Wang Si Wen, 26.   
20 Ibid., 29.   
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His life in Beijing during these years primarily consisted of collecting books and working 
on the preservation of classical texts such as the Erya, the first dictionary of the Chinese 
language ever written. While at court Ye collected various versions of the Shuowen jiezi, 
another Chinese language dictionary, and moved these texts to back to his home in 
Jiangsu. Reflecting on his experiences in these years Ye noted, “When I was working in 
Beijing, the scholar officials were still abundant in the teachings from the times of 
Qianlong and Jiaqing. Everyday when returning home from work or when resting, I 
worked on collecting my books. I often bore many books with tattered covers back to my 
home.”21     
 
INTELLECTUAL LIFE, WORKS, AND THE ARTS 
 
Ye spent much of his life collecting manuscripts and books.  From 1895 until 
1919, he edited and compiled the Guan Gu Tang Shu Mu Cong Ke, a collection of 
various writings from his fifteen most important predecessors.  In Cang Shu Shi Yue, 
“Ten Rules for Collecting Books,” Ye identified the ten most basic problems of book 
preservation.  These involved purchase, sorting/distinguishing, decoration and 
packaging, display, copying and repairing, transcribing/copying, collating, making 
comments on, collecting, and finally, imprinting and tracing.  The legacy of this book 
remained important despite Ye’s negative reputation among Communists, as it was 
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reprinted in 1957.22 This was especially true following the Wuchang Uprising, which he 
associated with the peasant rebellions of the late Ming and the Taiping Rebellion of the 
Qing.  One of his most important and enduring works came out of the debate between 
Ye and reformers in 1898, when he was the leading voice of opposition against Kang 
Youwei and Liang Qichao’s thought and the Southern Study Society in Changsha.  In Yi 
Jiao Cong Bian, he criticized not only Kang and Liang, but also Viceroy Zhang Zhidong 
as well.  The yi in the title is the character used for “different,” “other,” “unusual,” or 
“strange,” and was obviously indented to emphasize the unorthodox character of the 
teachings of the Kang-Liang reform faction.   
From Yi Jiao Cong Bian, in the “The Superiority of China and Confucianism,” Ye 
stated his views on the differences of China and the West, claiming there were many 
good things about Western philosophy and thought.  But the Chinese intellectual 
tradition was far superior.  He argued that the traditions of the imperial monarchy, rule 
by elites, and civil service examination system, each in their own ways were superior to 
western learning: 
[Mencius said:] “The people are the most important element in a nation,” 
not because people consider themselves important, but because the 
sovereign regards them as important. And it is not people’s rights that are 
important.  Since the founding of the Ch’ing [Qing] dynasty our revered 
rulers have loved the people as their own children. Whenever the nation 
has suffered from calamity such as famine, flood and war, the emperor has 
immediately given generous relief upon its being reported to provincial 
officials.23  
 
                                                
22 McDonald, Urban Origins, 64.  
23 Yeh Te-hui, “The Superiority of China and Confucianism,” in William Theodore DeBary, et. al. eds., 
Sources of Asian Tradition, Vol. II.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. 
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 Two things stand out in this statement.  First it is obvious that Ye completely 
rejected western individualism, as well as concepts such as peoples rights and democracy. 
Following this passage he also remarked that if China were to be governed “by the 
people,” the result would be “different policies from many groups, and strife and 
contention will rise.”24 It also reveals some contradictions in light of what we know 
about his grain hoarding during the rice riot.  Perhaps as a businessman he felt it was the 
state’s duty to provide for public welfare, rather than his own?  But his rejection of 
western modernity should not be completely dismissed.  This is especially true given 
what we know about the chaotic and violent progression of China’s development 
following the Revolution of 1911.  Because the years that followed resulted in the 
failure of western democracy to be established in China, his views were in some ways 
prophetic.  Ye knew as well as any, that centuries of Confucian statehood could not 
simply be cast aside in favor of a system alien and foreign to Chinese culture.         
Although Ye became known as one of most hardline conservatives of the day, his 
patronage of the Changsha opera is worth noting.  He and his family founded, financed, 
and managed Changsha’s first modern, Hunan River opera troupe and theater companies, 
such as the Tong Chun Ban and the Tong Chun Yuan.  Prior to his day, Hunan had 
already established a tradition and culture of local theater and opera, all performed in the 
local dialect.  Due to the fact that the Ye family’s Huo Gong Dian temple complex also 
housed one of the largest stages and performance venues in the city, naturally Ye’s 
family took an interest in promoting the arts. The Tong Chun Ban opera troupe was 
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divided into four different classes based on quality. The highest were the heaven (tian) 
and the earth (di) troupes, who held performances at Huo Gong Dian and other venues 
throughout the city.  Fees for admission for these shows ranged between twenty and 
twenty-four copper cash.  The lower quality troupes were known as black (xuan), and 
yellow (huang). These troops usually performed in private residences, charging a cheaper 
fare of twelve or sixteen copper cash. Performers within each class were responsible for 
making and maintaining their own costumes.25  
Viewing opera was an activity that Ye Dehui frequently engaged in with his 
contemporaries and mentors among the local scholar gentry, Wang Xianqian and Wang 
Kaiyun in particular, and they were often seen together at performances.  During the 
winter of 1901 Wang Kaiyun invited Ye to his residence to see a special performance of 
opera, but was disappointed that his protégé did not attend. This suggests that not only 
was local opera an important component of the leisure life of the gentry elite, but that it 
served as a kind of signifier of the bonds between mentors and their students.  One of 
the main contributions Ye made to Changsha’s opera scene was through his compiling, 
editing, and writing of standard opera classics.26      
It was said that Ye Dehui even participated and acted in some Xiang Opera 
performances, even playing female roles. The dan jue was one of the four main 
characters in traditional Chinese opera, and a typically female role.  Similar to 
Shakespeare’s time, female parts in opera or dramatic performances were also usually 
                                                
25 Yuan Qinshu, “Xiang ju gong gong chen Ye Dehui,” Zhongguo wen xue yan jiu, Huxiang wen hua, no. 
2 (China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House, 2008), 113-116.  
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played by men.  But in the world of traditional China, associating with actors, or even 
performing as one ranked among the lowest occupations, on par with prostitution.27 A 
popular traditional idiom about the reputation of actors during Ye’s day was literally 
“Whores have no feeling and actors have no meaning,”(biaozi wuzing, xizi wuyi) which 
may have also contributed to Ye’s infamous reputation among Changsha’s citizenry.  
He was known for having a hedonistic lifestyle, which probably only reinforced such 
stereotypes.  It was said that he frequented brothels, consorting with both female and 
male prostitutes, and owned pornography.  He was “the wickedest man in Changsha,” 
and “full of disgrace.”  Another former resident noted, “prostitutes, gambling, a carefree 
lifestyle; there was nothing he wouldn’t do.  How could he be called talented?”28 
Based upon what we already know from Ye’s suppression of the 1898 reform 
movement in Changsha, coupled with how he was viewed by locals during the time of the 
rice riot, we now have a better understanding of his influence in Changsha society during 
the late Qing.  His hoarding of grain also makes it clear that he was serious about his 
business interests, to the point of neglecting the needs of the local population in a time of 
crisis.  In this way one might say that as a powerful intellectual and gentry elite Ye 
projected his own form of hegemonic masculinity onto Changsha’s urban landscape, one 
fully embedded in the Confucian tradition and distinctly Chinese.  Gender studies on 
Chinese masculinity has argued for understanding the binary opposition between wen, 
translated as “culture” or “civility,” and wu, meaning the “physical” or “martial,” and 
                                                
27Interview with Xiong Pingsheng. In Liu Duping and Tang Ying, Changsha jiyi, 248. 	  
28 Ibid. Ye also owned and operated some of Changsha’s opera houses.  Also see Interview with Lei 
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usually associated with warfare.  Both of these concepts can “be applied to a broad 
range of classes as a paradigm for conceptualizing maleness.”29 In classical Chinese 
literature the ideal type of man was often viewed as one who embodied both of these 
traits; for instance, one who was adept at writing verse and poetry but also displayed 
prowess on the battlefield.  But as with any form there often emerged dichotomies, 
where “wu became associated with non-elite masculinity at various times in China’s past, 
while wen was a more often elite masculine form.”30  It is obvious then that if Ye 
embodied either of these, it was certainly wen, the kind of civility of a Confucian scholar.                
 
THE FIRE PALACE AND POZI STREET CONTROVERSY 
 
From the time the Ye family settled in Changsha in the mid-1860’s, they virtually 
dominated Pozi Street’s life and commercial activity, much of which was based out of 
Huogong Dian, and owned half of all the businesses and shops on the street. The Ye 
family’s connection to their home province of Jiangsu was likely maintained through the 
Suzhou guild house as well as shops from numerous other provinces, most of which dealt 
in medicine or herbs. For instance, the East and West Henan Medicine Holding 
Companies, the Anhui Elegant Writing Shop, the Jiangxi Taihua Jin, the Jiangsu Ye 
Health and Eye Medicine Shop, the Jiangsu Jiu Zhi Tang Medicine Shop, and the Ye 
Gong He Dye house.  A local money house, the Changsha Yantai Shun Qianzhuang, 
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was also located on Pozi Street. As noted above, the dye house was started by Ye’s father 
when he first arrived in Changsha sometime in the late 1850’s or early 1860’s, and by 
marriage Ye Dehui became associated with the family who owned Jiu Zhi Tang.  
Because of its name the Ye’s also probably owned the eye and medicine shop, also based 
out of Jiangsu.  These businesses comprised Pozi Street’s lao ba jia, or “eight main 
shops,” as it was then referred to.31           
First built in 1747 and rebuilt in 1826, Huo Gong Dian served as both a site of 
patronage and worship for Hunan’s fire god zhurong, and also as an entertainment venue, 
teahouse, and host to numerous street vendors, shops, and performances of Hunan River 
opera.  As the street’s main temple complex, as well as one of the commercial and civic 
centers of the entire city.  After its reconstruction the temple complex encompassed a 
large area of old central Changsha, covering approximately sixteen mu of urban space 
(equivalent to 2.5 acres).  As with most temples when one entered they passed under a 
memorial arch and entered a large courtyard.  In the center lay not only the Fire God 
Temple, but also an opera stage, the Amicable Pavilion, The Universal Charity Pavilion, 
as well as the Temple of the God of Fortune, or Cai Shen Miao.32 Later called Fu Lu 
Gong, this temple was Changsha’s temple for caishen, or the “god of wealth,” and also 
the center for the city’s cai shen hui, or “wealth organization.”  During the late Qing 
each old style bank or money house in the city, known as qian zhuang, had to pay a 
special fee of fifty taels paifei, or “placard fee,” to the Caishen Miao for membership.  
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32 Liu Guochu and Tang Yifan eds., Huo miao wen hua: Huo Gong Dian (Changsha: Changsha yin shi ji 
tuan huo gong dian you xian gong si, 2004), 8. 
  152 
In order for a qianzhuang to identify itself as a legitimate enterprise and advertise itself as 
such, it had to place a placard noting so outside its place of business.  Thus it gave 
someone like Ye Dehui a large amount of control over many of the financial and business 
transactions in the city.33   
In 1896 Caishen Miao officially became Fulu Gong, and as such contributed to 
Changsha’s wealth and commercial activity. The Huo Gong Dian complex, including the 
temple for the fire god and the god of wealth, made it one of the old city’s most important 
urban centers for business, but also a key center of local power and politics during the 
late Qing.  Its importance was most reflected in the formation of the “Public Security 
Corps,” or bao an tuan, or more specifically, the Changsha “Bao an xi zheng gong suo.”  
During the late Qing such organizations played a prominent role in city life, as this 
particular “corps” (tuan) of Fulu Gong became one of Changsha’s most influential civic 
organizations, primarily because its jurisdiction encompassed most of the surrounding 
streets adjacent to or very near Pozi Street; for instance Xin Pozi Jie, Bao An Jie, Shuang 
jing jie, etc.34   
The formation of community management through “street corps,” or jietuan, in 
Changsha dates back to the Taiping Rebellion, begun under the patronage of Zeng 
Guofan.  Also mentioned briefly in the first chapter, the Changsha gazetteer from the 
reign of the Tongzhi Emperor (1861-1875) distinguished between “village corps” or 
duanlian, and its urban counterpart by noting that the village corps were usually headed 
                                                
33 Zhang Jingping, YDSP, 247.   
34 Ibid., 248.  
  153 
and managed by local gentry while the city corps was managed by local officials, and that 
it did “not interfere with the daily life of the people though it checks the neighborhood 
household by household.  The village corps must train recruits, yet the urban corps only 
tightens the baojia control.”  More importantly was that the two institutions were funded 
by different agencies, with local militias being financed by contributions from villagers, 
and the urban organizations with subsidies from the local government.35 It also 
established the guidelines for the formation of the jietuan within each of Changsha’s 
neighborhood districts, of upper, eastern, middle, western, and lower, totaling eighty-
seven corps, and that each corps was responsible for security in their respective districts.  
For instance, if an individual was arrested for a wrongdoing or suspected of being a local 
bandit, they would be subject to punishment by the local corps and made to report to a 
local gentry who usually served as the corps leader.  Such would have been the 
responsibilities of “leaders” such as Ye Dehui.  In times of emergency households in 
each district were required to send able-bodied men “to watch the fortress [the city gate] 
at night and to register the people who pass.  These night watchmen are also paid. In 
addition each of the city gates is assigned civilian and military officials as well as a guard 
of soldiers, who check and make inquires of those who pass through.”36 The gazetteer 
for neighboring Shanhua county during the Guangxu reign (1871-1908), similarly 
accounted for this kind of neighborhood security, that a city such as Changsha did “not 
need to train militia, but only need[ed] to strictly implement the baojia (the system of 
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household registration common in imperial China) system, which suffices to purge 
vicious people and to prevent disorder.”  He Wenping argues that Changsha’s network 
of street corps was managed by local gentry and urban elite, and that it represented a 
“hybrid” of the urban household registration (baojia) and the urban militia (tuanlian) 
systems.37            
During the late Qing Changsha contained two-hundred and fifty-four “sections” 
or “wards” (tuan), with each having its own tuanzong or “community leader.”  Each 
street within a tuan also had its own zhinian, or “street warden.” Since the headquarters 
for the Pozi Street bao an organization and Huogong Dian were virtually one in the same, 
both had the same street warden.  During the late Qing this post was usually filled by 
one of the eight most influential households in the community.  Although the Ye family 
had never been among the most wealthy of all the families, for much of Dehui’s life the 
post of tuanzong was held by his father, which upon his death in September 1912 allowed 
for Dehui to assume the post. The tuanzong of Huogong Dian was also the senior 
community leader, or zong tuanzong, of all Changsha’s tuan’s.38 A year after his father’s 
death Ye’s reflections about his new appointment were printed in the Changsha Ribao, 
under the title “An Announcement from Ye Dehui:”   
Since my childhood your humble servant has grown up on Pozi Street, and 
inherited my father’s business from four previous generations. Since 
before the time of the Qing, and for the last two dynasties, we have been 
called the leaders of this community and ward, there have been many 
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arrangements.  The Ye family name has always been among the leading 
candidates for the post of community leader.39  
 
Becoming community leader also allowed for Ye to assume the post of the 
zhinian or street warden for Pozi Street as well as the entire Huo Gong Dian complex.  
Thus Ye Dehui simultaneously held three key positions of urban governance: senior 
community leader, community leader, and street warden. Such authority, coupled with 
his leadership over all of Huo Gong Dian, gave him a significant amount of control over 
much of Changsha’s business and civic related matters. 
In his well-known study of Hankou during the same period, William Rowe 
challenged the theory that cities in imperial China often lacked a clearly defined Central 
Business District, classifying them as pre-capitalist spaces of urban production.  While 
he notes that sections of Hankou were organized according to trade but were never in one 
central area, he nonetheless argues that Hankou also “conformed in important respects to 
the model of land use and land value distribution in the ‘capitalist’ city.”40  Thus the 
significance of Huo Gong Dian, Pozi Street, and Ye Dehui’s family for late Qing 
Changsha’s commercial, cultural, and civic prosperity was obvious. His position as senior 
community leader also granted him a distinct advantage when it came to having a say in 
affairs related to commerce as well as local governance.   
Joseph Esherick and Mary Rankin’s edited volume on elite society in the late 
Qing and early Republican periods suggests a “patterns of dominance” model, that elites 
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during this period advanced “their political objectives by forming associations, which 
then become resources in a new structure of political contention.”41 Thus in the case of 
Ye Dehui the influence of his family and his role as leader of the bao an organization 
possibly represented a “new structure” of contention and local power, one that emerged 
in wake of the rapid commercialization and erosion of state power following the Taiping 
Rebellion—processes that even played out in a isolated hinterland locality such as 
Changsha.  According to Chang Chung-li’s seminal study on the role of the gentry in 
nineteenth century China, out of all the provinces Hunan contained the highest number of 
gentry “newcomers,” following the Taiping Rebellion, which he attributed to the 
influence of Zeng Guofan’s militia army. “Newcomers” were defined as those who 
achieved gentry status not by virtue of their family but more likely owing to merit or their 
advanced social position. More importantly is that in wake of the rebellion the entire 
Qing Empire witnessed a significant growth in the number of gentry.42  Chang’s other 
influential study on gentry income during the same period notes the influence of the salt 
trade in contributing to and augmenting their wealth and status. The growth of the salt 
trade also grew in conjunction with increased trade with the West and opening of treaty 
ports. This necessitated the presence of financial institutions and large capital capable of 
sustaining the growing market. “Only the privileged gentry,” noted Chang, “especially 
the upper gentry, had the capital and the connections to handle these mercantile 
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activities.”43  What is also interesting to note is that while the salt trade and involvement 
with Western merchants may have facilitated the growth of gentry and their financial 
networks in the coastal provinces as well as other major ports along the Yangtze such as 
Hankou, locales such as Changsha remained comparatively isolated from such activity.  
This perhaps explains why local elites such Ye Dehui became so powerful.  In a very 
large way the Taiping diaspora and his family’s subsequent settlement in central 
Changsha created the perfect conditions for Ye’s eventual wealth and success.   
On late October 31, 1912 one of Changsha’s most famous and notable hometown 
heroes of the Revolution of 1911, Huang Xing (1874-1916), returned home.  As his boat 
docked Governor Tan Yankai, local officials, and a multitude of the city’s residents 
presented him with a twenty one-gun salute.  Thousands crowded in the streets to get a 
view of Huang and “raise hats in respect” (tuomao).  Huang entered the city at Xiao Xi 
Men, the “Small West Gate,” which ran perpendicular to Pozi Street, where Huang’s 
welcome parade began.  As a gesture of respect city officials decided to change the 
name of the small west gate to “Huang Xing Men,” and the name of Pozi street to 
“Huang Xing Road.”  Huang himself later politely refused this gesture, but upon his 
visit signs had already appeared indicating the name change.44   
While Huang Xing visited Changsha, Ye Dehui was in nearby Xiangtan attending 
over his father’s funeral.  When he returned to Changsha to discover that the placards 
bearing the name of Pozi Street were replaced by Huang Xing’s, he became incensed. Ye 
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promptly had them taken down and replaced them with the original placards, reportedly 
observing that such gestures represented nothing more than a “foolish gesture of flattery” 
(hu mei gong yu).  He composed an essay “On Recovering the Name of Pozi Street,” 
(guang fu po zi di ming ji) viciously criticizing the frenzy aroused by Huang Xing’s visit, 
calling for the ancient names of many streets, landmarks, and temples throughout 
Changsha to be renamed in Huang Xing’s honor.  
Ye sarcastically observed that if cities in China were to follow the example of the 
United States and name public places after national leaders, then why not name the ferry 
that crossed the Xiang River after Huang Xing, or for that matter some of the public pits 
where residents dumped their trash?  One cannot help but note a certain amount of irony 
in Ye’s sarcasm.45 After 1949 the names of public streets and place names in cities 
throughout China, many of which had existed since antiquity, were changed to reflect the 
legacy of the communist revolution as well as honor martyred heroes.  For instance, in 
Changsha today one finds streets named “Cai ‘E Road,” and “Huang Xing Road,” named 
after famous revolutionaries.  Most cities all over China today also have streets with 
names such as “Liberation Road” (Jie Fang Lu), “People’s Road,” (Ren Min Lu) and 
“May 1 Road,” (Wu Yi Lu).  There remains no such road(s) for Ye Dehui.  Following 
the Revolution of 1911 and the fall of the Qing dynasty, such actions represented a direct 
challenge to Ye’s traditionalism and influence over local society.  A local revolutionary 
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hero, Huang Xing, was a literal embodiment of the changes that began taking place in 
cities such as Changsha but also throughout China after the fall of the Qing.         
Shortly following the Huang Xing incident, Ye faced an additional challenge from 
the new reformist currents that emerged after the Revolution of 1911.  Not long after he  
assumed his position as community leader Ye entered into conflict with the Changsha 
Women’s Federation.  In the spring of 1913 the leader of Changsha’s women’s 
movement, Tang Qunying, made a proposal to rent out the space of the “Protect the 
Country Temple,” or Huguo Si, also located on Pozi Street, as a school for girls.  Her 
proposal even won the praise of Zeng Guofan’s relatives.  She also petitioned to Tan 
Yankai, then Hunan’s provincial military governor, to provide the funds to convert the 
temple into a school, who initially approved the measure.  The women’s organization 
also notified the street wardens (zhinian) of the Pozi Street Public Security Corps (bao an 
tuan) that since the Huoguo Si had been built under the patronage of Zeng Guofan’s 
family in 1850, they should have the right to change it into a school.  But the women 
were unable to produce a contract or deed proving such ownership.46     
To counter these efforts, Ye Dehui and the wardens also jointly petitioned Tan 
Yankai, stating that the Huo Guo Si was property of the Pozi Street community 
organization, and that Zeng Linsheng and the women’s union had no right to transform 
the temple into a school.  Ye and the other wardens also argued that arrangements had 
already been made to convert the same temple into a railroad school, and that students 
had not yet arrived.  Finally, the petition also urged Governor Tan to rescind his 
                                                
46 Zhang, YDSP, 250.  
  160 
approval for the women’s school.  Shortly after this, Tang Qunying and the women’s 
union issued their own petition, but in the form of leaflets, stating that Ye Dehui had no 
right to interfere, and that any matter related to Huo Guo Si’s future lay in the Zeng 
family’s hands. Tang and other union members even went to some of the zhinian directly, 
pleading for them to reconsider.47  
 Ye became so incensed over the matter that he bitterly and sarcastically attacked 
the women’s movement, but also insinuated a similar dislike for Tan Yankai, calling him 
a “bully.”48 After the Revolution of 1911 Ye had cast himself as an enemy of the 
revolutionary parties and constitutional factions.  He and other conservatives also 
became alarmed by the change that swept over Tan Yankai and other constitutionalists 
following the revolution.  Prior to the revolution Tan served as a jinshi and then leader 
of the provincial assembly.  He had been the first scholar from Hunan to earn first place 
in the jinshi exam in two hundred years.49 Thus there may have been a degree of envy on 
the part of Ye and others, who may have held high expectations for Tan, but he 
disappointed the traditionalists because of his aspirations to serve in the new republican 
government.  He was also the top official in the province.  With his scholar 
background Tan was also a huge advocate of educational reform and the founding of new 
schools, which explains why he may have had such a keen interest in founding the new 
girl’s school.        
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But in the change of power following the Qing’s abdication, Ye and others 
believed Tan became consumed by a lust for power, and in the manner of Yuan Shikai 
assumed complete military control of Hunan as provincial governor.  Since the 
Changsha Women’s Union sought Tan’s support and patronage to change a local temple 
into a school, they obviously drew Ye’s suspicions.  What is also interesting to note 
about Ye’s editorial in the Changsha Ribao was his willingness to adopt to the changing 
modern conventions of the day.  He used a newspaper to air his grievances.  Ye and the 
conservatives also believed that such occasions represented an opportunity for both sides 
to express their opinions on Hunan’s future.  Posting of this struggle in the pages of a 
local newspaper also made the controversy open to the public.  For the first time literate 
residents could become informed about local events, as well as the goings on and thought 
related to one of the city’s most wealthy and powerful residents.   
The incidents involving Huang Xing and the ChangshaWomen’s Federation such 
represented one of the first instances following the Revolution of 1911 that cracks 
appeared in the foundation of Ye’s traditionalist regime and their influence on 
Changsha’s public sphere. The first obvious break emerged during 1910, when Ye and 
other gentry holed up in their homes in fear of hoarding rioters.  But this time the 
challenge came from a local revolutionary hero, Huang Xing.  Tang Qunying, an activist 
reformer in her own right, was part of the new generation of students after 1898 who 
received a liberal education abroad in Japan.  In this way the Hundred Days of Reform 
were not a complete failure.  More on this will be discussed in Chapter 6.  But Tang’s 
dispute with Ye Dehui also represented the changing gender dynamics at work at work in 
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Changsha following the Revolution of 1911; a confrontation between a reformist woman 
leader, and Ye Dehui, the hegemonic urban overlord with a nefarious and some would 
say misogynistic reputation.           
In the Changsha Ribao the Pozi Street Public Security Corps (bao an tuan) also 
posted an editorial expressing their views, stating that a special meeting had been 
convened.  They certified that Hu Guo Si was property of the street association, and that 
the family of Zeng Fuofan and the Women’s Federation had no authority to convert it 
into a girl’s school.50 In Ye’s defense another point to consider is that in August 1912 he 
used temple funds to create one of Changsha’s first modern primary schools, the Li Ze 
School, which remained open well into the 1980s.  After it opened children from poor 
families could attend for free.  Thus it is obvious that Ye was an advocate and supporter 
of education.  But his reaction to the women’s schools was also a reflection of his 
conservative opposition towards reform.                 
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   Image 5-2. Photograph of Ye Dehui.  
Photo courtesy of Ren Bo.51 
 
 Image 5-2 is a photograph take of Ye Dehui sometime after the Revolution of 
1911.  What a change in appearance revolution makes!  Even to the neutral observer 
this presents a much better likeness of Ye Dehui than Image 5-1, and suggests the 
character of a man one might want to have a drink with in a Changsha teahouse—his 
reputation notwithstanding.  The contrast of the two photographs of Ye could not be 
more apparent.  Image 5-1 was taken of Ye at a time when the standards for men’s 
fashion in the Qing dynasty were still the established norm.  He wears traditional 
Confucian robes and a cap, and it is apparent that his head is shaved in accordance with 
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the tradition that all men throughout the Qing empire wore their hair in a queue, shaved 
in front and braided in the back.  Image 5-2 depicts Ye much differently.  In this 
photograph, perhaps taken sometime after the revolution of 1911 or in the immediate 
years prior, he appears more serene and less hostile.  He has grown hair on the top of his 
head and wears eyeglasses.  After abdication of the Qing imperial court and 
establishment of the new republic, the traditional queue was viewed as a representation of 
China’s backwardness and even outlawed.  Young men cut their queues off and began 
growing their hair out as signs of liberation and modernity.  But for some, such as those 
from Ye’s generation and older, cutting the queue off was difficult and hard to bear 
because it amounted to a rejection from their cultural heritage and its traditions.  Many 
in fact were even forced to cut their queues off.  These photographs represent the 
contrasts in Ye’s character in this chapter, as they are expressive of the ideological 
tensions between Confucian orthodoxy and tradition on the one hand, versus reform, 
revolution, and modernity on the other.  In the Introduction I noted the importance of 
moving beyond the construction of binary oppositions and the need for a “third way,” to 
writing history.  In this case oftentimes the individual historical actors we write about 
often did not have the luxury of “complexity.” Rather, their time and place functioned 
within extremes.  Such was the case with figures such as Ye Dehui.     
During the midst of all the controversy caused by the rivalries with Tang 
Qunying, Tan Yankai, and Huang Xing, Ye was obviously worried that his influence over 
local affairs was being threatened.  In late May 1913 he organized a special meeting of 
all community leaders of Changsha’s 254 wards at Huo Gong Dian.  But during the 
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meeting government troops suddenly barged in, seized Ye, and escorted him to the South 
Gate police station.  The sight of soldiers escorting one of Changsha’s most wealthy and 
powerful officials created quite a stir among onlooking bystanders.  Some shops even 
closed their shutters and a crowd of curious locals followed behind.  When forced inside 
the station Ye cried out for help.  The small crowd that followed soon turned into 
several hundred, and some of the bystanders explained that no matter what crime Ye was 
alleged to have committed, he was still the community leader of Changsha’s most 
powerful Public Security Corps, and the proprietor of Huo Gong Dian, and the matter 
should be settled by the community organization and not the local police.  Alarmed at 
the sight of such a large crowd and uncertain of how to handle the situation, the chief of 
police ordered Ye escorted back to Huo Gong Dian. Some of the crowd gathered there 
called for a citywide boycott and the closing of all businesses, and others for an armed 
uprising. Tan Yankai ordered government troops to the temple to disperse the crowd, and 
Ye was spirited away by sedan chair out of the city for his own safety.52  Shortly 
following his arrest and release, a certain battalion commander named Zhang leveled 
three indictments against Ye Dehui:  Failing to discharge his duties as community 
leader, was responsible for the massacre of many of his countrymen, and that after the 
Qing government’s abdication he went into hiding.  Furthermore, he not only sabotaged 
efforts to found a women’s school, but also allegedly humiliated and beat one of the 
leaders of the local women’s federation.  Finally, during the rice riot and other grain 
shortages of previous years Ye took advantage of his power as a prominent leader of 
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Changsha’s Public Security Corps to influence the local rice market and disrupt the 
distribution of relief grain to the poor and needy.53  Shortly following the Pozi Street 
women’s school controversy he fled Changsha.  He first went to Wuhan and eventually 
to Shanghai, where he met in exile with fellow compatriots sympathetic to the former 
dynasty who were also weary of the drastic changes brought by reform and the new 
republic.    
 The events of spring 1913 also took place within the context of tumultuous 
national events.  In opposition to Yuan Shikai’s despotic aims, in March Song Jiaoren 
and his faction declared the “Second Revolution.”  In May, the same month of Ye 
Dehui’s arrest, the provincial governors of Hunan, Jiangxi, and Anhui declared their 
provinces independent, and sent an open telegram to Yuan Shikai. Tan Yankai was the 
head signee.  But in October Yuan Shikai dispatched Tang Xiangming and a army of 
soldiers to Hunan to not only pacify the province but to establish Tang as the new 
provincial governor and minister of civil affairs, forcing Tan out of power and to seek 
refuge in Shanghai.   
 Within this unstable climate Ye Dehui returned from temporary exile back to 
Changsha, remaining secluded at his residence in the city center to avoid detection.  
Soon after arriving Tang had many of Tan Yankai’s head ministers executed by firing 
squad, as well as many as 17,000 loyalists and others somehow affiliated with the 
government or suspected of sedition.  Through this Tang earned the name “Tang the 
butcher.”  Though intensely critical of Tan Yankai’s tenure and even subject to arrest 
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and ridicule by his government, he certainly did not support Tang Xiangming.  So once 
again he put ink to paper to express his opinions, this time distaste for Tang’s brutality, 
calling his short period of governance “an era of banditry.”54 Ye also referred to Tang as 
“a suckling, sniveling babe who naturally wants to study Zeng Guofan and Zuo 
Zongtang.”55 When Tang read Ye’s denunciation in the Ya xi ya bao, he became furious 
and ordered for Ye to be seized and arrested at his residence.  Late on the evening of 
January 23, 1914, soldiers surrounded Ye’s courtyard home.  But getting wind of the 
situation before he could be apprehended, he fled to the roof of his house to hide.  Later 
he found refuge inside a western bank—no doubt because of his financial connections 
and business dealings—and by the next morning had fled the city by boat to Wuhan.  
The next day Tang Xiangming issued a three thousand jin reward bounty for Ye’s 
capture.56     
 Luckily for Ye Dehui, Yuan Shikai summoned Tang back to Beijing to reprimand 
him for not following orders.  Later secret agents arrested Tang in Wuhan.  By the time 
of Tang’s arrest Yuan guaranteed Ye that there had been a misunderstanding, but it was 
too late.  Despite Yuan Shikai’s pardon, Tang had already secretly ordered for Ye 
Dehui’s arrest.  He was eventually found in a Changsha opera house and taken into 
custody.  But some of his allies within the gentry and literary communities throughout 
China quickly rushed to his aide.  Even the vice premier of China at the time, Chen 
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Qingying, all petitioned the Beijing government for his release. Ye also called upon an 
unexpected ally, Tang Hualong, Tang Xiangming’s oldest brother, who defended Ye and 
advocated for his release.  Thus not only could Ye count on such friends to help him in a 
time of need, but it also reveals the extent of his connections outside Changsha.  He was 
eventually set free.57             
The events of May 1913 also provide an interesting comparison to those of the 
rice riot three years before, when angry crowds gathered at the South Gate police station 
demanding the release of a local carpenter, Liu Yongfu.  In both cases authorities were 
swayed by the urging of the crowd, in this case placing more faith in the ability of 
preexisting institutions to administer justice rather than the city’s newer and more 
“modern” police force.  This also casts Ye Dehui in a different light from the testimony 
of south Changsha residents who seemed to have despised him.  Rather the account in 
Shenbao suggests that the crowd sympathized with Ye and demanded for his release. 
Were residents at the time completely distrustful of the local reform government and its 
modern manifestations, regardless of who was taken into custody or arrested?  While 
one can never know the thoughts and intentions of the masses, it at least suggests that in 
late Qing Changsha Ye was indeed a polarizing figure.  
Ye Dehui opposed the opening of a women’s school at a local temple and the 
renaming of Pozi Street in honor of Huang Xing in newspaper editorials.  These were 
both moves by Ye to secure his power base in the community at a time when he felt his 
influence in local society was being challenged.  In previous years, the reform 
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movement of 1898 being one example, Ye aired his grievances with reformers through a 
more scholarly and academic route, typified by his criticism of Liang Qichao, Zhang 
Zhidong, and others in works such as Yi Jiao Cong Bian.  But with the advent of the 
modern newspaper—itself a marker and symbol of modernization and tool for the 
building of civic consciousness among emerging nation states during this period—Ye 
was forced to adapt to the conventions of the day.  He now aired his views within a 
more public and civic venue.  Proposing to open a girl’s school in a location other than 
Pozi Street might not have elicited such a vicious response from Ye, who expressed his 
disapproval. When leaders of the women’s movement sought to thwart Ye’s efforts to 
stop the school, they issued leaflets throughout Changsha in rebuttal.  The details of the 
debate were posted in a public newspaper such as Shenbao, and suggest that the 
controversy was given national press coverage, making readers aware of Ye Dehui’s 
thought and activities.  Much of this occurred while Tan Yankai and Tang Xiangming 
played the role of feuding warlords.  In the matter of a few short months Ye managed to 
earn the wrath of two provincial governors who shared mutual discord, but nonetheless 
shared a similar dislike of Ye Dehui. 
 
SUPPORTING YUAN SHIKAI 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter on the rice riot of 1910, beginning in the 
early 1900s Ye maintained a cordial relationship with Japanese businesses interests in 
Changsha. This began shortly after the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  In 1898 a merchant 
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named Shiraishi Ryuhei was sent on a fifty-day trip through the Yangtze provinces as 
well as Hunan in order to explore possibilities for future business ventures.  Eventually 
Shiraishi and other merchants helped establish the Hunan Steamship Company, which 
eventually became the Nisshin Steamship Company.  Having been founded by Japanese 
merchants, most of the shareholders were obviously from Japan.  But one-third of the 
shares were reserved for Chinese investors, and there is strong evidence to suggest that 
Ye Dehui was one of them.58   
 As Ye’s contact with the Japanese intensified, so did their interest in his scholarly 
background and published works. He used his own private presses to print and send 
books to colleagues in Japan, gaining for himself a readership among Japanese 
intellectuals. This also grew out of Ye’s cordial relations with the Japanese consulate in 
Changsha.  He also dealt with two of the nine Japanese companies that operated in the 
city by 1913.  By this time dignitaries, high-ranking businessmen, and reporters from 
Japan were all frequent guests at Ye’s residence.  During and after the controversy on 
Pozi Street as well as the Second Revolution ,Ye enjoyed safe passage to Shanghai via 
Japanese merchant ships.59 Thus his narrow brush with death in these turbulent years 
was due in large part to his engagement with an emerging colonial power.       
 But Yuan’s reign also gave Ye an opportunity to redeem himself.  In January 
1915, Japan issued Yuan’s government the Twenty-one Demands, calling for increased 
colonial rights and territories for the Japanese in northern and coastal China.  Students 
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throughout the country became furious and erupted in protest.  In Changsha a young 
nineteen year-old student named Peng Chao cut off his finger in protest, and issued Tang 
Xiangming a nine-character a “blood letter” (xueshu) expressing one’s determination, 
hatred, or last wishes.  It stated, “I’m determined not to see my country be humiliated.” 
A few days later Peng committed suicide by jumping in the Xiang River.60 In order to 
pacify such mounting discontent and avoid more suicides, the Hunan government 
realized the need to act quickly.  Shortly following this incident in July 1915, Ye was 
issued funds to establish an Anti-Japanese society in Changsha, of which Ye was to be 
the president.  All this despite the fact that by this time he had already gained a loyal 
readership of Japanese intellectuals, as well as his business connections. The organization 
held its first meeting in August.  Behind all this was Yuan Shikai, who, as it turns out 
secretly funded the founding of Anti-Japan organizations throughout China, to “stave off 
the most onerous of the Japanese demands in order to maintain the support of patriots 
while at the same time securing Japanese support for his imperial ambitions.”61       
           
LATER YEARS AND DEATH     
  
The 1920’s were a tumultuous decade for Changsha and especially for all of 
China.  Sun Yat-sen’s death from cancer in 1925 allowed the Nationalist leader Chiang 
Kai-shek to come to power.  Shortly thereafter, in the summer of 1926 he launched a 
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full out assault on all of China’s provincial and regional warlords.  This was the first 
Northern Expedition (1926-1928).  Hunan’s main waterway, the Xiang, as well as its 
provincial capital were one of the three main areas targeted for a military offensive that 
began in south China and pushed its way north.  As for Ye Dehui, his involvement in 
foreign shipping and the local grain market continued during this period.  But his power 
and local influence began to face a significant challenge at a crucial time in Hunan’s 
history, especially from 1926 to 1927, when Mao Zedong’s peasant movement grew in 
intensity throughout the province.  Sentiment against privileged land owning gentry 
classes increased in large part due to the instability of the times, but also a result of 
communist activism. The communist’s propaganda spelled certain doom for Ye and 
others like him, and eventually his wit and reputation could no longer save him.   
By the 1920’s Ye’s relationship with Japanese shipping companies in Changsha 
became so close that by 1926 Ye even planned to travel to Japan.  He had been invited 
to give lectures on his academic thought.  As the peasant movement within the province 
intensified, Ye did not hold back his disdain and hostility.62  This made him an easy 
target for revolutionaries and leaders of peasant organizations.  But above all he thought 
of himself first and foremost as a scholar.  Business ventures, accumulated wealth and 
property, came second.  For a man who spent most of his life using his pen to launch 
attacks or to defend himself from the attacks his critics, it is no wonder that Ye grew 
incensed by the activism of Hunan’s peasant associations, most members of which 
possessed very little formal education.  During the late 1920’s in China enough young 
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intellectuals and radicals came of age to pose a more significant challenge to Ye’s old 
brand of conservatism than Liang Qichao and others had in 1898.  The insistence from 
that era that Confucianism should remain the model for China’s nation building was 
viewed by contemporary scholars such Lu Xun, Hu Shi, and even Mao Zedong, as 
backward, outdated, and completely irrelevant.  For these reformers and others 
Confucianism was ill suited to address the numerous social and political problems China 
faced during the early twentieth century.     
 For Changsha’s unionized and activist masses Ye Dehui embodied all things 
backward about China’s class system, and among the chief causes of peasant 
exploitation.  He was also known as a hedonist and abuser of women.  Unfortunately 
for Ye, Changsha County also served as the nucleus for the formation of peasant 
associations within surrounding counties in central Hunan—for instance, Xiangtan, 
Hengshan, Liling, and Xiangxiang—all of which were located relatively near or adjacent 
to Changsha.  Furthermore, targeting gentry for humiliation, banishment, imprisonment, 
and even execution lay among the “Fourteen Great Achievements” of the peasant 
associations, as laid out in Mao Zedong’s famous “Report on an Investigation of the 
Peasant Movement in Hunan.” Execution of landed gentry within these counties became 
widespread.  In his report Mao noted that “every county has these major tyrants, some 
as many as several dozen and others at least a few, and the only effective way of 
suppressing the reactionaries is to execute at least a few in each county who are guilty of 
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the most heinous crimes.”63 Thus for Mao and the other communist vanguard execution 
of gentry was a natural byproduct of the peasant’s activism and necessary for the spread 
of revolutionary ideals.  
 Mao’s famous report in March 1927, detailed the peasant movement at its peak. 
The following month Ye met his end.  On the evening of April 4 a large group from the 
Changsha peasant association surrounded his home. After seizing Ye they escorted him 
to detention at the city center to await trial.  Friends and relatives visited him in 
confinement, and noted that despite his circumstances he appeared quite calm.  Prior to 
his trial they made desperate attempts and pleas for his release, but to no avail.  On 
April 11 he was given a large trial by the “Hunan Number One People’s Court for 
Abolishing Counter-Revolutionary Elements,” and sentenced to death by firing squad on 
the grounds of the Changsha Education Association.  The court charged Ye and made 
public his most significant crimes:  conspiracy to murder and massacre members of the 
reform party and revolutionary factions during the Wuchang Uprising and during the 
reform movement of 1898, supporting the plot by Yuan Shikai to become emperor, for 
supporting Wu Peifu’s show of military force and supporting Zhao Hengti’s 
governorship, for playing a key role in Hunan’s warlord governments, including 
disseminating “feudalistic thought,” and other propaganda against the peasant uprising.  
Finally, Ye was also charged with being the chief leader of conservative factions 
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throughout Changsha and Hunan province, and for being the city’s most well known lie 
shen, or “evil gentry.”64                               
       
Conclusion 
 
Perhaps one reason why Ye Dehui is such a potentially interesting character for 
modern historians is because he represented a kind of anachronism.  The very year of 
his birth, 1864, marked the end of a rebellion that wrought drastic changes to Chinese 
society.  The growth of commerce that followed allowed for local elites such as Ye 
Dehui to not only become politically powerful, but extremely wealthy.  Emergence of 
the Ye family as a powerful force in Changsha’s urban life during the late Qing also 
represents a distinction from other elite families and regions from this period.  This 
concerns the power held by certain lineage groups and their dominance over local and 
regional political life.  In his study of Zhejiang’s Yin County, Timothy Brook identified 
the success of several familial groups through successive generations and centuries.65 
But in contrast the Ye’s were an immigrant family not native to Hunan.  Their rise only 
occurred in wake of the post-Taiping diaspora.  In this regard they represented an 
entirely different class of gentry elites during this period, ones that despite having very 
little familial roots in their respective localities, nonetheless became successful members 
                                                
64 Zhang, Shou wang si wen, 300. 
65 Timothy Brook, “Family Continuity and Cultural Hegemony:  The Gentry of Ningbo, 1368-1911,” in 
Joseph Esherick and Mary Baukus Rankin eds., Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance 
(Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1990), 27-50.   
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of the gentry merchant class. The growth of affluent families and lineages, and their 
exodus from one region to another has also been an occurring trend throughout Chinese 
history. Such has been the case especially when families were “fleeing military disorder,” 
associated with the tumultuous transition between dynasties, or other domestic 
rebellions.66   
Despite his perceived moral failings and contempt for the lower classes, Ye Dehui 
was a learned bibliophile, known for his wit and extensive library of Chinese classics, 
famously saying that the two things he never loaned out were “his wife and his books.” 
Certainly no figure in late Qing Hunan better combined the ideals of conservatism, anti-
reformism and staunch opposition to westernization.  After Ye’s execution in 1927 
during the Hunan peasant uprising, Liang Qichao, who was severely criticized and 
essentially banished from Hunan by Ye and other members of the gentry following the 
reform movement of 1898, spoke of Ye’s passing in a letter to his sister.  Liang noted, 
“Although Ye often showed little respect toward others he possessed great knowledge. 
One could also say that he was not a totally bad person.”67  Amidst the fury of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1968 Mao Zedong even reflected that Ye had been unjustly 
executed.68 
In Ye’s case it is also worth noting that in the historiography of the rice riots, and 
even much of the scholarship on modern Chinese history, we find terms such as 
                                                
66  William T. Rowe, “Success Stories:  Lineage and Elite Status in Hanyang County, Hubei, c. 1368-
1949,” in Joseph Esherick and Mary Baukus Rankin eds., Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance 
(Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1990).   
67 Ding Wenjiang and Zhao Fengtian, Liang Qichao nianpu, 1145.  
68 Gong Yuzhi, “Cong Ye Dehui zhisi.” 
  177 
“conservative gentry” casting a diverse group of men and scholars into confined and 
limited categories.  Within this discourse radical reformers are recognized as heroes and 
victims and conservative gentry as villains.  Indeed, much of the current literature on 
Hunan’s intellectual climate in the late Qing emphasizes the plight of reformers such as 
Tang Caichang, Tan Sitong, Xiong Xiling, Guo Songtao, and even Liang Qichao during 
the 1898 reform movement.  But hopefully this chapter has provided a better 
understanding of Ye’s important role as an urban elite during the late Qing.  As the 
forces of reform gained steam after the Revolution of 1911, his traditionalist authority 
became challenged by the likes of Tan Qunying and Huang Xing.  
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5-Activism and Urban Identity in the 1920’s  
On October 7, 1920 Mao Zedong (1893-1976) published an article in the 
Changsha Da Gong Bao (“L’Impartial”), titled, “Appeal to the 300,000 Citizens of 
Changsha in Favor of Self-Rule for Hunan,” arguing that it was the responsibility of the 
people of Changsha, literally its shimin, or townspeople, to establish an independent 
Hunan government:   
Therefore, the responsibility has inevitably fallen on the shoulders of our 
300,000 citizens of Changsha.  If the citizens of Changsha do not rise up 
immediately in a self-rule movement there will never be any hope for self-
rule in Hunan.  Citizens of Changsha!  Although your 30 million fellow 
Hunanese are not aware that they have placed this responsibility on your 
shoulders, they have already silently done so.  If you succeed, 30 million 
people will benefit.  If you fail, 30 million people will suffer. You must 
know that your responsibility is not light.1   
 
This appeal reflected the tendancy in Mao’s early thought that “reasoned from a 
more Western-centered and urban centered perspective” to advance his developing 
radicalism.2  The “30 million people,” he referred to were not merely China’s citizens, 
but all the people of Hunan province.  Appealing to Changsha’s citizenry contributed to 
the ongoing discourse of provincial and national mobilization following the May Fourth 
Movement, that established the city as a center of urban activism during the 1920’s.  
Beginning with articles published in the local press from May 1919, specifically in the 
Hunan Da Gong Bao, this chapter discusses Changsha’s local activism during the 1920s.  
                                                
1 Mao Zedong, “Appeal to the 300,000 Citizens of Changsha in Favor of Self-Rule for Hunan,” in Schram, 
ed. In Vol. I of Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings, 1912-1949, edited by Stuart Schram. 
Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992., 572.  
2 Ibid., xl. 
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Discussing Changsha’s social climate also invites us to explore different pockets 
of activism in the city.  The Da Gong Bao chronicled the activities of numerous schools 
and student organizations from around the province.  One of these, the Hsiangya 
Medical School, was founded and funded by medical missionaries from Yale University.  
Thus this chapter also discusses western institutions such as Yale in China, one of the 
wealthiest and influential foreign missions working in China by the 1920’s.  Through 
publications such as “Save the Nation Weekly,” students from Hsiangya were some of 
the most vocal anti-foreign elements of the May Fourth era in Changsha.  The 
unpublished writings of Edward Hume, the founder and director of Yale in China and 
Hsiangya, also reveal the extent of both his and his institution’s unsympathetic attitude 
toward organized labor and student activism in the city.  Editorials from the Da Gong 
Bao, student publications such as “Save the Nation Weekly,” as well as numerous 
handbills and leaflets, established Changsha as an urban space of radical thought during 
the 1920’s.  The final part of the chapter will discuss the work and writing of Mao 
Zedong, and his years spent in Changsha as an author and labor organizer.    
  
HUNAN AND THE EARLY REPUBLICAN YEARS 
 
In part the calls for Hunan independence originated in the Republican 
government’s failure to achieve or maintain a unified China following the Revolution of 
1911.  On January 1, 1912 a new Republic was proclaimed in China. Yuan Shikai 
(1859-1916), a former general of the Qing army, was appointed as the first president.  
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But Yuan harbored ambitions of becoming the next emperor.  Soon after he proclaimed 
himself emperor of a new dynasty, provinces and rival factions emerged throughout 
China.  Some of these supported him, while others did not.     
As the result of Yuan’s rule, during the late 1910’s and early 1920’s Hunan and 
other provinces became places of bitter conflicts between competing warlords.  In the 
previous chapter, I briefly discussed the tensions between Tan Yankai and Tang 
Xiangming.  But there were additional warlord governors, such as Zhang Jingyao and 
Zhao Hengti.  From 1911 to 1927 Hunan was controlled by thirteen different provincial 
governors, each loyal to a different faction, or clique.3  Edward McCord has labeled 
China’s warlord climate during this period as one of praetorianism, a situation where “a 
number of individual military commanders exercise[d] autonomous political power by 
virtue of the actual or threatened use of the military force under their personal control.”4 
Following Yuan Shikai’s attempt to become China’s next emperor, he ordered northern 
forces of his Beiyang army to Hunan commanded by Tang Xiangming, to pacify the 
province.  But after Yuan’s death in 1916 Tang’s position became compromised, 
allowing Tan Yankai to resume his post as military governor.  Tan then consolidated all 
military and civil forces garrisoned or working in Changsha by removing commanders 
appointed by Tang’s regime from their posts and replacing them with local Hunanese.  
One of his ablest aides and comrades at this time was Zhao Hengti.  Despite their defeat 
northern armies loyal to the northern clique returned to Hunan in the spring of 1918, 
                                                
3 McDonald, The Urban Origins, 21. 
4 Edward A. McCord, The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1993), 4.  
  181 
commanded by the warlords Wu Peifu and Zhang Jingyao.  The native Hunan forces 
were no match for the invasion, and Changsha was captured on March 26.5  Zhang was 
appointed as the new military governor, but similar to Tang Xiangming was viewed by 
locals as an outsider and remained unpopular, especially in the provincial capital.  Both 
how Zhang came to power and his subsequent dislike among locals will help us better 
understand the events surrounding his ouster in the fall of 1919, amidst the fury of the 
May Fourth Movement, discussed below.      
Thus calls for independence in Hunan in 1920 not only occurred due to rising 
provincialism, but also resulted from the political and social fragmentation caused by 
warlord politics.  The culmination of the independence movement was a mass parade 
and demonstration through the streets of Changsha on October 10, 1920 commemorating 
National Day.  Representatives from all manner of classes; urban workers, military 
officers, and students, in total numbering some 20,000, marched in support of Hunan 
self-government.  The National Day march and convention that followed solidified 
Changsha’s place as one of the main centers in China’s hinterland of liberal thought and 
activism during the post May Fourth era.  The conference lasted for more than a month, 
with Cai Yuanpei, the chancellor of Beijing University, giving the introductory lecture.  
Thinkers and intellectuals from all over China were invited to attend, as were Bertrand 
Russell and John Dewey, who happened to be on a lecture tour through China at the time.  
                                                
5 Ibid., 227ff, 263. 
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Both made appearances and lectured.  Having been contentious rivals, this also 
represented the first and only time the two ever met in person.6   
As a printed document from the time, the formatting and style of the Hunan Da 
Gong Bao symbolized ideological contradictions at play in the city during the May 
Fourth era.  During a time when the city was rife with anti-foreignism, the same 
newspaper that served as one of the main outlets of urban activism contained numerous 
advertisements for foreign-invested companies in the city.  Butterfield and Swire, 
Amco, and British-American Tobacco, all paid for advertising space. 
                                                
6 Stephen R. Platt, Provincial Patriots: The Hunanese and Modern China (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2007), 204-205. 
Image 6-1. Front matter for the Hunan Da Gong Bao (“L’Impartial”), 
May 20, 1919, pp. 2-8. Advertisement for Butterfield and Swire on 
left of page (“Tai Gu Gong Si Jian Lun Chuan”). 
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Images 6-2-4.  All images taken from the Hunan Da Gong Bao, May 20, 1919 (“L’Imartial”), 
pp. 2-8. The top and center images show advertisements with illustrations for British American 
Tobacco (“Ying Mei Yan Gong Si”).  Bottom image shows an advertisement for Amco 
(“Shanghai Mei Shang,” left panel) and the China Nanyang Brother’s Tobacco Company (Zhong 
Guo Nan Yang Xiong Di Yan Cao You Xian Gong Si” right panel).1  Copied by the author.           
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Images 6.1-4 show that advertisements for Western tobacco and shipping 
companies appeared in the same newspaper with articles denouncing foreign imperialism. 
This made the Da Gong Bao a kind of literary space of the competing forces at play in 
Changsha during the early Republican period.  This was the same issue that posted 
telegrams from student associations from other cities in the province urging the Beijing 
government to take action in response to the Versailles Treaty of May 4, 1919 (further 
discussed below).  This was also the result of a new generation of urban youth who had 
come of age during the early twentieth century, those who grew up absent of the rigors of 
the imperial examination system which had been abolished in 1905.  Furthermore, the 
coexistence of divergent discourses of imperialist power and urban activism in the local 
press emerged less than two decades after Changsha opened as a treaty port.  As early as 
1913 at least two-dozen Western companies maintained offices in the city, most them 
British, German, and Japanese.  In addition to Butterfield and Swire, British American 
Tobacco, and Amco, there were offices for Jardine Matheson, Asiatic Petroleum, and 
many others.7  When Japanese and western businesses arrived in Changsha concessions 
were built in the north part of the city, and along the western banks for the Xiang River.  
Along this bank were situated the two “Big” and “Small” western city gates, which 
according to former residents were the center of western commercial and leisure activity, 
with opium dens, brothels, and casinos, most of which were Japanese owned and 
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operated.8  At one time British American Tobacco placed a large, multicolored 
advertisement along the outside of the western wall, most likely for all the merchant ships 
and their crews to see as they docked, of a woman holding a cigarette.  In large 
characters it read “Smoke Hatamen Cigarettes,” and “They’re good.”9    
Robert Bickers describes the condition of British diplomats, merchants, and 
missionaries in China during the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “pseudo-colonial,” 
employing a kind of “private enterprise imperialism.”  This contrasted with Britain’s 
colonial projects elsewhere around the globe, most notably in places such as India.  
Rather, the British presence in China was not overtly colonial, one that sought to enforce 
rule of law through outright administrative governance through a Raj or military 
occupation.10  With the exception of personnel to police the concessions of larger treaty 
port cities such as Shanghai or Hankou, or with the pervasive presence of gunboats to 
patrol China’s numerous waterways, there were relatively few British soldiers garrisoned 
in China.  But there were more than a fair share of trading companies, and such was also 
the case with Changsha.  After the Mackay Treaty of 1902 officially allowed for the city 
to be opened for western trade, Britain’s commericial interests took full advantage of the 
city’s access to a main waterway, and as the capital city for the Qing Empire’s top rice-
exporting province.  What remains truly remarkable in the case of Changsha is the rapid 
                                                
8 One of the Japanese brothels at Xiaoximen was called Meinaihe. See Liu Duping and Tang Ying, 
Changsha jiyi: Qingmo Changsha qiangmi fengchao changpian jishi  (Changsha: Hunan wenyi 
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pianyin, June 1988),  34.  
10 Robert Bickers, Britain in China: Community, Culture, and Colonialism, 1900-1949 (Manchester:  
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pace of its westernization.  Soon after it opened in 1904, numerous western enterprises 
established factories and concessions along the western banks of the Xiang River.  
The first foreign owned enterprises to dominate the local market came from 
Japan.  Under the Treaty of Shimoniseki, and more specifically the McKay Treaty of 
1902 (also known as the Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty), Japanese businesses were 
allowed to set up factories and offices in various treaty ports.  Through both their 
economic and cultural influence, the Japanese slowly won the hearts and minds of 
Changsha’s consumers.  By 1906 a branch of the Japanese post office had opened near 
the Japanese consulate, and by the second year of the new republic (1913), there were as 
many as nine Japanese businesses or shipping companies in the city.11   
According to a former Changsha resident named Xie Jusheng, by the time of the 
Changsha Riot of 1910, Japanese businesses flourished in the city and remained popular 
with local residents.  This was especially evident in the “Small” and “Big” gates located 
on the western banks of the Xiang River.  Xie worked at the Big West Gate General 
Store, specializing in pickling.  His shop’s location put him in frequent contact with 
both western and Japanese businesses, giving him a unique vantage point from which to 
view the changes the foreign presence exerted on Changsha’s market:  
The Japanese were the best and they really knew how to do business. The 
prices of their goods were always a bit lower than other places.  Their 
things were nice looking and there was a label on every item indicating the 
price, there was no bargaining or evening off prices.  Take a bowl for 
example. Several came bundled together, if you bought you bought the 
                                                
11 Wang Yayuan, Changsha gong ren yun dong da shi ji (Changsha: Hunan da xue chu ban she, 1988),  
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whole bundle.  There were no returns.  They spoke Chinese with a 
Changsha accent and spoke it well.12 
 
A friend of Xie’s named Cao Kechang, owned and operated a prosperous 
ceramics shop near Da Xi Men that for many years dominated the city’s market on 
ceramic goods, but after a few years Cao went out of business.  At night he would go 
down to the docks to enjoy the cool breeze near the water, but while doing so often 
became frustrated at the sight of the Japanese merchants and ships, cursing, “Japanese 
devils raised by a foreign mother’s dog!  As soon as they came there has been no 
business left to do!”13  Much of Japan’s business interests in China came in the form of 
immigrant merchants, businessmen, traders and shopkeepers.  Communities of these 
sorts gradually emerged in many Yangtze River treatyport cities such as Shanghai, but 
also as far inland as Hankow, Chongqing, and Changsha.  Such anti-Japanese sentiment 
did not derive from the kind one often encounters in China today, but instead from very 
practical concerns.  It reveals the simple frustrations of a local businessman muscled out 
by foreign competition.  The Japanese also enjoyed a certain advantage over western 
countries because they made efforts to learn the local customs and even spoke the local 
dialect.     
 
 
 
                                                
12 Liu Duping and Tang Ying. Changsha jiyi, 226. 
13 Ibid.    
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ORGANIZED LABOR AND FOREIGN INFLUENCE 
 
The Hunan branch of the Chinese Communist Party was formally established in 
Changsha on October 10, 1921. Cities such as Changsha, as well as smaller mining towns 
such as Anyuan served as smaller centers, separated from the larger metropole, where 
local activists experimented with organizing workers.  The successful strike of coal 
miners in Anyuan in 1922 was hailed as “one of the major accomplishments” of the 
CCP’s early years, convincing Mao Zedong, Li Lisan, and Liu Shaoqi that similar strikes 
could be held elsewhere.14  Although a smaller and less industrialized city than its other 
urban counterparts, modern industry first came to Changsha in 1895, with the opening of 
the Shangshan Ji Match Company.  Another enterprise, the Baoshan Machine Company, 
opened the next year.  Several more enterprises opened in the following years.  Each of 
these enterprises opened due to the reformist policies of Hunan governor Chen Baozhen.  
 Organized labor movements and strikes occurred in Changsha well before the 
foundation of the CCP, and independently of activists such as Mao, in that they were 
conceived and organized by the workers themselves.  From the end of April to the early 
part of May 1917 Changsha’s dockworkers, numbering between seven to eight thousand, 
stopped working to demand higher wages.  During the previous year the wages of a 
dockworker to transport two baskets of coal or grain from one pier to another was 
approximately forty wen copper cash, enough to purchase 1.3 jin of medium grade rice.  
But due to inflation, by the spring of 1917 this sum could only buy .5 jin.  On April 22, 
                                                
14 Elizabeth Perry, Anyuan: Mining China’s Revolutionary Tradition (Berkeley: University of California 
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1917 the dockworkers marched from the wharfs at the banks of the Xiang River into the 
city and surrounded the office of the county magistrate for two days.  The government 
finally capitulated to the worker’s demands by agreeing to three conditions:  Cost of 
each load carried would not be subject to the inflation of copper currency.  The 
maximum amount of weight each dockworker should be expected to carry would be 
reduced by twenty-five percent.  Thirdly, each of these new regulations would be posted 
at each of Changsha’s eleven piers.15  The following year there were additional strikes 
by the city’s rickshaw pullers, as well as by masons and carpenters.  Each of these 
demonstrated the “extent to which a phalanx of local organizations such as the various 
guilds and merchant organizations had real power,” rivaling the warlord government, 
which not only controlled the province during these years but urban affairs as well.16  
This also shows that labor activism existed in the city prior to May Fourth and the 
leadership of Mao Zedong.    
 
STUDENT ACTIVISM AND YALE IN CHINA 
  
 During the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, Horace Pitkin, a graduate of Yale 
University’s class of 1892, was beheaded.  Some of Pitkin’s fellow alumni were so 
moved by his death that they lobbied to establish a mission in China’s hinterland, away 
from the bigger cities with large concentrations of foreigners and their concessions.  By 
                                                
15 Wang Yayuan, Changsha gong ren yun dong shi (Changsha:  Guo fang ke ji da xue yin shua guang yin 
zhuang), 11-13. 
16 McDonald, Urban Origins, 146. 
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1902 they raised several thousand dollars and founded the Yale Foreign Missionary 
Society and chose Changsha, a city known for its anti-foreignism.  The mission was 
formally established in 1904, the same year that Changsha officially opened as a treaty 
port.  To head the effort they chose Edward Hume (1856-1957), a Yale alumni and 
graduate of the Johns Hopkins Medical School.  Despite encountering initial resistance 
to the foreign presence in the city, the influence of both the hospital and school proved 
far-reaching.  Its curriculum combined both Chinese and Western learning, and also 
emphasized that Christianity would not be imposed upon its students.17  The original 
locations of both the hospital and school were in the heart of Changsha, in an old rice 
storehouse near the banks and docks of the Xiang River on West Archway Street (Xi Pai 
Lou).  After extensive renovation the compound included classrooms for the school, a 
chapel, housing for foreigners, and a dormitory for students.  Hume wrote about his 
experiences in Changsha in Doctors East, Doctors West, An American Physician’s Life in 
China (1946).  It chronicled his years in Changsha, providing an insightful perspective 
of a foreigner in residence in the city during the early years of the twentieth century.  
Despite a rough start Hume endeared himself to the local population through his work as 
a physician and by making friends with locals.  
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   Image 6-5.  Notice placed on Yale compound  
   during 1910 riot.18     
 
Such contacts no doubt served Hume and his family well during the rice riot in 
1910 when crowds burned and looted foreign buildings throughout the city.  During this 
incident the Yale facilities, at that time located in the heart of Changsha, were spared.  
Image 5.1 shows the notice posted on the front gate of the Yale compound at Xi Pai Lou 
by the local neighborhood association during the riot:   
The Yale hospital is a rented building, and insomuch as during this crisis 
they have abandoned it, the residents of these streets have sealed it to keep 
it from harm.  To relieve the needs of the poor, a fund for purchasing rice 
has been started which will amount to one hundred thousand and all are 
gladly contributing.  Having given notice under no circumstances must 
you damage this property.     
 
                                                
18 “Notice posted by neighbors on the Yale Mission Hospital, Changsha, during the Riot of April 1910, 
when nearly all the foreign places had been destroyed.”  Item RU 232 6.6A. Yale University: Manuscripts 
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In 1910 Yale’s tenure in the city was still in its infancy.  During moments of 
crisis it still had to depend on the support of the local community for protection.  In part 
this may have been attributable to the philanthropic and medical care provided by the 
institution.  But perhaps the residents of Xi Pai Lou also deserve a degree of credit for 
allowing the compound to remain unharmed during the riot.  Yale in China also 
benefited from the wealth and capital that came with its brand name.  In addition to 
talented physicians such as Hume, it also benefited administratively.  From 1909 to 
1922 Dickson Leavens, a noted economist and expert on the international silver market, 
served as the organization’s treasurer in Changsha.  He compiled weekly reports and 
letters regarding the financial situations of both the schools and hospitals in monthly 
letters to the Board of Trustees back in the United States.  For instance, according to his 
own financial report covering the years 1926 to 1927, Leavens reported the Yale in China 
budget as numbering some 150,000 U.S. dollars.  Most of this budget covered the 
expenses for the hospital.  Some 80,000 of this amount came via a grant provided from 
the “China Medical Board, a possible source of income from the Nationalist 
government.”19      
But for as much as the Yale hospital may have benefited Changsha, by the 1920’s 
its welcome in the city became compromised by rising local resentment toward foreigners 
caused by international events.  In May 1919 events in Europe inaugurated a social and 
intellectual revolution throughout China.  In what became known as the May Fourth 
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Movement, students in cities erupted in protest and outrage at the awarding of German 
concessions in Shandong province to the Empire of Japan during peace negotiations to 
end World War I.  The Treaty of Versailles may have ended the war in Europe, but its 
effects were felt in China and continued to resonate well into the next decade.  
Following the outbreak of nationwide protests the Changsha Da Gong Bao, 
“L’Impartial,” chronicled the activities of many student groups and organizations, 
including the students of Hsiangya Medical College, serving as the main source for the 
response of Changsha’s activist and intellectual community in the city.  An editorial 
from May 15 announced that a meeting of the provincial educational bureau’s executive 
secretaries convened the night before to address the situation in Qingdao.  Delegates and 
representatives from schools, businesses, and peasant associations throughout Hunan 
attended. Similar meetings were held in cities throughout China.20  In the days that 
followed the newspaper also contained the text of important telegraphs sent to Beijing 
from Paris and other cities in China on the question of Sino-Japanese relations, and 
emphatically stated that the relationship between the two countries was a matter to be 
settled between them only, and not a matter of international concern.  An issue from 
May 19th showed the complete text of a telegraph from the Student Union in Changde, 
another city in Hunan.  It was addressed to the president of China, the national 
committee on foreign affairs, and all military governments in the country, and stated that 
the Versailles Treaty stipulations amounted to a “forfeiture of national sovereignty, and 
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was a humiliation to the country” (sang quan ru guo).21  By May 28 the next week 
official associations to protect domestic products had been founded in Hunan’s major 
cities, calling for student strikes in schools throughout the province on June 3.  The day 
after the strike, on June 4, the “Declaration of Hunan Student’s Strike” appeared, stating, 
“The conscience of all students in Hunan has been aroused.  Considering the demands 
of the current circumstances, it was resolved that all students in Hunan province declared 
a strike in obligation to save the nation and pledge their support.”22  
Another article appeared a few days later, titled “The Progress of the Hsiangya 
School after the Strike,” noting the organization of ten man “Save the Nation Teams” (jiu 
guo tuan) at businesses throughout the city, and that each team drew maps of which 
establishments in Changsha that could potentially harmed by the influence of Japanese 
products.  The activities of Changsha’s urban Save the Nation Teams were primarily 
facilitated by students from the Yale University Medical College, or “Hsiangya Yi Xue 
Yuan” who were studying in Changsha when the movement began.  To inform poorer or 
illiterate residents with little or no education pictures with illustrations were posted in 
public areas throughout the city, depicting humorous scenes of how foreign products 
harmed the local economy.  More than one thousand handbills were also distributed to 
residents advertising the Save the Nation Teams and their mission.23  
Chow Tse-tsung chronicled student demonstrations and strikes following May 
Fourth in Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan, where student groups formed and 
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discussed how to best respond to the suppression of demonstrations by authorities in 
Beijing on May 4.  In Wuhan in neighboring Hubei province just north of Hunan, some 
of the most radicalized student groups were also from a missionary school.  On May 11 
some two thousand representatives from fifteen colleges and middle schools met at Wen-
hua University, a U.S. funded institution.24  One of the main sources of activism and 
debate in these urban centers was the student press.  In Changsha periodicals such as the 
“Save the Nation Weekly,” published by students from Hsiangya, called for a radical 
approach to dealing with those who advocated or collaborated with foreign interests.   
The outrage and indignation of Changsha’s student community at the outcome of the 
Versailles Treaty was expressed in the June 19, 1919 issue.  An essay on the front page 
by Gao Jinglang (1892-1983), titled “Regarding Traitors,” called for punishment by death 
those who betrayed China to imperial interests, and stated that, “Anyone has the right to 
punish traitors in our country and put them to death.”  It also criticized the “wolves in 
sheep’s clothing” that betrayed the nation (mai guo zei).  Prior to his residence in 
Changsha Gao studied in the United States at Harvard Medical School, helped found the 
Xinhua School of Medicine, and eventually became a top doctor in Shanghai after 1949.  
In classrooms in universities all over China, noted Gao, the call to kill such traitors was 
voiced by students in Beijing, Zhejiang, Anhui, and with equal enthusiasm in southern 
provinces such as Hubei and Guangzhou.  In other cities in Hunan students and 
educators participated in a nationwide student strike on June 3.  Teachers at schools and 
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universities in the city of Hengyang telegraphed the provincial government to have 
governor Zhang Jingyao (1881-1933) removed from office.25    
Zhang had been appointed as governor in March 1918, and was a military man 
with a warlord background loyal to a faction in northern China led by a general named 
Duan Qirui.  After the protests began in Changsha and in other cities in Hunan, Zhang 
closed student presses, disbanded the Provincial Assembly, the Provincial Educational 
Association, and other groups.26  By the fall of 1919 calls appeared in the Changsha 
press for his removal, especially following the discovery of a large shipment of opium 
seeds at the Wuhan railway station in December.  Once the shipment of some fifty bags 
was found, and were addressed to Zhang, news spread through student media and other 
national press agencies.  The opium bags were discovered by a young worker named 
You Yong, a recent graduate of the Railway Management School of the Ministry of 
Communications.  As a member of the Wuhan Student Association, You felt inspired to 
report the shipment to his friends and colleagues.  The opium bags were addressed to the 
“General Command Headquarters of the Second Route Army,” and were being managed 
by soldiers from Hunan’s Sixth Mixed Brigade who stated that the bags were to be turned 
over to the governor of Hunan.  One of the news dispatches from the time even 
contained an excerpt of You’s account of the event:   
Zhang Jingyao grows poppy extensively throughout Hunan in order to 
make a huge profit; in order to provide for his army for five years, he is 
sowing the seeds of an evil fruit that will hurt China for thousands of 
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years, bringing calamity to the country and misery to its people, a crime 
that must not escape punishment.27  
 
 The dispatch also noted that once the Wuhan students arrived at the station to 
inspect the bags they were immediately confiscated and photographed.  The growing of 
opium had also been practiced by in Shaanxi by a warlord governor named Chen Shufan, 
making him wealthy in the process.  Thus You and the Wuhan students, as well as their 
classmates in Changsha were completely within reason to demand the removal of corrupt 
governors such as Chen and Zhang Jingyao, as the law was on their side.  A recent 
treaty had been signed with the British banning the production and shipment of opium 
throughout China.            
On December 27 Mao Zedong and other Hunan activists, now based out of 
Beijing, submitted a petition to the national government expressing their opposition to 
Zhang Jingyao’s involvement in a mining scandal.  They accused Zhang, along with 
Zhang Rongmei, director of the Hunan Mining Bureau, of selling the rights to a zinc 
smeltery at an area called Shuikoushan into a joint American and Chinese venture.  The 
deal would have made both men millionaires.  Under the arrangement, ore from the 
mines would be sold to management at a price of ten U.S. dollars per ton.  As the largest 
and most profitable mine in Hunan, the contract would have also given the Shuikoushan 
joint ownership a complete monopoly over mining operations in the province.28  
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  The controversy over Zhang Jingyao’s opium seeds revealed that even in the early 
stages of the May Fourth era, matriculation of student activists such as You Yong into the 
national bureaucracy allowed them to become government whistleblowers.  In the 
months after protests began this was also facilitated by formation of the Save the Nation 
Teams, created shortly after the first nationwide student boycott on June 3, 1919.  In 
Changsha teams and their representatives were established at various work units 
throughout the city.  For instance, there were three different teams listed at businesses 
located on Yao Wang Jie, at the main branch of the Changsha post office, and two 
different businesses at Ba Jiao Ting, located in the city center.  There were even teams 
posted at three different shops on Pozi Street, the city’s commercial and business hub, as 
well as at two different book printing shops.  In total there approximately 19 teams 
stationed at 16 different businesses.  Situated within the heart of the city the teams and 
their representative leaders (tuan dai biao) had ready access to promote the ideals of 
national salvation to local residents by distributing pamphlets and other literature.29  The 
May Fourth movement also spawned the formation of ten-man Save the Nation Teams in 
cities throughout China.  In Changsha and other cities every ten-man team appointed 
their own group leader (tuan zong).  Individual team members carried cards advertising 
the group’s mission on the front and contained all the names of the other group members 
on the back.  These teams used their activism and distribution of printed matter to 
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educate Changsha’s residents about the importance of national unity in the face of foreign 
imperialism.     
 Another essay on the front page of “Save the Nation Weekly” from the June 19 
issue was an article written by a Hsiangya medical student named Ying Yuanyue (1896-
1991). Ying railed against how Japanese goods dominated the market in cities and towns 
throughout Hunan since 1915, when China capitulated to the “Twenty-one Demands.” 
Using medical jargon to diagnose China’s ills he argued that such dependence on foreign 
goods was akin to a kind of sickness needing treatment, and that Japanese merchants or 
locals who conspired with them should be forcefully dealt with.  In order to promote the 
sale of domestic products on the market he recommended that Changsha’s shops stop 
selling Japanese goods and place any remaining items on hand into a communal market 
where they could be consolidated and sold at a more reasonable price.  As with Gao 
Jinglang, Ying was a top medical student and later achieved success as a physician, 
studying in the United States at Johns Hopkins University.30  Such essays reveal the 
extent to which the Yale Medical School in Changsha attracted top students from around 
the country.  Neither Ying nor Gao Jinglang were from there, but nonetheless put their 
rhetorical skills to use in condemning the Japanese presence in the city.  
 Discussion of these kinds of regional responses bears similarity to Wen-hsin 
Yeh’s analysis of May Fourth as a regional movement rather than one isolated to 
commercial and political centers such as Beijing and Shanghai.  Her “middle country 
radicalism,” suggests that student movements and activism in cities throughout China 
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remained “squarely at the center rather than the periphery of the structural transformation 
of Chinese society in the 20th century.”31  The articles from Hsiangya’s “Save the Nation 
Weekly,” as well as the Hunan Da Gong Bao, certainly illustrate that such was also the 
case in Changsha.  Furthermore, the degree to which Gao Jinglang, Ying Yinyue, and 
other Hsiangya students resented the foreign presence in the city represented an 
interesting paradox.  Regardless of how much Edward Hume and Yale’s other doctors 
and teachers may have endeared themselves to Changsha’s population owing to their 
medical work, and even after the hospital and school relocated to their new location 
outside the north gate of the old city, resentment toward Yale and other foreign 
institutions in the city continued.  Even students from their own medical college joined 
the protests against the foreign presence in Changsha.  This was evident not only in the 
student activism following May Fourth, but also came to a head following the “May 
Thirtieth Incident” in 1925.   
On May 30, 1925 locals in Shanghai became outraged when news spread that a 
Chinese employee at a factory had been killed in a Japanese-owned factory.  During the 
ensuing protests police in Shanghai’s foreign concession fired on protesters, killing 
eleven people.  Although it took place in a city in the far eastern coast the incident 
mobilized student activists in cities all over China, and caused the membership of the 
Communist Party to grow.  The incident, “breathed life into the CCP.  In 1925 CCP 
membership was still slightly under 1,000; two years later, it had grown to more than 
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57,000.  CCP members had led huge mass movements, both in the city and in the 
countryside.”32  In Changsha schools printed and distributed handbills on the streets 
with specific demands and language hostile to foreigners.  A June 1925 handbill from 
the students of Fu Chu’u Middle School read:     
Brothers!  We must not trust any out-siders.  We must rely only on 
ourselves—help ourselves.  Let us use these slogans and go ahead. 
 
1. “Down with the imperialism of Japan and Britain.” 
2. Have no business dealings with Britain or Japan. 
3. All unequal treaties must be done away with.   
4. Kill the murderers.   
5. Help the families of those who have been killed.   
6. Don’t allow England or Japan’s troops to be stationed in China.  
7. Strike down the old traitor Tuan Ch’i-Jui [Duan Qirui].33   
  
This handbill in particular expressed that the Duan Qirui warlord clique 
represented just as much of a threat to China as the imperialism of England and Japan, 
even on par with the troops who fired on bystanders in Shanghai.  Handbills were also 
drawn up and distributed by students from the Chen Ya Middle School and made similar 
demands.  The student activists who authored them not only called for an end to British 
and Japanese imperial interests in Changsha, but also viewed themselves as part of the 
larger national discourse on anti-imperialism, calling for the complete cessation of 
relations with western nations.  They demanded that foreign factories be closed, those 
responsible put to death, and indemnities paid out to the families of those killed.  
Furthermore:   
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(3)  Boycotting of English goods is not enough.  We must 
eradicate the roots of the British and Japanese in China.   
(a)  Let us take back control of the [foreign] customs. 
(b)  We must regulate imports and exports.   
(c)  Help our own capitalists.  “Down with the capitalists” is the 
common cry, but that means foreign capitalists, because they are always 
taking the strength from our country. . .  
(d)  We must set up a gold standard.  Silver is unstable and we 
must have our currency stable.   
(e)  Down with imperialism (that means foreign imperialism)   
      
If we can accomplish this, we can do without Japanese and British 
goods and we need not suffer under foreign oppression.34  
 
 These handbills reveal the extent of anti-foreignism in Changsha during the 
1920’s.  It was prevalent even among urban middle schools.  Students from a local 
prestigious girl’s school, the I Fang School, even got into the act:   
Wake up!  Prepare!  Purify! 
You Chinese, do you know that the situation of China is?  China 
is not now a closed country paying attention only to herself.  She is not 
one of the nations of the world, but one of the weaker ones and apparently 
approaching her ruin.   
What bad deed could Shanghai students do empty-handed?  Who 
would think that several times the English would fire at and kill them?  
That men should die is a small matter, but a shame of the country is 
great.35  
 
Changsha’s IFang School was founded in June 1918 by Zeng Guofan’s 
granddaughter, Zeng Baosun near the site of her grandfather’s temple.  This explains the 
note beneath the title of the handbill among Edward Hume’s papers, “This school is 
under the auspices of Miss and Mr. Tseng.”36  These were students who, like their 
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classmates from other schools who distributed handbills, were also acutely aware of 
China’s place in the world and viewed national humiliation as a greater disgrace than the 
loss of human life.  
The rising tide of anti-foreign student movements throughout the 1920’s 
eventually pressured Edward Hume to eventually transfer administration of all Yale 
facilities in Changsha over to local control.  Beginning with the May Fourth student 
unrest in 1919, and also reaching fever pitch with the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925 and 
the May Thirtieth Incident, there were also reports from all over the city that in addition 
to strikes and other worker’s movements local police even ordered foreigners out of their 
rickshaws and made them walk.  Any Chinese seen carrying a foreigner’s luggage was 
beaten up and harassed by students.  American women and children were spat at in 
Changsha’s streets.  The frequent student strikes and boycotts of the early to mid 1920’s 
made it difficult for both Western and Chinese teachers to maintain discipline.37  
Shortly after Sun Yat-sen’s death Hume was even informed by one of his female 
students that at one of the mass rallies held it Sun’s honor, “it was moved, seconded and 
carried by acclimation that all foreigners in Changsha should be brought to the execution 
ground and shot at dawn the next day,” and that Hume was “number one on the list” to be 
executed.  Fortunately Hunan’s governor dispatched a detachment of troops to the 
school to protect Hume and his staff.38  None of this animosity was lost on Hume.  In a 
letter to the Yale-in-China trustees he noted that the Chinese were becoming 
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“increasingly fed up” with the foreign presence in China.  He likened it to if Indians or 
some other outside culture decided to come to America to try and tell how their 
“education should be formed and developed.”39  Thus as tensions and unrest throughout 
China increased in these years, so did Hume’s anxiety.  Via correspondence he 
quarreled with the Yale trustees, criticizing the ineptness of his American staff, many of 
whom had little knowledge of Chinese language or local customs and culture.  He also 
noted that much student resentment was also directed against the American teachers at 
the Yale Middle School, who showed little appreciation for Chinese history or culture.40       
Hume and many of the American Yale in China staff also remained suspicious of 
the Hunan labor movement and communist activity among students.  Responding to a 
strike of 189 Yale students in mid-December 1924 one teacher in Changsha observed:   
The background of the disturbance there which resulted in 189 students 
leaving the school and college appears to involve the following factors 
prevailing over a great part of China.  First among these are the doctrines 
of Bolshevism which have been fermenting among young students 
throughout the republic during the last three or four years.  Through these 
teachings they have acquired the old Russian conception of the assumed 
responsibility of university students for the political welfare of their 
country. Chinese students are, therefore, much more prominent in 
propagating revolutionary doctrines than in the Western world . . . 
Extreme forms of socialistic and communistic bodies with others exhibit 
special “isms” and more extravagant phases of this radical and almost 
violent onset against Christianity, capitalism and foreign control.41   
 
 Of further concern to the American staff was the rise, especially after 1919, of 
nationalism among student populations in cities throughout China.  This emergent 
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nationalism was in many ways directly linked to the rampant degree of anti-foreignism 
that had been ignited by the intellectual flames of the May Fourth Movement.  This 
increased following the events of 1925 in Shanghai, which also spawned nationwide 
protests and strikes.  In the passage above we can also see how the teachers at Yale in 
China associated the teachings of Marxism specifically to the mentality of youth in the 
non-Western world, causing unrest among youth they remained powerless to control.  
This sentiment was even expressed by Hume in early 1925: 
Probably the most potent destructive force at work in Hunan at the 
moment is the group of agitators who give allegiance to one or another “-
ism.”  Ninety miles away from the capital [Changsha] are the famous 
Pinghsiang coal mines, where thousands of the miners have been made 
members of one or the other two labor organizations there, one the “Ma 
Tang” or Marxian Group; and the other the “An Tang” or Anarchistic 
Group.  The latter is in reality the Labor party at the most extreme left; 
the former is the Communistic party.42   
 
 Here Hume referred to his alarm over the emergence of anarchism and 
communism among worker’s movements in the coalmines of eastern Hunan and 
neighboring Jiangxi.  Pingxiang and Anyuan became testing grounds for labor activism 
during the 1920’s, with Anyuan later becoming known as China’s “little Moscow.”  
Much of the history of this was actually chronicled by Liu Shaoqi, who along with Mao 
served as the main organizers of the coal miner’s strike at Anyuan.  Following their 
successful strike in 1922 the workers from Pingxiang and Anyuan issued their own 
declaration.  Similar to the urban handbills distributed by Changsha’s students, some of 
                                                
42 Edward Hume, “Reflections on the Recent Student Strikes in Hunan:  Some elements back of the anti-
Christian outburst,” in Ibid., 4.   
  206 
Hume’s concern may have originated from the literature generated by the Pingxiang and 
Anyuan workers that also may have made its way to his desk: 
 The strike is successful!  Our anger has been aroused!  Before 
workers were “beasts of burden,” now “long live the workers!”  Our first 
main objective has been achieved, and we can declare our return to work.   
 Although we have only attained a small victory this time, this is 
our first, but later our second, third . . . . . victory will be infinite, so this 
time our pain cannot be fully resolved, but the second, third . . . . . it will 
be resolved; as long as it is our group (tuan ti), this organization (ju le bu). 
 Our “method,” “heart,” and “courage,” during this strike, has at 
last expressed our sacred vitality (shen sheng jing sheng).  Friends!  
You should now never say that workers have no sense or intelligence!43  
 
Hume remained completely unsympathetic toward the labor movement, student 
radicals, and other “agitators,” referring to them as the “most destructive force at work in 
Hunan” during the 1920’s.  Other Americans working for Yale also experienced 
hostility from locals.  In November 1926 the household servants of the Greene family 
petitioned them for a twenty-five percent increase in wages, as well as extra pay for 
working during the Chinese New Year.  Most importantly was that all new servants 
were to be dismissed or hired only on the authority of the local labor union.  Again 
directed by communist labor unions, Chinese nurses at Hsiangya followed suit by 
presenting their own demands and threatening to go on strike.44  Hume’s resignation 
from Yale-in-China in 1926 came not only from local pressure and the anti-foreign 
feeling felt throughout the city, but also as a result of his own personal conviction that the 
hospital, school, and medical college should eventually come under local Chinese 
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administration. When he finally departed the city in January 1927 he was promised his 
own private compartment by the Hunan governor but in the end he and his family had to 
find a small space huddled in a mail and baggage car.45  
But Hume at least indirectly played a part in financing the activities a young 
radical named Mao Zedong, who was allowed to rent a space owned by Yale to open his 
cultural bookstore. This eventually became the headquarters for Mao’s “Cultural Book 
Society” founded on December 1, 1920, and listed at 56 Chaozong Street.46  Its address 
was on the same street and address as the press for “Save the Nation Weekly,” published 
by the student union of Hsiangya Medical College, located outside Changsha’s north 
gate.  Mao even later collaborated with the Yale students by serving as the editor of the 
journal Xin Hunan, or “New Hunan.” 
 
MAO ZEDONG IN CHANGSHA 
 
In June 1912, shortly after enrolling in Changsha’s First Normal School, Mao 
Zedong wrote “Essay on How Shang Yang Established Confidence by Moving of the 
Pole,” where his views regarding the need for a strong government to rule society were 
already evident.  Shang Yang (390-338 B.C.), a founder of the Legalist school, once 
issued a series of decrees on how to rule properly.  According to Sima Qian, Shang once 
offered gold pieces to anyone who would move a pole he erected at the south gate of his 
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city.  At first no one dared move it, but after Shang increased the amount to fifty gold 
pieces one man finally moved the pole, “to demonstrate that he did not practice 
deception.”  Mao interpreted this as representative of the failures of those in power to 
rule, especially in China soon after the Revolution of 1911.  He saw the sense in 
authoritarianism but believed the degree to which it existed in China for centuries had 
failed its people.47  His use of Shang Yang also illustrates an important theme in Mao’s 
writing and from other figures from the May Fourth era, of using classical Chinese 
thought to criticize China’s present circumstances.  
May Fourth writers were also intensely critical of the Confucian tradition and 
argued for the complete emancipation of the individual.  Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu, and 
others believed that Chinese society remained hindered by antiquated filial traditions.48  
These and other thinkers also published essays critical of marriage customs, as well as 
other aspects of society associated with backwardness.  Chen Duxiu (1879-1942), one of 
the main voices of the movement and founder of the influential journal New Youth 
viewed Confucianism as “a product of the feudal ages.”  Furthermore, “it did not fit the 
needs of modern society.”  Freedom of women to marry and for widows to remarry 
were both part of what Chen viewed as the need for total freedom for the individual in 
China’s new society.49  Some of Lu Xun’s most famous essays scathingly rebuked old 
culture and what he felt was the irreparable harm it exerted on Chinese society, believing 
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Chinese “should live for themselves instead of for their ancestors.  To learn modern 
science and Western knowledge was more important than to recite the Confucian 
classics.”50  Similar to thinkers such as Hu Shi (1891-1962), Mao possibly sought to 
“reorganize China’s national heritage,” by infusing it with Western philosophy.51      
 Like many of his contemporaries Mao was mainly critical of orthodox 
Confucianism and was influenced by its more progressive strands.  Like Liang Qichao 
and some of the reformers before him, Mao was influenced by the Neo-Confucian school, 
the teachings of Wang Fuzhi and Zhu Xi in particular.  He was also inspired by more 
contemporary scholar officials such as Zeng Guofan and Guo Songtao.  All of these 
thinkers had studied in training academies in Changsha.  Recognizing Mao’s intellectual 
heritage, as well as how his ideas compared with the more notable May Fourth thinkers 
above makes us recognize his place within Hunan’s intellectual tradition, and how he 
may have viewed himself as one meant to pass on such tradition, albeit with his own 
distinct perspective, also inspired by Western thought.  His time in Changsha also first 
exposed him to the translated works of Friedrich Paulsen, Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, 
John Stuart Mill, and many others.  
At Beijing University in the winter of 1918 Mao joined a Marxist study group as a 
librarian and fell under the tutelage of Li Dazhao, one of the founders of Chinese 
communism.  Mao eventually returned to Changsha to write and publish articles for his 
own journal, the Xiang River Review.  It provided an intellectual forum to advance his 
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newly developed understanding of Marxism.  The first translations of Karl Marx’s 
works were made available to young scholars at this time, and the influence of the 
Russian Revolution of 1917 also had a profound impact on the development of 
communism in China.     
Written just a few months after the May 4th protests, on July 14, 1919 in the first 
issue he published “Manifesto on the Founding of the Xiang River Review,” identifying 
Japan as China’s greatest “international oppressor.”  The most effective means for 
dealing with such aggression was through the boycotting of Japanese products, students 
boycotting classes, and through strikes and protests from the merchant and worker’s 
classes.52  One week later, on July 21, Mao wrote “The Great Union of the Popular 
Masses,” where some of his earliest conceptions of a Marxist revolution through a mass 
uprising were elucidated, in particular for unionization of the working classes.  His time 
spent at the Beijing University Marxist study group, as well as the events of the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 and its success, influenced this three-part essay.  In particular this 
article also “capsulated a dominant element in the thought of the May Fourth Movement:  
that spontaneously, because of the logic of the situation, great masses of the people could 
be mobilized for the defense of the nation,” which suggested that for Mao “democracy 
and national salvation went hand in hand.”53                 
Mao’s most important writing from this period also reflected his involvement 
with organized labor, frequently appearing in the Da Gong Bao.  Published in May 1922 
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“Some Issues That Deserve More Attention,” commemorated May Day on behalf of all 
of Hunan’s workers, arguing they had the “right to existence, the right to work, and the 
right to enjoy the fruits of their labor.”  The essay declared to Changsha’s readers the 
rights of local workers and presented a basic presentation of Marxist thought.  Mao 
concluded by referencing Mencius, who once cited the Book of Poetry to explain how 
unjust rulers failed to learn from history:  “The beacon of Yin is not remote, It is in the 
time of the (last) sovereign of Hsia,” which meant that the tyrants of Yin failed to learn 
from the fate of the tyrants of the Hsia dynasty before them.54  In this case the reference 
critiqued the provincial assembly’s failure to draft a constitution advancing the rights of 
workers and that those who had come to power in Hunan had failed to learn from China’s 
past.55    
By November 1922 factories, businesses, and other manual laborers throughout 
the city successfully unionized, and Mao founded and was elected head of the All-Hunan 
Federation of Labor Unions.  The local press, the Da Gong Bao in particular, published 
tracts and declarations from certain unions.  The “Charter of the Changsha Mason’s and 
Carpenter’s Union” first appeared in the September 6 and 7 issues.  As we may recall, 
this was the same occupation of low wage urban laborers involved in the rioting over rice 
twelve years earlier.  In 1910 the local masons and carpenters only conceived method of 
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protest was to attack symbols of local and state power, such as the Qing government 
yamen and Western institutions.  But following the founding of the Chinese Communist 
Party in Shanghai in 1921 a flurry of unionization and labor related activism occurred in 
cities all over China.  Even in places such as Changsha marginalized elements of the 
urban population who once lacked the means and resources to express their grievances 
now did so in ways more associated with the mores of modernity.56  
“Charter of the Changsha Mason’s and Carpenter’s Union” contained eighteen 
articles, stating that membership was open to “any mason or carpenter in Changsha,” and 
covered areas such as payment of monthly dues, providing education and healthcare, as 
well as assistance for the unemployed.  Similar to the urban Save the Nation Teams (jiu 
guo tuan) established following May Fourth, the basic unit of organization within the 
union was the ten man group, with each electing their own representative(s).  
Organizing by groups of ten was based on the baojia system, blending traditional forms 
of local governance with Marxist conceptions of trade unionism, forming a unique and 
thoroughly Chinese version of political organization.  The following month the Da 
Gong Bao featured the official strike declaration of the masons and carpenters: 
We, the masons and carpenters, wish to inform you that for the sake of 
earning our livelihood, we demand a modest pay increase.  Since June 1, 
we have been paid thirty-four cents for grade A work, and twenty-six 
cents for grade B work.57  
 
                                                
56 According to Stuart Schram, although in certain cases Mao may not have played a direct role in drafting 
the specific charters and declarations of certain unionized groups, his degree of involvement with them 
suggests that his name and influence can remain “legitimately attached to” certain documents, the charter 
of the masons and carpenters in particular.  (Mao Vol. II, xxvii). 
57 Mao, “Strike Declaration by the Masons and Carpenters of Changsha,” October 6, 1922, Ibid., 127.  
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 As the author of these articles Mao remained at the center of arbitration in the 
days that followed, between representatives from the union and the Changsha county 
magistrate.  Eventually the strike was successful.  All told, of the four major strikes in 
Hunan during the early 1920’s—by the miners at Anyuan and Shuikoushan, the 
Guangzhou-Hankou rail workers, the Changsha masons and carpenters, and the 
compositors and printer’s strike—only the later two were uniquely urban in character.  
But organization of these groups need not be characterized as a form of orthodox 
proletarian Marxism, where urban industrial workers successfully unionized.  On the 
contrary, Mao’s and other activist’s work in the city were indicative of the fact that local 
institutions of industry and commerce “were equally as old, and just as traditional, as the 
landlord-tenant system in the rural areas.  Thus the Chinese revolution, even during its 
early urban phase, often operated within an unorthodox environment and could not 
escape being shaped by it.”  The major strikes in Hunan during this period were also 
mainly directed against Chinese-owned operations, and not foreign institutions.58  Even 
the strikes of miners and railroad workers fell into a peculiar middle category, because 
they involved a kind of industrialized work which most often took place within a rural 
area.  Most of these workers hailed from rural villages in Jiangxi and eastern Hunan.  
As activists who organized successful strikes of these workers, Mao and Liu Shaoqi 
employed what Elizabeth Perry has referred to as “cultural positioning,” i.e. knowledge 
                                                
58 Lynda Shaffer, Mao and the Workers: The Hunan Labor Movement, 1920-1923 (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1982), 204-205.  
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and familiarity with the rural way of life to win over the hearts and minds of workers.59  
This also raises the question of to what degree Mao’s account of the Hunan peasant 
movement was influenced by urban circumstances.  Was there such a divide between 
urban and rural?       
 “Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” from the winter and spring of 1927 
was in part written to correct the negative perception of the peasantry that existed among 
urban and right-wing party elements in cities such as Changsha.  Of the five counties 
Mao investigated for approximately one month—Xiangtan, Xiangxiang, Hengshan, 
Liling, and Changsha, most were close to the provincial capital.  In his opening remarks 
of the report, he stated that the information regarding peasant conditions in the 
countryside was “the exact opposite of what I had heard from the gentry class in Hankou 
and Changsha.”60  The same was true for peasants in the countryside of other provinces, 
such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang, where in a similar study of villages he noted that, “most 
people believe that since these two provinces are peaceful and prosperous the peasants do 
not suffer much.”61  In early 1927 the CCP was also still technically allied with the 
KMT and its efforts during the Northern Expedition to drive out regional warlords.  
Thus Mao’s mission also needs to be understood in this regard, since there were high-
ranking members of the Nationalist party in Changsha who persisted in the belief that 
China’s peasants were nothing more than “riff-raff” : 
                                                
59 Perry, Anyuan:  Mining China’s Revolutionary Tradition.  See Introduction.   
60 Mao Zedong, “Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” in MRTP, Vol. II, 429.  
61 Mao Zedong, “The Bitter Sufferings of the Peasants in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and Their Movements of 
Resistance” MRTP, Vol. II, 414.  
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When I first arrived in Changsha, I met all sorts of people and picked up a 
good deal of gossip.  From the middle strata of society upwards to the 
Guomindang right-wingers, there was not a single person who did not sum 
it all up in the phrase, “Its terrible!”  Even very revolutionary people, 
influenced by the views of the “Its terrible” school which dominated the 
climate in the city, became downhearted when they tried to picture the 
situation in the countryside in their mind’s eye and were unable to deny 
the word “terrible.”62   
 
 This was a bias against the peasantry among right-wing elements of the KMT.  It 
was also shared by rural gentry elites, who both claimed that the formation of peasant 
associations may have been a good thing, but that peasants placed in charge of the 
associations amounted to nothing more than pizi, or “riffraff.”63  But for Mao the so-
called riffraff comprised the most important element of the entire peasant movement.  
By classifying upper, middle, and lower ranking peasants he believed the latter were key 
to the movement.  This was because, “the poor peasants (especially the portion who are 
utterly destitute), being the most revolutionary group, have gained leadership of the 
peasant associations.”  Furthermore:  
This leadership by the poor peasants is extremely necessary.  Without the 
poor peasants there would be no revolution. To deny their role is to deny 
the revolution.  To attack them is to attack the revolution.  From the 
beginning to end, the general direction they have given to the revolution 
has never been wrong.64  
 
Mobilization of the peasantry was also a key objective of the Northern Expedition 
(1926-1928).  Thus Mao’s idea of “revolution” was also related to its potential success, 
in part because it united China’s two rival parties, the communists (CCP) and the 
                                                
62 Mao, “Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” in MRTP, Vol. II, 432.   
63 Ibid., 435.  
64 Ibid., 439.  
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nationalists (KMT).  Mao also wrote his report under the assumption that the United 
Front between the communists and nationalists would continue.  When Chiang Kai-shek 
decided to purge the communists in April 1927 it split the alliance and drove them 
underground.  This betrayal reoriented the focus of their mission and forced them 
underground to encampments in the mountains of neighboring Jiangxi, east of Hunan.               
The rise of labor and trade unionism in Changsha during the 1920’s should also 
be understood within the context of the violent warlord conflicts that raged through 
Hunan and all of China during this period.  This and other disputes in south China, 
especially Guangdong, caused Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist leadership to make 
Hunan one of the main objectives of pacification for the Northern Expedition. The basic 
thesis of Angus McDonald’s The Urban Origins of Rural Revolution (1978), was that the 
peasant movement in Hunan cannot be understood without first considering the influence 
of urban activism—by masses and elites—not only in cities such as Changsha, but in 
smaller provincial centers such as Hengyang, Lilang, and Pingxiang.  As wholesale 
unionization and anti-imperialist sentiment swept through these cities and towns the 
emerging party intelligentsia grappled with how best to liberate Hunan’s peasants, and 
also how to incorporate them into the larger goals of the Northern Expedition.  But for 
some scholars the peasant movement was more than a “conscious emergency adaptation 
to shifting national political circumstances that was subsequently exploited by an 
opportunistic and ambitious Mao Zedong.”65  Stephen Averill argues that one of the 
                                                
65 Stephen Averill, “The Transition from Urban to Rural in the Chinese Revolution.” The China Journal, 
No. 48. (July 2002), 87.  
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main facilitators of rural activism in the early twentieth century was the abolition of the 
imperial examination system in 1905.  This created a vacuum which led to the 
“fragmentation” of old gentry elites, also allowing the emergence of Western-styled 
schools, that “at each level in the educational hierarchy fostered intimate interactions 
among students drawn from increasingly broad geographical catchment areas, passed 
some of them on to higher-level institutions, and returned many of the rest to their home 
areas to seek teaching and other jobs.”66  Thus Western ideas of trade unionism and 
organization trickled down to rural areas.        
Ultimately the contentious warlord politics and factionalism of the 1920’s played 
out in cities such as Changsha, where military and government elites exerted the most 
influence, forcing Mao and the Party to realize that the key to national revolution lay in 
the countryside.  Following the successful strikes by the miners in Anyuan and 
Shuikoushan, Hunan’s first peasant organization after the founding of the CCP in 1921 
was the Yuebei Peasant Organization, established in 1922.67  These and other peasant 
organizations served as the inspiration for Mao’s report in February 1927.  But Chiang 
Kai-shek’s decision a few months later, in April, to purge the communists, resulted in the 
imprisonment and mass execution of thousands.  The ensuing years were not kind to the 
people of Changsha, Hunan, and the rest of China.    
 
                                                
66 Ibid., 91. 
67 “Hunan di yi ge nong hui—yue bei nong gong hui,” (dang shi ren ji ti hui yi), HNLSZL 1, 1960, 1.  
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Conclusion 
 
 The nationwide demonstrations that swept through China after May 4, 1919 
inaugurated an intellectual and cultural enlightenment.  In cities all over China, students 
and workers inspired by anti-foreign nationalism staged protests, boycotts, and published 
articles in local newspapers, and other journals expressing new found national identity.   
Changsha’s student activists engaged in a variety of progressive activities.  They 
distributed leaflets and handbills on the streets of Changsha.  Students from the 
Hsiangya Medical School wrote for “Save the Nation Weekly,” and organized Save the 
Nation Teams.  They were all activists within an emerging urban landscape of national 
identity and anti-imperialism that swept through China during this period.  Despite 
whatever material funding Yale may have provided Mao and Changsha’s student press, 
Edward Hume and other American teachers became critical of student activists and 
remained blinded by their disdain for communism and organized labor.  Hume’s lack of 
sensitivity to such issues may have contributed to the growing negative perception of 
Changsha’s foreign community after 1919, ultimately forcing them to leave the city in 
1926.              
 In the fall of 1925 Mao penned a famous poem titled “Changsha.” Inspired by a 
famous account from the Zuo Zhuan, It represented his intense appreciation for ancient 
Chinese culture.  He wrote of being in Changsha with “a throng of companions, Vivid 
yet those crowded months and years.  Young we were, schoolmates/ At life’s full 
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flowering; Filled with student enthusiasm/ Boldly we cast all restraints aside.”68  These 
experiences with his “companions” may have referred to the work Mao engaged in as an 
activist author and labor organizer in the city during the 1920’s.  His written works in 
newspapers such as the Da Gong Bao also contributed to the city as a center of emerging 
nationalism in early twentieth century China. Through his use of traditional Chinese 
literature as a mode of criticism, and his involvement in the Changsha’s labor and peasant 
movements, placing him back within the context of urban China during the early 1920’s 
reminds us of why he became so influential and eventually became leader of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).  Doing so also constructs a narrative in contrast with 
contemporary understandings which have previously dominated discussions of Mao—
author of the famous report about the peasant movement in 1927, “leader” of the Long 
March and of guerilla movements in Jiangxi and Yanan, and finally as the great 
Chairman, father of modern China after 1949 and chief architect of economic and social 
policy that reaped disastrous consequences for millions.  
                                                
68 Mao Zedong, “Changsha,” in MRTP, Vol. II, 225.  
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6-Women in Changsha 
 This short chapter is a brief account of women’s history in Changsha focusing on 
three specific areas:  educational reform, the infamous suicide of a local woman named 
Zhao Wuzhen in 1919, and a discussion of prostitution in the city during the Republican 
period.  It is more thematically related to the chapter that follows, which covers the 
story of a woman activist and author named Sophia Zhu Tierong.  Although the 
Hundred Days of Reform may have in many respects failed in the city, it nonetheless 
initiated some important advancements for women’s education.  After 1898 women 
from all over China went to study in Japan.  Hopefully this will show that not all women 
experienced hardship and violence, but became part of a more upwardly mobile 
generation of emancipated women in China and Changsha.  
 
 
EDUCATION 
 
 The first women’s school in China was founded in Shanghai during the Hundred 
Days of Reform, on June 1, 1898.  Women’s education was a major priority for reform 
minded intellectuals, and though the reform movement, it signaled the beginning of a 
movement to establish schools for young women throughout China.1  Establishing 
institutions for female education in Changsha became a priority for young intellectuals 
                                                
1 Wang Zheng, Women in the Chinese Enlightenment: Oral and Textual Histories (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), 172. 
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and revolutionaries who either hailed from the city or worked there.  Despite the 
contentious climate of China during the early twentieth century, several girls and 
women’s schools opened in the city during the Republican Period.  These consisted of 
two basic types.  The first were middle schools that were divided into senior (gao) and 
junior (chu) level grades, and consisted of a core curriculum that taught literature, history, 
geography, painting, human physiology, math and science, foreign languages, and 
physical education.  There were also schools referred to “professional schools,” (zhi 
xiao), also divided into senior and junior schools.  Most of these began without their 
own facilities, usually met in private houses, with the rent paid by private donors.  As 
they attracted more students and increased in wealth, but especially following the 
Revolution of 1911, many girl’s schools received subsidies from the local government, or 
became official public schools.  Those that did received a visit each semester from a 
“school inspector,” (duxue) that evaluated the teachers and curriculum, distributed funds 
to first, second, and third level school staff and administrators, cited violations, and then 
reported back to the provincial government.  By the 1930’s Changsha contained one 
female public middle school, seven private girl’s schools, one public professional school, 
and twelve private professional schools.2             
Changsha first primary school for girls, the Hunan Number One People’s Girl’s 
School (Hunan Min Li Di Yi Nu Xiao) opened on June 10, 1903.  The impetus to open 
the school came from a former county magistrate named Long Rui, as well as a recently 
                                                
2 Huang Zengfu, “Changsha nu zi jiao yu shi hua,” Changsha Wenshi Ziliao (Changsha: Zhongguo 
Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang huiyi Changsha shi wei yuan hui), No. 8 1989, 165-173.  
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returned student from Japan named Yu Fan, who petitioned then governor Zhao Erxun to 
open a school in the city.  Their aim was to model such a school on those in Shanghai.  
For the first semester a total of forty resident and non-resident students enrolled.  The 
two women chosen to head the school were the wife of Long Zhanlin, who was the Vice-
President of the Board of Rites at the imperial court in Beijing, as well as a woman 
named Xu Huang Xuanyou (this was her married name, to someone with the surname 
“Xu.”  She is referred to this way throughout the reference material).  The stepmother 
of Huang Xing, who went on to become one of Hunan’s most famous military leaders 
during the Revolution of 1911, was also one of the managers of the school.3  It was not 
mere coincidence that these two women were placed in charge, since the Huang and 
Long families both hailed from Changsha and had previous dealings with each other.  
The Long family supervised Changsha’s Ming De School and invited Huang Xing to 
teach there after he arrived from Shanghai the following fall.4  But just over one year 
after it opened, in the fall of 1904, Changsha’s gentry sent a memorial to Beijing urging 
that the girl’s school be closed due to excessive “corrupt practices,” and other abuses.5  
Whether this derived from their opposition to female education or their suspicion of 
Huang Xing’s underground revolutionary activities is not known.  
Despite the closing of Hunan Number One People’s Girl’s School, it later 
reopened at a secret location east of the city, as the Dong Xiang Private Girl’s School, or 
more officially the Ying Zhu Xue Tang.  Classes were held in the homes of either Xu 
                                                
3 Huang, “Changsha nu zi jiao yu shi hua,” 166. 
4 Hsueh Chun-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961),  
17.  
5 Huang, “Changsha nu zi jiao yu shi hua,” 166.   
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Huang Xuanyou or Huang Ying, near the foothills of a small forest.  Its rural location in 
a private residence likely allowed it to avoid detection by local gentry who could have 
opposed its creation.  Most of the women who headed these schools had connections to 
the Revolutionary Alliance (Tong Meng Hui) in Changsha.  This included Xu Huang, 
Huang Ying, and other female members of the organization such as Tang Huangqiong.   
When the school commemorated its twentieth anniversary in 1923 it had begun accepting 
male students for several years previous, and had graduated two classes of boys from 
middle school, six different classes from its normal school or teaching college, as well as 
two different grades of twenty four primary school students.  At one time it even served 
as a trade school for teaching sowing, embroidery, weaving, and dyeing.6   
During the Revolution of 1911 the Ying Zhu Xue Tang continued to conduct 
classes in secret, but after the beginning of the new republic it began receiving funding 
from the provincial government, and relocated to a new facility in the city near a bamboo 
and pine shop called Zhu Shan Pu.  Among its noteworthy pupils were Yang Kaihui, 
Mao Zedong’s first wife, who was executed in Changsha by the Guomindang (KMT) in 
1930.  By 1949 one of the vice-committee chairs of the Changsha County Peasant 
Association, Yu Ximai, was a graduate of the school, as was Huang Zemin, who 
eventually went on to teach there.  After the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, 
it became Changsha’s Number Five Middle School.7                      
                                                
6 Ibid., 168-169. 
7 Ibid., 169. 
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By 1904 there were approximately three thousand students from China living and 
studying in Japan.  Many of these students, such as Sun Yatsen, Huang Xing, and 
others, formed China’s first revolutionary organizations.  Of these 373 were male 
students from Hunan, comprising eleven percent of all students in Japan at the time.  As 
a part of the xinzheng reforms of 1905, the next year Hunan’s governor petitioned the 
Qing court to allow approximately twenty female students from Hunan to study abroad in 
Japan.  These “new policies” (xin zheng), was an effort by the Qing imperial court to 
finally implement many of the policies that had been proposed during the Hundred Days 
of Reform in 1898.  The most important result of these was western modernization, such 
as the construction of railroads, telegraphs, establishment of municipal police forces and 
other western-style urban infrastructure.  Special emphasis was also placed on 
education.  The age old imperial examination system, a bedrock of China’s education 
system for centuries was even abolished.      
Xu Huang Xuanyou, who had been the headmaster of the first women’s school in 
Changsha, was also chosen to supervise the female students in Tokyo.  The tuition and 
fees of fifteen female students were paid through a joint effort between the Hunan 
Education Bureau (Xue Wu Chu) and local wealthy gentry.  Thus although it seems 
some members of the gentry may have been opposed to women’s education in Changsha, 
they were nonetheless willing to put up the money to pay for their education abroad.8  
One of the women in the first class was Tang Qunying, who eventually became the head 
                                                
8 Ibid., 167.  
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of the Changsha Women’s Federation, and some years later entered into a bitter dispute 
with Ye Dehui over the opening of another women’s school in Changsha.   
Tang Qunying (1871-1937) was one of Hunan’s most famous female figures and 
revolutionaries.  Born and raised a rural area on the outskirts of Changsha, from a young 
age she stood out as a tomboy and became known for being aggressive and outspoken 
even among other boys.  She was influenced by her father Tang Xingzhao, who had 
served as a general in Zeng Guofan’s Hunan Army, who taught her sword fighting skills 
as well as how to ride a horse.  One of seven siblings, her and her sisters received the 
same educational training in the Confucian classics as her brothers.  She was among the 
first female students from Hunan to study in Japan, where she joined Sun Yat-sen and 
Huang Xing’s Revolutionary Alliance, and became close friends with Qiu Jin.  During 
the Revolution of 1911 Tang personally led military engagements on horseback against 
Qing forces.  According to historian David Strand, Tang and other women soldiers 
likened themselves after the famed female heroine Hua Mulan, joining “classical 
statecraft, revolutionary ideology, and the demolition of male stereotypes about the 
weaknesses of women.”9    
Some of the women who led this inaugural class abroad became known as the 
“three aunts,” (san wei bo mu) placed in charge of the group.  These were a certain Lady 
Nie, aged forty-nine, the mother of a deceased professor from Changsha’s Normal School 
named Guo Dezhong.   Xu Huang Xuanyou, aged forty-four, and Wang Yi (who was 
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formerly known as Tan Yunsheng, and was the mother of Wang Shize, a deceased 
counselor and admiral in the Qing Navy).  Although many of the classes the students 
enrolled in were taught by Japanese lecturers who could not speak Chinese, translators 
were provided.  Among the other leaders of the female Chinese students in Japan at this 
time was Qiu Jin (1875-1907), the eccentric and charismatic young revolutionary from 
Zhejiang, martyred after attempting an anti-Qing uprising in 1907.10          
 Most of the women from Changsha who received their education abroad during 
this period ended up pursuing careers in education.  Xu Huang Xuanyou became 
Changsha’s first female teacher and the headmaster of the first women’s school in nearby 
Changde, investing much of her own money in its founding.  Other students helped open 
women’s schools either in Changsha or other parts of Hunan.  In addition to being the 
founder of the city’s first women’s federation, Tang Cunying and another student named 
Zhang Hanying founded Changsha’s first newspaper for women, the Nu Quan Ribao. 
Wang Changguo founded the Basic School for Women, or the Wu Ben Nu Xiao, and 
during the governorship of Zhao Hengti was the only female delegate to the provincial 
assembly.11  
 This new generation of educated women contributed to Changsha’s growing 
modernity during the early years of the twentieth century.  After a time this generation 
began to challenge the traditionalist regime of Changsha’s conservative gentry.  The 
most notable example of this was Tang Qunying’s clash with Ye Dehui in 1913, 
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regarding the establishment of a girl’s school near the Fire Palace on Pozi Street.  But 
although these years were in some ways fruitful for the future status of women in 
Changsha, there still remained significant problems.  In 1919 the suicide of a local 
woman betrothed in marriage alarmed residents throughout the city, and began a debate 
in the local press about the status of women in Chinese society.     
 
THE CASE OF MISS ZHAO 
 
On November 14, 1919 a Changsha woman named Zhao Wuzhen committed 
suicide by cutting her throat and bleeding to death.  On her wedding day she slit her 
throat with a razor while seated in the traditional sedan bridal chair.  She had been 
betrothed to be the second wife of a man named Wu Fenglin, but was against the 
arrangement since he was considerably older than her and ugly.  Thereafter referred to 
as “Miss Zhao” in the Changsha press, her death shocked the city, moving local writers to 
respond in the Hunan Da Gong Bao.  Several of the articles written about Zhao’s death 
were written by Mao Zedong, and many of his non-labor related writings from this period 
concerned the relationship between the sexes and the family.    
Mao wrote approximately ten articles on Miss Zhao’s suicide.  The incident was 
also raised in the press by other local scholars such as Xiao Rulin (1890-1926).  In 
“Commentary on the suicide of Miss Zhao,” published only two days after Zhao’s death, 
on November 16, 1919, Zhao is identified as a resident of Changsha.  Mao noted the 
three specific circumstances ultimately leading to her death:  The first was Chinese 
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society, the second “the family living in the Zhao residence on Nanyang Street in 
Changsha,” and the third “the Wu family of the Orange garden in Changsha, the family 
of the husband she did not want.”  For Mao each of these conditions represented “three 
iron nets,” in traditional Chinese society from which Miss Zhao was unable to escape.12  
The radical anarchist Peng Huang (1896-1921) penned a rebuttal to Mao’s article the next 
day, to which Mao then issued his counter response. Peng was one of Mao’s closest 
colleagues and another student activist from Hunan, but blamed Zhao’s death on her own 
backward thinking.  In “ ‘The Evils of Society’ and Miss Zhao,” Mao answered Peng:   
Since society contains ‘causes’ that could bring about Miss Zhao’s death, 
this society is an extremely dangerous thing.  It was able to cause the 
death of Miss Zhao; it could also cause the death of Miss Qian, Miss Sun, 
or Miss Li.  It can make ‘women die; it can also make ‘men’ die . . . We 
must protest loudly, warn and awaken those fellow human beings who are 
not yet dead, and cry out ‘society is evil’!13  
 
For Mao ‘society’ was in part represented by his own backward province of 
Hunan and its capital city, Changsha.  To illustrate this point he responded to Peng’s 
argument that Miss Zhao should have simply run away to liberate herself from her 
predicament.  Doing so would have proved difficult, due to the fact that in a city such as 
Changsha women lived in a perpetual state of segregation from urban life.  Because 
women were forbidden to go outside the home, peddlers of silk and other cloths in the 
city had to sell their wares to them from house to house.  Public toilets were for men 
only, and women were never seen frequenting teahouses or staying in hotels.  It was 
always men who shopped at Changsha’s well-known local high-end shops such as 
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Taihefeng or Yutaihua and never women.  The manual laborers in the city were 
obviously all men and many of the schools in the city still lacked female students.14  
Women in Changsha and throughout China still lacked genuine status or identity.  
Many, such as Miss Zhao, even lacked true given names.  Her name, “Wuzhen” 
combines the characters wu, meaning “five,” and zhen, meaning “chaste,” meaning she 
was the fifth daughter of a man named Zhao.              
In Mao’s “Against Suicide,” published on November 23, he argued that the 
conditions of an unjust society were the main reason people choose to commit suicide.  
Although in doing so one’s “spirit of rebellion against oppression should be admired,” he 
suggested it “is better to be killed in struggle than to die by suicide.”  Mao concluded 
that suicide represented a “revolt” against mankind’s “natural physiological condition,” 
and that it had “no place in ethics, in psychology, in physiology, or biology.  Thus the 
criminal law of many nations includes prohibitions against suicide.”15   
Mao’s essays on suicide were also supplemented by other articles concerning the 
status of women, such as “The Marriage Question—An Admonition to Young Men and 
Women,” “The Question of Reforming the Marriage System,” “The Question of Love—
Young People and Old People:  Smash the Policy of Parental Arrangement,” “Smash the 
Matchmaker System,” and “The Problem of Superstition in Marriage.”  The last of these 
criticized the traditions surrounding marriage and matchmaking in Chinese history, again 
invoking the past to critique the present.  Miss Zhao’s death was facilitated by the 
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tradition of the sedan chair in Chinese weddings.  It dated back to King Zhou of the 
Shang, when the spirit of his concubine Daji was replaced by the spirit of a fox, and thus 
it became a tradition for brides to be protected by a chair within a locked compartment.  
Such traditions, concluded Mao, amounted to “so many cheap tricks of marriage and 
have no other purpose than to be the rope that tightly binds a man and a woman together.  
Between the matchmaking and the exchange of gifts, the bride and the groom are so 
tightly bound by the bonds of superstition that they can’t even breathe . . .”16  
Even a few years after the Miss Zhao incident as he became increasingly involved 
in issues of Hunan’s working class, he continued to criticize the old China and the 
practice of suicide in particular.  In May 1921 a former teacher and intellectual named 
Yi Baisha (1886-1921) took his life following an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate a 
warlord in Beijing.  He fled to Guangdong and drowned himself during the Dragon Boat 
Festival, evoking Qu Yuan’s gesture hundreds of years before, in the hopes of “arousing 
the masses.”  Yi had also been a native of Changsha, and again Mao responded in 
writing, this time in a short poem to honor Yi’s memory, titled “A couplet for the Hero 
Yi Baisha”:  
The useless one died not, the useful one died in anger; I weep  
for the future of the Republic.   
 
Last year I mourned Mr. Chen, this year I mourned Mr. Yi;  
what can be done now about Changsha’s backwardness?17   
      
                                                
16 Ibid., 439ff, 449.  
17 Mao Zedong, “A Couplet for the Hero Yi Baisha,” in MRTP, Vol. II, 87.    
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The poem also references the death of Chen Tianhua (1875-1905), whose suicide 
in 1905 moved many in Changsha.  This as well as his essays on suicide from 1919 
were also a response to a recurring phenomena in the capital city of his home province 
that represented not only its “backwardness” but of all of China.  To Mao the fates of Yi 
Baisha, Chen Tianhua, Miss Zhao, and possibly others such as the Huang family who 
collectively took their life during the rice riot of 1910, all represented “Changsha’s 
backwardness,” and that as such were examples of the failures and backwardness of all of 
China.  For most of the May Fourth intellectuals, as well as activists such as Mao, China 
was a young fledgling nation trapped by its past traditions.  These traditions were not 
only related to women’s marriage rights, but extended to other well established social 
practices in Changsha.  The best example of this was the trade of prostitution. 
 
PROSTITUTION IN CHANGSHA 
 
 Public record dates the existence of prostitution, even in hinterland cities such as 
Changsha, to the Western Zhou period.  Among Hunan’s river towns it was common, as 
depicted in Shen Congwen’s story, “The Border Town,” about life in a West Hunan river 
town during the Republican Period.  In Shen’s account of the fictional village of 
Chatong, the prostitutes in that community catered to the numbers of itinerant boatmen, 
merchants, and other traders, where “the shanties on the waterfront of the small town 
began to house women of a special type who came in from the surrounding countryside 
or whose husbands, Sichuanese soldiers had been drafted to Hunan and never returned.”  
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Such practices, notes Shen, were the direct result of merchant activity in the region.  
And although this kind of work may have seemed “parasitic,” to some, the women who 
worked at these establishments, “were more to be trusted than those gentlemen in the city 
who talk[ed] of nothing but morality and conscience.”18 
During the late Qing and early Republican Periods numerous brothels existed in 
Changsha.  Some were patroned by wealthy members of the Guomindang, as well as the 
gentry elite, and were often used as legitimate venues to discuss business.  According to 
a survey conducted in 1947, by that year there were one hundred and fifty-two 
“entertainment houses,” (lehu) in the city, which employed approximately four hundred 
sixty-three women.  There were also two hundred and fifty “brothels”(jiyuan), which 
contained as many as sixty-one stages for performance, and employed as many as eight 
hundred women.19       
In January 1953 Changsha’s Public Security Bureau arrested twenty-nine 
individuals, all mostly women, who were suspected of running brothels and other various 
crimes.  The issue of Changsha Wen Shi Ziliao from 1989 contains the graphic accounts 
of five women and one male, and of the twenty-nine detainees were considered the six 
most disturbing and famous cases of powerful and influential brothel keepers in 
Changsha during the Republican Period.  The nature of these case studies indicates that 
prostitution was a well-established enterprise, known to both the government and to 
many among the local population.  
                                                
18 Shen Congwen, “The Border Town, Biancheng,” translated by Yang Xianyi and Dai Naidie 
(Fenghuang: Yilin chubanshe, 2011), 22-24.  
19 Tan Junwen, “Changsha changji zhi xing fei,” Changsha Wenshi Ziliao (Changsha: Zhongguo Renmin 
Zhengzhi Xieshang huiyi Changsha shi wei yuan hui), No. 8 1989, 180-192.  
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 Chen Yuzhen, aged thirty-six at the time of the interview, was originally from the 
Mi Luo River region near the Hunan/Jiangxi border.  In 1941 she opened the Xi Zhan 
Tang brothel, but owned other ones named “Wild Orchid” (Lan Feng Zi), as well as the 
“Seven Moderns” (Qi Mo Deng).  Lady Chen was the mistress of at least three powerful 
local officials.  A garrison commander named Xu, a local official named Yu Hansheng 
(who was later executed), and a director of the security bureau named Li Maotou, all 
notorious for bullying and mistreating prostitutes.  They were all accused of enticing 
young girls from the local urban labor force into prostitution, even paying money to have 
their names changed.  In 1947 two different prostitutes, one named Li Zhen and the 
other Zhang Zuming, reportedly both contracted syphilis.  Lady Chen refused to pay or 
arrange for either of them to receive medical care and forced them to continue seeing 
customers.  Both of the women died under her employ.20      
  Zhou Sizhen, was aged fifty-one when detained by the security bureau.  In 
1935, by way of her connections with a boyfriend who was a former Guomindang officer, 
known locally as “Pockmarked Gui,” and also the head of a local chapter of a secret 
society, the “Hong Bang.”  She opened her own brothels in partnership with as many as 
twenty other owners.  Some of the bosses were other women named Xu Jishun, Guo 
Daniang, and another named “Crazy Gui” (Gui Fengzi).  Zhou co-owned and operated 
at least three of the brothels.  From 1935 to 1949 she employed as many as a hundred 
prostitutes.  In 1947 at a boarding house near the train station a male customer named 
Yang Xiaohua allegedly witnessed Zhou beat a young prostitute under her employ.  
                                                
20 Ibid., 185.  
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Yang felt sorry for the young girl and attempted to secretly take her away to a safe place.  
But Lady Zhou soon discovered what had happened and ordered some thugs to find 
Yang.  They found him, beat him to death, and hung his body from the Luo Peng Bridge 
near a local granary.  In 1948 Zhou enticed a young girl from Yi Yang, a small city just 
to the north of Changsha, to one of her private brothels, where she was forced to have sex 
with and become the concubine of a Guomindang agent named Yu Taosong.21   
Zhou Suyun, age unknown, was listed as a resident of number 112 Luo Xing 
Tian.  This Lady Zhou was possibly similar in age to the Lady Zhou discussed above, 
because she was accused of using her oldest son, a local bandit surnamed “Gong,” to 
entice young women into her employ.  She often spent time in the nearby countryside 
trying to recruit peasant women to work for her using deception.  In December 1947 one 
of her girls developed some kind of medical problem, meaning that her body could not 
endure sex any longer, so she tried to run away.  Lady Zhou tracked her down at the 
train station and ordered a hired thug to beat her to death.  In May of 1945 she allegedly 
beat another girl severely, and forced her to continue seeing male customers, after which 
similar problems with the girl’s genitalia developed.  The girl was eventually sold to 
another brothel in Hankou for eighty yuan.  The next year she allegedly enticed two 
other girls from the street and also sold them to an operation in Hankou.  In 1944 she 
kidnapped two war refugees from Guilin, one named Li Cunying, the other Wang Juying, 
into prostitution, and even had them serve at least eight men in her own family.22        
                                                
21 Ibid., 185-186.  
22 Ibid., 186.  
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 The only male whose case was discussed among the group of former brothel 
keepers was sixty-five year old Liang Yihe.  In 1948 he was accused of kidnapping at 
least eight different women in collusion with the local security bureau.  Liang forced the 
women into prostitution out of his own residence, where he also repeatedly raped them.  
Even following the communist revolution Liang continued his practice.  On one 
occasion while entertaining seven known ruffians who wanted prostitutes, Liang enticed 
one of his girls (?) to perform for the men on a stage, where they gang raped her for 
several hours, for so long in fact that she was unable to endure.  The girl eventually 
crawled into the street and gave a loud cry to gain the attention of passers by who took 
pity on her, but she eventually died from the trauma.23 
 Possibly the eldest of the arrested group was a sixty-eight year old woman named 
Zhang Huangzhi, whose well-known brothel catered exclusively to high ranking officials 
from the Guomindang.  Her wealthiest clientele came from the family of Tan Tianyi, 
who was the director of Changsha’s South District Public Security Bureau, and a frequent 
guest at Lady Zhang’s brothel, where some of Changsha’s most famous and wealthy 
prostitutes worked.  But she was also accused of extorting some four million yuan from 
her girls, using the funds to purchase a lavish house.24   
 The last woman’s case discussed was forty-five year old Guo Xiying.  A native 
of nearby Xiangtan, Lady Guo’s husband was one of the directors of the local security 
bureau (he was executed in 1951).  Using his money and influence the couple opened a 
                                                
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid. 
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brothel at number 31 Guan Yuan, where they employed over twenty prostitutes.  What 
is particularly disturbing about this case was that Lady Guo and her husband raised four 
young girls, whose names were all listed in the case—Yang Huixian, Yang Xuemei, Guo 
Jinhui, and Yang Zaiyang—who by at least the ages of twelve were already forced into 
prostitution.  During one instance the young Yang Xuemei was forced to have sex with 
a sixty seven year old elderly official, but when the young girl refused, Lady Guo beat 
her so badly “until she was black and blue and covered with bruises.”  Lady Guo also 
had at least ten known “sworn sisters” who worked in the same trade as brothel owners, 
were all associated with local secret societies, Guomingdang commanders garrisoned in 
the city, and were all accused of bullying and mistreating young prostitutes, and of 
“committing all manner of crimes.”25    
 The Nationalist Party, or Guomindang (KMT), ruled Changsha and most of China 
during the 1930s and 1940s.  The Communist Party (CCP) had been driven underground 
following Chiang Kai-shek’s purge in 1927, and essentially remained so until World War 
II.  During the Guomindang’s control of Changsha efforts were made to ban 
prostitution, or at least address its potential threat to public health.  In 1948 the 
Changsha Municipal Sanitary Commission conducted physical examinations on forty-
seven prostitutes detained from a local brothel called Yang Zhou Ban.  They diagnosed 
thirty-four girls with gonorrhea, three with syphilis, and nine with some other form of 
sickness.  One of the most famous cases of prostitution involving a madam brothel 
owner and her relationship with local officials occurred during the 1920’s under the 
                                                
25 Ibid.   
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Governorship of Zhao Hengti.  The director of the Changsha Police, Zhang Huizan 
detained and beheaded a brothel owner and prostitute only known by her nickname, 
“Pockmarked Liu,” who had apparently earned notoriety for herself through her ability to 
recruit young girls into prostitution, but in her uncanny ability to “hook and bait,” many 
clients for herself.  It was said that no man was immune to her charms.  Like many 
powerful madams in her trade she mainly worked as a procuress out of her residence in 
an alley called Fu Yuan, number 20.  But likely owing to some disagreement she had 
with local officials, or perhaps even Zhang Huizhan himself, she was brutally detained 
and beheaded.  
Other than the disturbing and alarming abuse of young girls illustrated in each of 
the above cases, it is also important to consider that the arrest of these individuals and the 
detailed reporting of their various crimes occurred within the intense period of political 
activism and mobilization that characterized China following the Communist Revolution 
in 1949.  From the language and jargon of the cases it is apparent that the arrest of these 
and other individuals was not only part of a campaign to eradicate prostitution, but also to 
capture and expose the crimes of those who had collaborated with the Guomindang 
government.  This is seen in the use of the character wei, meaning “fake,” “bogus,” or to 
denote one as a “puppet” or “collaborator,” preceding the titles and positions of high 
ranking men who had various dealings with the madam brothel owners.  For instance, 
the public security officer named Xu and the former official named Yu Hansheng, were 
both listed with wei before their names, emphasizing they had worked for or collaborated 
with the Guomindang.  This was also the case with Tan Tianyi, the director of 
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Changsha’s South District Public Security Bureau, and also with the husband of Guo 
Xiuying, who had served as the director of another local security force.  Furthermore, in 
at least two of these instances, the official Yu Hansheng, and the husband of Lady Guo, 
the term “already suppressed” (yi zhen ya) appeared in parenthesis next to their names, 
meaning they had been executed, likely as a part of “The Campaign to Suppress 
Counterrevolutionaries,” which roughly lasted from 1950 to 1952.  Began soon after the 
CCP came to power in 1949, this campaign and others, such as the “Resist America and 
Aid Korea,” as well as the “Three Antis Campaign,” aimed to eliminate foreigners and 
foreign influence in China.  It also aimed to completely cleanse the Communist Party 
and eradicate all previous influence of the Guomindang.  Thus thousands of suspected 
former agents and spies were rounded up and arrested, and in some cases even 
executed.26  After 1949 the CCP also enacted a swift nationwide campaign to eliminate 
prostitution.  As part of the “Prostitution Reform Campaign” of 1951, prostitution was 
successfully banned in cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Suzhou, Yangzhou, 
Zhenjiang, and Hangzhou.  At least in the case of Shanghai, former prostitutes were sent 
to special “Women’s Labor Training Institutes,” for reeducation and to help them 
matriculate back into society.27   
 One of the main problems with the cited cases above also concerns the degree to 
which they are part of a dominant discourse of prostitution from this period.  In the eyes 
of communist reformers and later historians influenced by CCP historiography, trades 
                                                
26 Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,  
1999), 507-509. 
27 Gail Hershatter, Dangerous Pleasures: Prostitution and Modernity in Twentieth Century Shanghai 
(Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1997), 304-310.   
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such as prostitution were viewed as a social ills, and emphasized the exploitation poor 
prostitutes experienced at the hands of oppressive madam brothel owners.  Much of this 
knowledge comes from Gail Hershatter’s work on prostitution in Shanghai during the 
early years of the twentieth century.  She acknowledged the exploitation experienced by 
lower grade prostitutes, but nonetheless recognized it as a legitimate business-making 
venture for the more upwardly mobile and affluent classes of prostitutes or courtesans, 
many of which became very reluctant to leave their way of life when efforts were made 
after 1949 by the CCP to abolish it entirely.  This had to do with differing depictions of 
prostitutes in the “mosquito press,” and the popular press.  Within the mosquito press (a 
magazine akin to a kind of local tabloid on local affairs), notes Hershatter, courtesans in 
Shanghai were often discussed as subjects “at the top of the hierarchy of prostitution,” 
and as characters within a “literature of nostalgia,” that idealized Shanghai’s courtesan 
culture of the 1920’s, where not only were prostitutes expected to provide sexual 
services, but also were expected to exude a certain femininity of high culture, i.e. to dress 
nicely, sing songs from popular operas, and serve as hostesses during banquets for 
important officials.  Thus they were also viewed as legitimate entertainers and 
entrepreneurs.  But in contrast to this image of the prostitute, newspapers such as 
Shenbao condemned the practice and largely focused on the miserable and degrading 
conditions in which many prostitutes worked, the abuses they experienced at the hands of 
their oppressive owners, and the dangers they posed to public health.  In 1941 the same 
  240 
newspaper conducted a popular study that noted at least half of Shanghai’s prostitutes 
had contracted some form of venereal disease.28    
 In her analysis of Gao Xian, an engineer and cultural theorist writing during the 
1920’s, Tani Barlow observed that women during this period were reduced to objects of 
prostitution, and “forced by culture to barter sexual access for food and position.  They 
are sex and have sex, which why they can alienate or ‘sell it.”  Even under “conditions 
where women are not forced to sell their sexuality, that is, in nature or in a just social 
world, women are (as they should always be in a state of natural justice), the heart of 
sexual and social reproduction.”  Thus the plight of women was not lost on prominent 
and other intellectuals during the Republican period.29   
 From the few case studies of prostitution in Changsha one might also recognize 
the differences within the hierarchy of prostitution noted by Hershatter.  For instance, 
the case of Zhang Huangzhi, whose brothel almost exclusively provided services to 
officers from the Guomindang.  According to the report Zhang’s biggest crime was not 
abusing her girls but rather extortion of their money to buy her own expensive house.  
Thus the white-collar nature of the offense possibly indicates the existence of a similar 
hierarchy of prostitution in Changsha during these years.  But most of the cases cited 
from Changsha definitely fit within the narrative of prostitutes as victims, rather than 
sophisticated courtesans.  Classifying the madam brothel owner’s male Guomindang 
                                                
28 Gail Hershatter, “Courtesans and Streetwalkers:  The Changing Discourses on Shanghai Prostitution, 
1890-1949,” Journal of the History of Sexuality, Vol. 3, No. 2. (October 1992), pp. 245-269. See pp. 249, 
253, and 262.   
29 Tani E. Barlow, The Questinon of Women in Chinese Feminism (Durham: Duke University Press,  
2004), 84.  
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collaborators as wei, and emphasizing that these men had been “suppressed” (zhen ya), or 
in effect liquidated by the party soon after liberation obviously suggests that as primary 
sources these accounts remain somewhat tainted with a revolutionary understanding of 
prostitution as one of the social evils indicative of any bourgeois society.  Perhaps more 
importantly is that historians should also be aware that such sources “were written by 
men for a male audience.”30  In this regard the poor women depicted in these reports 
were victimized, objectified, and denied agency on at least two levels.  First in the 
horrible trauma and violence they experienced as prostitutes, and secondly through the 
means in which their cases were reported as possible tools of political propaganda and 
mobilization after 1949 that sought to delegitimize the Guomindang and legitimize the 
more pure and “moral” character of the CCP.  But it is also important to note that by 
detaining brothel owners and reporting their crimes, the Communist Party was at least 
attempting to eradicate prostitution and improve the daily lives for women in Changsha.  
It would have been difficult for even the party to fabricate the graphic detail narrated 
within these cases, thus they serve as authentic sources for understanding the corrupt 
political and moral climate that characterized Changsha while it was under Guomindang 
administration during the 1930’s and 1940’s, but more importantly the horrific culture of 
violence often perpetrated against women who struggled to live among the lower rungs of 
city life. 
 
                                                
30 Ibid., 268. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Discussion on women’s education in Changsha during the early twentieth century 
contributes to the discussion of local reform first raised in Chapter 2.  Although Liang 
Qichao’s efforts to establish western training academies and newspapers may have failed 
in 1898, it resulted in some significant achievements for female education.  In addition 
to establishing some of Changsha’s first schools for girls, the first generation of students 
was allowed to study abroad in Japan.  Among these was Tang Qunying, who went to to 
become the leader of Changsha’s Women Federation.  
 The case of Miss Zhao’s suicide in 1919 represents a body of Mao’s Zedong’s 
literature that has been seldom discussed in English language writing about revolutionary 
China.  By using Changsha as a case study, these articles reveal both his and other 
activist’s legitimate concerns about the rights of women in Chinese society.  The case 
studies of prostitution further suggest the difficulties faced by many women in Changsha 
who were employed at brothels.  Although many of the brothel owners were also 
women, the cases also reveal the extent to which trades such as prostitution were 
exploited by the Guomindang government in Changsha during the Republican period.  
This will help establish more context for understanding the reach of the Guomindang 
state in local life in the remaining chapters.         
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7-Iron Lotus 
Through her wartime activism, writing, and teaching, Zhu Tierong (1915-2009) 
lived a life indicative of women’s rising social status and position in China during the 
Republican period.  From her own written and unpublished autobiography as well as 
English and Chinese language versions of her late husband’s biography, she recounted 
the details of a life that contributed to Changsha’s history and modernization.   She 
served as a volunteer for the YMCA in Changsha during World War II and became an 
activist and advocate for the CCP’s welfare work in the city following liberation in 1949.  
As a part of the CCP’s campaign against the U.S. war in Korea, during the early 1950’s 
she was one of approximately sixty scholars in Changsha recently returned from America 
to denounce the war, calling for an end to American imperialism.  In a series of English 
language articles published in China Monthly Review, a Shanghai based publication, 
writing under her English name Sophia Chang, Zhu highlighted the extensive urban 
reforms that took place in Changsha soon after the communists came to power.  These 
articles not only provided glimpses into the drastic changes that took place in Changsha 
after 1949, but also established Zhu Tierong as a spokesman for the new China, and a 
vocal female figure in China following liberation.  
As happened with many who suffered under Mao, Zhu and her husband, Zhang 
Yifan drew suspicions from Party leaders because of their previous work as volunteers 
under the Nationalist government, but also likely because of their experiences studying 
abroad in America.  By the late 1950’s Zhu was accused of being a spy for the U.S. 
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government and eventually labeled a rightist.  Throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s she 
endured confinement, imprisonment, and humiliation.  Most tragically, after liberation 
her husband was already serving in top posts within Hunan’s provincial government, 
committed suicide during the summer of 1957 by jumping in the Xiang River.  That 
summer Zhang created controversy for himself during a Party meeting by suggesting that 
there should be “rule of law” as opposed to “rule of man” in China.  In the days that 
followed the Changsha Daily (Changsha Ribao) published a series of articles denouncing 
Zhang, spelling certain doom for his political future and safety.  By the time the articles 
were published Zhang had been hospitalized due to complications related to diabetes.  
After reading the articles in the newspaper, and realizing the futility of his situation, he 
tragically took his own life.  
Although Zhu’s is but one story of many cases of female achievements during 
these years, the purpose of this chapter will be to discuss Zhu Tierong’s life and legacy as 
a feminine heroine who exemplified the historical changes and processes that occurred in 
Changsha during the 1930’s and after 1949.  For as much as characters such as Ye 
Dehui represented his own uniquely masculine version of modernization in Changsha, 
beginning with her relief work during the Republican Period Zhu Tierong represented a 
newer, idealized, and revolutionary voice for women, modern Changsha, and all of 
China.  Her experiences within the timeframe of the Republican Period, the years 
following the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, and finally in the era of reform, 
were all part of a narrative journey that exemplified the transitions and turbulent nature of 
Changsha’s modernization.  One additional final episode discussed in this chapter, and 
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one which makes Zhu’s story unique, concerns a series of objections she raised in a 
private letter to author Mark Salzman concerning his fictional portrayal of her in his 
famous book, Iron and Silk.  
 
ZHU TIERONG AND GENDER HISTORY  
 
Some of the most popular English language memoirs of the Cultural Revolution 
have been written by women.  These of course are Wild Swans:  Three Daughters of 
China, by Jung Chang (1991), Life and Death in Shanghai, by Chung Nian (1987), Yue 
Daiyun’s To The Storm: the Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman (1987), as well 
as Jan Wong’s Red China Blues: My Long March from Mao to Now (1996).  Each of 
these works are autobiographical accounts of the different lived experiences of Chinese 
women during the Cultural Revolution, and serve as important accounts of how, despite 
the Communist Party’s promise of female liberation, women endured some of the most 
horrible treatment during these years.  The period of political openness following the 
reform and opening beginning in the late 1970’s and 1980’s also witnessed a large 
“literature of the wounded” (shanghen wenxue) emerge in mainland China, as numbers of 
former intellectuals, both men and women recounted the suffering they experienced.1  
This serves as one reason why biography served as such an important tool for each of 
these formerly persecuted women, because the narration and recounting of one’s life 
                                                
1 Wendy Larson, “He Yi’s The Postman: The Work Space of a New Age Maoist,” in Byrna Goodman and 
Wendy Larson eds., Gender in Motion:  Divisions of Labor and Cultural Change in Late Imperial and 
Modern China (New York:  Rowman and Littlefield,  2005), 212. 
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stories are important tools for dealing and coping with past trauma.  In this chapter I 
also argue that such was the case with Zhu Tierong.  Both her and her husband’s life 
achievements through the means of historical biography constitutes what Joan Judge has 
referred to as one’s “own experience of epochal change and national crisis,” where both 
male and female subjects who lived through the turbulent years of the Republican period 
and Communist revolution used their life narratives to cope with trauma they experienced 
under Mao.2   
By the mid to late 1920’s, the women’s movement in China reached its most 
active period since the May Fourth era began, and “motivated untold numbers of women 
from all social classes to participate actively in the revolutionary cause.”3   Such 
activism during these years was also a result of women’s rising social status.  The 
influence of May Fourth ideals on the liberation of women, the proliferation of women’s 
periodicals, as well as the emergence of the first women’s organizations in Nationalist 
China during the early twentieth century, makes it likely that Zhu was influenced by the 
such changing trends in the intellectual climate of her time.  
Born and educated in Shanghai, if she had remained there after graduating from 
university perhaps she would have become active in the women’s movement in the 
Jiangnan area similar to women such as Zhu Su’e, who Wang Zheng discusses in Women 
in the Chinese Enlightenment:  Oral and Textual Histories (1999).  Zhu Su’e became a 
                                                
2 Joan Judge, The Precious Raft of History: The Past, The West, and the Woman Question in China 
(Stanford:  Stanford University Press,  2008), 12. 
3 Christina K. Gilmartin, “Gender, Political Culture, and Women’s Mobilization in the Chinese Nationalist 
Revolution, 1924-1927,” in Christina K. Gilmartin, et. al. eds., Engendering China: Women, Culture, and 
the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 195. 
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lawyer in 1930, opened her own practice in Shanghai, and became involved with 
women’s organizations there.  But Zhu Tierong’s grass roots activism and devotion to 
her future husband led her to China’s hinterland, into Hunan, removing her from the 
center of politics, as well as the center of the national women’s movement.  But as with 
many women and others who were persecuted after 1949, these and other women also 
shared similar backgrounds in their desire to engage in activism related to aiding refugees 
during the war, as well as the mistreatment they experienced at the hands of the Party, 
only to be rehabilitated during the 1980’s.4  Zhu Tierong’s activism also bears some 
similarity to another of Wang Zheng’s oral history narrators, Huang Dinghui, who was 
actually a native of Liuyang, located just east of Changsha in Hunan.  Similar to Zhu 
Tierong, Huang wrote several versions of an unpublished autobiography.   Both women 
were also members of the Communist Party who sought to have their cases rehabilitated 
following the Cultural Revolution, and both women also wrote biographical accounts of 
their late husbands.5  
Zhu’s life and experiences also represent an opportunity to consider her case 
within our contemporary understanding of women and gender studies.  In addition to 
Joan Judge and Tami Barlow, and although an anthropologist the work of Lisa Rofel also 
provides a useful tool for analysis.  With regards to Chinese history and culture 
specifically, Rofel defines gender as “contingent, non-foundational differentiations of 
femininity and masculinity that are mapped onto social relations and bodies, defining the 
                                                
4 Wang Zheng, “Zhu Su’e (1901-): Attorney,” in Women in the Chinese Enlightenment: Oral and Textual 
Histories (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 187-220. 
5 Wang Zheng, “Huang Dinghui (1907-): Career Revolutionary,” in Ibid. pp. 287-356. 
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nexus of power knowledge that permeates social life.  Gender categories are not unified 
or stable but subject to negotiation, conflict, and change.”6  Rofel also conceptualizes 
gender as directly related to our understanding of modernity, where it remains “one of the 
central modalities through which modernity is imagined and desired.  Gender 
differentiation—the knowledges, relations, meaning, and identities of masculinity and 
femininity—operates at the heart of modernity’s power. . . Gender, then, is not just 
“about” women and men, but is about the state, the nation, socialism, and capitalism.”7   
Understanding gender in this way can also help provide a certain framework for 
examining how Zhu’s narrative understanding of her own historical experience 
contributes to recent discussions concerning newer approaches for understanding modern 
Chinese history.  Her husband’s death can make us think about the role of suicide in 
Chinese history.  Finally, her response to Mark Salzman’s book can help us answer 
certain questions related to how China and the non-Western world are often presented to 
the public via popular literature, the press, or even film.      
 
EARLY LIFE AND RELIEF WORK  
 
Also known as Sophia Chang by some of her Western colleagues and simply as 
Zhu Laoshi to her students, Zhu Tierong was born into a relatively well educated family 
on February 6, 1915 near Shanghai’s south gate.  Her father was a college graduate and 
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worked as an engineer, and her mother a schoolteacher.  According to her own 
unpublished autobiography, Zhu noted that “my father was a college graduate, a civil 
engineer and yet he had such feudal thoughts.”  This may have been one of the causes of 
an eventual separation between the two parents, because when “later on he and mother 
lived in different places, he would write letters to mother full of grudges and 
accusations.”8  Most of her early influence to become educated and learn English seems 
to have come from her mother, who worked at the prestigious Mary Farnham School in 
Shanghai, where in 1925 Zhu enrolled as a fifth-grade student.  According to Zhu, her 
mother was “economically independent,” and “worked as a school teacher and a social 
worker.  When living at home, she used to hire a helper to do the cooking, washing, and 
cleaning. Sometimes we lived in a school, sometimes in the YWCA or the relief 
organization where she worked.”9  Thus it was likely from her mother that Zhu 
developed the desire to work in social welfare.  Although the surname “Zhu” derived 
from her father, like many girls in China at the time, upon birth she was born without a 
given name.  Her given name, tie rong literally “iron lotus,” was given to her by one of 
her mother’s friends following a severe fit with whooping cough she suffered as a child.  
Apparently this friend had two children of her own named tie ming and tie hua, and when 
Zhu recovered she was given the name tie rong.10     
 She enrolled as an undergraduate at Shanghai University in the fall of 1933, 
majoring in chemistry and minoring in physics and music.  With her bobbed haircut she 
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stood out even among classmates who often made fun of her, many of which were the 
children of wealthy Guomindang officials.  Because of her haircut and outspokenness 
she nonetheless became noted for her skills in public speaking and debate.  While 
studying in Shanghai Zhu began relief work for the local chapter of the YMCA, where 
she met Zhang Yifan (1906-1957), an activist and law student from Hunan, and the two 
formed a close friendship.   
 The Japanese invasion of China in 1937 began with the bombing of coastal cities 
such as Shanghai and caused a mass exodus of war refugees into China’s interior.  Many 
fled to smaller cities on the mainland such as Changsha. After plans to study abroad in 
Hawaii fell through because of the war, Zhang Yifan encouraged her to join him in the 
war relief effort in Hunan.  In 1937 Zhang had been invited back to his home province 
by the local chapter of the YMCA to organize relief work for war refugees.  Even 
months after the invasion many hinterland cities became overcrowded, and facilities were 
ill equipped to house, clothe, and feed so many.  On January 8, 1938, during the midst 
of all their volunteer work Zhu and Zhang also found the time to get married, with a 
simple ceremony in Zhang’s hometown along the outskirts of Changsha.  Believing that 
a lavish wedding with guests, gifts, and a large feast would be excessive during such a 
time of national crisis, they only posted an announcement in the local paper, taking 
advantage of their time in the countryside to inform locals about the importance of 
national unification to resist the Japanese invasion.11   
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 As relief workers in wartime Changsha Zhang Yifan and Zhu Tierong worked as 
a team, helping lead the local effort to help war refugees who continued to pour in from 
all over China. From 1937 to 1940 Zhu worked as a chemistry instructor for the Hsiangya 
Nursing School, the general secretary for the local chapter of the YWCA and a student 
secretary for the YMCA.  She also did relief work both the Hunan and Guizhou 
International Relief Associations, as well as the Chinese National Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA), and the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) all in Changsha. She even worked as the liaison 
officer between the two later organizations.12   According to Zhu Tierong, from 
November 1937 to April 1939 Changsha was bombed by the Japanese twelve different 
times, and each time Zhang worked as a stretcher bearer for the wounded and as an 
ambulance driver, rescuing and saving the lives of many.13  Regarding her work during 
these years Zhu noted:   
Life was difficult in those years.  As relief workers, Iifan and I were 
constantly on the move-around Changsha, Yuanling, Hengyang, Dushan, 
Guiyang, Chongqing-to help the refugees, conscripts and students . . . I 
went with the First Aid Team to rescue some residents who were hurt 
during the bombing by the Japanese . . . As a welfare worker, I gave out 
money to the refugees whose homes were burnt by the KMT soldiers 
during the Changsha big fire . . . As a student secretary, I helped the 
students on their way to some safer places with subsidies for winter 
clothing, medicines, or mosquito nets . . . As an English secretary, I wrote 
plans, budgets, and reports . . .14       
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Zhang Yifan worked as the General Secretary in charge of the YMCA in 
Changsha, and Zhu worked as its secretary.  As a couple they became two of the most 
prominent activists in the province, and were in charge of one of Hunan’s most 
influential wartime charitable organizations.  The focus of the YMCA relief work not 
was not only centered in the provincial capital, but also extended to Yuanling district in 
West Hunan, and Lingling districts in the south, with these later two rural branches each 
having their own affiliate offices.  By the late 1930’s the YMCA became one of several 
relief and charity organizations working out of Changsha.  There was also the YWCA, 
the Changsha International Relief Committee, the League of Nations Epidemic 
Prevention Commission, as well as the Rotary Club.  Zhang Yifan was also a member of 
the international relief committee based in Changsha, which was a joint organization 
involving the cooperation of local Chinese and members of the international community, 
British, American, Norwegian, Italian, and German, all living and working in the city.15      
Zhu and Zhang’s work with the YMCA in Changsha is what likely brought them 
into contact with Yale in China, which eventually served as the initial liaison for their 
study in America.  The first hospital and school facilities opened by Yale were 
originally located on West Archway Street in the city center.  Later when the larger 
hospital, college, and school campuses opened just outside of the old north gate of the 
city, Yale initially leased their property on West Archway to the YMCA who later 
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purchased it outright in June 1926.16  In September 1946 the couple journeyed to the 
United States to study at Yale University, where Zhang studied law and Zhu earned a 
Master’s Degree in Sociology.  While enrolled there they openly expressed their 
opposition to Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government, even once attending a lecture 
given by one of Chiang’s former generals, Feng Yuxiang.  They also toured different 
YMCA’s throughout the country, raising money for the war effort by speaking to 
audiences about the situation in China.  They returned to Changsha exactly year prior to 
the Communist victory, in October 1948.17   
 
      Image 8-1. Zhu Tierong and Zhang Yifan, at Yale University, 1948. 
     “Zhu Tierong, Zhang Yifan, New Haven, Wall Street, 1946-1948.” In  
      The Sophia Tierong Zhu Papers, Item MS 1709, Folder 10: Pictures from late 1940s. 
      (Yale University: Manuscripts and Archives). 
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RETURN TO CHINA AND WORK AFTER 1949  
 
 When the couple returned to Changsha, Zhu continued her work with the YMCA 
in the city, and the following spring Zhang was hired by the Yali School to teach 
forensics.18  While doing such work both Zhu and her husband continued to support the 
Communist revolution through various underground activities, and Zhang Yifan 
remained adamant that the YMCA should continue its relief work.  In fact, according to 
Zhu Tierong, prior to the liberation of the city it seems that the two organizations in the 
city that were most involved with pro communist activities were the YMCA and the Yali 
School.  Zhang’s reports to the CCP before liberation also stressed the importance of the 
freedom of religion, which may have been one of the reasons he later endured 
persecution.19  
In July 1949, approximately one month before liberation, and with communist 
forces closing in on Changsha, CCP generals Cheng Qian and Chen Mingren sent out an 
open telegram throughout China to rally support for the coming liberation of Chinese 
cities.  Representatives of the Party underground in Changsha organized a petition drive 
to support the CCP, and Zhang Yifan was most active in this city, gaining signatures 
from the principal of the Yali Middle school, the pastors of various Christian churches, 
and gained signatures from members of the business and industrial community.  In 
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August 1949 Zhang also organized the “Changsha Committee to Welcome Liberation” at 
the Hunan public hospital.  When the city was liberated on August 5 and PLA (People’s 
Liberation Army) troops entered the city, thousands lined the streets to welcome them.  
Zhu also remarked that Changsha may have been the only city in China whose Christian 
churches welcomed the army and supported liberation.20  In the Chinese biography of 
her husband, Zhu Tierong referred to this activity as the tongdian qiyi, or qianming 
huodong.  In fact, noted Zhu, Zhang Yifan hao bu you yu, or “did not hesitate” to 
communicate these names to the CCP leadership.21  After the communists liberated 
Changsha in August 1949, Zhang and Zhu continued to have contact with the 
representatives from Yale working there.  
Writing under her Western name, “Sophia Chang,” Zhu Tierong also reported on 
the conditions in Changsha following liberation in John William Powell’s China Monthly 
Review, an English language publication based out of Shanghai.  Under its original 
name, the China Weekly Review, founded by Powell’s father, from the early 1920’s it was 
one of the main English language news magazines in China.  Other influential 
periodicals based in Shanghai at the time were the Shanghai Evening Post, Mercury, the 
North China Daily News, the China Daily Press, and the China Daily Tribune.22  But 
even within China the Review enjoyed a wide readership of English speaking Chinese, 
such as teachers, university professors, government employees, businessmen, and 
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students.23  Especially during and after World War II, and under Powell’s editorial 
leadership the magazine became increasingly critical of Chiang Kai-shek and the 
Nationalist government.  Following the war Powell and the magazine strongly supported 
the formation of a coalition government between the CCP and KMT, as well as Secretary 
of State George Marshall’s attempt to broker a deal between the two.  With the 
communist victory in 1949, and especially following the United States entry into the 
Korean War, Powell and the various Chinese contributors to the magazine harshly 
criticized the decision by the U.S. government to enter the war.  In September 1954 a 
Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony from former American POWs imprisoned in 
North Korea who stated that the China Monthly Review served as one of the main tools 
used by their captors to indoctrinate them with communist propaganda.24      
Zhu’s first published piece in the journal, in October 1950, titled “Return Students 
Protest,” opposed U.S. involvement in the Korean War.  Sixty-two Changsha residents, 
all of which had previously studied in America petitioned the U.S. government to 
demand withdraw all military forces in the Korean peninsula.  Ten of these had attended 
Yale, as well as five each from Harvard and Michigan, as well as numerous other 
prestigious universities.25  This petition was formed during the the “Resist America, Aid 
Korea Campaign,” where her husband Zhang Yifan, Zhu Tierong, as well as Ling 
Mingyou organized the petition of returned scholars with the full support of Changsha’s 
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Communist Party Secretary.26  The meeting convened on the campus of the former Yale 
Medical School where each signee mailed their copy to the same universities they had 
previously attended.  Its text was actually authored by Ling Minyou, the dean of the 
Xiangya Medical College, and not only called attention to the situation in Korea, but 
more specifically the U.S. support of the Chiang Kai-shek government in Taiwan, 
asserting that Taiwan was a part of China, and that the garrisoning of American soldiers 
there represented a “deliberate armed aggression by the American government against the 
Chinese people,” and warned the American people that their government was “playing 
with fire in the Far East.”27      
But Zhu’s harshest and most thorough rhetoric against Western, especially 
American imperialism came in the February 1951 issue, titled “Reply to an American 
Friend.”  The piece was partly written in response to a speech given by Warren R. 
Austin, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, on the need for supporting armed 
intervention in Korea.  Just one month prior, on January 15,1951 Austin gave a 
passionate speech before the U.N. on “Communist Aggression in North Korea,” that the 
Communist government in Beijing had “rejected efforts to bring about a ceasefire in 
Korea, and has continued its invasion of Korea and its attacks upon the United Nations 
forces there.”28  Referencing Austin’s speech throughout, she also used her rebuttal as a 
platform to narrate in detail the history of U.S./China relations, beginning with the Treaty 
of Nanking following the conclusion of the first Opium War in 1843, the influence of 
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American interests in the treaty that followed the second Opium War, and treaty 
provisions allowing for special protections for foreigners working in treaty ports.  The 
Boxer Rebellion, the Treaty of Versailles following World War I, as well as U.S. support 
of the Chiang regime during World War II were other examples she discussed as 
examples of American imperialism.29  Using the thought of anthropologist Bronislaw 
Malinowski, Zhu even presented a table correlating four types of Westerners in China in 
relation to their exploitive behavior; those who worked in government, church, business, 
university, and that “there was a thread of continuity between all these institutions in the 
function of westernizing, invading, exploiting, and numbing the Chinese.”  Finally, at 
the end of the article she concluded:  
By reviewing the history of Sino-American relations, we can clearly see 
that during the short period of 166 years America’s dominant interest in 
China has been concern with trade, raw materials, investment, and 
exploitation. . . The American attitude during these years was ostensibly 
warm and sympathetic and thus deceived many Chinese.  The poison was 
sugar coated.30   
         
Through these kinds of writings Zhu was presenting for both herself and her 
newly founded country a discourse counter to the one emerging in the anti-Communist 
American press at the time.  These were the beginning days of the Cold War, when the 
U.S. exerted its military might throughout the globe, especially in Asia, by sending 
combat troops to fight against communist regimes in Korea then later in Vietnam.  Her 
response to Austin’s remarks at the U.N. bears some similarity to Mao Zedong’s famous 
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essay from August 1949, “Farewell Leighton Stewart.”  John Leighton Stewart (1876-
1962), born into a missionary family in China, served as the U.S. Ambassador to China 
during the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists (1945-1949).  His 
support of the Chiang regime and disdain of communism made him one of the main 
symbols of American imperialism and power in China.  Zhu’s response to Austin, 
though similar, stands unique in its own right for advancing a kind of revolutionary 
understanding of modern Chinese history apart from Marxism.  For Zhu and other 
intellectuals of her time, one did not have to be a communist to recognize the exploitive 
nature of U.S./China relations.  By using cultural anthropology to interpret Western 
power and hegemony, Zhu offered her own unique interpretation of this legacy.   
Most of the editorials in China Monthly Review’s issues from this time also 
expressed intense opposition to the Korean War, which is why it must have been such an 
effective form of propaganda for indoctrinating American POWs.  The magazine was 
also one of the few if not the only English language publication at the time to publish the 
names of the Americans who were being held in North Korea.31     
Many of Zhu’s articles in China Monthly Review also focused on noting the 
extensive efforts of modernization in Changsha that followed liberation.  Her piece 
“Changsha Roundup,” featured in the November 1950 issue, chronicled the changing 
social and political climate in Changsha following the founding of the People’s Republic 
after 1949, that conditions were markedly different from when the city was governed by 
the KMT:  “No one looks down on manual labor.  The intelligentsia working in 
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government offices are also devoting some time to planting and raising vegetables on 
nearby plots of land.  The girls at Fusiang Middle School, a missionary school, are 
washing dishes after every meal.  Some of the boys attending Yale in China are earning 
their tuition by working at a milk station.”32  Furthermore, traditional social mores 
regarding women and marriage had gone by the wayside.  Expensive and lavish 
weddings were a thing of the past.  Zhu noted that both she and her husband were 
Christians, and had worked with the local YMCA.  Theirs as well as other religions 
were all religions were tolerated.   
Soon after liberation the Party also began several projects to improve public 
works.  Under the First Five Year Plan (1953-1957), and based on the Soviet model, 
wholesale industrialization through urbanization began in cities throughout China.  By 
1956 Premier Zhou Enlai even proudly proclaimed that construction of new cities and the 
improvement of existing ones was already happening.33  In the September 1951 Zhu 
reported on the new waterworks and sewage systems in Changsha, and was prefaced by 
“Forty years ago the Manchus talked about it—For twenty years the Kuomintang drew up 
plans—In two years the People’s Government built it.”  Prior to liberation Changsha 
had been one of the major cities in China without public water, but under the CCP she 
reported that some 30,000 square meters of roads had been “repaired or paved, more than 
3,000 new street lights have been installed, eight centralized sewage systems, totaling 14, 
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278 meters, have been either reconstructed or built anew.”  For years under the rule of 
the KMT government the city’s residents relied on drinking water from the Xiang River 
hauled by water carriers, a system that had existed in the city for centuries.  According 
to Zhu this river water sold in the local market at 500 hundred yuan per tan (dan), and 
with wealthier households employing their own private carriers, water remained “a 
considerable item in calculating household expenses.” At the time of writing the new 
sewage and water lines were still under construction, but would be finished by October 1, 
1951.  Upon completion there would be approximately 14 main water supply stations 
and 40 public fire hydrants, with the stations providing public water at a rate of 15,000 
long tons per day, enough to sustain a population of 300,000 with 60 liters of water per 
day.34   
Educational reform was also rapidly implemented.  As of November 1950 
approximately 31,000 students in Changsha were enrolled in primary schools, of which 
forty-three percent were supported by the government.  Night schools had been opened 
for uneducated workers, and for the first time children of workers were given the 
opportunity to attend school.  All in all noted Zhu, the attitude among organized labor in 
the city was one of enthusiasm and celebration, as different work units organized 
“dramatic clubs, singing groups, and athletic teams.”35    
The activism and advocacy for both her city and country expressed in these 
articles suggests that in the early years following the Communist Revolution, Zhu 
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Tierong served as an English-speaking advocate of the new China to the West, critical of 
the same western country she had recently returned from and had even closely 
collaborated with through her relationship with Yale and relief work, and that responded 
to the emerging anti-Communist, and largely male dominated discourse in the United 
States and in other western bloc powers that demonized both China and the Soviet Union.  
Both Zhu and other members of Changsha’s intellectual community who had previously 
studied in America viewed the entry of the United States into the Korean conflict as an 
act of imperialist aggression, and an act of betrayal on the part of a former ally.  For the 
Communist Party in Changsha during the early 1950’s, activist women such as Zhu 
Tierong represented their newly promoted stance on gender equality, ones who, 
“disrupted gender norms and generated new gender dynamics,” and were part of a “new 
public space in socialist China.”36  Thus in these articles she became the voice of 
Changsha’s new modernization in the Mao era.   
In contrast to the perception of foreigners, according to Zhu Tierong the social 
conditions in Changsha during liberation, especially the plight of the urban poor, was 
alarming:  
When Changsha was liberated 52 percent of the population needed relief 
although at that time there were about 30 relief agencies in the city.  
Because of the complete currency collapse in the last days of the Chiang 
[Kai-shek] regime, purchasing power in the city was almost nil.  
Unemployment and poverty were hand in hand.  About 20,000 hungry 
and helpless peasants swarmed into the city from the suburbs and 
neighboring hsien seeking relief.  The streets were full of beggars.  
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Since liberation the people’s government has done its best to heal the 
city’s wounds.37 
 
Zhu then listed the Changsha government’s efforts to provide relief for the city’s 
urban poor through a series of sweeping welfare reforms:  Aid was granted to 20,815 
unemployed workers and teachers, providing both groups cash relief and reassignment to 
other jobs.  The government reformed the number of local indigent beggars by 
providing work through labor, mainly by way of constructing the city’s new public works 
system.  After December 1949 approximately three hundred million yuan was spent to 
help relocate some 10,000 displaced war refugees back to their native villages, as well as 
repatriate 66,453 former KMT prisoners.  A government investigation in April 1950 
revealed that approximately 25,000 people in Changsha barely lived at a marginal line of 
subsistence, so the government provided cash relief as well as placement in special 
nurseries and hospitals to aid the elderly and disabled.38  The CCP in the city completely 
reformed the defunct welfare system, a topic that several of Zhu Tierong’s China 
Monthly Review articles consistently addressed.  The subject was personal to her since 
she had spent much of her time in the two previous decades doing such work and thus 
was glad to see what she viewed as the once defunct welfare system of the Nationalist 
government abolished.  By the time the city was liberated in August 1950 local charity 
houses and welfare institutions, most of which worked independently from the state, had 
become ineffective in addressing the rampant poverty and dislocation resulting from 
years of war and conflict.   Such development by the CCP, she noted, revealed a 
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“general shift from charity to public welfare, from age-old family relief to organized 
community relief and from emergency relief to productive training.”  
In contrast to the former charity tokens and sugar-coated poison used to 
mislead the exploited victims of the ruling class, it can be seen that the 
sum effect and strength of social welfare activities in a community 
depends greatly on its social system, economic order and political 
organization.  The total cultural configuration of the past was made to 
function for the welfare of a few and to neglect the interests and well 
being of the vast majority . . . The previous society [under KMT rule] was 
a complete failure and only under our new government could the former 
corrupt configuration be smashed.  Today we are on the right road, 
working toward social betterment and social health.39      
     
To Zhu there was no question that social welfare under the CCP had done a much 
more efficient job of managing public welfare in Changsha, likening it to the making of 
completely new and modernized city, with infrastructure and aid from the state to help 
the poor.  Drawing on her previous experiences as an aid worker during World War II 
and during the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists that followed, she felt 
that it was often easy for private and outside charity organizations—such as the YMCA 
for instance—to be too easily swayed and influenced by corruption, graft, and 
mismanagement.  In the public euphoria that swept the country following liberation, it 
was difficult for her and others to see that these very same problems could plague a 
government run welfare system as well.  Through her opposition to American 
imperialism as well as her detailed reporting of Changsha’s modernization following 
liberation, Zhu Tierong spoke for her city and country, conveying a youthful patriotism 
                                                
39 Ibid., 248. 
  265 
indicative of the period.  Her concluding remarks in “Reply to an American Friend,” 
best illustrate this point:   
Be not worried for us.  I am not a Communist, but when I see that our 
people’s government is asking for the opinions of the different strata of 
workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and industrialists, that the officials 
are working for the benefit for the people, that poor peasants are getting 
land to plow for themselves, that everyone should work for his food, then I 
know we are on the right track.40 
 
 Claiming she was “not a Communist,” was certainly another declaration of Zhu’s 
own independence and individuality.  But at this point we must also address the 
question of how her views expressed in this and other articles from the China Monthly 
Review were indicative of the CCP’s policy toward intellectuals following liberation.  
For as much as Zhu’s life and work have been positively portrayed thus far, her patriotic 
rhetoric from the articles should also be framed within the context of the thought reform 
campaigns which followed liberation.  After 1949, and with China’s economy in 
complete disarray, the Party  
Sought the cooperation of urban elites who possessed specialized skills 
needed for national reconstruction:  liberal intellectuals and the 
technological intelligentsia; bureaucrats and urban administrators left over 
from the old regime; and the national bourgeoisie.  Once political and 
economic stability had been achieved, the Communists moved quickly to 
end their reliance on what they regarded as the least politically reliable 
members of the urban population.41   
 
These were, namely, the nation’s class of intellectuals, a group of which Zhu and her 
husband were active members.  In order to understand this fully, by late 1951 the CCP 
began three important campaigns.  These were the aforementioned thought reform 
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movement, the “three anti campaign” against corruption, waste, and the bureaucratic 
spirit, and the “five anti campaign” against bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of 
government property, and stealing of state economic secrets.  In accordance with Mao’s 
belief in the fulfillment of an authentic bourgeois democratic revolution, under thought 
reform all those classified as intellectuals, especially teachers, were required to state their 
loyalty to Chairman Mao and his teachings, and participate in numerous self-criticisms, 
where they wrote out their life stories and potential crimes against the revolution, and 
struggle sessions where they could face criticism from peers.42 Evidence of her own 
personal experience with thought reform specifically do not exist in her autobiography, 
but based on the experience and recollections of several of Powell’s former contributors, 
there is little doubt that Zhu Tierong also participated in the thought reform campaigns, 
which likely influenced her willingness to serve as a mouthpiece for anti-American 
propaganda.  
However, it is also possible that her responses to Western imperialism also 
derived from her experiences and activism during World War II, as well as the education 
in sociology she received at Yale.  Even under while under control of the CCP after 
1949, in China as well as other socialist countries, “the socialist revolution rejected 
western domination even as it proceeded to invoke the Enlightenment assumptions 
embedded in socialism,” which made China’s historical situation completely unique.43  
Thus in the same token it is possible that her proclivity for narrating the virtues of the 
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CCP derived from her own education and experience, not purely from communist 
indoctrination.      
Another point to consider is the marked increase in CCP membership after 1937, 
the year that marked Japan’s invasion of the mainland to the end of World War II, where 
the number of Party members grew twentyfold, from 40,000 to 800,000 respectively.  
The first thought reform campaigns began in the communist stronghold in Yenan during 
1942 as a way to instill Party discipline and cohesiveness.44   Although not Party 
members both Zhu and her husband worked to advance the interests of the Party during 
the interwar period, and were influenced by its ideals.  In Yanan policies on thought 
reform were part of Mao’s “rectification campaigns” or zheng feng, primarily aimed at 
rural level officials who lacked indoctrination in communist ideology. Despite the 
potential for Zhu’s being influenced by the thought reform campaigns of the early 1950’s, 
her activism within the Changsha YMCA, a local organization known for its pro 
Communist activity, it is also possible that her inclination to extol the mores of the CCP 
had already been entrenched well before late 1951, when the thought reform campaigns 
began in earnest.                  
ENDURING THE 1950’S AND AFTER 
 
  Following Changsha’s liberation on August 5, 1949 the first people and 
institutions to fall under the yoke of the CCP’s suspicion were former KMT government 
workers, as well as Westerners and their hosting institutions.  Dwight Rugh, the 
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American missionary who worked for Yale in China discussed above, was the last 
American worker for Yale to remain in Changsha after 1949.  On May 17, 1951 the 
mass meeting “to expel American imperialist Dwight Rugh” was held on the Yali 
campus.  Students and teachers denounced him as a U.S. spy and agent of imperialism.  
The principal of the school even added a dramatic gesture by chopping in half the 
signboard for the Yale school inside the room with an axe, which met with enthusiastic 
applause.  Rugh was found guilty and given permission to leave Changsha after having 
been detained for several months.  At the train station he was made to kneel on the 
platform and face further criticism from those present.  He also had to exit the train at 
every station at every station on the way to Hong Kong via Guangzhou, and follow the 
same routine of kneeling to onlookers to be criticized.  He finally returned to the U.S. 
where he took up a position as a university administrator.  To this day his case remains a 
sensitive subject in Changsha, and efforts to clear his name have proved unsuccessful.45   
 Through their associations with institutions such as Yale and the YMCA both Zhu 
Tierong and Zhang Yifan became the targets of the mass political campaigns and social 
paranoia that began during the 1950’s.  When the city was liberated in August 1949 
Zhang organized a committee of underground Party members to welcome the liberating 
communists.  His ambitions and previous experiences with local government while 
under KMT administration likely served him well, and by 1957 he held several posts in 
Changsha’s government.  Following liberation in 1949 Zhang was elected as the leader 
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of the non-CCP Democratic Party in Changsha.  He was soon appointed as the 
secretary-general of Changsha’s Standing Committee, as well as the Vice secretary 
general of the Changsha Municipal People’s Consultative Conference (PPCC).  Zhang 
served as a “provincial people’s representative,” and was a member of the Provincial 
People’s Consultative Conference, as well as the Changsha’s People’s Government.  He 
served on the urban committee to resist the United States and aid Korea, the Three-Self 
Patriotic Movement of Protestant Churches in Hunan, as well as numerous local relief 
agencies and charities.46  
 But as befell many who suffered during Mao’s China, the honeymoon and 
euphoria of liberation soon wore off.  In June 1957 during a meeting of the Provincial 
People’s Congress, Zhang Yifan declared that in the new China there should be “rule of 
law instead of rule of man.”  Party conservatives viewed this as an excuse to attack him.  
An article in the July 19, 1957 issue of Changsha Ribao (Changsha Daily), titled “Is it 
good medicine or poison, criticizing Zhang Yifan’s absurd theory,” voiced the Party’s 
attack and criticism of Zhang’s views: 
Zhang Yifan says our court system is not the basis for law, and that 
“freedom is most important.” As a result, he demands that there should be 
“rule of law versus rule of man.”  Actually this kind of theory intends to 
terminate (sha) the merits our country’s newly established law system.  
In fact, since the revolution our Party and government have acted 
according to common principle, formulating and promulgating the most 
important matters related to criminal law . . . Furthermore, if Zhang’s 
unfounded deviation from criminal law unconsciously suggests that we act 
in accordance with the laws from previous years, condemning the policies 
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of all legal cases concerning the “rule of man,” then what kind of “rule by 
law” does Zhang seek?  Probably the “law” of the bourgeoisie!47                                 
      
 The article also states that since the revolution the Party had educated both 
workers and farmers, and through their individual education had come to know the merits 
of the law.  What use therefore, did Western notions of “rule of law” have in such a 
country where everyone knew it in the first place?  Zhang obviously introduced this 
philosophy out of his own training and practice in law.  As noted in the first part of the 
paper, Zhang had worked with the underground CCP prior to liberation, and even used 
his skills as a lawyer to advocate for suspected dissidents who had been imprisoned by 
the local KMT government.48      
 A few days later, on July 22, another article appeared, titled “Counterattacking the 
Rightists Attack on Law,” announcing that Party cadres had convened a meeting 
denouncing Zhang Yifan’s “excessive persistence”, related to his thoughts about rule of 
law versus rule of man, also aimed at all suspected rightists within Changsha’s party 
organization: 
Our youth has passion, even during their off times they call on the masses, 
they have visited the central and southern provinces and have received 
training at the government Party school for cadres, and a small number 
have successfully been trained, they have even in their spare time 
successfully learned the basic facts of criminal law.  Who then can say 
that we have no knowledge of the law?     
We simply follow the six laws.  If some violent classes have some 
incorrect feelings about criminal cases, and the Party leadership works 
cautiously and conscientiously, can state power be consolidated and 
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strengthened? These rightists must advance toward admitting their faults, 
otherwise the people will not allow it.49  
 
 Again here the article charges that within a true socialist democracy law as a 
professional enterprise had no place, and was a remnant of bourgeois society.  This kind 
of emphasis on people’s education was indicative of the mobilization campaigns 
sponsored by the CCP after liberation.  It is also quite possible that Zhang’s position as 
an activist both before and after liberation may have aroused jealousy on the part of any 
potential rivals.  Traces of this can been seen during the late 1940’s just prior to his and 
Zhu Tierong’s departure for America to study at Yale.  In both the Chinese and English 
biographical accounts of her late husband Zhu noted that one of the reasons they left 
China in 1946 was because Zhang had made some political enemies, and the situation for 
them in Changsha had grown unsafe.     
 The events of summer 1957 in Changsha also need to be understood within the 
larger context of China’s political climate as well as international events.  Following the 
death of Joseph Stalin in February 1956 Nikita Khrushchev, the newly appointed Soviet 
Premier, criticized Stalin in the now famous “secret speech,” for “placing himself above 
the party,” “acting like a dictator,” encouraging a national “cult of personality,” and 
instilling a “reign of terror” on Russia’s citizens.  From the time of its founding in 1921 
the CCP acknowledged Stalin as the undisputed leader of international communism.  
Mao and the Party leadership followed his dictates, but the secret speech left them feeling 
uneasy about how such news would be viewed in China.  If similar criticism were 
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allowed in Chinese social and political circles the results could have been disastrous.  In 
response Mao launched the “Hundred Flowers Campaign,” in May 1956.  Scientists and 
other intellectuals were encouraged to freely air their criticisms of both Mao and the 
CCP.  Then in February 1957 Mao then gave his famous speech, “On the Correct 
Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” considered “one of the most significant 
theoretical expressions of ‘Maoism’ in the post revolutionary era.”50  The speech served 
as the cornerstone and guiding ideology of the Hundred Flowers Movement, but also 
provided the basis and justification for the purges and mass persecutions that followed.  
Mao emphasized that contradictions in society had always been a “motivating force for 
social development,” that on the path to true socialism ideological struggles between the 
leadership and its people, the government and the masses, were inevitable.  The problem 
with this view was its insinuation that even members of the highest echelons of 
government leadership could be questioned and their views criticized while those of the 
people or masses deemed correct.51  By the summer of 1957 universities throughout 
China held mass rallies, demonstrations, and wrote big character posters denouncing high 
ranking Party cadres and teachers, who then became targets of struggle sessions.52  
When considering the fates of Zhang Yifan and Zhu Tierong within the context of such 
national events, one can better appreciate the reasons why Zhang’s views were so 
categorically denounced in the Changsha press that same summer.  Inspired by 
international events, as well as the internal struggles within the CCP, the editorials 
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published in the Changsha Ribao appeared at the very time when national politics entered 
its most contentious and turbulent period in China’s modern history.             
By the time both of these articles were published and the Party’s suspicions 
became aroused against him, Zhang’s physical health had deteriorated due to 
complications from diabetes.  This coupled with Hunan’s unbearably hot summer left 
him in a weakened state.  While hospitalized he read the newspaper articles condemning 
him and Changsha’s other rightists, then walked out of the hospital to one of the tail ends 
of Orange Island, filled his pockets with stones and committed suicide by jumping into 
the Xiang River.  How does one account for such a drastic and tragic turn of events, 
especially from one so gifted and talented as Zhang Yifan, who worked tirelessly on 
behalf of the needy and other refugees during the war against Japan and civil war, and 
who even studied law at one of the most prestigious academic institutions in the world?  
In doing so Zhang also left behind his eight year old son, Zhang Taiheng.  His suicide 
also returns us to a subject discussed elsewhere in the present work, the role of suicide in 
modern Chinese history.  Was Zhang’s a mere act of desperation, as the kind practiced 
by the Huang family during Changsha’s rice riot of 1910, or more of a political act akin 
to Chen Tianhua’s protest of the Japanese government’s policy of banning Chinese 
students in 1906?  As the example of the Warring States poet Qu Yuan (340-278 B.C.) 
suggests, perhaps such actions represented for these men and women a combination of 
both.  With China’s entry into the community of nation states beginning in the early 
twentieth century, the acts of patriots such as Chen Tianhua and Zhang Yifan could be 
considered political, because they were actions taken in response to the oppressive policy 
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of a ruling state.  But in the case of Chen his death illicited a significant response on the 
part of Changsha’s student community, an outpouring of public grief and sympathy and 
galvanized rising popular discontent against the ruling Qing dynasty, which fell only a 
few years later.  The same was true for Changsha’s commoners who became incensed 
by the suicide of the Huang family, serving as one of the initial causes of the rice riot.  
This is perhaps why years such as 1957 represented the end and beginning of a divergent 
juncture in the narrative of modern Chinese history, when suicides inspired by acts of 
political oppression carried different meanings than those before. Yue Daiyun, a literature 
professor from Beijing University, who was also labeled a rightist and wrote about her 
experiences during the Cultural Revolution, observed that during these years suicide was 
considered a crime against the state, but functioned as a means “of disconnecting yourself 
from the people and of threatening the Party with your life,” and was “assumed to be 
committed because you are unable to face your guilt.”53   
One also reads the patriotism illustrated in the China Monthly Review articles 
written by Zhu Tierong above while experiencing a kind of historical “dissonance,” 
which comes when one learns about and reflects on the horrors Zhu experienced at the 
hands of the CCP just a few years after she wrote these articles. How are the 
achievements she wrote of Changsha’s post 1949 modernization, as well as her 
denunciation of American imperialism, to be understood once we learn of the persecution 
she and others experienced as well as her husband’s suicide during the Anti-Rightist 
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campaigns of the late 1950’s?  For the modern historian this begs the question of how to 
reconcile her activism immediately following revolution with the ultimate betrayal she 
and many others from this period endured.  It is difficult to read Zhu’s articles form the 
early 1950’s without coming to terms with the persecutions and purges of the Party that 
soon followed.   
Similar to the fates which befell many during this period, for Zhu Tierong the late 
1950’s were certainly the most tragic years of her life.  In 1956 her mother passed away 
at the age of 67, only to be followed by the loss of her husband.  Soon after their son 
was sent to a work camp in Hunan’s countryside.  In 1959 her father died from 
tuberculosis.  Zhu was eventually officially labeled as an “ultra rightist,” because like 
her husband she advocated Western concepts of democracy and justice such as habeas 
corpus, fair play, and the freedom of other political parties.  She was stripped of her title 
as chair of her department at Hunan Medical College, given a reduced salary, and was 
subjected to numerous struggle sessions for self-examination and criticism, as well as 
long periods of confinement and interrogation.  When she was allowed to teach she had 
to begin each class of the fall term by identifying her rightist status: 
During those days I always walked with my head bowed, I was supposed 
to obey everything the other teachers in the department asked me to do. I 
was often silent and seldom smiled. It seemed that ‘Yesterday I was a 
guest of honor, today I am a prisoner.’54    
 
Zhu also recalled that from 1956 to 1965 she endured adversity by taking solace 
in her books and music, that “Books gave me knowledge, soothing sympathy and 
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unspeakable joy of a wide horizon.  I always thought that it was unimportant that people 
belittled me, for I could swim in an ocean of knowledge if I read more books.”  Her 
music, which she loved to play on the piano, “consoled my bruised heart and gave me the 
strength to live on.”55  As with many from her generation, her personal struggles 
continued during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).  She endured further humiliation 
and was forced to do manual labor on the campus of Hunan Medical College.  On four 
different occasions her home was searched and ransacked by Red Guards, who 
confiscated many of her valued personal possessions, such as her husband’s clothes, a 
platinum ring she had bought in New Haven, as well as Western classical sheet music she 
loved to play on the piano.  For several years she was not allowed to correspond with 
her son, and was only able to send him money.  Posted on the door of her residence was 
a placard noting that she was a “black devil,” and she was not allowed visitors except for 
Red Guard students who could harass her anytime they wished.  During a mass criticism 
meeting of school officials and teachers half of her hair was cut off and she was forced to 
pay half the cost of it.  Shortly afterwards one male teacher committed suicide. Once she 
and other rightists were paraded around the campus in a truck then made to eat their meal 
on the ground like beggars.  For more than one year she was held in confinement in the 
basement of the Hunan Medical College Foreign Language Building, and was repeatedly 
interrogated, deprived of sleep, and accused of being a KMT agent or American spy.56   
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Given the intensity of the persecution during these years and her reflections on the 
horrors she experienced as presented in her autobiography, her outlook on her personal 
history nonetheless remained optimistic and in the opinion of this author, quite 
remarkable.  She poignantly recognized that she was one of many Chinese who suffered 
during those years, referring to herself as “only one of the intellectuals, a little nobody, 
and I experienced this horrible tragedy.  So what?”57  Those within the highest 
echelons of the Party such as Deng Xiaoping, also suffered.  Liu Xiaoqi and Peng 
Dehuai suffered so badly that they were unable to bear the strain and died as a result.  
Changsha’s first Party Secretary remained imprisoned in Beijing for a number of years, a 
fact that he noted personally to Zhu years later.  He was frequently beaten and strong 
lights remained on within his cell day and night.  Changsha’s first mayor also suffered 
intense persecution.58  Thus Zhu viewed her own story within the larger national context 
of what scores of her countrymen and women experienced as well.  Her reflection of 
“So what?” represented her own unique perspective on how she chose to cope with a 
traumatic past and the courage she displayed as a woman and human being in a period of 
great peril and despair.  Faced with her husband’s suicide and persecution, she like 
many others, simply endured.     
With the end of the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of the Reform Era, 
Zhu’s record as a rightist was officially corrected on March 9, 1979.  She was invited to 
be a member of Changsha’s People’s Provincial Consultative Conference (PPCC), and 
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resumed her teaching duties at Hunan Medical College, where she also played an integral 
part in reestablishing relations between that institution and Yale in China.  Among her 
students were some of the first Americans to study and teach in China since the 1940’s.  
Of great importance to Zhu during these years was that Zhang Yifan’s case was reviewed 
by the Communist Party in Changsha and his reputation rehabilitated.  In a letter sent to 
her from the Changsha City United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist 
Party, it was acknowledged that Zhang Yifan had done work “beneficial to the Party and 
the people,” prior to liberation, and afterwards worked and supported the Party.  His 
views published in the Changsha Ribao in 1957 on the rule of law were deemed correct.  
Finally, an article in the October 20, 1984 issue of the Changsha Evening Post announced 
the rehabilitation of Zhang and other Party members.59      
 
EPILOGUE:  IRON SHARPENS IRON  
 
By the early 1980’s Zhu Tierong was in her seventies but had continued full time 
work as an English teacher and served as an important faculty liaison between Hunan 
Medical College and Yale in China.  Among the first group of students to work and 
teach with Zhu in Changsha during these years was a Yale graduate named Mark 
Salzman (b. 1959).  From a young age Salzman became interested in Chinese culture.  
Encouraged by his parents he later attended Yale where he majored in Chinese literature 
and graduated with honors.  He also gained fluency in Mandarin and Cantonese.  From 
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August 1982 to July 1984 he taught English with the Yale-China Association in 
Changsha at Hunan Medical College.60  After returning to the U.S. Salzman achieved 
notoriety by writing a somewhat autobiographical account of his time spent in China 
teaching English and studying martial arts.  His book Iron and Silk (1986) became a 
New York Times bestseller and was even adapted into a movie of the same name, with 
Salzman, in the tradition Audie Murphy, playing himself in the lead role.61  The book’s 
popularity made it one of the first Western accounts written by a foreigner in China 
following the end of the Mao era.  It also placed Changsha at center stage in popular 
Western literature, giving its readers an intimate glimpse into Chinese society.  When 
his train first arrived there during the late summer of 1982 Salzman observed that 
construction on Changsha’s main train station had been completed near the end of the 
Cultural Revolution to accommodate for the number of domestic tourists who visited the 
city in route to Chairman Mao’s hometown of Shaoshan, but “by the time construction 
ended, however, interest in the Chairman had waned, and since Changsha is neither a 
scenic nor important city, hardly anyone stops there anymore.”62  He was also shocked 
to find “how filthy everything looked,” and how in Changsha 
Dishwater and refuse were thrown casually out of windows, rats the size 
of squirrels could be seen flattened all over the roads, spittle and mucus 
lay everywhere, and the dust and ash from coal burning stoves, heaters and 
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factories mixed with dirt and rain to stain the entire city an unpleasant 
grayish-brown.63   
 
 This also establishes Salzman’s skills as a writer in that it adequately captures his 
impressions of Changsha and a typical Chinese city during the early stages of the reform 
era.  Later in the book he meets a local man named Zheng who reminded him that 
“although Changsha was a poor city, its natives were most polite, its food the most 
peppery, and its dialect the most lively of all of China, so I [Salzman] should feel lucky 
indeed to have been sent there.”64  A prominent part of his narrative also describes the 
various Chinese friends he encountered and worked with while teaching, which included 
a number of teachers, students, and especially his gong fu instructor.  Each of these are 
given fictional names, but one character named “Teacher Wu,” introduced in the first part 
of the book, is one based on Salzman’s experiences with Zhu Tierong.  We know this 
because following publication of Iron and Silk she obtained a copy, read it, then wrote 
Salzman a private letter detailing her objections to the portrayal of Teacher Wu.  Later 
this letter along with much of Zhu’s other writings and personal correspondence was 
archived among the Yale in China collection housed at Yale’s Sterling Memorial Library.     
 Not long after his arrival in Changsha, wrote Salzman, he was summoned by a 
senior member of Hunan Medical College’s English Department, Teacher Wu, to help 
edit an English language application the school was submitting for a World Bank loan.  
He was asked to report to her office the next morning, which left him uneasy, “wondering 
if I had done or said something wrong during the past week and was about to be purged 
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or criticized.” (19).65  The next day Salzman showed up as requested, where the reader 
is first introduced to Teacher Wu:  
Nearly Seventy years old, Teacher Wu was short and plump, with heavy 
eyelids above and below her eyes that made her look tired.  I had heard 
that both she and her husband had received advanced degrees from an 
American university in the 1940’s.  When they finished they returned to 
China, determined to serve their country whatever the outcome of the civil 
war.  Like most Chinese with intellectual backgrounds, they were made 
to suffer despite their patriotism.  Teacher Wu’s husband came under 
attack during the Anti-Rightist Campaign in the late 1950’s; to protect his 
family, he apologized to the State for his ‘crimes against Socialism,’ then 
took his own life.  During the Cultural Revolution Teacher Wu became a 
target and had to endure not only her own public denouncement and 
humiliation but those of her son, who was ‘sent down’ to the countryside 
for nearly a decade (20).66        
 
 Here Salzman not only describes the physical attributes of Teacher Wu, or rather 
Zhu Tierong, but establishes a back story for the reader’s understanding and 
interpretation of Wu in the pages that follow.  His description of her even closely 
resembles my own summary of Zhu’s life in the introduction to this chapter.  Although 
Zhu’s own objections to the portrayal of Teacher Wu will be further discussed below, one 
should also note the context in which both she and other characters in the book are 
introduced.  One of the first characters introduced in the book is actually China itself, 
revealed to us through Changsha, a city Salzman initially described as a “neither a scenic 
nor important,” and one where he was shocked to find “how filthy everything looked.”  
By the time we first meet teacher Wu some pages later, Salzman describes his 
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experiences during the initial days of teaching at the college, and when Teacher Wu first 
summoned him he became afraid that he might be “purged or criticized.”       
 It goes without saying that Zhu Tierong would have been sensitive to Salzman’s 
observations about Changsha, but also his references to the horrors of the Mao era.  It is 
also puzzling that in describing their experiences studying abroad Salzman wrote that 
Zhu and her husband “had received advanced degrees from an American university in the 
1940’s,” but failed to mention that both Zhu and Zhang Yifan attended Yale, the very 
same institution Salzman graduated from, or that both of them had been involved with 
Yale in China during World War II.  
Edward Said’s Orientalism describes the construction in western literature of the 
non-Western world, one often characterized as backward and illiterate, yet mysterious 
and forbidding.  Under such narratives perceived social backwardness and 
unconventionality in countries such as China becomes romanticized at the expense of the 
characters in a story, or even historical subjects.  Moreover, it identifies the concept of 
the “other” in explaining how Western accounts of non-western countries often objectify 
their subject matter as a way of legitimizing western cultural superiority.  Those with 
the untrained eye or with little experience or exposure to countries such as China often 
unconsciously engage in such objectifying jargon, be they popular writers, or members of 
the government or media.  Bearing this in mind, one can better appreciate Zhu’s 
sensitivity to how her character was portrayed in Iron and Silk.  During her 
ethnographic fieldwork for her book Other Modernities:  Gendered Meanings after 
Socialism, Lisa Rofel recounted an instance about how she was once sternly reprimanded 
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by a middle-aged woman in Hangzhou after asking her to relate her life story.  The 
woman responded that such questions were akin to American photographers who were 
often seen wandering around the streets of Hangzhou during the early 1980’s (the same 
period in which Salzman’s book is set, and ironically where the events of the film 
adaptation of Iron and Silk are also set) with cameras meaning to capture “the most 
downtrodden, most poverty stricken scenes in town.  What were they doing with these 
pictures?,” the woman asked rhetorically.”  Rofel then remarked that she interpreted this 
woman’s story “as a warning about the politics of cross-cultural representations and the 
ways in which China has been made to serve as one of the central markers of those who 
have not quite reached modernity.”67    
But for Zhu Tierong her biggest bone of contention concerned how Salzman 
portrayed her husband’s suicide.  Zhu: “You’ve presented an incomplete picture of my 
husband’s death.  I don’t know who told you all these things.  Did you check the facts 
with me?”68  She then listed the facts of her husband’s case, that he was criticized for 
stating there should be rule of law rather than rule of man, and that he read the Party’s 
denunciations of his views in the Changsha Ribao, and then on July 20, 1957 took his 
own life by jumping into the Xiang River.  But Salzman did not mention anything about 
Zhang Yifan’s political rehabilitation during the early 1980’s.  Zhu reminded him that 
the work Zhang had done for China had been “beneficial to the Party and the people,” 
and that “after liberation he cooperated and worked with the Party, he supported the Party 
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and loved the socialist motherland.”  Finally, she asked, “After reading the facts, do you 
think your picture was complete?  Talking about suicide without mentioning the redress 
is incomplete.”69  For her there was also no question that her husband’s suicide, 
subsequent rehabilitation, and how he was portrayed remained of great importance to her.     
Concerning the application for the World Bank loan, she also took issue with 
Salzman’s account of how he helped her correct some perceived errors in its English 
wording, specifically related to spelling mistakes as well as possible references within the 
application’s three stated goals and conclusion to the Four Modernizations.  According 
to Salzman both he and Teacher Wu worked on the application together, and “corrected 
misspellings for about an hour, then took a break for tea.”70  But Zhu remembered their 
exchange differently, and remained confused as to how he could have remembered the 
exact contents of the World Bank loan, if he had taken the time to jot down its goals and 
conclusions after their meeting, or whether he “kept the words in memory and then wrote 
them down just to be dramatic and to appeal to the readers.”  Furthermore she asked,  
“Was there any professional courtesy?  Is it proper for a teacher to quote what a student 
writes and to ridicule it afterwards? . . . As to the statement ‘we corrected misspellings 
for about an hour’ that was inaccurate.”71 
  Zhu then acknowledged her own “weaknesses” in English writing were mostly 
related to questions of style and the appropriate use of specific expressions.  During the 
course of her association with other teachers from Yale none of them had ever pointed to 
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her errors in her spelling, and if any of her Chinese students were to read Salzman’s 
account they might think that Zhu was ill equipped to be an English teacher.  She then 
pointed out that she still retained in her possession the original document with the English 
wording for the loan he helped her with, dated September 1, 1982 and that she could “not 
find one single misspelling on the two sheets,” and then stating, “What a discrepancy 
between fact and your imagination!”72   
 Zhu also pointed out certain factual errors in Salzman’s account of when Teacher 
Wu asked him to help tune the piano in her home.  After finishing the corrections for the 
World Bank loan, Teacher Wu invited Salzman to her house, because it was located near 
his apartment.  After stating this was “the first time I had entered a Chinese person’s 
home,” he then wondered how she would have been able to acquire a piano, to which she 
replied that, “she grew up playing and had continued to study when she was America.  
She bought the piano there, and brought it back to China when she returned with her 
husband.”73  But according to Zhu this was also inaccurate:   
Fact:  I bought the piano in Changsha after liberation at the cost of 400 
silver yuan.  The receipt is in my son’s hands.  I returned from the states 
in October 1948 by plane.  The transportation between Shanghai and 
Changsha was in confusion already.74  
 
The state of “confusion” she referred to was that given the wartime climate of 
China at the time it would have been difficult to transport something as large as a piano 
from the United States to China, let alone over land from Shanghai to Changsha.  After 
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observing the ragged appearance of Teacher Wu’s piano as well as the poor quality of its 
sound the two then attempted to play a duet together, but soon had to “give up,” because, 
sighed Teacher Wu:   
One night the Red Guards came.  They took everything in the house and 
burned it.  They wanted to take the piano, but—and here she smiled at 
the floor—it was too heavy for them to throw out the window!  So they 
just hit it for a while and left.  I haven’t been able to find anyone to fix it 
since then.75 
 
 It then seems that Salzman was the one person in Changsha who could have saved 
her piano from its plight, and accepted her offer to help tune it.  But the story of the 
piano and the Red Guards also contained distortions.  Zhu then explained that when the 
Red Guards did visit her home they took some items, such as her husbands clothes, noted 
above, but not everything. They in fact did not burn anything or attempt to throw any of 
her possessions out the window, and that she even “offered them the piano, they said they 
would not take it that time, later on when they wanted it, they would come.  But they 
never did.”76  
 Her statement noting the difference between facts and imagination above touches 
to the core of what Zhu argues throughout her letter concerning her perception of how 
both her caricature and China are represented in Western literature.  Her rebuttal also 
serves as example of the pride she took in as a writer and teacher of English, which were 
also very important to her.  One also sees here the same China centered view of history 
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displayed in the articles she wrote for the China Monthly Review during the 1950’s, 
despite the fact that she had benefited from an education abroad.     
The publication of Iron and Silk also came at a very sensitive period in the 
relationship between China and the United States.  It was published during the 1980’s 
when the anti-Communism of the Reagan era was in full swing and this was one of the 
first accounts written by a foreigner living in China during the era of reform.  At the 
same time China had just opened its economy after years of political oppression, and its 
social and political climate was pregnant with its own mounting civil unrest related to the 
question of democratic reforms.  Many survivors who lived through the horrors of the 
Mao years were coming to terms with what they had experienced then, and were voicing 
their criticisms of the CCP.  At the same time she wrote the biographies of herself and 
her husband, Zhu Tierong began to have contact with a new generation of Westerners—
young Americans such as Mark Salzman who had never been to China before, and 
despite what they may have read in books published in the West, possessed very little 
knowledge of what ordinary Chinese people experienced during The Great Leap 
Forward, anti Rightist Campaign, or the Cultural Revolution.  But perhaps the most 
telling statement of criticism in Zhu’s letter to Salzman comes at its end:   
In short, you have given me the impression that you feel it fun to imagine, 
to exaggerate, to dramatize, and to appeal to the readers at my expense.  
Have you ever thought of the adverse effects that might be produced by 
your imagination, overstatement or by your incomplete picture?  I AM 
AN INDIVIDUAL IN A COMMUNITY, NOT A CHARACTER IN A 
MOVIE [emphasis Zhu Tierong].77  
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 Although she never specifically mentioned that she saw the film version of Iron 
and Silk, Zhu then explained how her feelings had been hurt by Salzman’s portrayal of 
her as Teacher Wu, and that if anyone in China who knew her had read the story, they 
would assume this character was intended to represent Zhu Tierong.  She concluded by 
admonishing him that “you are writing about a concrete institution and concrete person, 
then you must be accurate in presenting the situation and facts and be fair to the person 
concerned.  A writer must be honest.”  Finally she even suggested that Salzman revise 
the book to reflect her concerns, and that he should “change the untrue things in the 
second printing of the book.”78  More importantly, stating her individuality served as a 
kind of declaration of her own agency, both as a citizen of China and as a modern 
Chinese woman.  Even as one who had experienced significant trauma and persecution, 
she remained devoted to her country and remained sensitive to not only her portrayal, but 
to how China, her “community,” was presented as well. 
 The influence of Lisa Rofel on my understanding of Zhu Tierong’s experience 
also invites a kind of comparison between the thought of a professionally trained scholar 
such as Rofel versus the observations of Mark Salzman in 1986, a young college 
graduate.  For Salzman and others in the general public with an untrained eye or lack of 
sensitivity to history, colonialism, gender, or basic understandings of difference, the 
description of China in the first part of Iron and Silk provides a vivid description of a 
mysterious and as yet undeveloped and seemingly backward country.  Remarking on the 
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strict “practice” of China’s state security apparatus and their scrutiny of her fieldwork 
during her stay in Hangzhou, Rofel observed that she    
Never lost my sense of how seriously the Chinese state weighs westerners’ 
words and the force with which that realization struck me.  Regardless of 
what one thinks about the state’s practice, we would do well to remember 
that it exists within a context that includes recurrent memories of a 
colonial past, the barely fading traces of over thirty years of virulent 
anticommunist U.S. rhetoric about ‘Red China,’ and China’s desire to 
became a nondependent, formidable player within global networks of 
political and cultural economies.”79    
 
Thus Zhu’s admonition of Salzman was informed by the same kind of cultural 
and political sensitivity, one fully aware of China’s contentious history with the West.  
Her statement above that discussing her husband’s suicide without noting the redress of 
his case was incomplete also adds insight concerning the perception of history, reminding 
us how the events which took place during the 1950’s and 1960’s in China were 
remembered by those who experienced them.  For them there remained a connection 
between when the events occurred and the praxis of writing about the trauma during the 
initial years of the reform and opening of the 1980’s.  For her and many others one 
period cannot be discussed without its legacy and remembrance in another.  Similar to 
analyzing the role of suicide, this is perhaps another way of rethinking characters and 
events from the Mao era, as a way to challenge our different approaches to modern 
Chinese history.  
How China is depicted in the Western world, be it in the popular press or other 
media continues to be a relevant topic today, and was one that Zhu Tierong was acutely 
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aware of in the 1950’s, and still aware of even in the very early years of the post Mao era.  
Especially beginning with the thought reform campaigns of the early 1950’s, the means 
of narrating one’s life story was a practice intellectuals in Mao’s China became acutely 
adept at, as they were constantly required to write down the events of their life within the 
framework of a Marxist understanding of history, and if their experiences had made a 
lasting contribution to the development of Chinese Communism, and what faults they 
committed in doing so.  In sum, such narration was constantly bound to the interests of 
the state, and was “a political activity with serious consequences for one’s relationship to 
state power,”80 and not merely a simple story of one’s experiences about living in a 
foreign country after graduating from college.        
As for the film version of the book, one main problem with devoting any great 
amount of attention to it within a dissertation exclusively focused on Changsha is that the 
movie Iron and Silk was actually filmed and takes place in Hangzhou.  Changing the 
setting was likely due in part to the appeal of Hangzhou, known in China as a popular site 
for domestic tourism.  Though not a blockbuster, and made more in the style of an 
independent film, the movie was well received by some critics, and it devotes much time 
to Salzman’s experiences studying gong fu.  In similar fashion to the book characters 
such as Teacher Wu function as supporting characters and are not an important part of the 
story. 
In March 1987 Salzman wrote to Zhu Tierong apologizing for having offended 
her through his portrayal of Teacher Wu.  He admitted that all the points she made in 
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her letter were indeed were correct, but he was attempting to write an artistic 
representation, or “impressionistic portrait,” of his time spent in China.  He also stated 
that, “The character of Teacher Wu is someone who has had a very difficult life, a life 
that few Americans could imagine, but she is nevertheless an artist and a gracious, 
touching person.”  He expressed both his admiration and sensitivity to Zhu’s feelings, 
and ended the letter by asking for forgiveness and hoped they could still remain friends.81      
 
Conclusion 
 
Through her relief work, writing, and activism this chapter has established Zhu 
Tierong as an important member of the historical narrative of modern China and 
chronicled her contribution to Changsha’s modernization.  I have attempted to give her 
the voice and seat at the table that her life’s work and writings prove she so richly 
deserves.  For Zhu Tierong preserving the legacy of her husband’s work with the 
YMCA and his contributions to war relief effort in Changsha were perhaps even more 
important than telling her own story.  The evidence for this can be found in the fact that 
she went through the effort of writing both English and Chinese language versions of 
Zhang Yifan’s biography, as well as another article detailing his work with the YMCA in 
Changsha, of which Zhang’s leadership of the organization was a prominent part of the 
narrative.  Establishing a narrative of Zhang Yifan’s life and contributions has also been 
a focus of this chapter, as I have attempted to situate both his and Zhu’s wartime activism 
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in Changsha, as well as Zhang’s fate during the late 1950’s within the larger context of 
the World War II and liberation experience in China during these years.      
The story of Zhu Tierong, Zhang Yifan, and others from their generation also 
provide a kind of litmus test for evaluating what historian Huaiyin Li refers to as “within 
time” and “open ended” approaches to studying modern Chinese history.82  Under a 
“within time” approach historians focus on the era in which certain events occurred, and 
not with the assumption of an end point or teleology.  An “open ended” approach 
encourages us to think of history by not imposing a fixed chronology on the events we 
discuss.  For instance if one considers the events of the Changsha rice riot of 1910 
absent of the foreknowledge of the Xinhai Uprising which occurred just over one year 
later, we can better recognize it as event resulting from various socioeconomic conditions 
and inequalities which had accumulated in Hunan during the intervening years, 
culminating in a late Qing uprising of urban commoners and peasant activists.  A 
“within time” approach also allows us to view Zhu Tierong’s literary activism in the 
articles from China Monthly Review as pieces reflective of the new optimism that swept 
through China following the Communist Revolution, and of the vast potential which 
existed for social and political change.  These writings also reflect the sense of betrayal 
many Chinese felt when the United States entered the Korean War.  As difficult as it 
might be for American audiences to understand, that her articles served as propaganda for 
the indoctrination of American POWs should also be understood in this regard.    
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However, it is almost impossible to read her optimism about Changsha’s 
modernization these articles absent of any sense of tragedy and with a kind of 
“dissonance” discussed above.  During the Mao era she was betrayed by the very system 
and Party she so strongly supported.  Ultimately, perhaps the appropriate response to 
such historical questions should come from Zhu herself, who reflected on the hardships 
she experienced by simply remarking, “So what?” 
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8-Fire Gods and Benevolent Angels 
During the early morning hours of November 13, 1938 a massive fire swept 
through central Changsha, leaving thousands dead and homeless in its wake.  Homes, 
businesses, and ancient relics were all destroyed.  Known as the “Wenxi Dahuo,” in 
Chinese, the fire was actually planned and carried out by officials of the Nationalist 
government working in Changsha.  They acted on direct orders from Chiang Kai-shek 
(1887-1975), leader of China’s Nationalist Party (KMT) during World War II, also 
known as the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945).  This chapter shows that Chiang ordered 
the fire as part of his “scorched earth policy,” and although he ordered Changsha be 
burned days in advance of an anticipated Japanese occupation of the city, local officials 
were blamed for the destruction of the fire and subsequently executed as punishment.  
The fire harmed Chaing’s reputation in the national press and among those who worked 
under him.  Evidence for this comes from accounts of former Nationalist Party workers, 
civil servants, and residents, as well as other high-ranking members of the military and 
civil bureaucracy who lived and worked in Changsha during World War II.     
But the story of the 1938 fire is also one of those who served as volunteers in 
Changsha.  Both government and non-government agencies such as the YMCA, 
provided emergency aid and relief by organizing shelter, medical care, food, and housing 
for thousands of displaced refugees.  By analyzing the conditions of wartime Changsha 
we can also better understand the reach of the Nationalist state in a specific locality 
during the war, and how the experience of the war shaped the formation of charitable 
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organizations.  Changsha was also one of the first major world cities to experience mass 
destruction and devastation during World War II, yet to date discussion of the 1938 fire 
remains largely overlooked by scholars, making a construction of its particular historical 
narrative more important than merely a local “micro-history” but one that serves as an 
important part of the larger story of contemporary global history as well.      
 
INTRODUCTION:  WARTIME CHINA 
 
For most countries outside the United States World War II began much earlier 
than 1941.  This was also true for China, whose people endured an invasion and 
subsequent occupation by the empire of Japan during the summer of 1937.  Following 
the Meiji Restoration (1868), Japan’s territorial aims increased with its industrial growth 
and economic prosperity, as it modeled itself as a colonial power based on the British 
model.  Fully aware of western colonial interests in Asia, Japan also viewed itself as a 
civilizing power in the region, whose responsibility it was to “liberate” neighboring East 
Asian countries from Western colonial oppression.     
 Japan’s relationship with China dates back centuries, as dynasties such as the 
Tang inspired generations of Japanese culture.  By the late nineteenth century Japan was 
already several years into a social and political “restoration,” that abolished the centuries 
long feudal system of shogunates, restored the imperial monarchy along constitutional 
lines, and established an industrial economy.  The success of this program was first seen 
during their stunning defeat of the Chinese navy during the first Sino-Japanese War in 
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1894.  Following this war Japan’s colonial interests in main land China increased.  As 
discussed in Chapter 5, under the Treaty of Shimoniseki (1895), Changsha opened as a 
Japanese trading port.  The city’s access to a main water route, the Xiang River, 
connected to Yangtze port of Hankou to the north, made it attractive to Japanese 
merchants.  Later, with the construction of a main rail line from northern China to the 
south, provincial capitals such as Changsha became vital transportation hubs in the 
country’s isolated and rugged interior.    
 After the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, Nanjing was established as the national 
capital and seat of government for the Guomingdang, or Nationalist Party (KMT).  
Initially led by its founder, Sun Yatsen, his death from cancer in 1925 allowed his 
protégé, a young military officer named Chiang Kai-shek to become China’s de facto 
president.  Beginning with Guangdong province in China’s southern coast in 1924, 
during the Northern Expedition (1926-1928) Chiang and his army successfully subdued 
the southern provinces from almost a decade of warlordism.  But by the 1920’s another 
party had emerged.  The Communist Party (CCP), emphasized the rights of the working 
class, and promoted a proletarian revolution.  Both Chiang and his wife, Soong 
Mayling, educated at Wellesley in the United States and fluent in English, despised 
communism.  Though the two parties shared similar Leninist organizational structure 
and philosophy their views differed about China’s future.  The Chiang’s and the 
Nationalists had deep connections in the business world, especially financial centers such 
as Shanghai.  As a part of the international Comitern, by the early 1920’s communist 
cells appeared in cities throughout China, promoting worker’s rights and the formation of 
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labor unions.  Further advancing the communist’s cause were events surrounding the 
end of World War I.  
 The Japanese government wasted no time in taking advantage of their newly 
acquired territory.  Throughout the 1920’s businesses and immigrants began occupying 
areas in north China.1  Then in what came to be known as the “Mukden Incident,” on 
September 18, 1931 the detonation of explosives near the present day city of Shenyang 
was staged as a pretext for a full scale military invasion of northeast China, intensifying 
Japan’s colonial presence.  The pretext for the Japanese invasion of China proper came 
following the “Marco Polo Bridge Incident,” near Beijing on July 7, 1937.  This resulted 
in “the removal of population, government, schools, and factories from coastal areas to 
the interior.”2  Wartime Changsha served as a perfect example of this policy.  
Accompanying this intense mobilization of population and industrial capital were two 
distinct wartime policies advanced by Chiang Kai-shek, “trading space for time,” and the 
“scorched earth policy.”  Even before the outbreak of war, Chiang and his military 
advisors knew that China’s army was no match for Japan’s, and thus began formulating a 
strategy allowing for a tactical retreat into the interior, forcing a war of attrition.  Chiang 
also did not want factories, supplies, and weapons falling into the hands of the Japanese 
army.  In many cases he ordered the destruction of facilities, as well as other potentially 
useful elements of infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and telegraph lines.      
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After sharing an alliance during the Northern Expedition, known as the United 
Front, in 1927 Chiang turned on the communists, staging a coup and purging their party 
members in Shanghai, executing thousands.  The communists then moved underground.  
The dispute between the two parties continued into the 1930’s, but by 1937 the Japanese 
invasion forced another tenuous alliance.  Following the “Xian Incident,” of December 
1936, Chiang was betrayed and kidnaped and forced to negotiate with communist leaders 
for a truce, establishing an alliance between the two parties so efforts could be focused on 
fighting Japan.  Under the “Second United Front,” all communist military forces 
technically fell under Chiang’s leadership.  
Exactly one month after the war began, on August 7, 1937 in a decision 
determining the course of the war and the fate of millions, Chiang moved the main 
theater of combat from North China where hostilities had begun, to southern China near 
Shanghai.  Attacking Japanese concessions there allowed the potential for gaining the 
sympathy of the western community.3  Another obvious reason for this is that the bulk 
of the Japanese resources in China, its colonized population and military forces was 
stationed in Manchuria.  Chiang knew that his army would be no match if a major battle 
was fought there.  This may have been effective for eventually winning American 
support, but in many ways it proved a giant failure.  By November Japanese forces 
routed the Nationalist army near Shanghai.  After three months approximately 270,000 
Chinese troops had been killed, some sixty percent of Chiang’s main army.  In 
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December the Japanese took Nanjing, where they raped and slaughtered the city’s 
civilian population.4 
Chiang’s gamble to force the fight against Japan in the south paid off, with the 
most important battle in the early stages of the war fought at Xuzhou, where the 
Nationalist Army was ultimately defeated in May 1938.5  The loss of Xuzhou was 
devastating for Chiang’s forces, as they had invested some 200,000 troops as well as 
additional reinforcements to defend the city.6  For the Japanese, victory at Xuzhou 
paved the way for their advance to Wuhan, where despite being held at bay by Nationalist 
troops for ten months, they captured the city in October 1938.  By early November the 
enemy had advanced into northern Hunan.  
 
PANIC  
 
During the time of the fire Changsha’s population numbered roughly 300,000, but 
from the beginning of the war in summer 1937 refugees from the eastern coastal 
provinces as well as other cities that had fallen to the Japanese poured into the city.  On 
November 9, 1938 the city of Yueyang in northern Hunan fell to the Japanese, causing 
panic.  Poor urban infrastructure was ill equipped to cope, and military checkpoints 
throughout made it difficult for anyone to go in and out.  While longtime residents fled 
                                                
4 Ibid., 120.   
5 Hans J. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China: 1925-1945 (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 
292.  For the positive reviews of van de Ven’s book, see John Fitzgerald, The China Journal, No. 53, pp. 
243-244, and Diana Lary, The China Quarterly, No. 178, pp. 525-526.    
6 Ibid., 218.  
  300 
to the countryside, wharfs near the Big and Small West gates along the Xiang River 
became overcrowded with people trying to secure passage on boats.  Many slipped into 
the water and drowned.   Possessions and luggage were left behind.  Some boats and 
other ships became so overloaded with passengers that they capsized.  There was also 
some problem with people trying to cross the river from the west side to get the banks on 
the east side, but the ferrymen piloting the boats charged high fees.7  Many ships 
dropped their gangplanks even after only a few boarded.  Such was the case with.   
A former eyewitness named Sun Jintang, claimed that a ship attached to the firm 
Jardine Matheson retracted its plank while people were trying to board, and many fell 
into the river and drowned.  Not long after there were reportedly dead corpses of men 
and women left floating in the river.  By that evening the fire had started somewhere 
around the South Gate, near the Tianxin Pavilion.  In a matter of hours the entire city 
became engulfed in a sea of fire.8 
Since the Tianxin Pavilion was considered the highest vantage point Changsha 
and then known as the tallest building in the province, some former eyewitnesses recalled 
that an initial fire lit from this location was meant to signal groups of “fire teams” (fang 
huo dui) to begin dispersing throughout the city and begin setting buildings on fire.  
Additional word went out that the enemy would soon be occupying the city and further 
panic ensued.  People left their homes in the middle of the night to leave, and roads 
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became congested with traffic.9  At the train station throngs of people fought desperately 
to board trains, fighting and trampling over each other, a sight that one “could not bear to 
look at.”  Some of those who were trampled over were injured soldiers from the front 
lines.  The insides, front, back, and top of the trains leaving the station were all packed 
with people hanging on for a ride.10  
Crime, looting, and robbery ensued.  A shop owner named Wu Guangzhao, 
apparently after successfully leaving the city, could not bear the thought of losing his 
shop or his possessions, so he went back to check on them only to discover that most of 
his possessions were looted or stolen.  He was later beaten to death by thugs.  Such 
activity, along with robbing and looting continued into the second and third day of the 
fire.  According to one eyewitness, by the third day of the fire a whole street, called Ba 
Ba Jie (literally “Cake Street,” where there were many local bakeries), located outside the 
city’s East Gate (then called Liuyang Men), was totally gone.11  By this time most of the 
old city lay in ruins.  Most of the destruction was concentrated in the business and 
financial centers, from Nan Zheng Jie (today’s Huang Xing Road) which entered the the 
city from the South Gate, and served as a main thoroughfare into the city center, 
including Po Zi Street, Taiping Street, and to the Big West Gate along the river.  Pozi 
Steet, along with the customs houses and foreign owned buildings along the river, all 
completely burned down or were badly damaged.  Afterwards many took particular 
notice to the fact that public and government buildings in the north part of the old city 
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remained relatively undamaged, later conveying the impression that certain buildings and 
areas were selectively burned.  During and after the fire a former railway worker named 
Dai Zheming worked at a China made goods store, located on present day Zhong Shan 
road.  Behind this store was a restaurant opened by a famous local chef named Liu 
Sanhe, who owned his owned restaurant or tavern called the “Sanhe Restaurant.”  Dai 
claimed that during the time of the fire, the fire team for the north city area lived in Liu’s 
restaurant, who apparently cooked for and fed some of these men.12 
A missionary doctor from Yale in China’s Hsiangya Hosptial, Phil Greene, 
remarked in a letter to his wife that following the fall of Wuhan there were early 
indicators in Changsha that it was going to be an example of the scorched earth policy. 
During the late morning of October 25 he heard an explosion.  A weapons arsenal 
located behind the hospital suddenly blew up:  “Just one big bang and the whole place 
was gone.”13  Three days later Greene noted the number of refugees swarming into the 
city fleeing areas already occupied by the Japanese, and then the following day, on 
October 29 many people had already begun evacuating.  By early November it was easy 
to notice the stream of people leaving by any means available, using trains, buses, 
rickshaws, and even wheelbarrows.  By November 12 he wrote, “Places of businesses 
and homes are securely padlocked! . . . uncanny stillness in the usually busy 
thoroughfares . . . a deserted and evidently doomed city.  Toward nightfall soldiers with 
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rifles and fixed bayonets took positions along the silent streets.”14  Later that same 
evening, another Yale in China staff member, Frank Hutchins, recalled that then 
Governor Zhang Zhizhong invited several members of Changsha’s foreign missions 
community to his personal residence for dinner: 
We had a delightful dinner with the Governor.  As we left, he said to a 
doctor and his wife, who lived in the heart of the city, ‘You must move 
tomorrow.’  That was about 9:30 p.m.  When asked if they could stay 
on in the hospital, the Governor again said that they must move the 
following day, the 13th.  They agreed that they would move as soon as 
the Governor sent cars to take away the wounded men who had been in 
their care in the adjoining buildings (military hospitals).  As we left, the 
Governor said to them again, ‘You must move tomorrow.’15   
 
 A few hours later, soon after midnight a British gunboat reported seeing the first 
signs of fire, and that “no one seemed to be fighting them.”  In his diary and own 
account of the fire, Zhang Zhizhong also mentioned his dinner with local foreign 
missionaries that same evening and that he urged them to leave the city.16   During the 
panic that ensued during the early morning hours of November 13, Greene observed in a 
fashion similar to many Chinese eyewitness accounts, of fire teams from Military Police 
Headquarters who were going to set fire to the house of one of his servants.  According 
to Greene these men  
Evidently had orders not to burn foreign property deliberately and left, 
making no trouble.  Another squad with oil and cotton came along a 
minute or two later, smashing in doors of private houses and building an 
oil and cotton fire under the stairs, then opening the windows and leaving.  
I threatened to smash the skull of the first one who started a fire windward 
of us no matter whose house it was.  Three or more groups came along 
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the next hour—all from the Military Police; then an officer, and after some 
talk with him no new fires were started near the hospital.17     
 
 All of this testimony suggests the plan to burn Changsha had been conveived days 
in advance.  Feng Yuxiang (1882-1948), an infamous warlord during the Republican 
period reportedly known for his criticism of Chiang Kai-shek, claimed that in the early 
days of the November prior to the fire, KMT officials, as well as their families began 
leaving the city.  Days before the fire Chiang flew from nearby Nanyue Mountain to 
Changsha, to meet with Feng and Tang Shengzhi in the home of Changsha’s mayor, He 
Jian.  During the meeting Chiang relayed to Feng and others present that the city be 
burned.18  Whatever the degree of Feng’s experience with Chiang during the fire, his 
disapproval of the Generalissimo was widely known.  When Zhu Tierong and her 
husband journeyed to the United States in 1946 to study at Yale, they travelled with Feng 
on the same boat from Shanghai.  He even joined them for a time in New Haven and 
lectured to a large gathering of Yale students denouncing Chiang Kai-shek.19   
During the fire, Zhang Wenxin (1904-1995) was the regimental commander and 
section chief for the Changsha branch of the KMT officer’s school.  He was responsible 
for training provincial police and military officers from Hunan’s countryside, and also a 
younger sibling of the provincial governor Zhang Zhizhong.  Zhang Wenxin also 
confirmed that during early November 1938 Chiang Kai-shek convened a secret meeting 
of his top generals at Nanyue Mountain, where he directed that based on his “scorched 
                                                
17 Greene., 114. 
18 “Feng Yuxiang jiang jun tan Changsha da huo,” CSWSZL, No. 1, 1984, 55-56. 
19 Zhu Tierong, “Autobiography of Zhang Yifan,” Sophia Zhu Tierong Papers, 5. 
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earth policy,” if the Japanese army were to advance on the city, then it should be burned.  
The following decisions were made in the meeting:  first, prior to the fire all government 
facilities would be relocated to Yuanling in West Hunan, where it would serve as the 
wartime provincial capital.  Second, wounded soldiers, permanent residents, as well as 
all necessary goods and materials in Changsha would be evacuated.20  Zhang also noted 
that at the time the “scorched earth policy” was a top-secret policy only Chiang and his 
top staff knew of, and was a “closely guarded secret.”  During the meeting Governor 
Zhang Zhizhong raised objections that burning the city was not a good method for 
hindering the enemy’s advance.  But Chiang would not listen to any objections.  Days 
after the meeting he sent a telegraph to Zhang Zhizhong stating: “To Changsha Chairman 
Zhang:  Changsha cannot be defended, as to the matter of burning the entire city, by no 
means hesitate.”21  
Another reason for the destructive force of the fire was that local police failed to 
stop many instances of spontaneous arson committed by ordinary citizens.  This was 
also a result of the widespread degree of panic that spread in Changsha, once word spread 
that the Japanese were advancing.  Thus in addition to the “fire teams” sent out by local 
officials, ordinary citizens participated in the destruction.  Many local policemen also 
left their posts without proper authorization.  Local police and fire brigade members 
were actually told to burn selected areas by the chief of police, Wen Zhongfu. Changde 
had been cut off.  The garrison commander for the KMT’s Second Regiment, Xu Kun, 
                                                
20 Zhang Wenxin, “Changsha da huo zhen xiang,” CSWSZL, No. 1, 1984, 80.  
21 Ibid.  
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supposedly lost his composure, acted hastily, and failed to warn residents prior to the city 
of the need to evacuate.22       
 During the 1930’s Liu Feizhang was a member of Changsha’s Number Six 
Theatrical Team.  Both he and members of his team participated in relief efforts to look 
after refugees following the fire.  Reflecting on the events of that fall, Liu directly 
blamed the KMT for the fire, emphatically stating that Chiang Kai-shek gave the orders 
for Changsha to be burned.  He also remembered seeing two-man fire teams, who were 
sent to every corner of the city—south, north, east, and west, one bearing the torch, the 
other a vat of gasoline or kerosene:  “The great Changsha fire occurred on November 
12, 1938 and lasted for approximately two days.  It began precisely during the early 
hours of the morning. The fire was started by the Guomindang (KMT).  The order to 
start it was given by Chiang Kai-shek.”23       
 In his popular biography of Chiang Kai-shek, Jay Taylor claims that the 
Generalissimo could not have given the order to burn the city, because “he had not before 
called for such a total destruction of a city about to be lost nor did he afterward.”  Taylor 
also adds that on November 14 Zhang Zhizhong issued a formal apology, but saying he 
had not given the order to burn the city.  Phil Greene even later received a letter from 
Soong Mayling saying that her husband was not responsible.  On November 16 Chiang 
arrived to investigate, and the missionaries soon learned that the garrison commander, 
and the chief of police had been executed.  Governor Zhang, considered “a trusted 
                                                
22 Ibid, 82.  
23 Liu Feizhang, “Zhou Enlai tong zhi can xie zu zhi ling yi Changsha da huo hou de jiu zai huo dong,” 
CSWSZL, No. 1, 1984, 57.   
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follower of the Generalissimo,” was dismissed from office but was allowed to remain in 
Changsha.24 Since Zhang eventually joined the CCP in 1949, out of loyalty to the Party 
he could have blamed Chiang for the fire.  
 Although Taylor suggests that Chiang Kai-shek could not have ordered the fire, 
Zhang Zhizhong’s diary and own oral account suggests that he was ordered by Chiang to 
burn the city.  Around nine o’clock on the morning of November 12, Chiang sent him a 
confidential telegram ordering him to “make preparations” and to “not delay” in carrying 
out his orders.  Shortly after he received a phone call from one of Chiang’s aides 
iterating the same order.25  Zhang was also baffled by the fact that he kept receiving 
reports that different work units of the public security bureau throughout Changsha had 
been dismissed, and were even seen marching out of the city.  When he tried to confirm 
this with Wen Zhongfu, the director of Changsha’s Public Security Bureau, he was 
informed that personnel from non-essential areas had been evacuated, but work units in 
the important areas of the city were still occupied.  Later in the evening, on his way to a 
local radio station to give a broadcast commemorating the birthday of Chiang Kai-shek, 
Zhang witnessed this first hand:   
On the way to the radio station I noticed that regardless if they were 
essential or non-essential, all work units were deserted.  After arriving at 
the radio station, I ordered my adjutant Wang Jiancheng to call Director 
Wen, to inform him that all personnel should be returned to their work 
                                                
24 Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo, 160. He also cites MacKinnon, “Defense of the Central Yangtze,” p. 39, 
who quotes the Zhang memoir. In the footnotes of his book Taylor adds that in Zhang’s memoirs, published 
in 1985, he claimed that Chiang ordered the burning of Changsha “in a panic” because he had just fled 
Wuhan, where he “ordered the destruction of key facilities, but not the burning down of the city.”  See 
Taylor Notes on p. 628.   
25 Yu Zhanbang, “Zhang Zhizhong sheng qian kou shu,” CSWSZL, No. 2, 1985, 17. 
  308 
units within two hours, and that both him and I would inspect every street 
to see that it is done.26       
 
  Later when Zhang attempted to get in touch with Director Wen to inspect the 
various work units, he noticed that the phone lines had been cut.27  In this way Zhang 
placed a degree of blame upon the KMT generals and other officials garrisoned in 
Changsha for the destruction of the fire.  Similar to the accounts above, some of these 
officials met with the Generalissimo in Changsha soon after the fall of Wuhan, and 
decided that the city should be burned to prevent its important facilities and infrastructure 
from falling into enemy hands.  Although he placed some blame on others and he was 
under Chiang’s orders, Zhang also reflected that “The burning of Changsha was my 
responsibility, moreover, after reflecting on it today, I have a guilty conscience.”  He 
also admitted that the fire “was completely my mistake.”  But Zhang also stated that he 
would not have burned the city unless ordered by Chiang.28 Other recent studies also 
acknowledge Chiang’s orders to burn Changsha as historical fact.  He acted under poor 
judgment and with strong objections from his top generals.29  It is also ironic that in the 
hours leading up to the burning of Changsha’s facilities and historical relics, and for 
those fortunate enough to own a radio, amidst the eerie stillness accompanying the city’s 
empty streets they would have heard a broadcast commemorating the birthday of a 
national leader who had ordered their destruction.     
                                                
26 Ibid., 19. Chiang’s birthday was on October 31.   
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid., 21.  
29 Stephen Mackinnon, “The Defense of the Central Yangtze,” in Mark Peattie et. al. eds, The Battle for 
China:  Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2011), 200. 
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During World War II, Chen Zheng was an assistant with the plain clothed division 
of the Nationalist Army’s field headquarters based out of Wuhan.  In October 1938 he 
was posted at Nanyue Mountain to handle security for Chiang Kai-shek’s arrival to meet 
with his top commanders.  According to Chen, Chiang flew to Nanyue on October 26 
and convened the special meeting with his top generals on November 2nd or 3rd, which 
included Feng Yuxiang, Wang Jingwei, Bai Chongxi, Governor Zhang Zhidong, Chen 
Cheng, and others.  During this conference Chiang, and these high-ranking members of 
the military cabinet in Nationalist China, all put themselves at risk.  The mountain was 
bombed at least three different times by Japanese planes.  On one occasion the forested 
area near a small temple at the base of the mountain was bombed, killing more than ten 
people and injuring many others, among them women, children, and the elderly.30  A 
few days after the meeting, on November 9 Chen and others journeyed back to Changsha 
by truck.  A journey that should have taken a mere two hours instead took the entire 
day, because an endless stream of refugees crowded the roads.  By the time they arrived 
back to the city, most of the streets and urban markets were completely empty, and there 
were all kinds of rumors going about:   
Some people said that the enemy was attacking as nearby as the Mi Luo 
River [a river in northern Hunan, not far from Yue Yang], and some said 
they would soon be in Changsha. In short, people were in a constant state 
of anxiety (ren xin huang huang bu ke zhong ri).  Where the enemy 
would attack, we really did not know.  We also did not have a lot of 
accurate information . . . but only knew that if our army could not hold the 
Mi Luo River, then in two or three days time they could advance on 
                                                
30 Yang Jixuan zheng li, “Changsha da huo qian hou de jing li he jian wen, Chen Zheng kou shu,” 
CSWSZL, No. 1, 1984, 107-108.  
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Changsha.  So at that time I knew the situation for Changsha did not 
bode well (xiong duo ji shao).31   
 
Chen Zheng’s experience during the fire is important because it provides the 
perspective of both a government insider and yet one who also witnessed the carnage of 
the fire and lived through it.  As with other accounts he recalled seeing the large fire lit 
atop the Tian Xin Pavilion during the early morning hours of November 13, serving as a 
signal fire for teams to begin torching the city.  He witnessed both high ranking officers 
as well as ordinary rank and file soldiers use kerosene and torches to set fire to buildings.  
Dai Liqin, the officer temporarily placed in charge of the train station and managing the 
evacuation of government personnel, ordered two separate groups of trains to leave the 
city.  One train departed for Yuan Ling in West Hunan that would go on to Chongqing 
(the wartime capital).  Another southbound train that would pass through Hengyang 
(just to the south of Changsha) and make its way to Guangxi, then Guizhou, but would 
also end up in Chongqing.32   
Chen was on the train bound for Hengyang, and recalled a terrifying sight:  the 
train station filled with chaos and panic, as scores of people attempted to board trains that 
could not hold enough passengers.  Soon after the city was ablaze much of the station 
and the area of the tracks where their car was situated became surrounded by a sea of 
flame, and all on board feared for their lives.  Many of the rail cars had ammunition 
attached to the outside, so Chen and the other passengers feared the fire would cause it to 
ignite and explode.  They also were forced to wait some time for a locomotive to attach 
                                                
31 Ibid., 108-109.  
32 Ibid., 110.  
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to the car, compounding their distress as the fire grew in intensity.  Many rode on top of 
the train, and other injured were strapped to the side, but unsecured.  Once the train 
finally did start moving many fell off, and many were crushed by the train or perished 
from the flames.  The urban areas surrounding Changsha’s main East Gate, were in a 
part of the city most affected by the fire, and unfortunately the train tracks led straight 
through this area.  Those inside had to cover themselves with blankets to avoid being 
burned.  Once the train finally made it through the flames to a safer area outside the city, 
they still were not safe.  To make matters worse, around 4 a.m., after stopping to allow 
the passengers to go to the toilet, they were even strafed by machine gun fire from 
Japanese planes!33     
In addition to providing an eyewitness account of the fire, Chen Zheng’s 
experience both at the Nanyue meeting and during the fire itself shows how quickly 
Chiang Kai-shek’s orders were issued to burn the city.  By the time Chen and his party 
set out to return to Changsha on November 9, the main roads were already flooded with 
evacuating refugees.  Coupled with the power of rumor and gossip news of the fire plan 
quickly made its way into the street, causing panic and chaos.  Moreover, it also 
confirms much of what has been said thus far, that members of the local military and 
police force, many of which were in uniform, were seen torching specific areas of 
Changsha.          
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AFTERMATH 
 
The KMT government’s official report and conclusions related to the Changsha 
fire, dated November 20, 1938, begins: “Following is the explanation of the disastrous 
fire at Changsha given by the Central Publicity Board and the Board of Political Affairs 
of the National Military Council.”  According to the report, one of the causes was due to 
“erroneous reports which misled the local soldiers and police,” and their “failure of 
previously mapping out the plan to meet all emergencies and their hasty and thoughtless 
action upon hearing baseless rumors.”  The second cause of the fire was “due to the 
indignation of the persons who had been entrusted with the task of making preparations 
for the carrying out of the destruction plan,” as well as local officials who panicked once 
Yueyang and other cities in northern Hunan fell to the Japanese.  The report then listed 
the various measures the government took to punish those responsible, which included 
arresting and punishing local officials and the appropriation of relief funds to the 
homeless and needy.34  
The testimony of the former governor, as well as the Changsha KMT 
government’s own officials report illustrates there was a definite plan to “carry out” the 
destruction of the city.  During the fire Gao Yihan served as a security officer for the 
Hunan and Hubei region, and following the fire investigated the chief reasons and causes 
of the Changsha fire.  The three men held most responsible were Hunan’s provincial 
garrison commander Feng Ti, the second regimental commander Xu Kun, and the chief 
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of the public security bureau Wen Zhongfu.  Each were blamed for the fire and 
summarily executed, but according to Gao were simply “scapegoats.”   Gao fled his 
post in Wuhan after the Japanese took the city in late October, where he and many others 
fled to Zhijiang, a city in Western Hunan.  Once they received the news of the Changsha 
fire, Gao was ordered to go to the city to investigate what had happened, and concluded 
that during the early days of November 1938 Changsha became a place governed by 
high-ranking KMT bureaucrats where one could “barely secure their own personal safety 
in such troubled times” (gou quan xingming yu luanshi).  According to Gao, all KMT 
officials who worked in Changsha during the war with Japan were all well aware of 
Chiang’s signature policies of “scorched earth,” “buying space for time,” and that the 
state of international affairs and its impact on China was cause for drastic measures.  
These policies, noted Gao, were not subject to change.35  
Following the fire the communist press took full advantage of the tragedy by 
criticizing the decision to burn Changsha.  An article appearing in the Chongqing 
Xinhua Ribao dated November 21, 1938, criticizing the scorched earth policy.  This 
paper was a communist publication, which the KMT allowed as a result of the Second 
United Front, and mostly discussed the KMT’s policy of jian bi qing ye, which translates 
as “strengthening defense works, evacuating noncombatants, hiding provisions and 
livestock, and strengthening the defenses and clearing the fields, ” but also can be 
understood as the “scorched earth policy.”  The article is mostly a summary of this 
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policy in the nationwide campaign to resist and fight the invading Japanese army.  But 
at the end it denounced the scorched earth policy apparently approved by Changsha city 
authorities to burn the entire city: 
After the recent fire in Changsha public opinion is very unsettled there 
(feinan).  Soon after the defeat at Yueyang, cities throughout Hunan were 
put to the torch and people fled.  (Some text omitted), Part of this is 
understandable, but is definitely not the appropriate means to implement 
the “scorched earth policy.”  We (the newspaper) absolutely praise the 
efforts of different districts throughout Hunan in adopting this policy to 
attack the enemy, even if it means a drastic loss of material goods, which 
we will not even balk at to do (zai suo bu xi)!  But we completely cannot 
agree with a kind of policy that does not mobilize the masses, and depends 
on a method of “burning” that causes the masses to suffer many hardships.  
This misses the original intent of the strengthening and provisioning 
policy, is completely baffling, and is a scheme that could be used by the 
enemy to deceive us.         
 The improper implementation of this policy has resulted in a 
serious mistake.  This kind of necessary denial to the enemy of the 
strengthening and provisioning policy, is a method that is being used in 
battlefields throughout China during the war, and is a serious attack on the 
enemy. . .  
 The lesson from the Changsha fire is that such is not suitable 
method for engaging in the people’s war, and we should not use the 
scorched earth policy in this fashion.36  
 
Thus the communist press used the Changsha fire as an opportunity to criticize 
the KMT’s wartime “scorched earth” policy and make it known that public opinion in the 
city was very unsettled following the fire.  More importantly is that for both the CCP 
and its readership it politicized the event, possibly contributing to the negative perception 
of Chiang and the Nationalist party fomenting throughout China at the time.  In this way 
Changsha became an example to many of failed Nationalist wartime policies during the 
early stages of the War of Resistance against Japan.  The events surrounding the fire 
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also contributed to the growing negative sentiment against the Chiang regime among the 
general public.  This was especially in Changsha, whose residents suffered the 
consequences of their president’s orders.   
The written accounts of former officials working in Changsha during the fire also 
reveal the degree of mismanagement on the part of the KMT government in carrying out 
the plan to torch the city, as well as the distrust on the part of those who formerly worked 
under Chiang’s administration.  Obviously the burning of Changsha was a catastrophic 
failure for the enormous toll it exerted in lives lost and the cost of damage to public 
property.  But it also serves as an example of the reach of the Nationalist state in 
Changsha during the Republican period.  Since the order to burn the city originated 
from the highest echelon of state power, the Generalissimo, the fire represented his 
influence over local affairs and his failure to act in the best interests of his people.  Not 
to mention that the notion of burning an entire city in order to “save” it from an invading 
enemy, was quite senseless.  Scorched earth campaigns were also used by both Hitler 
and Stalin.  In U.S. history the most famous exemplar was William Tecumseh 
Sherman’s adoption of the policy in his campaign through the southern states during the 
later months of the American Civil War.  In the minds of Feng Yuxiang, Zhang Wenxin, 
Gao Yihan, and Hunan’s former Governor, the orders to burn Changsha were given by 
Chiang, who they all held ultimately responsible for the tragedy of the fire.  For these 
high-ranking leaders it also seriously undermined Chiang’s credibility as their leader.   
Chiang’s decision to burn Changsha, as well as the defeats at Wuhan in 
Guangzhou during the fall of 1938 also cost him politically, causing the defection of 
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Wang Jingwei and other KMT leaders.37  Phil Greene, the doctor from Yale’s Hsyiang-
ya Hospital, also noted that on Thursday, November 17, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in 
Changsha on a personal tour of inspection, and met for tea with assembled guests at the 
Hunan Bible Institute.  He told his guests there in fact had been a plan to burn the city, 
but only to “Destroy certain buildings of military importance when the Japanese really 
arrived.  This that has happened was not planned and is being investigated.  Please help 
us in any way you can to help the people and move them on out care for them, etc.”38   
The total damage of Changsha’s Wenxi Fire resulted in some 20,000 urban 
buildings totally destroyed.  Most of these consisted of businesses and private 
residences located in the central and southern areas of the city surrounded by the old wall.  
A number of prominent temples and monuments were also completely lost or destroyed, 
as well as many rice warehouses, resulting in the loss of some 1.9 million shi of grain. 
Approximately 200,000 people were left homeless, with a rough estimate of casualties at 
20,000, many of whom were buried in mass graves outside the city.39 
For as much as the destruction of Changsha in 1938 can be catalogued as a human 
tragedy and a failure by the Nationalist government, Japan’s failure to capture Hunan 
meant that the province and its capital city remained a part of unoccupied China for the 
most of duration of the war.  In some ways this bears similarity to when the Taiping 
Army laid siege to Changsha almost one hundred years before.  But perhaps the fire 
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may be catalogued as a pyrrhic victory for Chiang’s war of attrition.  It also meant that 
efforts would have to be made to take the province again, which was attempted during the 
“Second Changsha Offensive,” from late December to early January 1942, when 
Nationalist troops fought mounted stiff resistance and held the city.40  But following this 
battle the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War in China became further influenced by the 
war against the United States in the Pacific.  Again in April 1944 Hunan and Changsha 
became another important theater of combat, as part of one of the most massive 
offensives by any army during World War II.  Known as “Operation Ichigo,” it involved 
the advance of some 500,000 Japanese troops into China’s interior.  Strategically the 
pacification of Hunan was vital because the central, Xiang River cities of Yuzhou, 
Changsha, and Hengyang were each situated along the railway line connecting the 
Beijing-Wuhan line in the north to the one coming south from Guangzhou.  Wang 
Qisheng, an historian and native of Hunan, argues against much of the traditional PRC 
scholarship on the Sino-Japanese War, which suggests that Chiang Kai-shek failed to 
deploy enough troops during the Ichigo campaign to Hunan because he wished to 
preserve troop strength for an eventual confrontation with communist forces.41  Actually 
Wang notes, the main reason for the Nationalists eventual defeat was due significant 
decline in combat effectiveness.  The Nationalist Army had an ineffective officer corps. 
Common soldiers were malnourished, illiterate, often too weak to march long distances, 
and were improperly trained.  Despite all this however, “Nationalist soldiers were tough 
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Battle for China, 426.  
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and had high morale,” which may explain in part why the battle for Hunan during Ichigo 
was one of the most fiercely fought from the Chinese side.  The defense of Hengyang 
became known as one of the most courageously fought engagements of the entire war.42  
Although Hunan finally fell in September of 1944 for the first time in its modern history 
to an invading army, the Japanese victory was hard earned and obviously short-lived.                 
 
RELIEF 
 
 Following the Japanese invasion, cities in China’s hinterland became centers for 
war refugees fleeing the north and eastern parts of the country.  Such was the case for 
Changsha before, during, and after the fire of 1938.  Relief agencies such as the YMCA 
and Changsha International Relief Committee, with funding from the Nationalist 
government but also from outside donations, were integral to urban recovery and 
provided assistance to thousands of homeless residents as well as war refugees.    
 The YMCA in China gained distinction during the 1920’s due to the work of 
James Yen’s Mass Education Movement in Ding County, in North China’s Henan 
Province.43  In Changsha its founding and existence paralleled the years of the city’s 
modernization.  First established in 1911, and for several years located near West 
Archway Street, it became one of Changsha’s most active civic organizations.  It was 
financed by the national committee for the YMCA in China and served as a center for 
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education and recreation.  The Board of Directors included some of Hunan’s most 
notable figures, such as the famed revolutionary hero Huang Xing, philanthropist Xiong 
Xiling, Governor Tan Yankai, and others.  Zhu Tierong and her husband Zhang Yifan, 
discussed in chapter seven, both worked for the YMCA during the war.  With his wife 
by his side, by the late 1930’s Zhang Yifan served as the Y’s Secretary General in 
Changsha, and worked closely with its other branch facilities in Hunan.  With the 
beginning of World War II in China, and under Zhang’s direction the Y became a center 
of anti-Japanese propaganda.  Shortly after the war began, Zhang often posted banners 
on every door inside the Y, with slogans such as, “We have been at war for one year, 
what contribution have you made to resist Japan?”  As a popular entertainment venue 
the theatre inside the Y frequently hosted plays, speeches, and debates, all aimed at 
mobilizing popular support against the Japanese invasion, and featured entertainers or 
other local celebrities.  Zhang himself often gave patriotic speeches.  Agnes Smedley 
(1892-1950), the American feminist, journalist, and CCP advocate, was invited by the 
local branch to speak there.  Smedley’s involvement with the Y also reveals that the 
YMCA in Changsha became one of the first civic institutions to actively support the 
growth of the Communist Party in the city.  As a journalist Smedley spent a good part of 
the war travelling with the Eighth Route Army, the communists’ primary military outfit, 
which maintained branch offices in many of the major cities in China’s hinterland.  The 
branch office in Changsha was supervised by Xu Teli (1877-1968) and Wang Yuanbo.  
Zhu Tierong recalled very clearly that at least on one occasion Xu, the noted teacher and 
mentor of Mao Zedong and CCP activist, gave a rousing speech to a packed house at the 
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YMCA and his remarks were met with “thunderous applause.”  When Zhang Zhizhong 
became Hunan’s Governor in 1937 he ardently supported the Y’s activities in Changsha.  
Zhu Tierong worked closely with his daughter, Zhang Suwo, who frequented there.44  
 After Japanese bombing raids began on the city, the YMCA also organized an 
urban “ambulance corps,” (Jiu Hu Dui).  In mid November 1937 the eastern section of 
the city near the old Xiaowu Gate and East Train Station was bombed, injuring and 
killing many residents.  Since many of the shops and houses in the old city were 
constructed so close together and in such close proximity, even a few bombs dropped on 
such a small area could inflict enormous damage.  This coupled with the city’s narrow 
streets and alleyways, often made it difficult for rescuers to enter the affected areas.  
Segments of the local police force, often believed to be KMT “collaborators” (wei) with 
the enemy in many instances failed to respond or act appropriately.  In this regard aid 
workers from the YMCA served as a substitute.  Their facilities maintained a steady 
supply of field dressings, stretchers, and emergency lamps, which the ambulance corps 
often relied upon.45  
Following the fall of Xuzhou in Jiangsu province in May 1938, scores of 
displaced people, most commonly referred to as nanmin (literally, “people with 
difficulty”) fled from China’s northern and eastern coastal provinces into the hinterland, 
to cities such as Wuhan and Changsha, where “Most refugees had no definite destination; 
they were moving away from danger, not towards any particular place.  Many moved 
                                                
44 Zhu Tierong, “Kang zhan shi qi de Changsha ji du jiao qing nian hui,” Changsha Kang Zhan, No. 7 
(Changsha: wen shi zi liao zhuan ji, 1995), 114-121.   
45 Ibid.  
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repeatedly, never certain where they were or how long they would stay there.”46  A 
recently published study on wartime Wuhan in 1938 shows that the first six-months of 
the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945), “produced the greatest forced migration in Chinese 
history,” when some 95 million people, approximately 26 percent of the population, were 
forced from their homes.  Numbered at just over 13 million, Hunan had one of the 
highest refugee populations.47  In his study on Russian refugees during World War I, 
Peter Gatrell defines refugees as those who “have left their homes involuntarily as a 
result of war, famine, or some such calamity,” and that the condition of refugeedom 
“remained synonymous with spatial mobility and uncertainty.”48 Although the character 
of China’s refugees differed in composition from the millions in Russia in Europe who 
were forced from their homes also due to policies of racial cleansing, such as Gypsies and 
Jews, some comparison can be made in that in both cases of wartime Russia and China, 
the national governments remained powerless as how to best address the crisis.  Tsarist 
officials in Russia’s interior had no accurate information about how many refugees 
moved from province to province or town to town, and “had very little accurate 
information about the numbers, condition, and destination of refugees.”49  
 As with wartime Russia the Nationalist government donated the funds that were 
in turn used by local relief agencies such as the YMCA.  The government’s monetary 
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donation to the relief effort was facilitated through the Ministry of Finance for Rire-relief, 
and included the rationing of rice, fuel, and salt, distributed to various “refugee stations” 
established throughout Changsha.  Some of these stations were foreign missions, such as 
the Hunan Bible Institute, the Roman Catholic Mission, as well as the Yale in China 
compound north of the city.  The locations of these missions facilitated their efficient 
functioning as refugee centers following the fire.  The Catholic mission as well as the 
Yale compound were both located near each other on property just outside Changsha’s 
north gate.  With its compound located just outside the city’s eastern wall, and on the 
opposite side of the city, the Hunan Bible Institute also served as an ideal location for 
refugee relief.  Each of these missions, outside the confines of the old wall, would have 
been relatively unaffected by the fire.  At the time of the fire the second largest mission 
hospital in Changsha was the Hudson Taylor Hospital, named after the missionary James 
Hudson-Taylor.  Most of its facilities were destroyed during the fire.  Its equipment 
and staff were all moved to the Hunan Bible Institute, making both it and Hsiang-ya 
hospitals and relief shelters.  A fourth refugee center, located at the Liebenzeller 
Mission, was established not far from the gates of the south wall, making the total 
number of foreign mission-based relief centers at four, creating a kind of circumference 
around the old city of relief stations.  There was also a relief center set up at Changsha’s 
north train station, located outside the north wall and not far from the Yale and Catholic 
relief centers. Additional relief measures included special stations for burn victims, 
homes for the elderly, other types of shelters that included heat and bedding, much of 
which was donated by the “Red Swastika Society.”  Gruel kitchens and the distribution 
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of free rice tickets for feeding refugees were also established.  Some of the additional 
major financial donors to the relief effort were the International Red Cross Committee for 
Central China, who donated forty-eight thousand U.S. dollars.  The “American 
Advisory Committee” donated thirty thousand dollars.50  Soon after the fire a special 
loan committee was formed and allocated fourteen thousand dollars to “assist those who 
returned to the city and had practically lost all their possessions,” and approximately one 
thousand personal loans were given out to individuals who had lost private possessions or 
property.  Most of these were paid back in full within a year, and the aid continued in 
subsequent years.51  The 1939 to 1940 yearly report for the International Committee also 
listed the Nationalist government’s contribution to local welfare at 83,000 and a 
substantial increase in the American Advisory Committee’s contribution at 115,000.  In 
addition to providing for the material needs of refugees in wake of the fire, funding was 
also allocated for occupational needs.  Factories for soap making, spinning and weaving, 
shoe and sandal making were all constructed after the fire, in addition to three poor 
schools for destitute and refugee children.  By 1940 these facilities, the soap factory in 
particular, still functioned.52      
Although the Japanese did not capture Changsha during the fall of 1938, it as well 
as many other cities in Hunan and throughout China suffered from the onslaught of 
bombing from Japanese planes.  Following the invasion of the eastern coast in the 
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summer of 1937, bombing sorties commenced in China’s interior.  Beginning from 
November 24, 1937 to August the following year, table 9.1 summarizes the YMCA’s 
relief and rescue activities.  In the Chinese version of the table, the column titled 
“Nature of Work,” or gongzuo qingxing, provides extensive detail, but for the sake of 
space only the number of casualties and number of injured treated is shown.  In addition 
to treating the wounded and transporting them to hospitals, on August 18, 1938 teams 
from the Y gave out 2,000 loaves of steamed bread, as well as approximately100 Jintan 
mouth lozenges (ironically made in Japan), as well as hot tea.  Following the first 
recorded bombing near Changsha’s East Train Station on November 24, 1939, relief 
workers dug through the rubble of a wall near an area called Luoxin Tian Kou to help 
rescue approximately eleven trapped children from a local school.  Rescuing victims 
buried beneath rubble was a common following many of the bombings.  After a 
bombing on August 26, 1938 the principal of a vocational school was rescued beneath the 
fallen rubble by a YMCA “excavation team” (wa jue dui).  More than 100 people were 
also given temporary shelter inside the YMCA on the same day.  
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Table 9-1. YMCA Sino-Japanese War Bombing Recovery Work in Changsha53 
                                                
53 “Ben hui zai Changsha zhi jiu hu gong zuo,” Kang zhan liang nian lai zhi Changsha qing nian hui 
(Changsha zhong hua ji du jiao qing nian hui, zhong hua min guo nian ba nian shi er yue, December 1939), 
37. In Yale-China Association Records, 1900-1976, Record Unit 232, YRG 37, Series XIV, Box 195 (Yale 
University: Manuscripts and Archives).  
Date of 
Incident 
Location No. of 
YMCA 
personnel 
involved 
Nature of 
work 
Remarks 
November 24, 
1937 
Xiao Wu 
Gate, East 
Train Station 
All staff, 
secretaries, 
and workers. 
122 total. 
24 people 
treated for 
wounds. 15  
transported to 
Xiangya 
Hosp. 
Three enemy 
planes 
appeared. Many 
killed. 
February 8, 
1938 
Xinhe Train 
Station, steel 
bridge at 
airport. 
Secretaries-6 
Staff-7 
General 
workers-12 
Wartime 
service team-
48. 73 total. 
Stretcher and 
bandage 
teams 
evacuated 7 
people to 
hospital. 
8 enemy planes 
dropped bombs 
with negligible 
damage (?). 
April 8, 1938 ? and Hunan 
University 
Secretaries-6 
Staff-7 
General 
workers-18 
Wartime 
service team-
62. 93 total. 
Stretcher and 
bandage 
teams treated 
16 people. 10 
seriously 
wounded 
moved to 
Xiangya 
hospital.   
More than 20 
enemy planes, 
dropped more 
than 100(?) 
bombs. Hunan 
U. Library 
totally 
destroyed.  
July 23, 1938 Areas outside 
north and east 
gates. 
Secretaries-6 
Staff-5 
General 
workers-16 
Wartime 
service team-
68. 95 total. 
Stretcher and 
bandage 
teams treated 
25 people, 18 
transported to 
hospital.  
Nine enemy 
planes.  More 
than 100 bombs 
dropped. More 
than 300 people 
killed. 
  326 
Table 9-1 (cont.) YMCA Sino-Japanese War Bombing Recovery Work in Changsha. 
  
In the days immediately following the fire in mid November 1938 Japanese 
planes dropped propaganda leaflets in and around Changsha: “See what a rotten 
August 18, 
1938 
Tianxin Rd. 
East Train 
Station Rd. 
Jingwu Rd. 
Secretaries-7 
Staff-8 
General 
Workers-18 
Wartime 
service team-
64.  97 total. 
 
Three 
ambulance, 
stretcher 
teams sent 
out.  20 
wounded.  
20 sent to 
hospital.   
18 enemy 
planes. Over 
100 bombs 
dropped. More 
than 60 people 
killed.    
August 26, 
1938 
East, South, 
and north 
districts. 
Secretaries-7 
Staff-8 
General 
Workers-18 
Wartime 
service team-
81. 114 total.  
 
Three 
ambulance 
and stretcher 
teams. 22 
wounded. 21 
sent to 
hospital. 
Loaves of 
bread and tea 
distributed.  
18 enemy 
planes, 200 
bombs dropped. 
Approx. 700 
people killed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 27, 
1938 
Airfield at 
Guihua Yuan, 
Fushou 
Bridge, north 
of city 
Secreteries-5 
Staff-4 
General 
Workers-12 
Wartime 
service team-
43. 64 total. 
Three 
ambulances 
used, donated 
by local Bank 
of China. 
Treated 12 
people for 
injuries, 5 
taken to 
hospital.  
18 enemy 
planes, more 
than 100 bombs 
dropped, 
causing many 
to flee.  
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government you have; we will never burn you.”54  For the Japanese army successful air 
and bombing campaigns were essential to their wartime strategy in China during World 
War II.  Attacks aimed to terrorize civilian populations in cities, destroy urban 
infrastructure, and “to strike at China’s military bases so as to weaken its resistance and 
to support Japanese army ground operations.”55  Coupled with the war on the ground 
these attacks could eventually pressure the Nationalist government into a swift surrender.  
The large scale bombing of cities in China’s interior was also a direct result of the 
stalemate following the fall of Wuhan and Guangzhou in the autumn of 1938.  With 
Changsha now a pile of rubble, Chinese forces stiffened their resistance, forcing the war 
of attrition that Chiang Kai-shek began planning for after the invasion began.  
Relocating the seat of government to Chongqing also allowed further time for the 
Chinese army to strengthen its defenses, no doubt aided by the rough, mountainous 
geography of south central China.  Thus air power became more important as the war 
drew on.  The data from table 9.1 also reveals the extent to which how certain areas in 
Changsha were selected for destruction prior to the fire:  roads, bridges, and the train 
station, as well as the narrow areas surrounding the city’s gates.  In all cities the main 
targets of Japanese bombers were mainly military installations and bases, as well as the 
new capital of Chongqing.  The bombing and destruction of Hunan University in April 
1938 is further evidence of the fact that educational institutions were also targeted, not 
                                                
54 “Letter from Dr. Phillips F. Greene to Mr. Robert Ashton Smith,” The Burning of Changsha:  Nov. 13-
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only in Changsha but in cities throughout China.56  Especially following the 
introduction of the Mitsubishi A6M, or “Zero,” fighter into China’s theater of combat the 
Japanese maintained aerial dominance until American entry into the war in 1941 saw the 
bulk of Japan’s air forces concentrated in the Pacific, allowing the stalemate in China to 
continue.57 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The tragedy of the Changsha fire has been compared to the equally disastrous 
decision by Chiang Kai-shek in June 1938 to break the dykes of the Yellow River at 
Huayuankou in Henan province.  The resulting flood caused one of the first mass 
killings of World War II, drowning approximately 800,000 people.  Some 70,000 square 
kilometers of the North China Plain were consumed by floodwaters, causing an exodus of 
refugees to the west across north China.  Many refugees even remained in their place of 
flight at the war’s end in 1945.  In similar fashion, Changsha was one of the first major 
cities in the world to experience the mass destruction and carnage of global war.58  
When comparing the Changsha fire of 1938 with other events in the history of the city’s 
modernization, such as the Rice Riot of 1910, there are certain notable comparisons, 
specifically related to the reach of the state.  In both cases local leadership took part in 
orchestrating violence upon the city.  But despite its place as a provincial capital and the 
                                                
56 Lary, The Chinese People at War, 24.  
57 Mitsuru, “The Japanese Air Campaigns in China, 1937-1945,” 248. 
58 Lary, 24.  
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presence of the imperial government as a prominent fixture of urban space, the events of 
the riot in 1910 suggest that the ability of the Qing government to exert control over local 
affairs was negligible.  Urban life and governance was dominated by groups such as 
street corps, community organizations, and local gentry elites who hoarded grain such as 
Ye Dehui.  But by 1938 the new Republican government, under direct orders from their 
president, managed to burn down much of the city.  Establishing Chiang Kai-shek and 
other urban leaders as ultimately responsible for the carrying out of a scorched earth 
policy demonstrates that at least in the case of the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945) the 
wartime climate allowed for the reach of the Nationalist state to achieve destructive ends 
at the expense of Changsha’s citizens.   
It also remains difficult not to place a large degree of the blame for the destruction 
of the fire upon Chiang Kai-shek.  In making the case for the reach of the state, he in all 
respects represented and even personified Nationalist China during the war.  When it 
concerned wartime policy and major combat decisions Chiang was the state.  More 
recent scholarship on the role of the Generalissimo during World War II substantiates this 
argument.  It is well known the Chiang was an intense micromanager, often issuing 
orders not only to commanding generals in the field but to every head along the chain of 
command:  company, brigade, and platoon leaders as well.  For as much as he wanted 
to personally control and dictate the outcome of a battle or engagement, this often 
resulted in confusion and eventual mistrust.   
The practice of using “personal directives,” or shouling, has a long history among 
ruling leadership in China, dating as far back as the Qin dynasty.  Chang Jui-te has 
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argued that Chiang’s wartime management in part derives from this tradition.  For as 
much as one might consider such supervision admirable, it was chaotic for Chiang’s 
subordinates to function under such a system.  He often used personal telegrams to issue 
orders to directly to regimental commanders at the war front, often bypassing the higher 
chains of command at the division and corps levels.  One example Chang discusses 
comes from the battle of Xinkou in northern Shanxi in 1937, when the Generalissimo 
used a personal directive to bypass the orders of Yan Xishan, the Commander of the 
Second War Zone.  When troops heard conflicting orders both from Yan and Chiang, 
confusion ensued.59  Other scholars such as Wang Qisheng have also argued that 
Chiang’s intense micromanagement often reaped negative consequences for the war 
effort.  Commanders such as Xu Yongchang, and provincial governors such as Zhang 
Zhizhong both privately blamed Chiang for causing confusion during the war, that 
because unit commanders often waited to hear from him for direction, they often shied 
away from taking the initiative, resulting in inaction and tactical failure.60    
The case of the Changsha fire serves as yet another example of Chiang’s style of 
management during the war.  He personally flew to Nanyue not far from Changsha in 
the days before the fire, issuing orders to local commanders.  He later sent personal 
telegrams to Zhang Zhidong confirming the order to implement the scorched earth policy.  
Chiang even toured the city in the aftermath and made sure that local officials were held 
responsible and punished for the destruction.  Although in so doing he placed himself at 
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great personal risk, his actions before and after the fire are but one example among many 
of how his personal style of leadership was detrimental to the Nationalist’s war effort.  It 
is also worth noting the irony of Chiang’s visit to Nanyue Mountain in November 1938.  
That fall Chiang assumed the role of the very deity commemorated in a temple atop the 
mountain, of huo shen, or zhu rong, Hunan’s “fire god.”    
This chapter has also shown how the efforts of non-government agencies such as 
the YMCA to aid wartime refugees exerted their own influence over local affairs in 
Changsha.  By helping lead the urban relief effort, with a ready staff of willing and able 
volunteers, and along with the aid of local mission hospitals such as the Hsiangya and 
Hunan Bible Institute, the city became an important center for humanitarian relief in 
unoccupied China during World War II.  Even in the face of frequent bombing raids that 
began soon after the Japanese invasion, the people of Changsha remained undaunted in 
their efforts to resist and endure, with volunteers such as Zhang Yifan organizing 
propaganda activities that aroused patriotism and national pride.  Zhang and others also 
risked their lives following the bombing raids to tend to and evacuate the wounded, as 
well as rescue victims buried beneath debris.  The YMCA and International Relief 
Committees received large subsidies from the KMT, meaning that even while focusing 
on the Japanese occupation and maintaining a stable wartime economy, the state did not 
turn a complete blind eye to the plight of ordinary citizens.  Although Chiang Kai-
shek’s military and political apparatus may have failed the people of Changsha, its 
monetary contribution subsidized much of the relief effort, leaving a complicated legacy 
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of the Wenxi Fire’s impact on Changsha’s modernization both for the historian and those 
who lived through it.   
  333 
Conclusion 
At this point we can return to the original question posed in the introduction.  
Why were Changsha and Hunan province so particularly anti-western and anti-reformist, 
and how did these sentiments shape its modernization during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries?  In the case of Changsha the record shows that during the post 
Taiping years the number of temples and sacrificial altars in the city grew.  When 
combined with the conservative intellectual tradition espoused by the ruling gentry and 
by the legacy of the Taiping Rebellion upon urban life, during the 1890’s Changsha 
became a center of an intense anti-foreign xenophobia.  Zhou Han’s inflammatory 
literature incited riots throughout China.  Later the same decade, the Hundred Days of 
Reform failed in Changsha in part because of the local gentry’s domination over the 
intellectual life of the city.  In this way that 1890’s was the beginning of a period of 
ideological warfare that shaped Changsha’s modernization for the next half century.   
As conservative as they were, in their own way characters such as Zhou Han and 
Ye Dehui represented their own manifestations of Hunan nationalism during the late 
Qing.  Their version of anti-foreignism made them bedfellows of a conservative 
mentality unique to Hunan and Changsha.  Mao Zedong and other student activists who 
protested against the foreign presence in Changsha during the 1920’s represented a kind 
of realignment of this mentality.  This was a new kind of consciousness that continued 
to resist the foreign presence in the city, but one reimagined as a new form of modernity. 
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An unfortunate consequence of this was the execution of Ye Dehui in 1927, where one 
brand of local extremism was eliminated by another.    
Despite her experiences studying abroad at Yale and subsequent close 
collaboration with the foreign community in Changsha during World War II, Zhu 
Tierong also adopted a China centered, nationalist, and patriotic worldview that 
intensified after the United States entered the Korean conflict during the early 1950’s.  
She represented a new generation of activist women that continued to question the West’s 
influence in China and in global affairs.  Her experiences following the Communist 
Revolution in 1949 were unique in their own right, as was the defiant courage and 
heroism that she displayed enduring the horrors of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the 
Cultural Revolution.         
 But the fierce confrontations between tradition and modernity, or between the 
indigenous and foreign, were certainly not the dominating characteristics of urban life in 
Changsha.  According to William Rowe, Hankou during the same period “was a violent 
and contentious place.  That does not mean, however, that the local population easily 
accepted violence of a premeditated ideological sort.”1  As with other cities during the 
Republican period, there were pockets of civic activity, commerce, and philanthropy, 
clearly present activities in Changsha in places such as Huo Gong Dian, as well as in the 
propaganda work, refugee relief, and other humanitarian efforts of organizations such as 
the YMCA during World War II.  The city’s revered intellectual traditions spawned 
great minds and future leaders.  Although the reforms of 1898 may have failed in the 
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short term, they resulted in the first generation of women from Changsha being sent to 
study abroad in Japan.  Several girl’s schools were established throughout the city.  
Liberated women such as Tang Qunying became outspoken opponents of Ye Dehui’s 
control over local affairs, even defying his objection to opening a girl’s school near Huo 
Gong Dian by distributing pamphlets and other literature in support of female 
emancipation.  By the 1920’s newspapers such as the Hunan Da Gong Bao, as well as 
numerous student pamphlets and publications, such as those from the Hsiangya Medical 
College, were indicative of a growing civic consciousness that was inexorably linked to 
China’s growing national identity and role in the growing community of nation-states of 
the early twentieth century.       
 The previous writings on the 1910 riot, specifically by Joseph Esherick and 
Arthur Rosenbaum, focused on the role of Changsha’s urban gentry in hoarding grain and 
inciting the unrest.  But Liu Duping’s oral histories provide a better picture of what 
specific types of urban commoners—specifically carpenters— were involved in the riot. 
They directed their anger at both the local Qing government and the western community 
in the city.  The specificity of my own account, noting the names, occupations, and 
backgrounds of the oral history interviewees represents a kind of “people’s history” 
approach that has attempted to understand the make and mentality of Changsha’s 
subaltern working class.  Sources such as the oral histories and bamboo poems also 
suggest that to those who either witnessed or participated in the rioting, the memory of 
the event was just as meaningful than the riot itself.  The same perhaps rings true for the 
other major turbulent event in Changsha’s history, the fire of 1938.   
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 The events of 1910 also teach us something about the reach of a Qing imperial 
state literally on the eve of its collapse.  Centuries of imperial tradition had finally begun 
to outlive their effectiveness.  Specifically, “the rule of avoidance,” required local or 
provincial officials to be posted outside their place of origin.  The Qing yamen at the 
city center was a walled city within a walled city, with its occupants and most notably the 
governor himself existing in complete segregation from the rest of urban society.  
Governors such as Cen Chunming were not native to Hunan, and remained out of touch 
with the harsh realities around them—how the city also functioned as a place of refuge 
for displaced peasants from the surrounding countryside, driven from their homes by 
flood or famine.  Indeed the events of the riot suggest that local elites such as Ye Dehui 
and vice-governor Zhuang Gengliang played more prominent roles in orchestrating—and 
in Zhuang’s case even pacifying the riot.  
 I have also shown the unique character of the area of the city surrounding 
Changsha’s southern gate (“Nan Men Kou”).  In 1852 this entire area had been ground 
zero for one of the fiercest battles in the city’s history.  On the southeastern corner of the 
south wall was the Tianxin Pavilion, where a canon killed one of the Taiping army’s top 
generals, Xiao Chaogui.  Following the rebellion this canon was worshipped as a kind of 
deity.  This object and its surrounding physical space became sites associated with 
Changsha’s folk culture and tradition of resistance.  It was just a few hundred yards 
outside South Gate that the Huang family committed suicide in April 1910.  They took 
their lives in Lao Long Pond, where many peasants frequently committed suicide.  Dai 
Yishun’s granary was located just outside South Gate.  It was also at the South Gate 
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police station where the carpenter Liu Shaoming was detained by local police, and rioting 
ensued when a crowd demanded his release.  Also outside the South Gate and wall was 
Aoshan Temple, where a local magistrate was assaulted and beaten by a crowd.  Hungry 
Stomach Ridge, a collection of shanty huts where indigent peasants congregated and 
lived, was located on the slopes of Miao Gao Peak, the very same small hill from where 
the Taipings had shelled the city years before.  South Gate was also a popular gathering 
place and market for locals and travellers entering the city.    
 Changsha’s modernization was just as much if not more a byproduct of its 
regional and local conservatism as one of radical reform.  Recent scholarship by 
Stephen Platt and Liu Liyan are valuable contributions to the historiography of modern 
Hunan.  But these have focused mainly on the reform narrative, such as the roles of 
notable intellectuals Wang Fuzhi and Guo Songtao, as well as the founding of Hunan 
First Normal School.  Figures such as Ye Dehui are scarcely mentioned in either of 
these studies.  There is obviously a reason for this.  If the observations of local 
residents from Liu Duping’s oral histories are any indication, there were elements of 
Changsha’s population who utterly despised Ye Dehui.  His headquarters, the “Fire 
Palace,” was an influential part of the city’s commercial and civic life.  But despite his 
wealth and power, Ye’s nefarious reputation earned the disrespect of many, which 
explains in part why he was executed by the communists in 1927.  His bad reputation 
was also written into Changsha’s modern historiography by both Chinese and western 
historians.  In the end Ye Dehui’s brand of radical conservatism and masculinity called 
for an equally radical and violent response.  This was the unique condition of Hunan and 
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Changsha during the 1920’s, and one of the reasons it was such a space of contentious 
and turbulent politics.    
 I have also noted the consistent presence of infamous suicides in Changsha during 
the twentieth century.  The most significant early examples were the deaths by suicide 
of Chen Tianhua and Yao Hongye in 1905, whose funeral processions in Changsha 
became a public spectacle.  The riot of 1910 was inspired by the suicide of an entire 
family.  Numerous people also took their lives by jumping into some of Changsha’s 
local wells.  Following the Revolution of 1911 activists such as Peng Chao wrote blood 
letters to the governor and committed suicide by jumping into the Xiang River in protest 
of the contentious warlord politics of the time.  The gruesome suicide of Zhao Wuzhen 
in 1919 spawned similar public indignation and outrage.  It served as an exemplar to 
urban activists such as Mao Zedong of women’s subjugated status in Chinese society.   
While researching at Yale during the summer of 2014 I learned the story of Zhang 
Yifan’s suicide during the Anti-Rightist campaign in 1956, and was deeply moved.  For 
some reason the story of his death and Zhu Tierong’s subsequent hardships made me 
comprehend the gravity and horror experienced by their generation.  Her own story also 
serves as an exemple of the conflicted relationship activists and intellectuals from her 
generation maintained with the West.  Though she obviously benefited from her studies 
abroad at Yale, earning a Master’s degree in sociology, she retained a China centered 
worldview, one that still viewed the West’s involvement in China with criticism and 
suspicion, especially after the United States entered the Korean War.  Zhu’s articles in 
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the China Monthly Review also provide us with first hand information on the scale of 
modernizing reforms by the CCP in Changsha following liberation in 1949.   
 Many of the instances of crowd violence discussed in the preceding chapters did 
not originate with the state, but from the ordinary rank and file, or masses.  This was the 
case with the riots inspired by Zhou Han’s literature in the early 1890’s, as well as with 
the rioting carpenters and other urban commoners in 1910.  The anarchism espoused by 
Mao and medical students from Hsiangya Medical College was in part even directed 
towards the state, viewing the government’s capitulation to the conditions of the 
Versailles Treaty of 1919 as an act of treason.  The case studies of prostitution during 
the 1920’s and 1930’s also show that state actors, specifically local officials of the 
municipal police, actually condoned the existence of, participated in, and even benefited 
from the trade.  State sanctioned violence came in the form of orders given by Chiang 
Kai-shek to burn Changsha to the ground during World War II, fearing a possible 
occupation by the Japanese.    
 Finally, my discussion of the anti-Christian riots of the early 1890’s discussed the 
influence of Zhou Han’s published literature from the Bao Shan Charity Hall near 
Changsha’s Xiao Xi Men, or Small West Gate.  But he was by no means the sole 
proprietor and instigator of anti-Christian activity in the middle Yangtze region or 
throughout China during this period.  There were similar riots during the late 1800’s, 
such as the death of the French missionaries in Tianjin.  However, the riots of 1891 
represented “the cathartic climax of the first phase of central China’s response to the 
West.”  They were also intrinsically tied to the anti-Qing activity of secret societies such 
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as the “Elder Brother Society,” (Ge Lao Hui) as well as other “fundamentalist Confucian 
literati” in communities throughout the middle Yangtze.2   
 Rowe’s description of “fundamentalist Confucian literati,” also strikes a familiar 
chord.  Does this label remind us of anyone in particular?  It of course perfectly 
describes characters such as Ye Dehui.  One speculates as to his possible patronage of 
Zhou Han because of the Bao Shan Hall’s proximity to Pozi Street near the Small West 
Gate in the old city.  But I have also tried to show how Ye himself was a complex and 
enigmatic figure.  Despite his opposition to the Hundred Days of Reform and Liang 
Qichao’s educational endeavors in Changsha, the late 1890’s were also a period when Ye 
invested in Japanese shipping and commercial interests in the city.  Following the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, cities opened as a treaty port to Japan.  Changsha’s 
“Fire Palace,” served as his seat of Ye’s influence, where he assumed the guise of not 
only a wealthy businessman and local literati, but as perhaps the most powerful 
community leader in the city.  Controversy ensued after the attempt to rename public 
streets and other landmarks after Huang Xing, a hero of the 1911 revolution.  It 
prompted a public and even satirical response from Ye Dehui in the local press.  To his 
credit Ye did even show some remorse about the events of 1910.  In later years his death 
was viewed by Liang Qichao and even Mao Zedong as a mistake.       
 The presence of certain western institutions during the late Qing and early 
Republican years in Changsha also left complex legacies in their wake.  This leaves us 
with even more questions related to their potential contributions to the city vis-a-vis how 
                                                
2 Rowe, 276-277. 
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they were perceived by locals.  Much of my discussion has focused on the influence of 
Yale in China, and its affiliated institutions—Hsiangya Medical College and the Yale 
Hospital.  Certainly more research needs to be done on the equally significant influence 
of other institutions, especially Western business interests, such as British American 
Tobacco, Butterfield and Swire, Jardine Matheson, and others.  The American doctors 
and teachers who worked in Changsha from Yale, such as Edward Hume, Frank 
Hutchins, and others not discussed up to this point, such as Winston and Maude Pettus, 
cared for the sick and needy and saved many lives.  The notice placed by locals on the 
front gate of the Yale compound, referenced in Chapter 5, during the 1910 riot reflected 
of a nuanced relationship between Changsha and the West.  That the Yale facilities, 
(where today ironically sits a Starbucks and large shopping mall), were spared the wrath 
of rioting crowds speaks to the degree to which street associations who controlled the Xi 
Pai Lou area, also yielded their control over local affairs.    
Following the intense anti-foreignism that followed the May Fourth period of the 
early 1920’s, and the Shanghai Incident of 1925, even Yale in China was not immune to 
the growing negative attitude and perception toward westerners in Changsha.  I have 
also called attention to Edward Hume’s intense antagonism and complete distrust of 
student activism and unionized labor in Changsha during this period.  This was also 
reflective of Yale’s own institutional bias towards communism and socialism that 
emerged in the United States following the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the founding 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921.  In this way Hume did not do himself 
or Yale, any favors.  He was forced to leave the city in 1926 and never returned.   
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 Another important issue concerns the Hunan labor movement.  Despite a more 
traditional Marxist understanding of a distinct separation between town and countryside, 
the study of Changsha shows that cities in China have been defined as much by their 
relationship to the periphery—the surrounding countryside—rather than existing as 
completely separate and autonomous entities.  Works by both Schaffer (1982) and 
McDonald (1978) have discussed the relationship of Changsha’s urban activists with the 
labor movements in the surrounding countryside.  Places such as Shui Kou Shan and 
Anyuan each maintained active unionized labor groups.  In the case of the Anyuan coal 
mines the unions were more active than in Changsha.  This somewhat blurs the 
distinctions between urban and rural, town and country, which so often characterize more 
conventional interpretations of labor or rural history.  Mao and other activists journeyed 
back to the provincial capital and reported on the growing number of peasant associations 
in part to correct the perception among the urban elite that rural peasants were backward 
and illiterate.   
 How the residents of Changsha endured the fire of 1938 makes an important 
contribution to the history of the Second World War.  I have also argued that the 
historical evidence makes a compelling case for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ordering 
Changsha’s destruction as a part of his scorched earth policy.  How will introducing this 
newer narrative of Chiang’s actions during the war affect his historical legacy, especially 
at a time when many scholars have attempted to vindicate his reputation?  Only time 
will tell. 
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 Times of trouble and carnage also possess the possibility to activate the human 
potential for kindness, empathy, and humanitarian endeavor.  The patriotism and 
courage of YMCA and other volunteers who worked in Changsha during the war should 
not be forgotten, and their names and exploits should be memorialized alongside those 
who served or lost their lives.  Even prior to the fire volunteers in the city went on 
numerous trips to bombed areas to rescue those buried in debris, and to care for the 
injured and wounded.  In Changsha there was a concerted multinational effort and 
humanitarian relief fund for countless numbers of war refugees who poured into the city.  
Mission hospitals, such as Hsiangya (Yale), the Liebenzeller Missions, and the Hudson-
Taylor hospital all did their part as well.  
The narrative of this dissertation is bookended with two violent and formative 
events in the city’s modern history, when the city was sieged by the Taiping army and 
with a fire that destroyed much of Changsha and its cultural relics.  Urban life was 
turbulent for commoners, such as the carpenters who rioted in 1910 and ransacked Cen 
Chunming’s government yamen, or the beggars who lived a precarious existence on 
Hungry Stomach Ridge outside the city’s south gate.  The execution of Ye Dehui in 
1927 was an extreme response on the part of the urban masses to the legacy and influence 
of the gentry classes’ dominance over local life.  Many other gentry met the same fate.  
Urban life was also capricious and cruel for young women who worked as 
prostitutes during the 1920’s and 1930’s.  For those betrothed in marriage such as Zhao 
Wuzhen, a defiant deterrent was suicide.  According to some historians the horrors 
experienced by Zhu Tierong and others during the 1950’s and 1960’s should be 
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understood within the context of what Chinese people experienced during World War II, 
in that it conditioned its people, and perhaps more tellingly, its ruling elites, to the idea 
that violence was a necessary component of social reform and revolution (see Diana 
Lary).  Indeed, Changsha’s modern history was often the result of hostile battles 
between opposing forces.  Much of this was related to its relationship to western 
countries, and the city’s struggle to adopt conventions of western modernity.  But we 
should not ever discount the incredible capacity for Chinese people through the ages to 
chi ku, or “bear hardships.”  The ideology and language of oppressive governments and 
individuals, or even economic conditions may often provoke violence.  But language 
can also be a tool for liberation and empowerment.   
The sand of Changsha’s Orange Island was deposited there by the Xiang River 
ages ago, and like history its river always remains in motion.  River and island divides 
the city into two opposite banks, perhaps symbolic of the divisions and struggles 
Changsha has experienced throughout its history. 
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Glossary of Chinese Names and Terms 
 
Ao Shan Miao       鳌山庙 
Bai Sha Jing       白沙井 
bao jia        保甲 
bao an tuan       保安团 
Bao Qingtian       包青天 
Bi Xiang Jie       碧湘街 
Cen Chunming      岑春蓂 
Chen Tianhua       陈天华 
Changsha wen shi zi liao     长沙文史资料 
chi ku        吃苦 
Da gong bao       大公报 
Dai Yishun       戴义顺 
ke bo        刻薄  
dan jue        旦角 
dao tai        道台 
De Chang He Qian Dian     德昌和钱店 
dian dao zhi ji       颠倒之迹 
Dong Fang Za Zhi      东方杂志 
Dong Ting Hu       洞庭湖 
Fan Xi Xiang       樊西巷 
Fan Yuanquan       范远泉 
gong suo       公所 
E Du Ling       饿肚岭 
He Wenqing       何文清 
Heng Shan       衡山 
hu xiang wen hua      湖湘文化 
Huang dao men      黄道门 
Huang Guisun       黄桂荪 
hui guan       会馆 
Huo Gong Dian      火公殿 
hui yi        回忆 
ji yi        记忆 
ji yuan        妓院 
jiao an        教案 
jin shi        进士 
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Kang Guihe       康桂和 
Kong Qianjiao       孔宪教 
kou shu li shi        口述历史 
Lai Chengyu       赖承裕 
Lao Long Tan       老龙潭 
Ling Shaomei       凌少梅 
Liu Daoyi       刘道一 
Liu Duping       刘笃平 
Liu Shaoming       刘少明 
Liu Yongfu       刘永福 
Mao Zedong       毛泽东 
man        蛮 
Mi Luo Jiang       汨罗江 
Miao Quansun       缪荃孙 
Nan Men Kou       南门口 
Po Zi Jie       坡子街 
qian gu wei you      千古未有 
qiangmi       抢米 
Qu Yuan       屈原 
Rui Zheng       瑞澄 
Shan Hua Xian      善化县 
Shen bao       申报 
shi ren jiu guo tuan      十人救国团 
Tan Chunsheng      谭春生 
Tan Sitong       谭嗣同 
Tang Caichang      唐才常 
tian zhu       天主 
Tong Meng Hui      同盟会  
tong xiang hui       同乡会 
tuan zong       团总 
Wang Xianqian      王先谦    
wei        伪 
xin zheng       新政 
Xiong Xiling       熊希龄 
ya men        衙门 
Yang Gong       杨巩 
Yao Hongyue       姚洪業 
Ye Dehui       叶德辉 
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Yi Rengai       易仁荄 
you gu bu shou      有谷不售 
Yue Lu Shan       岳麓山 
Yu Changchun      余长春 
Yu Zhimo       余之谟 
yuan hun       冤魂 
yuan men       辕门 
Zhan Bingsheng      湛炳生 
Zhao Wuzhen       赵五贞 
zhan piao       栈票 
zhen cai zhu, jia ke ren     真财主，假客人 
Zhang Liansheng      张连生 
Zhang Yifan       张以藩 
Zhang Zhidong      张之洞 
zhi nian       之年 
Zhou Han       周汉 
zhu        猪 
Zhu Rong       祝融 
Zhu Tierong       朱铁荣 
Zhuang Gengliang      庄赓良 
zi liao        资料 
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